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J36TRACT 
In this thesis an investigation is conducted into the justification 
for various aspects of the teacher's role in schools, being concerned in 
particular to find out whether certain aspects are in some way necessary 
for the role as a justifiable one in a justifiable institution. That 
thesis is, itself, an instantiation of a further thesis concerned with 
the prescriptive implications of philosophy of education, which is 
discussed in the first section. 
The second section discusses what it is to be teaching someone 
something, raising objections to the current orthodox analysis of the 
concept of teaching, which is argued to be inadequate to account for 
our current understanding of it. Various terms of art are considered 
and found unsatisfactory, and a new schema for analysing teaching is 
introduced. An alternative analysis which does not embody certain 
important assumptions of the orthodox analysis is presented. Objections 
to it are considered. 
The third section examines the concept of role, using as its 
basis an analysis presented by R.S. Downie. This analysis is considered 
to be too crude for the investigation of this thesis, and an alternative 
analysis is again developed for application here. Some of the problems 
of role concepts are discussed in relation to the social sciences. 
The fourth section applies the above analyses to a consideration 
of the teacher's role in respect of the following aspects: (a) the 
teaching of understanding, beliefs and skills (including the specifying 
of low-level objectives) (b) the teaching of values (c) assessment 
and evaluation (d) authority in the sphere of knowledge and, briefly, 
the personal/impersonal dimension of the teacher-pupil relationship. 
Particular attention is given to the psychological concept of interest. 
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The final section collects together the prescriptive 
implications of the work of sections II - IV, for teachers 
themselves and for those who are concerned to provide the con-
ditions under which teachers are expected to fulfil their 
roles. 
References are numbered consecutively for each section 
and bound in at the end of each. 
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is in major part a consideration from a philosophical 
point of view of some aspects of the role of the teacher in a school. 
The aspects chosen are ones which have, at different tines and by 
different people, been suggested as ones which should be eliminated 
from the role - or, to use the currently fashionable jargon, are 
"negotiable". These include the teaching of propositional knowledge 
(e.g. by those who claim that since knowledge is now so quickly 
obsolescent, children should simply 'learn how to learn'), the planning 
of low-level objectives (e.g. by those who propose widespread use of 
enquiry, as opposed to discovery, methods), the teaching of values 
(e.g. by those who claim that schools ought not to 'impose middle-class 
values' on children), the assessment aspect (e.g. by those who hold 
that the criteria must ultimately be arbitrary) and the authority aspect 
(e.g. by those who fear indoctrination). The investigation will seek 
to establish whether these aspects are necessarily or merely contingently 
associated with the role. Particular attention is paid to the psychological 
concept of interest, both because of its relationship with the value of 
what it learned and because it can be clearly demonstrated that the 
teaching of interest is an instance of the teaching of values which 
cannot involve imposition. 
This detailed working out is an instantiation of a wider thesis 
regarding the prescriptive implications of much philosophical work, 
which is set out and discussed in Section I. 
The other main centre of interest of this thesis is the development 
of an analytic scheme of what I have called "perficience" verbs and an 
explanation of their logic. This constitutes Section II of this thesis, 
which concludes by offering a new analysis of teaching which not only 
serves as a foundation for the work described above but is also offered 
in its own right as a valid analysis, to be preferred to the current 
orthodox one as a way of understanding teaching. 
section III is devoted to an analysis and discussion of concepts 
of role, as a further basis to Section IV, which contains the work 
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discussed in the first paragraph above, and Section V spells out 
the prescriptive implications of the justificatory work of sections 
II - IV. 
SECTION I  
Philosophy of Education and the Status of this Thesis  
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CHAPTER 1: On the Nature of Philosophy of Education and its Practice 
in Colleges and Departments of Education 
Philosophy used to be thought of as providing a comprehensive 
understanding of the universe, and philosophers as constructing 
metaphysical and ethical systems and thus prescribing the Good Life 
for Man. Now philosophy is more modest, and is generally no longer 
understood in this way. The view of philosophy as a second-order 
activity (the 'under-labourer' view) has been applied to Philosophy 
of Education by O'Connor1, who suggests that Philosophy of Education 
has no problems of its own but consists simply of those aspects of 
philosophy which are of particular concern to students of education. 
Hirst and Peters stress the importance of the use of these 
'under-labourer' methods to solve important practical or theoretical 
questions. Theywrite2, "To do conceptual analysis, unless something 
depends on getting clearer about the structure underlying how we 
speak, may be a fascinating pastime, but it is not philosophy." 
However, Wittgenstein3  wrote of philosophy as he conceived of 
it that it left everything as it was (though the changes in his own 
thinking and of people's conception of philosophy which resulted 
from his philosophizing might be adduced as evidence for rejecting 
the claim). But if what he said is true of philosophy now, and if 
Philosophy of Education is being properly philosophical, then it, 
too, must leave everything as it is. 
This is not regarded as being an objection to philosophy by 
some of those who believe it to be true of philosophy as it is 
conceived of now. For example, A.J. Ayer, when asked about this by 
Brian Magee in a radio interview said that he did not regard it as 
an objection to philosophy because, as he put it in his incisive way, 
"that's where things are".4 But many would clearly regard it as an 
objection to philosophy, for this way of understanding philosophy, 
including the Philosophy of Education, makes it essentially and 
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necessarily conservative. This is important to those who teach the 
Philosophy of Education to intending teachers, for it may mean that 
some of them are unwilling to give this activity their serious attention. 
To those who feel that philosophy of education, Oeen, as Ayer put its, 
as having as its point clarification, elucidation and justification, is 
important there are grounds for concern if students are unwilling to 
consider it seriously. 
I believe, however, that Ayer is wrong in agreeing with 
Wittgenstein that philosophy, conceived of in this way, necessarily 
leaves everything as it is. This does not seem to be merely an 
empirical point, but rather a point based on beliefs about the nature 
of philosophy (and, a fortiori, philosophy of education). In this 
Chapter I shall argue that it is not the case that philosophy of 
education necessarily leaves everything as it is (and thus to claim that 
it is not necessarily conservative), that much work in philosophy of 
education has direct prescriptive implications for practice (though 
not all of the same kind) and that, rather than constituting an 
objection to philosophy of education, this constitutes the main 
justification for including philosophizing about education and school 
practices as part of the professional training of teachers. This 
thesis itself, as a consideration of justifications, is seen as 
having prescriptive implications, so that though a case is argued 
for the above claims in this chapter, their instantiation and 
illustration in this thesis is also offered as grounds for their 
acceptance. 
The main point to be made here is that if an activity which 
investigated social practices was necessarily conservative, there 
would be a sense in which its enquiries would be spurious. This 
chapter thus seeks to defend philosophy of education against charges 
such as that of Adelstein, who has attacked philosophy and the 
method of conceptual analysis as being necessarily conservative. 
He writes6, It defends only the status quo, because it takes the 
status quo as its starting point." Though he uses Gellner's book, 
"Words and Things"7 in support, he does not appear to know of 
Gellner's own speculation6 that the society of Moroccan Berbers could 
be undermined by subjecting one of its concepts, baraka, to the 
techniques of analysis developed by kyle and Austin. 
I am not here concerned to discuss whether or not conceptual 
analysis could undermine our educational system, but only to indicate 
some of the ways in which it need not leave everything as it is, even 
though it takes the status quo as its starting point. A major part 
of this thesis is concerned with analysis of the concepts of teaching 
and role, and the prescriptive implications which, I shall suggest, 
necessarily derive from an acceptance of these analyses, coupled with 
a formal belief about what justifies schools, do not support the status 
q uo in any simple way. 
Contextual implications for practice  
I start this discussion by using as an example the work of 
P.S. Wilson9. Wilson makes it clear that what he is doing is conducting 
a serious investigation into the meanings of educational language. In 
a footnote to his paper "Interests and Educational Values"10, he 
explicitly disclaims any intention of engaging in educational evaluation, 
adding "let alone a proselytizing or missionary venture on behalf of 
any particular brand of educational activity". There is no suggestion 
here that he, or any other writer, intends to prescribe for others what 
they should do, in that the search for prescriptions was the reason 
he engaged in his enquiry (though, of course, some writers may in fact 
have such reasons). 
However, in my view the reader of "Interest and Discipline in 
-Education"11 may be forgiven if he finishes reading it with the feeling 
he has been given prescriptions for what is worth doing. What the 
teacher ought to do is help children learn through interest, for 
education is the development of interests, and children ought to be 
educated and not merely 'schooled'. So the question which this work 
has raised in my mind is whether Wilson, in claiming that a child— 
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centred view of what education is is justified (e.g. because of its 
usefulness in picking out a distinction with 'schooling' which is of 
importance) is implicitly prescribing what ought to be done, whether 
he intends this or not. Though there is clearly a difference between 
justifying and prescribing - one can prescribe without justifying -
to justify something is implicitly to prescribe it, ceteris paribus. 
If this is the case, then questions can be raised about the suggestion 
that philosophy must leave everything as it is, for it is accepted that 
justifying (or showing that there is no justification for) something 
is a philosophical activity. 
flow it may be true that all Wilson is saying is that if a 
teacher is not helping children to learn what they value for reasons 
which are intrinsically instrumental to their own learning goals (i.e. 
interest), then it is not appropriate to describe him as educating 
them. That is, as Peters says12 of his own analysis of education in 
"Ethics and Education", what he is doing is laying out criteria by 
virtue of which what people do in schools (and elsewhere) may be 
assessed as educational or not educational. So, it might be suggested, 
I am quite mistaken to regard this analysis as in any way prescriptive, 
a claim that this is what a teacher or educator ought to do. It is 
rather that this is what he must (logically) do if he is to be educating 
in the sense in which child-centred theorists use the term. 
So, according to this argument, what is being justified is the 
analysis. Wilson is giving us reasons for believing that this is what 
educating is. If the reader accepts that educating, in this sense, is 
what he ought to do, then he is prescribing for himself. It is not 
Wilson who is being prescriptive. Or, at the most, he is prescribing 
language use, not prescribing what ought to be done. 
Such an argument, however, leaves out the central and important 
connection between a person's concepts and his actions, as already 
discussed, in different contexts, by Pring13 and Hirst14. Given that 
a person accepts that he ought to be educating, or that he ought to 
be teaching, or that he ought not to be indoctrinating, then the 
understanding he has of each of these concepts affects his actions 
'in its name' (as Hirst put it). I shall use the term 'contextual 
implication' to refer to the implications of an analysis offered and 
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accepted in a context (in this case, teacher training and education) 
where there are both normative beliefs involved in the concept and 
commitment to action. Thus a person writing for students in Colleges 
and Departments of Education should know that students who accept the 
analysis (e.g. of educating) and believe that educating is what they 
ought to be doing, will conclude that what is delineated by the analysis 
is what they ought to be doing. 
Thus if there are, so to speak, competing concepts of education, 
Wilson or Peters, by convincing such people of the validity of their 
analysis ("I have shown that this is what we really mean when we use 
the term 'education'") significantly alter their conception of what 
they should do. In this way, the analysis of key educational terms 
may not leave everything as it was. 
It might be suggested that, even if true, this is no more than 
an empirical claim. It is clearly not necessarily the case that any 
change in practice will take place as a result of conceptual analysis. 
For, as Hirst and Peters have pointed out in respect of their own 
analysis of education15, it could always be argued that if this is 
what education is, then it ought not to get very high priority in schools. 
My claim, however, is that within the 'form of life' which is our 
institutionalized school system, there is the assumption that education 
is what the schools are primarily for. Given that conceptual analysis 
is being practised in this context, the prescriptive implications 
arise not only from the normative assumptions about educating (or teaching 
or indoctrinating) which prevail in the context within which the 
analysing is done but also from the nature of conceptual analysis. 
This is because the relationship between thought and action is not 
merely a contingent one. It is my belief that this claim holds for 
much work in social philosophy and in ethics16  . 
It is interesting that in a recent book Barrow accepts the 
normative aspect of the concept of education as over-riding17 and 
suggests that the descriptive aspect be adjusted to fit this whilst 
at the same time accepting the descriptive analysis of indoctrination 
and suggesting that it is not wrong18 As he indicates, claims 
about what ought to be done are often made implicitly through the 
normative component of a concept. But the prescriptions involved 
are not thereby justified, as Barrow realizes (and indicates by 
additionally explaining why he believes indoctrination to be justifiable). 
Convincing people that teaching involves "displaying the underlying 
rationale of the subject matter"19 might make a great difference to 
what actually did go on in schools, even though the analysis is not 
descriptive. But displaying the underlying rationale is justifiably 
demanded or not independently of whether it is called 'teaching'. 
So though it is the case that conceptual analysis may not leave 
everything as it is, conceptual analysis cannot by itself justify 
people's changing what they do. Except for a person who takes an 
extreme position on the fact/value issue, on any analysis of an activity 
X or social practice Y it is always appropriate to ask "But ought it 
to be done?" and seek a rational justification for engaging or refusing 
to engage in it. To analyse a concept which denotes a social practice 
is not to offer a justification for the social practice which it 
denotes. Therefore, Peters, for example, has gone on20 to consider 
the justification for education in the sense which interests him. 
Logical implications for practice. 
I have suggested above that conceptual analysis and the justification 
of social practices are different philosophical activities. But of 
course there is a relationship between them, for, on this view, the 
former delineates what it is that is being justified. Alternatively, 
an attempt may be made to explicate the conditions under which a given 
social practice (as delineated by analysis) is justifiable. This 
distinction between analysis and justification is of importance because 
of the difference between what people (logically) must do qua X and what 
they ought to do. It is fallacious to argue that certain things or 
kinds of things are what a person ought (morally) to do because he has 
taken a role as an X (e.g. torturer) because this is what, in this 
case, torturing is. Rather we might wish'to argue that if this is 
what torturing is, the social role of a torturer is an unjustifiable 
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one. Any assumption, as, for example,Scheffler and Hirst both seem to 
me to make, that one can get from an analysis of teaching alone an 
understanding of what a teacher's obligations are, is fallacious. It 
rests on unstated premises that the social role of teacher is a 
justifiable one and is associated with an obligation to teach in that 
sense rather than an obligation to teach in some other sense. 
I suggest that the claim that an adequate justification has been 
offered for a social practice (clearly delineated by analysis) or for 
aspects of a social role, implies the claim that, ceteris paribus, 
those practices should be engaged in. For there would be a contradiction 
involved in suggesting that a practice had been adequately justified as 
worth engaging in but that no-one ought to do so. Similarly, a claim 
that a practice is unjustifiable clearly implies that it should not be 
engaged in. There would be a contradiction involved in claiming to 
have shown (as for example Dearden21 has in respect of competition in 
school work, and Bailey has in respect of compelling children to 
participate in competitive games) that the practice is unjustifiable 
but that it is permissible to continue promoting it. 
Here, however, the implications are of a different logical order 
from the prescriptive implications of analysis in a context closely 
tied to normative practice. These are instances of logical implication. 
If one accepts the premises and the arguments, then, if one is rational, 
one must accept the conclusions, including the prescriptive implications. 
In the previous kind of case, it is not irrational to deny the normative 
claim (and thereby reject the prescription), as Barrow has done for 
indoctrination. 
This argument must not be taken as suggesting that all work 
involving consideration of the justification of social practices 
necessarily has prescriptive implications, for a philosopher may simply 
lay out the arguments and draw no conclusions whatever. The prescriptive 
implications, on this account, are derived from the formulation of 
judgments and conclusions. As long as it is considered to be part of 
philosophy to draw conclusions of this type (and, indeed, it might be 
argued that to fail to draw a conclusion at all is to fail to complete 
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one's philosophical investigation), then, on my argument, such 
philosophical work is necessarily prescriptive in the particular 
sense which does not imply that it was the intention with which 
the philosopher undertook the work to prescribe. It is to say that 
it is part of the nature of the philosophical activity of 
investigating the justifications for social practices that it 
has prescriptive implications. Thus it is not the case that to 
say of a philosopher that he is being prescriptive in this sense is 
somehow to have a complaint against him, as some people seem to 
suppose, and as might be suggested in some cases of prescribing via 
contextual implication. And, of course, it is not to suggest that 
only "professional" philosophers can or should do this. It is 
rather to claim that when a person engages in an attempt to justify 
a social practice, he is engaged in a philosophical activity. 
I have already pointed out that conceptual analysis is not 
necessarily conservative, for, as Gellner made clear23, analysis may 
show that the concept embodies some inherent contradictions; or, 
by virtue of the examples of usage he chooses, a philosopher may offer 
a programmatic analysis which he believed to be and which was accepted 
as reportative, and which itself brings about change in language usage 
and thus in social practice. The philosophical activity of examining 
justifications for social practices is also not necessarily conservative. 
For philosophical work may justify, and thus, on this account, implicitly 
prescribe, either the maintenance of the status quo (by claiming that 
social practices which are widely engaged in are not justifiable, or 
that social practices which are not widely engaged in are more justifiable 
than practices which are engaged in). 
So philosophy of education itself is neither essentially and 
necessarily conservative, nor essentially and necessarily radical 
nor essentially and necessarily liberal, nor anything else. This is, 
however, not to say that particular philosophical writings are neutral. 
Philosophy is neutral only in the sense that, as an activity, it has 
no bias. Any individual piece of work in philosophy which draws a 
conclusion about the justifiability of social practices is not neutral. 
asewhere24 I discuss other ways in which philosophy of education 
may have prescriptive implications. Here I have concentrated on 
discussing the justification of social practices and the relationship 
with analysis, since this is what is being instantiated in the rest 
of the thesis. 
Philosophy of education and professional training for teachers  
It must be wondered whether the view that much philosophical 
work has prescriptive implications for practice involves a radical 
change in one's conception of philosophy of education. For philosophy 
is conceived of as seeking knowledge and understanding (theoretical 
knowledge) and the view put forward here is that it issues often in 
practical judgments. 	 It is still a matter of philosophical controversy, 
after all, as to whether prescriptions can be true or false, so that 
this may seem, at first sight, a strange conception of philosophy. 
But I am not suggesting that philosophy of education can appropriately 
be conceived of as a search for prescriptions, for it still seems more 
appropriately conceived of as a search for knowledge and understanding. 
It can be practiced by those who have a serious concern for truth, or 
those who are interested in the philosophical problems arising in 
educational discourse even if they are not interested in problems of 
practice, or by those who would not presume to prescribe for others. 
I do suggest, however, that philosophers should be aware of the 
prescriptive implications of some of their work, particularly if they 
publish it in the context of teacher training and education. 
To make the point, then, in another way, it is not that philosophy 
of education is a search for prescriptions. It is rather that to 
understand that something is justifiable (theoretical knowledge) is 
to understand both that it ought (ceteris paribus) to be done and why 
it ought to be done. Given the nature of the philosophical enterprise 
of justification in areas to do with social practices, prescriptive 
implications are unavoidable. 
Must the philosopher of education, then, justify prescribing in 
this (non-intended) way? I suggest that it is inappropriate to ask for 
justifications of what is unavoidable. Rather, philosophers should 
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acknowledge openly what they are (necessarily) doing, not claim a 
neutrality of value where no such neutrality is possible. 
If the above account of philosophy of education is accepted and 
the prescriptive implications of any investigation of justifications 
which draws conclusions are seen to be necessary, then this thesis 
itself, as an examination of justifications, will unavoidably have, as 
part of its conclusions, prescriptions about what, ceteris paribus, 
teachers ought to do, about what members of society can justifiably 
expect teachers to do (i.e. what they ought and ought not to expect 
of teachers) and about characteristics which teachers need to have 
(who we ought to choose as our teachers) etc. I argue that if there 
is any justification for students in colleges and Departments of 
Education to study philosophy of education as part of a professional  
training, it is because of the prescriptive implications of this 
kind. 
Of course, philosophizing about education could be justified 
as worth doing for its interest and/or for its educational value. I 
have no wish to deny that reflective consideration (philosophy itself) 
as a search for understanding is worth doing for its own sake. But I 
do not think this would be adequate for suggesting that philosophy, 
including philosophy of education, should have any special status or 
even be a compulSory part of the curriculum in a professional training. 
For, given that there may be many kinds of intellectual enquiry which 
provide interest and educational value, why should philosophy of 
education be put forward as having any special claims? 
The traditional answer to this is that it is not right for 
anyone to go into the schools to work without having seriously and 
critically reflected on the professional activities in which he is 
going to be engaged. But if we ask why this is important, the only 
answer that could have any force is that philosophizing has practical 
implications; for if there were no practical implications for what a 
person was going to do as a teacher in school, what would be the virtue 
in his having seriously reflected? If his reflections could make no 
difference to what he was going to do, why would the fact that he was 
going into the schools to work constitute a reason for doing or not 
doing any philosophizing' This is why it seems to me that the prescriptive 
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implications of philosophy of education ought to be made clear, for anyone 
who believes that philosophy must leave everything as it is can see no 
practical point in doing it. And professional training is essentially 
practical. 
The conclusion to which I have come is that student teachers and 
teachers ought to engage in philosophizing about education because of  
its prescriptive implications for the practice of their professional 
role. That is, the prescriptive implications of much work in philosophy 
of education constitute, on my view, the main justification for 
including it in a course of professional training. It is to be 
imagined that there will be immediate objections "But who are these 
philosophers, that they should set themselves up as being in some 
special position to tell us what to dot" And there may be objections 
about reactionary philosophers 'imposing' reactionary views, or 
liberal philosophers 'imposing' liberal views, and perhaps even of 
radical philosophers 'imposing' radical views (though this last is 
perhaps not so likely as this role seems to have been given to the 
sociologists). 
But of course nothing has been said about anyone 'imposing' 
anything. Philosophers must put foward their views and the conclusions 
they have come to with intellectual honesty. students must then look 
at the arguments and judge them for themselves. Indeed, given that it 
is possible that one philosopher will claim that social practice X 
is justifiable and another that it is unjustifiable, there is no 
choice but that they decide whether or not they think they ought to 
engage in it by evaluating the arguments for themselves. It is only 
by philosophizing for themselves that they can decide which prescriptions 
to accept and act on. 
This is, of course, not a new point. Barrow25 has suggested 
that 'liberal philosophers of education' would be pleased if students 
disagreed with views (e.g. on the value of autonomy) put forward in 
articles and textbooks, because this would mean that more students 
were doing philosophy. But if this is to be more than empire-building, 
it must be admitted that the value of philosophy of education as part 
of a professional training cannot lie in our future teachers becoming 
clearer about how key educational words are used, or whether the 
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'liberal philosophers' are right to value autonomy. The value must lie 
in its relationship with the students' own values and actions, and in 
what they come to believe it is justifiable for them to do as teachers. 
At a time when many sociologists present their ideas on the 
way in which roles are "negotiated" as the teacher and pupils each try 
"to make their own definition of the situation prevail"26, it seems 
important to consider arguments which suggest that there are limits 
to the ways in which the role of the teacher can justifiably be 'redefined'. 
So, on my own account, in claiming that certain aspects of the teacher's 
role are conceptually demanded and cannot be abandoned by anyone with 
a certain understanding of teaching and certain assumptions about what 
justifies A's teaching B X, I must recognize that I am prescribing for 
teachers some of the limits within which they must rationally see their 
role if they share these premises. There is, however, no suggestion 
that these be accepted in any simple-minded fashion. Their validity 
rests on the validity of the arguments which I present here, and which 
teachers must assess for themselves. 
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INTRODUCTION TO SECTION II 
Teaching, we are told1, is an activity. This is the explicitly 
stated premise from which an influential recent analysis of the concept 
of teaching has started. The current orthodoxy is that teaching, in 
central cases, implies intention on the part of the person of whom 
teaching is to be attributed, but does not imply that anyone learns 
anything. 
This section of the thesis defends the now unfashionable view that 
teaching, in the central sense, implies learning on the part of the person 
being taught, claiming that other senses are necessarily derived from 
this one. 
In Chapter 2 I consider a range of objections to the standard 
analysis, objections which seem sufficiently powerful to call for a 
new analysis. In Chapter 3 I examine in detail the philosophical 
terms of art which have been, or might be, considered appropriate for 
discussing teaching (and learning), bearing in mind Austin's 
injunction2  about keeping the distinction between what a person is 
doing and what he is trying to do, as well as the further distinction 
between the Z a person is bringing about in doing X and what he is 
doing (Y-ing) in bringing Z about. As a result of these discussions, 
I conclude that new terms of art are required for understanding a 
certain kind of concepts (of a transactional nature between personsl 
including teaching. 
In this Chapter I develop the idea of a "perlocutionary-type" 
verb which I call a perficience, and give an account of the logic of 
such terms in our language. I use this concept to suggest an 
alternative analysis of teaching, presented in Chapter 4, and argue 
that all other concepts of teaching presuppose an understanding of 
the sense I call the 'outcome' sense. I shall later also argue that 
this is the sense which is most important in schools. There is a 
section on trying. 
It must be emphasized that the work of this section is concerned 
with the concept of teaching, and I have tried at this stage to keep 
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this separate from considerations about teachers in schools, though 
this has not been entirely possible because of necessary reference 
to published work. I shall argue later that it is a logical point 
that teaching institutions could not be set up and understood, and 
teachers appointed, without an understanding of the 'outcome' sense. 
Therefore current conceptions of the role of the teacher cannot be the 
basis of an analysis of teaching. It is rather that any satisfactory 
analysis of teaching must be capable of appropriate application in 
schools. 
It is my belief that considerations about what teachers ought 
(logically an morally) to do are introduced through the concept of role 
and through consideration of what it is justifiable to teach. Since 
it is admitted that not everything teachers do in their role capacity 
is teaching anyone anything (in any sense) we must find independent 
criteria, as Scheffler has suggested3, for picking out instances where 
a teacher is teaching his pupils something. 
The following grounds are given for attaching importance to this 
new analysis in its own right, aside from its place as a foundation of 
this thesis: 
(i) It is claimed that this analysis is the one which is demanded by 
the logical relationship between an attempt and its goal. If this is 
so, it would be expected to give a better account of current usage 
than the 'activity' analysis, which is shown here to embody internal 
contradictions. 
(ii) It is important that this analysis enables us, as the 'activity' 
analysis does not, seriously to discuss the merits of genuinely open-
ended or 'enquiry' (as opposed to 'discovery') teaching, which, by 
definition, involves pupils learning Xs which are not intended. Those 
who support this must reject one of the assumptions implicit in the 
'activity' analysis, that to teach an X a person must intend his pupils 
to learn that X, for with this assumption open-ended teaching is 
either logically impossible and the use of the term confused, or can 
only be said to be 'teaching' on some weakened use of the term. 
(iii) It is important that any analysis should leave us with language 
for discussing that relationship between teachers' acts and pupils' 
learning which has led "deschoolers" and others to talk of the "hidden 
curriculum" of schools, through which dispositions and values are 
- 26 - 
taught; and should accommodate such serious models of teaching as 
the Buber or 'dialogue' model suggested by Scudder4. The 'activity' 
analysis is inadequate for doing these things. 
(iv) It is suggest that a well-supported alternative to the orthodox 
analysis (or at least well-formulated objections to it) should be 
available for consideration by College of Education students. This 
is in relation to the points made about the contextual implications 
of analysis in Chapter 1. 
In developing the concept of a perfience verb as an analytic 
tool, I shall be employing a distinction between what I shall call a 
contingent consequence of an act and a logical consequence of an  
outcome. This distinction, and the concept of a perficience itself, 
I believe to be of wider application than this thesis alone. If this 
is so, then this section, besides being important as a foundation for 
this work on the role of the teacher, may be seen as work which, if 
valid, should have wider applications within the philosophy of action. 
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CHAPTER 2: A Critical Review of some of the Previous iinalyses of Teaching 
Introduction 
The literature on the concept of teaching is now so extensive that 
it would be impossible to review it quickly in one chapter of a thesis. 
However, some of the discussions are more relevant to the problem being 
considered here than others. No examination is made, therefore, of the 
distinctive differences between the views of B.O. Smith5 and I. Scheffler6, 
but the work of P.H. Hirst7 is discussed in detail. 
The assumption made here is that whatever can be learned could be 
taught. (This must not be taken as suggesting that whatever is learned 
must be taught.) I see no reason to believe that we car► decide a priori  
that certain things which can be learned cannot be taught. The claim 
is, however, formal in this respect. It is open to the results of 
further investigations of what is learned, as distinguished from what 
is innate or acquired in ways other than by learning. No analysis of 
learning is presented here, but many questions concerning learning are 
discussed in relation to Hirst's work on teaching and Kenny's activity/ 
performance distinction8. Since there is agreement here with the general 
position that the concept of teaching is parasitic on the concept of 
learning, if enquiries on the nature of learning suggest important 
modifications in our understanding of it, the formal analysis of teaching 
given would necessarily accommodate itself to them. 
Whether we can decide a priori what can be taught is controversial. 
For example, Powell9 suggests that we cannot teach people to be witty, 
but Ryle10 argues that a sense of humour is an educable thing. Powell's 
argument is that a sense of humour cannot be taught because it is, 
strictly speaking, not an activity, far less a rule-governed one, the 
success of which can be guaranteed by following a formula. 
There seems to be no reason for believing that only those things 
which are fully rule-governed can be taught, for, as Oakeshott suggests 
judgment and 'practical knowledge' are taught by imparting, nor that if 
success cannot be guaranteed, no teaching is possible. Indeed, if this 
were the case, then no teaching at all would be possible and nothing 
- 28 - 
could be taught, since success can never be guaranteed in a contingent 
world. 
Powell's view seems to be, in part, shared by Pincoffs12, who, 
looking at the conditions in which people might fail in their activities, 
classifies teleological activities as "people-dependent" and "world-
dependent", suggesting that whether or not activities can be taught is 
a matter of how dependent they are. 
The onus seems to be on those who claim that certain things can be 
learned but not taught to tell us why. We cannot guarantee virtue, vice 
or wit, but this is not relevant. We cannot guarantee that a language-
speaker will not make an occasional slip of the tongue, but this is not 
to say that he hasn't learned to speak the language or that he could not 
have been taught it. What I have learned to do, I am usually able to 
do, and, as Ryle suggests, being original in any sphere, being witty or 
being virtuous are not things a new-born baby can do or be. Insofar as 
they must be learned, it is assumed here to be the case that they may 
be taught, though this is not to say that we are entirely knowledgeable 
about how we teach these things. There are many things we do - and our 
teaching may well often be like this - that we do without knowing how 
we do them. If this were not so, we would have nothing to discover by 
observation about how it may be done. 
Teaching and Learning: 
In 1933 John Dewey13 suggested that teaching can be compared to 
selling commodities. No-one, he said, can sell unless someone buys. 
Thus he argued that there must be some exact equation between teaching 
and learning. Following Dewey, William Kilpatrick equally argued 
that unless the child (sic) learned, the teacher had not taught, 
This assertion appears to have been accepted for over twenty years, 
in spite of the many ways in which teaching is clearly unlike selling. 
Of philosophical importance is that it is a conceptual truth that no-one 
can buy unless someone else sells to him. However, there seem to be no 
grounds for a parallel claim that no-one can learn unless someone 
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teaches him. (If this were so, no new knowledge could, on some accounts, 
be created.) This is because whereas selling and buying can only be 
understood in terms of one another, teaching is conceptually parasitic 
on learning. The implication is one way only. We need to understand 
what learning is before we could understand what teaching is, but an 
understanding of teaching is not required for an understanding of. 
learning. To say this is to disagree with the implications of Smith's 
claim15 that a learner can be defined as one who is receiving instruction, 
(i.e. that learning is receiving instruction). We rather understand 
learning in the way suggested by Hirst16, as coming to a new state -
coming to believe P, know Q, understand R, appreciate S, or acquiring 
new skills, capacities etc., and a learner primarily as one who is 
doing this. 
In 1954 ;3roudy argued against Dewey's analogy, but on different 
grounds from those I have suggested above. He says, "Many educators 
glibly pronounce the dictum 'If there is no learning, there is no 
teaching.' This is a way of speaking because no educator (sic) 
really believes it is true, or if he did he would in all honesty 
refuse to take most of his salary 	  To teach is deliberately 
to try to promote certain learnings. When other factors intrude to 
prevent such learning, the teaching fails 	  As long as the effort  
was there, there was teaching."17 (my italics) 	  
Two points may be made about this. Firstly, 3roudy speaks of 
"the effort". This, of course, is misleading. In practice people 
can put more or less effort into their attempts. We speak, with 
justification, of people, including ourselves, as "trying hard", "not 
making much effort", "putting more into it than they/I used to", 
etc. 3roudy presumably does not want to suggest that there are 
quantitative differences in teaching to match the differences in 
effort, since he wishes to say that either teaching is going on or 
it is not. But if the grounds of his claim are something to do with 
people being entitled to claim their pay, it would be at least 
controversial as to how much effort a person must make before we are 
willing to say he is teaching. At the very least, the issue is more 
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complex than Broudy accepts, for the responsibilities of an 
institutionalized role are not decided by analysis. 
Secondly, this way of putting the point suggest that Broudy 
is arguing against the suggestion that teaching implies learning on 
social and moral, rather than logical and usage, grounds, and that 
he is working from the role concept of teacher in an institution 
to teaching. If it were the teacher's duty to teach in the sense 
which implies learning, then, according to Broudy, if pupils fail 
to learn, the teacher has failed in his responsibility and therefore 
does not deserve to be paid (which I take to imply 'is blameworthy'). 
I consider Broudy to be mistaken in implying that it follows from 
the fact that a person has failed to fulfil his obligations that he 
deserves to be blamed. Indeed, as Austin18 has pointed out, this 
is precisely the function of excuses in our language. If a person 
has an excuse for failing to fulfil his obligation, he is always 
considered less blameworthy, and sometimes blameless, even though 
he has still failed to fulfil it. Alternatively, he may justify 
failing in an obligation X by appealing to another obligation Y 
and claiming priority for Y. If his justification is accepted, once 
again he is not considered blameworthy for failing to fulfil X. 
What Broudy said was accepted by Scheffler, although it is 
clear that it would be more usual to say "the attempt fails" rather 
than, as Broudy put it, "the teaching fails". Scheffler then used 
the same argument as Broudy to claim that there was justification 
for calling what people do 'teaching' although no learning has taken 
place. Hy first point is that it is important to remember the 
kind of justification it is. The usage seems to be accounted for by 
Scheffler and Broudy as protecting people from charges of failing to 
fulfil role obligations - and this without any account of what role 
obligations are in general or how those of the teacher are to be 
understood: Since people might well accept my view that there was 
no justification for the claim that if they had not taught anybody 
anything they necessarily did not deserve to be paid, and since Dewey's 
analysis was the currently accepted one, the analysis of Broudy and 
Scheffler must have been prescriptive for its time. But Scheffler 
is most concerned that he should not be stipulating. 
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It is interesting to note an important distinction between 
Dewey's view and the Broudy/Scheffler position. The latter makes 
the teacher the final authority on whether or not he is fulfilling 
his role obligations. This position would seem at least to require 
some comment, which neither Broudy nor Scheffler provide, since 
ordinarily it is a matter for decision of a public kind. On Dewey's 
view a teacher would not necessarily be the authority on whether 
he is teaching or not, as he is in no different position from others 
to assess whether or not learning is going on, and sometimes in a 
weaker position than the learner or an impartial observer. 
Nothing at this stage turns on whether or not Scheffler's 
analysis is in fact prescriptive or descriptive. The claim is 
rather that the kind of reasoning which Broudy and Scheffler have 
offered is inappropriate for deciding whether or not teaching is an 
activity. And it is on this argument that the original claim by 
Scheffler that teaching is an activity is based, that it is the 
agent's view of what he is doing that is necessarily correct here. 
A point which needs to be considered is that it is possible 
for people to fail to be doing what they sincerely think and claim 
to be doing. The special case to be noted here is where the reason 
for their failure to be doing it is that it is logically impossible 
of achievement. This is best illustrated by the example of 
squaring the circle. People who believed that it was possible to 
square the circle could make the claim that they were engaged in 
doing it, and this form of language would be used by anyone who 
accepted that it was possible of achievement. However, those who 
recognize the logical impossibility do not wish to imply that they 
accept its possibility, as happens if they accept a claim "He is 
squaring the circle." To accept a claim "P is X-ing" is to accept 
the truth of its assumptions, in this case that X-ing is possible 
of achievement. 
There is a similarity to our usage in the acceptance of knowledge 
claims here. In the same way that we may reject e.g. the claim that 
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the Greeks knew that there were gods living on Mount Olympus because 
that would commit us to the belief that this was true, so we reject 
the claim that A was squaring the circle, instead adopting such 
usages as "A was trying to square the circle," or "A thought he was 
squaring the circle", etc. Where we believe that what a person is 
trying to achieve is logically impossible of achievement, we accept 
not only the usual idea that persons can be failing to achieve what 
they are aiming at, but also that they cannot be doing what they 
think they are doing. This is true even where a description of 
what they are doing is delineated in terms of their purpose or point. 
The application of this to teaching relates to a claim that it 
is logically impossible to teach someone that which they have already 
learned and not forgotten (or whatever alternative formulation is 
necessary for some Xs (e.g. habits) which cannot be referred to in 
this way). If my claim that we cannot speak of a person's doing what 
is logically impossible, but only of his trying to do it, is correct, 
it would follow that we could not say that A is teaching 3 X where 
we believe that B already knows X. And it would be usual for A to 
withdraw his claim to have been teaching B X if he later learned that 
B already knew X. If teaching were an activity, delineated by the 
purpose or point of the agent at the time he was acting, we could 
not speak in this way. We would not withdraw to full 'trying to 
teach' claims or speak of what they 'thought they were doing'. The 
interesting point about this is that, for most Xs, teaching B X 
must finish when B learns the X. This may happen without the person 
who is attempting to teach B X being aware of it. Therefore it is 
possible that, in ignorance of the occurrence of the outcome, he 
continues in his attempt, although (if what I have argued above is 
correct) he can no longer be teaching X to B. 
This discussion has produced a clear counter-example, supported 
by argument as well as by usage, to Broudy's claim that if the effort 
is there, there is teaching. Of course it is clear that Broudy did 
not have such a type of case in mind. 
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If we describe these cases as instances of trying to teach 6 X 
(or thinking that one is teaching B X) rather than as instances of 
teaching B X unsuccessfully - and it is my contention that this latter 
description is completely inappropriate as a description of what a 
person is doing when B already knows the X - this clearly suggests that 
the central sense of teaching cannot be the 'task' sense. I suggest 
that it is an 'outcome' sense, not in the sense of a final outcome, but 
in terms of the kind of 'uptake' which, I suggest, must be going on for 
anyone to be teaching someone in the central sense. But this 'uptake' 
(communication) itself is not sufficient, for there is a further, 
independent, condition of the ability of the recipient to learn (i.e. 
that he does not already know X). 
Though I suggest that clarity of understanding is increased by 
returning to the attempt/outcome distinction, the further point must 
be made that the occurrence of the outcome is not a sufficient 
condition for the correct application of the so-called "achievement' 
term. It must be the case that what is done by A is instrumental in 
bringing about the outcome. The 'outcome' sense of the term is 
used correctly if the speaker believes that the actions of an appropriate 
kind by A have been instrumental in bringing about the outcome, but my 
point is that if it is discovered that this belief is mistaken, the 
attribution is withdrawn. This point, like the previous one, has 
suggested to me that the logic of the term 'teach' is similar in many 
ways to the logic of 'know'. 
The Scheffler Analysis  
Scheffler's discussion of teaching is well-known, and I make 
no further comments concerning my agreement with Cooper20, who points 
out that Scheffler's analysis is far more appropriate to e.g. 
the teaching of philosophy than it is to e.g. the teaching of art 
and poetry appreciation, and, I might add, swimming. Certainly, 
in claiming that making clear the underlying rationale and submitting 
oneself to the independent judgment of pupils is a necessary condition 
of teaching, Scheffler is restricting the range of applications of 
the term. His claim that his analysis is descriptive ("the everyday, 
standard use") thereby fails, but if he is being prescriptive and 
suggesting the value of adopting such a narrower concept of teaching, 
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he gives us no justification for adopting such a use. One might 
hazard a guess that this is what he wishes to see going on in schools, 
but what people mean by a term is one question and what ought to go on 
in school is another. It might even be suggested that Scheffler has 
equated the meaning of 'teaching' and the meaning of 'educating' in 
the more specific sense delineated by Peters21 (except that Scheffler 
claims that teaching is an activity and Peters denies that educating 
is). 
Scheffler, like Broudy, points to the ways in which a person who 
is designated "teacher" may speak in arguing that teaching without 
learning can take place. He wrates22  , "We say, 'I was teaching P to 
X the whole afternoon but he learned nothing.'" Here, he claims, is 
the single case which is sufficient to falsify the claim that teaching 
implies learning. It is not clear whether Scheffler always accepts that 
the sense in which teaching does not imply learning is elliptical for 
'try to teach'. However, it is certainly not true that everyone would 
assent to Scheffler's claim to have found a counter-example. 
Since, for Dewey, teaching implies learning, he could presumably 
have denied that this counted as a counter-example by claiming that the 
term was being misused. This denial has recently been revived by 
Postman and Weingartner23. They write, "From our point of view, it 
is on the same level as a salesman's remarking, 'I sold it to him but 
he didn't buy it' - which is to say, it makes no sense. It seems 
to mean that 'teaching' is what a 'teacher' does, which, in turn, 
may or may not bear any relationship to what those being 'taught' do." 
Though it is difficult to agree with Postman and Weingartner 
that the remark is meaningless (it is clearly possible to make sense 
of it), they have brought up a point which has not previously been 
discussed and which ought to contribute something to our understanding 
of teaching. This is a consideration of what it is to be 'being 
taught'. For to say that B is being taught X by A is normally an 
alternative way of saying that A is teaching B X. This point is 
taken up more fully later in this chapter, since it ties up more 
closely with the analysis offered by Hirst24  which further develops 
Scheffler's claim that teaching is an activity. 
-35- 
The position taken in this thesis is that it is possible to make 
sense of the claim to have been teaching somebody though he hasn't 
learned anything, but that this is only a derivative sense of teach. 
This, I suggest, is implied by the use of the term 'but', which normally 
suggests that one of the usual conditions (of teaching) may be missing. 
However, Scheffler writes as if the 'task' sense of teaching is 
central. Here he does not seem to take fully Ryle's point25 that it 
is 'achievement' verbs that are often borrowed for 'task' use, not 
vice versa. According to Ryle, they are then being used "to signify 
the performance of the corresponding task activities when the hopes 
of success are good 	  'Hear' is sometimes used as a synonym of 
'listen' and 'mend' as a synonym of 'try to mend'." Ryle, by his 
use of the term 'borrow', implies that it is the 'achievement' sense 
which is prior. This must be understood before the notion of an 
attempt can be understood. A person whose activities are unified 
by his goal or purpose, the bringing about of which is X-ing in an 
'achievement' sense could not be engaged in an attempt unless he 
understood the 'achievement' sense% though this is not to say that 
he has to have the word X-ing in his vocabulary but only that he must 
understand the concept. 
This point can be made weakly or strongly, and the strong claim, 
which I feel can stand, says something not only about language but 
also about action. The weaker claim is that one needs to understand 
the 'achievement' sense of teaching in order to 22z of anyone (including 
himself) that he is teaching in a 'task' or 'attempt' sense. But 
the stronger claim is that understanding this tense is a necessary 
condition of anyone's even making such an attempt. A person needs to 
understand the 'outcome' sense of 'teach' before he can even -Ia. 
I suggest, then, that Scheffler's work is incomplete. Though he 
may have shown that there are two senses of the word 'teaching' in 
common use, one implying that learning is taking place and the other 
not implying this, he has not tried to show how the two are related 
and which has logical' priority. From Ryle's work, it seems it must 
be the 'achievement' sense, and since Scheffler's discussion is based 
on Ryle's distinction, one might have expected him to accept this. 
Much that Smith and Scheffler say, however, indicates that they do 
not, but no reasons have been given. 
On the basis of the arguments set out here, I suggest that the 
attempt sense must be analysed in terms of the outcome sense and that 
the choice of analysing the outcome sense in terms of the attempt 
sense is not open to us, as Hirst, for example, believes can be done. 
We must understand 'bringing about learning by the performance of 
certain kinds of acts' before we can understand 'trying to bring about 
learning by the performance of certain kinds of acts', for the one 
entails the other. Thus teaching cannot be primarily understood as 
an activity, though people can engage in acts and activities the point 
of which is to teach. 
I have abandoned the use of the term 'achievement' and prefer to 
speak of 'outcomes' only. Whether or not something is an achievement 
in the context depends on the purposes and goals of the agent of whom 
X-ing is predicated. Until we know we cannot speak of his achievements. 
'Hit' is an 'achievement' verb for kyle. But we cannot tell from A's 
hitting a tree with his arrow that it was an achievement for him, for it 
is only his achievement if he was aiming at that tree and not the next 
one. We understand his hitting the tree, however, as an outcome of 
his shooting independently of understanding the concept of aiming (trying 
to hit) for we can use the term in respect of what went on without 
consideration of what he was trying to do. 
The same can be said of teaching. It is pre-judging the issue to 
say that in 'standard' cases teaching is intentional. The question is  
which cases are to be taken as standard. Ryle suggests26 that we 
dispense with the "familiar sense of taught" in which we were taught 
virtues, and simply sac the question "Can virtue be learned?" But this 
sense cannot be dispensed with, I suggest, for there are good reasons 
for accepting that this, too, is an exemplar of the standard case, 
for what all instances have in common is the relationship between the 
performance of certain kinds of action and the responses of learners. 
If we speak only of learning, what we are doing that brings this learning 
about falls out of sight. We need to ask, "What am I teaching my 
children?" and not simply "What are they learning?" Their learning is 
often our responsibility in more than one sense of the word. 
There are good grounds, therefore, for accepting that teaching in 
its central sense involves an outcome of learning which can be seen as 
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an achievement only in relation to attempts. But it is not the case 
that anything which one might do that was instrumental in bringing 
about learning would be an instance of teaching. Further conditions 
are necessary. 
Macmillan and McClellan argue that, because of this, the task/ 
achievement analysis is inappropriate to teaching. Wherever the 
analysis is appropriate, they say, trying to achieve is necessarily 
doing the task. To try to get people to learn, they suggest, is not 
necessarily to be teaching, "for there are restrictions on motive and 
manner in teaching which do not auply, say, to propagandizing, 
conditioning, hypnosis...., each of which (under suitable conditions) 
could be an instance of trying to get someone to learn something." 
Similarly, it is agreed that turning up the radiators cannot, by itself, 
be teaching anyone French, as hirst and Peters argue2 . 
Scheffler moved from the claim that there is a task sense of 
'teaching' to the claim that teaching is an activity, and a parallel 
objection must be considered here. If one conceives of an activity 
simply in terms of point or purpose (i.e. as acts performed with the 
intention of bringing about a certain state of affairs), then the 
objection has great force. On this analysis of an activity (which, 
I suggest, must be a technical sense, since it would exclude many 
things which would normally be classed as activities on our understanding 
of the term in ordinary language - e.g. going swimming, walking in 
the park), there seem to be no conditions limiting the means which can 
be employed to bring about the required state of affairs. Indeed, 
it is not even necessary that it is the case that what the agent 
considers will bring about the state of affairs in question should 
be a possible, (or even a plausible) method of doing so. For, 
logically, provided that the agent believes that the state of affairs 
desired could be an outcome or consequence of the acts he performs, 
he is employing a means to an end. This is indicated by the kinds 
of answer he would give to questions like "Why are you doing X?" 
But in cases where the relationship between the means and the end is 
purely contingent (and some argue that this is necessarily the case), 
what A views as a means to the end Z need not be an appropriate method of 
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attaining Z. This is not entailed by his employing X as a means. 
If Scheffler and Hirst and Peters are right in suggesting (with 
different kinds of cases in mind) that there are limitations on the 
means used for bringing about learning, teaching cannot be an activity 
in this simple sense. 
Hirst refers in his paper29 to this concept of an activity and 
the above objection will be considered in relation to his position. 
It must be noted, however, that Hirst clearly holds a more restricted 
view of what can count as an instance of a given activity than Kenny, 
for example, seems committed to in his discussion3° (which is dealt 
with in detail in the next chapter). The Kenny analysis seems to allow 
of no conditions limiting what could count as an instance of a given 
activity, but Hirst suggests that, at least in some cases, not just 
anything can count as an instance of the activity in question. It is 
to this analysis that we now turn. 
The Analysis of P.H. Hirst  
The earlier discussions, accepting the tasWachievement distinction, 
have been further developed by Hirst in a recent book (in collaboration 
with Peters)31, and in the article already referred to. The remainder 
of this chapter is devoted to pointing out the difficulties involved in 
accepting this analysis as grounds for consideration being given to 
an alternative. The three conditions, indicated in the book and 
article as "logically necessary conditions for the central cases of 
'teaching'", are set out below. It is to these conditions that the 
rest of the discussion refers. 
(i) Activities must be conducted or acts performed with the primary 
intention of bringing about the learning of X. 
(ii) They must indicate or exhibit, explicitly or implicitly, that X. 
(iii) They must do this in a way which is intelligible to, and within 
the capacities of, the learners 
I understand Hirst to be claiming to be giving a descriptive account 
of the meaning of teaching, a general account that is compatable with 
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the normal application of the term. That is, where Hirst suggests 
correctly that we would not call giving an account of the Philosophical 
Investigations to six year olds teaching, his analysis, if it is to 
be successful, must exclude all such cases. I question whether it is 
successful, for it does not necessarily exclude all such cases, and I 
question whether it i§ descriptive, as will be seen. 
My own view is that an analysis of teaching which indicates what 
a person must do if he is to try to teach, and which enables us to 
discover what, if anything, we are teaching, more closely fits our 
current usage than one which refuses to allow us to predicate teaching 
X (in any central sense) of a person who does not intend to bring 
about that specific learning. And I am disquieted at the discrepancy 
between the later discussion which suggests that to be teaching, the 
bringing about of learning must be one's primary intention and the 
earlier one which suggests that teaching "in a fully intentional sense" 
occur by definition as soon as a person's activity "is influencedby 
any consideration of the would-be learners."32 
Though the main burden of the rest of the chapter is the pointing 
out of difficulties of the Hirst analysis of teaching as it stands, 
this should not be taken as suggesting that the analysis has been of 
little importance in our becoming clearer about teaching. 
The first reason for this importance is that Hirst has been the 
first person to lay the appropriate stress on the bringing of Xs into 
the "view" of the pupils, which I consider now to be the most important 
aspect of understanding teaching. It was Scheffler, of course, who 
pointed out33 that one could not simply teach a person but had to be 
teaching him something. However, he developed the point by directing 
his attention to the manner involved and the making available of the 
underlying rationale, in a way which I have already suggested was 
stipulative (at least in respect of English as opposed to American 
use of the term). 
Hirst developed the point in a different direction, suggesting 
that the explicit or implicit indication of the Xs to be learned was 
a necessary condition of teaching those Xs. This additionally 
emphasizes the very important, often internal, relationship between 
what is displayed and what is taught, a point which had not been 
clearly brought out before in relation to teaching of a non-intentional 
kind, though there has been some discussion of it in relation to 
education, and in respect of means-end reasoning in Macmillan and 
McClellan's article already referred to34 and by Sockett35. However, 
the Hirst formulation is not entirely appropriate in respect of 
teaching dispositions, attitudes etc., which he mentions specifically 
in his article. Whilst having a cognitive aspect, these may also have 
an aspect of "feeling" and this produces difficulties in respect of 
indication. I can, for example, indicate only la enthusiasm for 
history, when what I may be trying to bring about is B's enthusiasm. 
This I necessarily cannot indicate, since he is by definition not yet 
enthusiastic. But it surely does not follow from this that I cannot 
teach him to be enthusiastic about history. If this were the 
conclusion, it would clearly show Hirst's paper could not be presenting 
a descriptive analysis. But he cannot be suggesting this, since he 
gives such examples himself. 
The second important aspect introduced by Hirst is concerned with 
the availability of what is being indicated to the pupil's understanding. 
This is another aspect in which I am not in full agreement with him, 
but I suggest that bringing this to the forefront of the discussion is 
a major advance in understanding what, on our present usage, teaching 
involves. 
Hirst opens his article as follows: "The question with which this 
paper is concerned is simply 'What is teaching?' How do we distinguish 
teaching from other activities? That is, I think, a very important 
question...." It surely cannot be denied, however, that there are two 
questions here, not one as Hirst suggests. The question "What is 
teaching?" is a general question. It is only if one answers this 
question with the general answer that teaching is an activity that it 
becomes equivalent to the problem of distinguishing teaching from 
other activities. 
Hirst, in conflating the two questions, assumes that teaching in its 
central sense is an activity, but nowhere justifies this assumption. 
This section seeks to spell out some of the implications of the 
assumption, and by indicating that some are untenable, gives the grounds 
for rejecting the assumption. 
Normally we speak of teaching as something we do. Certainly, 
it does not seem to be something that happens to us. But, at 
least in philosophical terms, not everything we do is referred 
to as an activity. Kenny, for example, distinguishes between 
activities and performances, where performance verbs also refer 
to things we do. Hirst has not told us what his use of the term 
'activity' contrasts activities with. We do not know whether or 
not he has considered the possibility of teaching as a performance. 
Furthermore, since not everything we do is done intentionally, 
some investigation into the necessity of intention in central cases 
of teaching, rather than its assumption seems required. And even 
if teaching were something we could only do intentionally (like 
murder) it would not follow that it was necessarily an activity, so 
that this would need to be argued for. 
In assuming that teaching is to be classified as an activity, 
Hirst necessitates particular answers to questions which previously 
puzzled philosophers of education and worry teachers. Firstly, 
the assumption that teaching in its central sense is an activity 
makes it logically necessary for teaching in this sense to be 
intentional. It is not possible, given the way Hirst has explained 
his understanding of an activity, to engage in any activity non-
intentionally. Secondly, on this definition, the bringing about 
of an end-state of affairs which is aimed at is not a necessary 
condition of being engaged in that activity. Thus the assignation 
of teaching to the class of activities (rather than some other 
class) gives a necessarily affirmative answer to the question "Must 
teaching be intentional?" and a necessarily negative answer to 
the question "Does teaching imply learning':" These questions, to 
which earlier discussions have been addressed, are simply answered 
a priori if it is accepted that the proper question to ask is 
"How do we distinguish teaching from other activities?" And the 
person who is worried about what he is teaching children is simply 
a victim of confusion, or, as Hirst put it, "misunderstands".36 
I suggest that phrasing the question in this way, thus assuming 
the answer "teaching is an activity" to the question "How do we 
classify teaching?" or "What is teaching?" is a mistake. We must 
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start, as Hirst originally says, with the open question, "What is 
teaching?" or preferably, "What is it for A to be teaching B X?" 
We can then distinguish a far wider range of questions which it is 
possible to ask. 
None of this excludes the possibility that A's teaching B X is 
sometimes the successful upshot of his attempt to teach B X but there 
is the assumption that we do understand teaching in such a way that 
it is not necessarily the successful upshot of a teaching attempt. 
If this assumption could be shown to be false, any questions which 
presuppose it would be shown to be pseudo-questions. My suggestion 
is that it is Hirst's claim that the two questions are equivalent 
that requires support. It must be shown to be true and not simply 
assumed. This section implicitly indicates why it is unhelpful to 
regard them as equivalent. 
It does not seem to me that we do accept that a normal person 
knows (infallibly and indubitably) when he is teaching, whom he is 
teaching and what he is teaching, as on Hirst's analysis he does. 
Wa1137 and King-5 
 seem to have a point when they express the worries 
of teachers about this. Clearly they do not have Hirst's concept 
of teaching. If Hirst wished to prescribe a concept where such doubts 
have no place, this is fair enough, though we would need grounds for 
deciding to adopt it. But surely this is not what he sees himself 
as doing. On what grounds, however, can it be decided a priori  
that teaching is one of the things where the agent knows better than 
others what he is doing? For though sometimes an agent knows best 
what he is doing, there are other times when others know better than 
he. 
Hirst discusses in detail why an analysis of teaching is important, 
and though I am in agreement with much of what he says, the reasons 
underlying my agreement are sometimes different from his. Firstly, 
says Hirst, a lot of new educational methods are being canvassed in 
which there is almost exclusive emphasis on the activities of the 
pupil and the significance of the teacher is far from clear. (Here the 
introduction of the ordinary language use of'activity'confuses.) This, 
Hirst suggests, arises from a misunderstanding of what teaching is (my 
emphasis). I take this to mean that Hirst sees his analysis as 
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providing an understanding of our normal usage. But his analysis 
is not in accordance with ordinary language in many respects (e.g. 
we don't say that a person has been teaching all afternoon when he 
has been writing a text-book). Thus it must be prescriptive. But 
a failure to use the term in accordance with a prescription cannot 
be described as misunderstanding. There are difficulties over the 
way he makes his claim. 
But it is surely a most important point he is making. The 
significance of the teacher must be indicated, for if the teacher 
had no significance, there would be no point employing teachers 
rather than anyone else (or perhaps no-one) in a classroom. However, 
this seems a problem not only about what teaching is but also involving 
the larger issue of what is involved in the role of the teacher in a 
school. That is, an analysis of teaching, though necessary, cannot 
be sufficient for determining what teachers should be professionally 
committed to. This is not to disagree with Hirst about the importance  
of analysis, but about what follows from it. 
Secondly Hirst argues that we need a fuller understanding of 
what teaching is in order to distinguish it from such things as 
indoctrinating, preaching, advertising and propagandizing which are, 
in his view, in the same logical band as teaching. But in claiming 
that they are all classifiable as activities, Hirst has prejudged 
the issue, and decided the difference a priori. For if they are all 
activities and what distinguishes any activity is its purpose or 
point, then indoctrination, preaching and teaching are distinguished 
by their different aims or purposes. But this is precisely what is 
open to question. 
It may be that the insistence on intentionality here is seen as 
necessary for avoiding a functionalist account of human goings-on, 
with mechanistic and behaviourist assumptions about human affairs 
which would be unacceptable. It is my intention to indicate why 
abandoning the criterion of intentionality does not commit us to a 
mechanistic account. 
Thirdly, in Hirst's view, we need a great deal of carefully 
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controlled empirical research on the effectiveness of different 
teaching methods, and he says, rightly, that without the clearest 
conception of what teaching is, it is impossible to assess what 
goes on in the classroom. However, as will be shown, the analysis 
he presents raises extraordinary difficulties for empirical researchers 
concerned to judge the effectiveness of methods, difficulties which 
he may not realize are implied, and which appear to render irrelevant 
some of the empirical data which reason would indicate were essential 
to such enquiry - such as how well the teacher judges the actual 
conceptual frameworks and existing beliefs of pupils and their grasp 
of his language. If I am correct in suggesting that this is the 
consequence of a proper application of Hirst's analysis, then some 
amendment of the analysis is clearly needed. For on this account as 
it stands, many teachers who are good judges of their pupils.' under-
standings and cognitive states but who do not see the need for clearly 
specifying their objectives, or even feel that there are good reasons 
for refraining from such specification, will be excluded from any 
investigation, no matter how effective what they do is in promoting 
learning; while teachers who are very poor judges of their pupils' 
cognitive states but who have very clear objectives will be ideal 
subjects. Hirst may really be wanting to indicate simply that you 
cannot fairly judge the effectiveness of attempts to teach new 
curriculum projects or use new methods unless the teachers who are 
using them understand what they are intended to do. But this is a 
long way from claiming that any teacher whose aims are specified 
at a high level of generality, or rather fuzzily, are professional 
frauds and are not ("logically are not") teaching their pupils whatever 
it is that the pupils come to learn through the various activities 
these teachers engage in. 
Hirst describes teachers with "fuzzy" intentions as "a category 
of professional teachers who are in fact frauds because their 
intentions are never clear." It doesn't seem to be a logical point 
about the meaning of teaching that one is a professional fraud 
because one hasn't formulated one's intentions clearly. It seems 
rather to be a moral judgment concerning what it is to fill a 
professional role. Though this is, of course, a very important 
matter, it must not be confused with the problem of whether or not 
teaching is an activity. As already suggested, it does not seem that 
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one can answer questions about existing meanings by making moral 
judgments. 
Hirst seems to be suggesting that in order to be teaching at all 
in the sense which he sees as relevant to filling the professional 
role of teacher, a person must be very clear about what it is that 
he intends his pupils to learn, a vague formulation being identified 
with "having fuzzy intentions". I may misunderstand him here, but 
it seems to me that specifying that one wanted one's pupils to learn 
"something about pond life" would be an example of what Hirst means. 
My point is that if this is an example of having fuzzy intentions, 
it is difficult to see why this necessarily leads to fuzzy things 
being done "in the name of teaching" or why a person with such 
intentions should be designated as a professional fraud. 
Let us consider the example of a person who is interested and 
knowledgeable about pond life and ways of investigating it, taking 
his pupils to a pond where they engage in observation, discussion 
etc. with each other and with him, during which time the teacher never 
formulates his intentions less fuzzily. As a result of this and other 
activities, the pupils come to know a great many things about pond 
plant and animal life, as well as skills associated with pond exploration 
and perhaps even some understanding of what is involved in scientific 
method. Neither the fuzziness of the intentions of such a teacher, nor 
his major concern with interesting his pupils rather than getting them 
to learn specific propositions and skills, nor the fact that different 
groups of pupils with whom he engages in these activities may learn 
different things, seem to be sufficient grounds for refusing to 
predicate teaching of those propositions and skills etc. to him. 
Usage does not support this position. Nor would he normally be 
considered to be a professional fraud. 
My point here, though, is rather that, on Hirst's account, those 
persons engaged in empirical research on teaching methods (i.e. the value of 
practical activity at the pond-face) will be precluded from including 
the activities of such a group in their research. For as soon as the 
investigators engaged in what must, on Hirst's account, necessarily be 
their first step, that of ascertaining the teacher's primary intentions, 
and discover that this teacher cannot specify precisely what it is 
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that the pupils are to learn, or indicates that his primary intention 
is to sustain his pupils' interest in pond life, to carry out the 
orders of his Head of Department etc., then no matter how conducive 
the activities are to learning, aacording to Hirst he cannot (logically 
cannot) be teaching in the central sense, the sense necessary for 
him to be included in the research project. The investigators must 
exclude him - or alternatively, perhaps, attribute to him unconscious 
intentions, or subject him to psychoanalysis in order to show that 
his primary intention was "really" the bringing about of certain 
particular specified (not merely specifiable) Xs. This may sound 
a ridiculous interpretation of Hirst's position, but if the logic of 
the position leads to this, then surely there is something wrong with 
it. 
Furthermore, in assessing the effectiveness of a method of teaching 
(that is, whether it helps children learn) it is not necessary, as 
Hirst implies, to know the primary intention of the person performing. 
the acts. For if this were true, we could not assess the adequacy of 
instruction as a method of teaching a child how to lay the table by 
looking at cases where the primary intention of the mother doing the 
instructing is not that the child learns how to lay the table but that 
the table should be laid. In many instances of teaching in the world 
in general, A's teaching B X is a part of his ensuring that Y is done. 
It is possibly only in schools that we do not come across this often, 
but there is no reason why it should not happen there more. The 
question being asked is why we must insist that A's primary intention 
be that B learns X rather than e.g. that Y is done before we may say 
that A is teaching B X in a central sense. No reasons have been given. 
It is true by definition if central senses of teaching are activity 
senses. 
In making this claim, Hirst is presumably committed to challenging 
as confused such suggestions as King's, when he writes39  , "Teachers 
seldom 	 really know whom they are teaching.... They do not always 
know if they are teaching anything at all. And Wall' s40,  in writing 
about "those things.... which parent or teacher think they are teaching." 
Wall clearly considers it possible to believe mistakenly that one is 
teaching someone something when one is not, in the sense of having wrong 
41 beliefs about what one is doing. When Labov writes, "Bereiter and 
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Engelmann believe 	  that they are teaching him an entirely new 
language whereas in fact they are only teaching him to produce slightly 
different forms of the language he already has," he indicates the same 
belief. White, too, writes42  of "the teacher who says, 'I thought I 
was teaching Jones mathematics, but I now see I have only taught him to 
hate the subject,'" in his paper on indoctrination. 
If teaching is an activity, it is impossible (with reservations 
which have no relevance to the kinds of instances these writers discuss) 
to make a distinction between what you are doing and what you think 
(believe) you are doing. Given that the teacher is not having some kind 
of hallucination or delusion that he is displaying or indicating an X 
which he is, in fact, not indicating (Hirst's condition (ii)), then, on 
the activity analysis, a sincere teaching claim cannot be rejected. This 
must be so because we normally accept the teacher as the authority on 
what his intentions in respect of learning are and on his beliefs about 
what concepts, etc. his pupils can understand. The point is that Wall, 
King, Labov and White quite intelligibly reject what Hirst asserts -
that anyone who is teaching necessarily knows what and whom he is 
teaching. They would also reject what is further implied by Hirst's 
analysis - that to know whether and what you are teaching 3 in the central 
"achievement" sense (teaching successfully, in Hirst's terms) a person 
must, as a necessary condition of knowing this, be clear about what his 
primary intentions were and that they mu...it have been concerned with B's 
learning that specific X. 
It is undeniable that there is a well-known sense of teaching (which 
I shall suggest is the central sense) in which we accept the possibility 
of discovering (and the discovery can be made by anyone, pupil, teacher 
or observer) that a person is teaching another e.g. to love poetry, to 
be dishonest, competetive or co-operative, that his father can't be 
trusted, to produce slightly different forms of the language he has, etc. 
The problems we have in respect of teaching as what is going on cannot 
be made to disappear by suggesting that Wall, King, Labov and White are 
using a derivative sense of teaching. 
In his paper, Hirst refers to the teaching enterprise, and then to 
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the more specific activities "which are specifically called teaching 
activities" and which "do not include in their number the sharpening 
of pencils, the opening of windows and all other such activities which 
might form a legitimate part of the teaching enterprise as a whole."43 
But the idea of a teaching enterprise as used here seems to be doing no 
useful work. The more usual formulation would be to say that these 
are all legitimate parts of the teacher's role (of which teaching is 
only a part). There does seem to be an important sense in which we do 
speak of a teaching enterprise, but this is not it. 
It is not clear whether Hirst is smuggling a content into his 
analysis by his claim that, for example, sharpening pencils is not 
a teaching activity, or whether this is simply careless formulation. 
Clearly sharpening pencils could be a teaching activity on Hirst's own 
analysis, as a demonstration by a person intending that a child learns 
how to sharpen a pencil. So his claim that sharpening pencils is 
not a teaching activity must indicate some assumptions about the content 
to be taught in schools, or the intentions of the teachers working 
there. It is thus not relevant to the analysis. There is no such 
objection, however, to be made of hirst's later44, more specific, claim 
that "sharpening pencils cannot be itself teaching Pythagoras's theorem," 
with which I fully agree. 
What I disagree with here is Hirst's assertion that there are 
considerable differences between what could be an instance of work and 
an instance of teaching, so that teaching is more like gardening than 
like working. It is difficult to see how any acts can be regarded as 
being excluded a priori as teaching acts on logical grounds, any more 
than they can be excluded in the case of work. For example, if it 
is the case that thinking through a mathematical proof could not be 
an instance of teaching anyone anything, this is only so because of 
the contingent fact that there is not normally telepathic communication 
between people. Were this the case, then covert thinking could be as 
suitable for teaching as telling might be. Though in performing any 
act, a person is never necessarily teaching anyone anything, there is, 
I suggest, no a priori exclusion of any act as being an act through 
which one could not possibly teach anyone anything. 
Hirst seems to me to have had a most important insight in his 
- 1+9 - 
suggestion that teaching involves bringing what is learned into the 
"view" of the learner, and if this is so, teaching clearly involves 
acts and activities on the part of the teacher. But the acceptance 
of this claim does not commit us to the belief that teaching is 
itself an activity. 
Hirst points out that it is not the case that an activity which 
counts as a case of teaching someone something in one context would 
necessarily be a case of teaching anyone anything in another context. 
I accept this, but disagree that it supports the view that teaching 
is an activity. Planning activities with an end in view is not enough 
to ensure that there is a corresponding "super-activity", as Peters 
points out45 when discussing the suggestion that education is an 
activity. Hirst is right in his claim that we cannot hope to get 
clear about what teaching is simply by producing an exhaustive list 
of activities. But the fact that teaching activities are polymorphous 
does not show that teaching is an activity, much less a polymorphous 
activity. Peters refers often to educational processes, but is clearly 
aware that this does not imply that education is itself therefore a 
process. If this is the form of inference Hirst is using, it is invalid. 
My concern here is with intention not because I dispute that there 
are uses in which intention is implied and uses in which it is not, 
but because of the claim that the intentional use is the central use 
and that understanding this is necessary for understanding all uses 
of the term, which are explained in terms of their derivation from this 
use. Hirst says that his paper is restricted to a school context and 
claims that "in schools we are not primarily concerned with unintended 
learning." I have already suggested that we need first to understand 
teaching apart from a school context in order to understand what a 
school might be, but additionally it seems to me quite wrong to suggest 
that schools are not equally concerned with some unintended learnings 
as they are with intended learnings. Certain unintended learnings 
are very much the concern of the teacher. Firstly, there are the 
unintended learnings which are the outcomes of his own actions and for 
which he may feel responsible. If they are undesirable, he needs to 
be concerned both about them and about how they were brought about if 
he is to avoid bringing them about in the future. But, more relevant 
to Hirst's claim here, as I see it, is that if a school is seen as an 
institution established to promote certain learning achievements by 
pupils,, then the teachers must be concerned with those unintended 
learnings vinich represent not simply a failure to get people to learn 
what is attempted but their learning of something which is in some sense 
opposite to that which was intended (whether through their teaching or 
not). For example, if a teacher is trying to teach a child that a 
three-sided figure is called a triangle, there is a distinction between 
a failure to learn anything and the pupil's coming to believe that it 
is called a rectangle. The latter is an unintended learning which the 
mathematics teacher must be primarily concerned about, for it then 
prevents the child from learning that a four-sided figure is called a 
rectangle. 
This is not only the case with propositional learning. If we 
intend a student to learn to find 3 interesting, we necessarily intend 
that he does not learn to find B boring. Finding B boring, if it 
occurs, is learning we did not intend. If we intend him to learn to 
become autonomcus, we must be concerned if, unintended by us, he 
learns to become conformist. If pupils learn these alternatives through 
our acts, actions and activities, it begs the questions of responsibility 
to say that we have not taught them in the same sense and that this sense 
is unimportant in schools. This is one of the points which, it seems 
to me, deschoolers are trying to make. 
Of course, if we accept that the original sense has primary 
intentionality concerned with learning as a necessary condition, then 
it is necessarily but trivially true that we have taught them in a 
different sense. This does not mean that we are justified in claiming 
that we are not equally concerned in the school context with the other 
sense, nor does it itself show that the central sense is the one which 
involves intention. Hirst and Peters write46, "It is not that 
teaching" - or do they mean 'teaching' - "in most of its uses, implies 
that anybody necessarily learns anything." This is presumably a 
philosophical claim about a number of different concepts of teaching. 
But it has not been substantiated by an examination of the different 
concepts of teaching, and may be mistaken. But even if true, it does 
not, of itself, show that all our understanding of teaching is derived 
from intentional senses. 
Hirst has written of a person "teaching in the fullest  sense of the 
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word (my italics) and yet, in spite of the intention and the 
appropriateness of the activities involved, the pupils may learn 
absolutely nothing. Here the notion of teaching is simply (my 
italics) that of trying to get people to learn and no more (my 
italics)."47 Perhaps due to incautious wording, he is at this point 
open to the charge of Macmillan and McClellan, as discussed already48. 
The claim of this thesis is that there is no sense of teaching 
which is no more than trying to bring about learning, for this would 
allow turning up the radiators to be a case of teaching Pythagoras's 
theorem. What I am suggesting is that the so-called task sense is 
elliptical for attempting to teach in the outcome sense, with the 
restriction that the acts performed must constitute an attempt to bring 
an X to be learned into the 'view' of the pupil as Hirst suggests. 
But Hirst has specifically denied that his account sees the activity 
sense in this way49. He does not accept an account of the task sense 
as elliptical in this way, for on his account the outcome sense is 
understood primarily as used to denote a successfully completed activity 
and can only be understood once the activity sense is understood. There 
is one disagreement between us here. 
The other disagreement seems to be that on Hirst's account, the 
achievement sense is used to denote a successfully completed activity. 
I would argue that any adequate analysis must cover the sorts of uses 
where there is no implication that anything has been completed, though 
the teaching attempts are successful - as, for examp),e, in teaching 
philosophy. 
Learning and 3eing Taught 
Learning is also characterized as an activity by Hirst, who notes 
that the achievements of learning are new states of the person not 
necessarily involving knowledge5°. He distinguishes the possibility 
of non-intentional learning, and by this he means learning as the 
result of causal processes. Here there is a difficulty, for clearly 
not all instances of learning are covered by this classification of 
intentional learning and learning which has resulted from causal 
processes. 
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If this classification were intended as exhaustive, what can 
be said by Hirst about the kind of learning which is often described 
as "casual", in which the doings of the agent are not primarily 
directed towards the achievement of learning? That is, learning 
is not his activity (in Hirst's sense of the term). However, it is 
clearly not causal in the sense I take him to mean from his examples 
of hypnotism, sleep-learning and conditioning. If a person is 
engaged in activities with the primary intention of enjoying himself, 
pleasing others, obeying instructions, etc., or if he non-intentionally 
learns X in the course of trying to learn Y, his activities result in 
learning which doesn't seem to be causal in Hirst's sense. 
For example, some children's play brings about learning, though it 
is not primarily engaged in in order that learning will occur. Children 
may be learning while watching television, though they are primarily 
watching for pleasure. On this account, learning activities are polymorphous. 
But one can assert this at the same time as it is denied that learning is 
a polymorphous activity. There is, in my view, a parallel here with 
teaching, which, in view of the conceptual relationship between them, is 
perhaps not surprising. 
The Hirst account of teaching and learning as activities would be 
thought by some (e.g. Scudder51) to have missed out entirely the 
personal nature of many teaching/learning transactions. The teacher 
and the pupil, on this account, each has his own goal, and that they 
happen to be identical is a contingent fact which simply makes success 
for both more likely. For the learner, his teacher is simply a means 
to his end. Who he is does not matter at all, as long as he has the 
requisite knowledge and skill. Though teaching and learning may often 
be like this, on Hirst's analysis this is necessarily so, even for 
very young children. That is, the account seems to leave no room for 
the interpersonal psychological factors involved. 
I return, now, to the point mentioned earlier, our understanding of 
the concept of being taught. On the activity analysis, we have to say 
that A is teaching B X (given that the conditions mentioned on page 38 
are fulfilled) whatever B is doing - whether or not B is actually 
attending to anything relating to A or to the X which A is trying to 
teach him. That is, on this analysis, to say of B that he is being 
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taught by A is merely to say of him that he is the object of A's 
intention and effort. But there are difficulties here. For A's 
intention and effort must be directed not towards B as he actually 
is (and clearly some sense can be made of this) but B as A believes 
him to be. But when I say of B that he is being taught by A, the B 
I refer to is the person in the world, not B as A believes him to be. 
It is scarcely plausible that each person who says "B is being 
taught by A" is referring to his own conception of B, for if this 
were so, there would be no common subject of discussion. All speakers 
use the name 'B' to refer to the person himself. This is not to say 
that each speaker's conception of B does not come into his making the 
statement, but that, given that each speaker may have a different 
conception of B, their agreement in discussion only makes sense given 
an assumed ontological existence of B as a common subject of reference. 
The second, and related point, is that to say "B is being taught 
by A" is to make some claim about B, not merely a claim about A as is 
the case if teaching is A's activity. That is, when we say "B is 
being taught by A" we say more than that B is the object of A's 
intention and effort. There is an analogy here, I suggest, with a 
claim like 	 is hurting B" and the corresponding "B is being hurt 
by A." There is a clear sense in which "hurting B" can be the purpose 
or point of whatever activities A is engaged in, so that B is the 
object of A's intention and effort. But our claim "B is being hurt 
by A" says more than this. It tells us something about B himself in 
that it indicates he is responding in some way to what A is doing. 
We cannot say "A is hurting B but B is not aware of what A is doing 
in any way." 
It is my suggestion that when we say B is being taught by A we 
make a similar claim. This is not yet to suggest that bringing about 
learning is necessary. It makes so far only the weaker claim that it 
involves a contradiction to say "B is being taught X by A and he is 
unconscious," "B is being taught X by A and he is in a dream" or "B 
is being taught X by A and he is quite unaware of A's presence." On 
the Hirstean analysis of teaching, these claims are quite sensible 
for "B is being taught X by A" means only that B is the object of A's 
intentions and effort. I suggest that in such instances we are not 
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in a position to make "being taught" claims about B, and can only say 
such things as "A is trying to teach B X but 	  
From the argument that we cannot make claims of the kind suggested 
above, we must conclude that some kind of "uptake" is necessary for 
someone to be being taught. If this is so, it explains how we can 
understand what it is for B to refuse to be taught by A, something 
which is impossible on the activity analysis. If this analysis is 
rejected, we can accept that 3 can refuse to be taught by A by, for 
example, deliberately refraining from paying attention to A or to 
what A is saying or doing in making his teaching attempt. When B 
has deliberately "tuned out", we cannot be saying anything true about 
him if we make the claim that he is being taught by A. 
That our language does, in fact, function in this way can be seen 
from a hypothetical discussion of a group of people whom A was trying 
to teach. If we wanted to say something about B, we would say of him 
that he (at least) was not being taught by A. The distinction, I 
feelt between teaching and certain other verbs is brought out by a 
comparison of "B is being shot at by A" and "B is being embarrassed 
by A." The basis of my argument about teaching is a claim that we 
understand teaching as having a logic more similar to the second 
example than the first. If this is so, and pupils are not being taught 
in the most usual sense when they have "tuned out", teaching them cannot 
be an activity of mine, for it makes no sense to say that my activity 
stops when pupils "tune out". 
Can we argue a priori that my teaching B cannot stop when B ceases 
e.g. to attend? The above discussion suggests reasons for being willing 
to say that it does stop. An additional reason is that supporting the 
view that my teaching B cannot occur when B ceases to attend though 
accepting that my trying to teach does not, is that this, at least, does 
relate my teaching B to things that are going on in the world other than 
my own actions. The activity analysis makes my teaching B X independent 
of whatever else is going on in the world at the time. Surely arguments 
are needed to persuade us to accept this idealist position. Such 
arguments have not been given. 
Clearly there must be a description under which what I am doing 
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does not stop when B ceases to attend, but I suggest that "teaching 3" 
(in a non-elliptical sense, with the implication that B is being taught) 
is not an appropriate description. The appropriate description must 
have no reference to B that implies "uptake". That is, the description 
of what I am doing as "proving 	 or "translating Q" or "explaining R" 
or "setting up a discovery situation" remains valid as a description 
whatever 3 is doing, and these acts constitute the pedagogic activity  
through which A attempts to teach B X. On this argument, teaching 3 X 
is what A is trying to do. A is not merely trying to bring about B's 
learning X but also to bring it about that he (A) is teaching B X. 
This distinction picks out the contingent (though not merely contingent) 
relationship between A's acts and B's learning. For B's learning X 
may occur without its being the case that A is teaching B X, even though 
he may be trying to do so. A simple example of this is the case where 
B is not attending to what A is doing (e.g. explaining X) but is reading 
the explanation in a book without A's knowledge while A explains it 
verbally. 
I turn now to Hirst's suggestion that it must be possible for the 
pupil to learn the X presented and his claim that this is a logical 
point, and the discussion which follows points to the ambiguous nature 
of the claim. Hirst seems to suggest that the pupil must be able to 
see the meaning involved in any act the teacher performs. Does this 
refer only to the pupil's capacities, or also to the empirical conditions 
needed? To put the latter question another way, seeing the meaning 
involved in the act presupposes seeing the act. It is self-contradictory 
to speak of the possibility of a person's seeing the meanings involved 
in acts he does not see. Does Hirst mean, then, that if B had been 
attending, he could have understood? But this is not simply a matter 
of having the appropriate conceptual frameworks, but also of understanding 
the language. Was A teaching B, on Hirst's account, if he mistakenly 
believed that B spoke English? Again, it is logically impossible for B 
to understand a language he does not understand. 
If we understand teaching as an activity, then a lecturer who 
sincerely believes that his audience speaks English and delivers a 
talk on the battle of Waterloo to them can be taken as a paradigm 
case of teaching, even if the audience does not understand English. 
Would Hirst say that his third condition was fulfilled or not? This 
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example indicates that his formulation is ambiguous. 
Do we gain insight into Hirst's intentions in this matter by 
taking one of his own examples? He says it would not be a case of 
teaching if a person presented the idea of a private language by 
reading from "Philosophical Investigations" to six year olds. However, 
although he describes this as "definitely" not teaching, on the argument 
he presents, he cannot do so. Surely if the person doing these things 
believed that the understanding of the position was within the capacity 
of those children (because he had not considered the differences between 
six year olds and undergraduates to be significant here) he must be said 
to be teaching them the private language argument if teaching is, as 
Hirst suggests, his activity. Hirst says53, "We are inclined to think 
that there could be teaching even when the present state of pupils is 
grossly misjudged." But his analysis must then allow that teaching 
occurs no matter how grossly misjudged the present state of pupils is. 
Surely he can never say from the position of an observer that any 
activities which indicate or display the Xs (that is, which fulfil his 
condition (ii)) "definitely" are not teaching. If he believes that 
observers are ever in a position to do this, regardless of the sincerity 
of the beliefs of the "teacher", then his position lapses into 
inconsistency. 
Hirst actually writes54, "It must be possible, and this seems to 
me a logical point, for learning to take place." This looks, on first 
reading, to be an objective demand - that it must be possible for the 
pupil to learn. This would mean that there were necessary conditions 
of A's teaching B X which depended on B's capacity to learn, on something 
that was the case, independent of A's beliefs about the matter. 
The difficulty arises because he goes on to say that teaching could 
take place even though the state of the pupils may be grossly misjudged. 
For the teacher's belief that his pupils can understand does not entail 
that they can understand. If we are to accept that teaching can occur 
when the cognitive states of pupils have oeen grossly misjudged, then 
Hirst's condition (iii) is not an objective demand but rather a subjective 
one, a demand that the teacher must believe that the pupils could 
understand. For it is only on this understanding of condition (iii) that 
teaching could occur when the cognitive state of pupils has been grossly 
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misjudged. In order to be consistent, Hirst must withdraw either this 
claim or the claim that a third party can judge any activities as 
"definitely" not teaching on the basis of condition (iii)'s not being 
met. 
If we are to adhere to the claim that a person may be teaching 
certain children even when he presents material which they are incapable 
of understanding because of misjudgment on his part, we must rephrase 
Hirst's third necessary condition to read, "is, in the opinion of A, 
intelligible to and within the capacities of the learner". The stronger, 
objective claim that it must be within the capacities of the learner is 
incompatible with teaching's being an activity. The weaker, subjective 
claim is incompatible with anyone's being able to tell a person who 
has sincere beliefs (no matter how ridiculous) about his pupils' cognitive 
states and who is indicating Xs in ways compatible with these, that he 
is mistaken. 
It seems to me more consistent with our understanding of teaching 
to accept Hirst's example, and claim that a person delivering an 
exposition of Wittgenstein to six year olds is not teaching them on the 
grounds that they are not understanding him. Certainly if it were 
claimed that these six year olds were entitled to teaching during the 
time when this was going on, it would not be generally accepted that they 
were receiving that to which they were entitled. 
Finally, if the subjective interpretation necessary for claiming 
that teaching is an activity is adhered to, a person 'logically can' 
teach another something they already know. All that is necessary is 
A's belief that B does not know the X (as required by condition (i) 
for A to have a sincere intention). The arguments used above in 
respect of condition (iii) apply analogously to a misjudgment in 
respect of condition (i). I have already argued that I withdraw my 
claim to have been teaching B X at time t when I learn that B already 
knew the X at that time, and retreat to "was trying to..." or "thought 
I was..." claims. 
I suggested earlier that there were some unexpected implications 
involved in the activity analysis in relation to empirical investigations 
of teaching. Researchers first have to investigate which of a person's 
intentions are primary, so that teachers who were primarily concerned to 
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avoid riots, keep children interested, etc. could be excluded (as 
professional frauds). Investigations are also needed of the detail 
in which teachers have specified that which is to be learned, so that 
teachers with 'fuzzy' intentions can be excluded. Now it is clear 
that they must additionally investigate the teachers' beliefs about 
the conceptual frameworks of their pupils, so as to eliminate any 
teachers who present Xs in ways which are inconsistent with those 
beliefs (e.g. because they are using curriculum project materials) 
even if their beliefs are wrong and the children do understand and 
are learning. 
My own view is that what is required is rather for investigators 
to ascertain for themselves as far as possible how intelligible the 
teacher is to his pupils, and eliminate from any investigations teachers 
who present Xs in ways which are incomprehensible to their pupils, 
whatever the teachers' beliefs on the matter. For surely it is a 
mistake to suggest that one can judge the effectiveness of new 
teaching methods when they are being used in situations in which they 
are bound to fail. It may not be the method which is poor but the 
teacher's judgment. It is not only the teacher's beliefs about 
the situation which are relevent to research. Also relevant is how 
things are. Analysis must surely square with common sense on this. 
If analysis suggests that the actual states of pupils and what they 
are doing is irrelevant to deciding whether or not a person is 
teaching them (as this one does) then surely there is something wrong 
with the analysis. It is surely not consistent with our usual 
understanding of what teaching is to suggest that nothing that could 
be discovered about pupils' actuality is relevant to deciding whether 
or not they are being taught. 
It follows from the claim that teaching is an activity that 
writing a textbook, making work-cards or films, etc. are teaching 
activities. If so, it would be appropriate to say that a person who 
spends time doing these things is teaching (something to someone) 
while he is engaged in doing them. If this were the case, there could 
be no ontological assumptions in our use of the term 'teaching', for 
all that is needed on this analysis is that the presentation is 
directed towards some hoped-for or putative pupils. 
Our usual application of the term, which accepts Scheffler's point 
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that a person can't just be teaching but must be teaching someone, 
has the implication that more than merely putative pupils are required. 
There is no support in the language for calling writing a text-book; 
preparing a work-sheet or handout, or constructing a programme for a 
teaching machine instances of teaching (although Hirst's three criteria 
are adequately met). If you ask a person who has spent the afternoon 
doing any of these things, it is not the case that he would reply, 
"teaching". To assert that this is teaching is thus to prescribe many 
adjustments in our language usage, and indicates the incorrectness of 
any claim that Hirst is giving an account of our current understanding 
of what teaching is, as embodied in ordinary language. 
Since a prescription requires some justification for its acceptance 
and none has been offered, we may ask why we should accept that any of 
these are usefully described as instances of teaching someone, though 
I clearly accept that the point of doing these things may be that 
someone should learn from them at some time in the future. That is, I 
suggest that a useful distinction can be made between what one is doing 
and the point of doing it. Though it is acceptable to say that someone 
has been engaging in activities the point of which is to teach someone 
something in the future, I suggest that this cannot be equated with 
saying that one was engaged in teaching all afternoon. This seems to 
me quite unacceptable, and since it follows from the activity analysis, 
that analysis must also be unacceptable. 
If teaching were an activity, it must always be engaged in for a 
period of time, so that we can say when A was teaching B X. But can 
we intelligibly ask when A was teaching hoped-for pupils? Isn't this 
like asking when A was shooting at hoped-for targets or treating 
hoped-for patients? The question "When were you teaching them?" indicates 
the ontological assumptions which lie behind the language of teaching. 
Indeed, were this not so, we would have to accept that a person who 
believed in elves and wrote a book designed to teach them the latest 
techniques of shoe-making was teaching elves shoe-making. I have 
already argued, in respect of a different point, that in accepting such 
claims, one is committing oneself to the truth of their assumptions -
in this case that elves existed. We would not normally do this. 
Consider a book written for putative pupils of a given age-group, 
which is later used by such pupils. What, then, is the appropriate answer, 
if any, to be given to the question "When was A teaching those pupils?" 
On the activity analysis we must say he was teaching them whilst 
writing the book - when they were, perhaps, asleep, doing something 
else or even not born yet. On the other hand, if we are to say 
they are being taught by him, the time at which this is occurring can 
only be when they engage themselves with the book, not when it was 
being written. How can these two claims be reconciled? 
One attempt to reconcile them is to suggest that the pupils' being 
taught is the upshot of A's teaching them. Certainly this overcomes the 
difficulty over time, for the upshot of an activity need not occur when 
the activity occurs and can occur after the agent's death. But "A is 
Xing B" and "B is being X-ed by A" are normally taken as alternative 
descriptions of the same goings-on, such that they not only describe 
the same events, but also have the same meaning. (Contrast Kenny's 
example of "Nero committed arson" and "Rome was burnt", which describe 
the same event but do not have the same meaning.) This being the case, 
it is impossible that one should be the upshot of the other, and this 
attempt to reconcile the two claims fails. 
The other possibility, then, is to reject the claim that A was 
teaching those pupils when he is writing a book, or that he was teaching 
hoped-for pupils, and say rather that if any person is being taught it 
is when he uses this material. I argue here not only that we do not say 
the former (which is consistent with the activity analysis) but also 
that it would be completely inappropriate for us to do so. I argue that 
for any valid teaching claim, the persons who are the objects of the 
claim must have an ontological status and not merely be an intensional 
object. This is to assert that a person cannot be teaching a person 
who does not exist (as he might love a person who does not exist). 
Since this is inconsistent with teaching's being an activity (on Hirst's 
understanding of it) if these arguments are valid, teaching cannot be 
an activity in that sense. 
Non-intentional teaching 
If teaching were an activity, it would be trivially true that an 
enthusiast talking about his hobby or interests, indicating or explaining 
or showing Xs to another person who learns, and doing so with no thought 
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of bringing about learning, cannot be teaching in the sense that Hirst 
discusses. He may simply enjoy discussing his interests with others. 
Similarly, we speak of a mother teaching her children a great deal when 
they are engaged in what is, to all of them, a pleasant social activity, 
and it is trivially true that she cannot be teaching them in the 'activity' 
sense. What is it, asks Hirst, that leads us to speak of teaching in 
these contexts? 
My own view is that this is a misleading question, and that it is 
these cases that enable us to understand what teaching is and hence to 
understand and to make teaching attempts. No reason has been given 
to explain why it is these cases that require special explanation, 
except that it is required in order to make them square with the 
analysis. 
According to Hirst, his analysis helps us to understand why at 
times we speak of teaching in a non-intentional sense. "The situation 
is interpreted as a teaching situation by the learner, .when from the 
intentional point of view, it is no such thing."55 This explanation 
cannot be correct in the case of the mother and the young child, for 
such an interpretation would be beyond the capacities of such a child. 
The explanation, as I understand it, is that though the displayer 
of Xs may not see the situation as a teaching one (that is, he is not 
engaged in the activity of teaching), the learner is engaged in the 
activity of learning. This explanation must be incorrect in the case 
of a young child, who cannot be engaged in the activity of learning 
until he has the concept of learning. This understanding is necessary 
for him to have learning as the point or purpose of his doings. But 
the explanation additionally lacks plausibility because we are equally 
happy to speak of learning and teaching even when we accept that both 
child and mother are engaged in activities with the primary point of 
enjoying themselves. 
An additional difficulty arises in respect of the claim that 
learning must be the point of the learnelis doings if the Xs which 
are being claimed to have been taught and learned are propositional. 
It was suggested that since teaching X is an activity, the Xs must 
be clearly delineated, not "fuzzy". Presumably the same must be true 
of learning, if learning, too, is an activity. But the learning of 
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propositions cannot be an activity if it is required that the 
propositions be tightly and clearly specified in the formulation 
of the intention. For this would require that he had already 
learned the propositions which it was his intention to learn. This 
is self-contradictory. But if it is not required that the learner 
have clearly formulated the propositions he intends to learn in 
order for him to be engaged in the activity (in Hirst's sense) of 
learning them, then we can ask for a reason to be given as grounds 
for the claim that for a person to be teaching those propositions 
he must have clear intentions in respect of them. 
I suggest that we always understand the 'outcome' sense of 
teaching in the same way, and that there are not two distinct senses 
depending on whether intentional or non-intentional teaching is 
involved. This is best illustrated by an example. Consider a case 
where A is trying to teach B X through discussion, and C, B's friend, 
joins in. The only difference in the situation of A in respect of 
B and C is, ex hypothesi, that he has no intention of bringing about 
C's learning. His principal intention in keeping C included in the 
discussion is to keep B from leaving to play with C. Now if the 
outcome sense had the meaning Hirst suggests, that it is used to 
denote a successfully completed activity, then the claims "A is 
teaching B X" and "A is teaching C X" (denoting outcomes in each 
case) must be using different senses of teach, one a central sense 
and the other a derivative sense. This would mean that the claim 
"A taught B and C X" in this context would be what might be described 
as a "conceptual mess". That it does not seem to be so surely indicates 
that there are not two outcome or achievement senses, one associated 
with attempts and one derivatively associated with the absence of 
an attempt. Additionally, the truth of the statement that A taught 
B and C X does not seem to require that either had the intention of 
learning X56. Learning does not have to be C's activity. 
The final objection to the analysis of teaching as an activity 
is that it generates a paradox in the idea of teaching by example in 
the moral sphere. Teaching by example, one of the paradigms of 
teaching in this area, is made logically impossible by this analysis. 
On the activity analysis, for a person to be teaching another e.g. 
to be honest by example, he must be performing his honest act with the 
primary intention of bringing about the child's learning. But if his 
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primary intention, his main reason for doing it, were to bring about the 
child's learning, it would not be, primarily, a moral act. For this 
requires, on most accounts of morality, that the act be done primarily 
because it is the honest thing to do. If both moral acts and teaching 
acts are defined in terms of the primacy of the moral or teaching 
intention (the answer the agent gives to the question "Why are you doing 
this?") teaching by example in the moral sphere is made logically 
impossible. 
Of course, we may say, "All right, then he was teaching in a 
different sense." But surely, at that stage, questions start to be 
raised about the point of that particular philosophical enterprise. 
Are we involved in the area of persuasive definition': If so, how are 
we to justify the new usages? Or are we trying to get clear about 
the language we use now? 
I have argued that a conceptital analysis of teaching is important 
as a preliminary to looking at the teacher's role (and for other reasons). 
Since it is often suggested that it is part of the role of the teacher 
to teach by example in the area of morality, the analysis of teaching 
which is applied for the investigation must at least allow for this. 
A person needs to live up to his principles as a part of teaching them 
to anyone else. 
Conclusion  
My ultimate concern is for justifying certain kinds of practices 
as part of the teacher's role, and insofar as justifying implicitly 
prescribes, to be involved in prescribing certain things for the role 
of the teacher and suggesting that there are certain capacities and 
characteristics which teachers ought to have. 
For this reason, it seems important to develop an understanding 
of teaching as we use the term in general, before we focus on the 
schools. Since I am convinced that the current orthodox analysis is 
stipulative and incoherent, for the reasons given in this chapter, I 
must propose an alternative analysis, for I cannot use an analysis 
which I believe to be incoherent as the basis of my justificatory 
enterprise. 
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The approach of this chapter has been polemical. My main aim 
has been to indicate the many difficulties involved in the analysis 
of teaching as an activity, and if the attack has seemed unusually 
spirited, it is because the analysis is so well established in 
educational circles. This is why it has seemed to me so important 
to make explicit the contradictions which, in my view, it contains, 
and this is what I have tried to do here. 
The criterion I have concentrated on has been primarily the 
first, which suggests that as a necessary condition for teaching a 
particular X, one must intend a particular person (or group of 
persons) B, to learn that X, clearly not fuzzily specified (as, for 
example, about P). I have criticized also the second criterion, 
insofar as it does not accommodate teaching by eliciting, and I 
have further suggested that the third criterion is ambiguous, as it 
is not clear from its formulation whether it is intended as an 
objective or a subjective demand. 
Following my argument in Chapter I, I suggest that analysing 
teaching in this way functions (whether intended or not) as a method 
of prescribing the professional role of teachers for those who accept 
that the primary role of the teacher is to teach (for what else could 
his obligation be?) That is, they argue along the following syllogistic 
lines: 
(i) I ought to teach 
(ii) This is what teaching is (i.e. I accept the analysis) 
Therefore (iii) This is what I ought to do 
I earlier argued, against Scheffler and Broudy, that what we mean 
by terms and what ought to go on in schools are different questions. 
Similarly, since this is not argued, by Hirst, to be the only sense of 
teach, we can ask why it is the case that teachers ought to teach in 
this sense (a prescription to be specific about one's objectives and 
not have fuzzy aims). A justification is required but is not provided. 
Conceptual analysis cannot itself justify a claim that this is what 
teachers ought to do. This can only be done through consideration of 
what is involved in the role of the teacher in school. 
What is involved in the role of the teacher is, as indicated in the 
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General Introduction, a controversial matter. Thus, in addition to 
the objections I have raised to the analysis on account of its 
internal inconsistencies and its failure to square with common sense 
in several important matters, I raise the objection that it conceals  
very real moral problems about the teacher's role. In insisting that 
teachers must teach in this sense certain questions are ruledout or 
answered a priori. 
I hope, therefore, to have indicated that the range of objections 
to this analysis are sufficiently coherent and important to justify 
serious attention being given to an alternative analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
 Terms of Art for Discussing Teaching and Learning 
Introduction 
Most of the discussions on teaching have involved philosophical 
terms of art, and it is clear that discussions on teaching require 
a schema which is adequate to discussions of the majority, if not 
all, uses of the term. After a careful examination of those terms 
of art which are in current use in philosophy, I have come to the 
conclusion that none of these are helpful in coming to understand 
the concept of teaching as it is centrally used, and the relation 
of this concept to other concepts of teaching. The main objection 
is that the schemas which represent, as it were, the current 
philosophical frameworks, are all dichotomous, whereas the concept 
of teaching seems to me to require a three-fold schema. Teaching 
claims refer sometimes to attempts, sometimes to protracted goings-on 
and sometimes to final upshots (new states in learners) having been 
brought about. It has therefore seemed to me necessary to develop 
a new schema which, I shall argue, is helpful not only for discussing 
teaching but also a number of concepts which refer to interpersonal 
transactions. 
Rather than simply to assert that existing terms of art are 
unsatisfactory, I have felt it necessary to devote the first section 
of this chapter to an examination of them, in order to justify my 
claim that a new schema is necessary. The first section of the 
chapter, which examines the Kenny activity/performance distinction, 
the Vendler activity/accomplishment distinction and the Ryle task/ 
achievement distinction (all descended from Aristotle), is thus 
negative rather than positive in character. It is also somewhat 
complex, and may be found difficult to follow, but this, I believe, 
is a result of the nature of the discussion and the kinds of 
distinctions being discussed. 
Having indicated the inadequacy of these terms of art for my 
purpose, in the second part of the chapter I develop a schema which 
seems to me to be more satisfactory for fully understanding the 
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language of teaching. I do this through a consideration of the class 
of verbs which can fill in for X in "A is X-ing B" where B is a person 
and where some response in B is required for the claim "A is X-ing B" 
to be true, as well as actions performed by A which bring about the 
response. The logic of this class of verbs, which I call "perficience 
verbs" is explored in the final section of this chapter. 
Activities and Performances - the Kenny distinction 
In "Action, Emotion and Will"57, Kenny lays out the criteria for 
what he calls "activity verbs". He is concerned to distinguish them 
from, on the one hand, "static verbs" and, on the other, from other 
"non-static verbs" which he designates as "performance verbs". No 
consideration of states is necessary here, and no further reference 
will be made to static verbs. It is the distinction between activity 
and performance verbs which concerns me. 
For Kenny, the defining characteristic is the difference in 
implication involved in the claim "A is X-ing". Where "A is X-ing" 
implies "A has X-ed", Kenny calls the verb an activity verb. Where 
"A is X-ing" implies "A has not X-ed", he calls the verb a performance  
verb. The other distinguishing characteristic is the implication of 
"A has X-ed". It is only for performance verbs that "A has X-ed" has 
any necessary implication, implying that "A is not X-ing". For 
activity verbs, "A has X-ed" neither implies nor excludes "A is X-ing". 
From these defining characteristics, Kenny gives an account of 
other features which serve to distinguish performances and activities. 
Activities, he says58, go on for a time. Only performances take time. 
Only performances can be complete or incomplete. Activities may be 
prolonged indefinitely or they may cease. Only performances come to 
a definite end and are finished. 
Now many of the things which have been said in the previous chapter 
seem to point to the use of teach as a performance rather than as an 
activity verb. Teaching a person to swim takes time. I may teach 
Peter how to swim in three months. And I may intelligibly say that 
I haven't finished teaching Peter how to swim yet. "I am teaching 
Peter how to swim" implies "I have not taught Peter how to swim" 
(or at least that I haven't finished doing so) rather than "I have 
taught Peter how to swim", which, on Kenny's criteria, would need 
to be the case if teaching were an activity. 
My claim that I have taught Peter how to swim has the implication 
that I am not now teaching him how to swim (though, of course, I may 
be teaching him to swim better). Also, according to Kenny, activity 
verbs cannot be qualified by the adverbs quickly and slowly, for 
only that which takes time can be so qualified. L>o, again, since it 
is quite intelligible to say that I have never taught anyone how to 
swim as quickly as I have taught Peter, the indications are that 'teach', 
by the criteria suggested by Kenny, is a performance verb, And, 
according to Kenny, performances are describab]e as "bringing it about 
that p" in contrast with activities which, according to Kenny, in many 
but not all cases are describable as "attempting to bring it about that 
p." 
It seems important at this stage to question whether this performance 
use of the verb 'teach' is to be identified with Ryle's achievement 
sense (to be discussed in detail later). It does not seem possible to 
identify the two. According to Ryle59, achievement verbs "signify not 
merely that some performance has been gone through but also that 
something has been brought off by the agent going through it". And 
also, of the application of an achievement verb to an agent, that the 
latter6o "is not being said to have done two things but to have done 
one thing with a certain upshot." The principle here is that 
achievement verbs usually mark termini, though they may mark the 
maintenance of a certain upshot. Kenny makes it clear that the use 
of a performance verb does not necessarily imply that the final terminus 
will be brought about, and teaching claims clearly cannot refer to the 
maintenance of a certain upshot. For these reasons it seems that no 
identification can be made. Many of Kenny's performance verbs 
involve an agent in doing something in which the bringing about of 
progress towards some final state is a necessary part, rather than 
doing something with a certain final upshot or the maintenance of an 
upshot (like Ryle's "keeping the hawk in view".) It is impossible that 
a performance should occur without something's being brought about, but 
that something is not necessarily either the maintenance of a given 
upshot or the bringing about of a final upshot. The occurrence of the 
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final terminus, the attainment of a new state, is what brings the 
performance to its end. 
Ryle's achievement verbs, Kenny points out61, fall into all 
three categories, 'know' being a state, 'cure' being a performance, 
and 'keep a secret' an activity. The achievement sense of 'teach' 
would thus fall into Kenny's performance category. But the above 
discussion indicates that though it may ise possible to assign 
achievement uses of verbs such as 'teach' and 'learn' to the 
performance category, this does not mean that achievement uses 
can be identified with performance uses. 
however, there are good reasons for suggesting that all uses 
of the verbs 'teach' and 'learn' cannot be performance uses, and 
these do not rest on the distinction between attempts and achievements. 
Activities, Kenny says, go on for a time, and I may have taught Peter 
swimming for an hour this morning. From a logical point of view, I 
can go on teaching him swimming indefinitely, or I may decide to stop. 
This seems to be an activity use of 'teach'. 
Kenny leads us to believe that his distinction between 
performances and activities corresponds to Aristotle's distinction 
between kinesis and energeia63. This restricts performance verbs 
to verbs with a limit, since it is implied that energeia need have 
no limit. This is why activities, in the Kenny sense, may be 
prolonged indefinitely. There is no logical necessity for them 
to end. 
It was earlier suggested that A's teaching B X must finish when 
B learns X. So, if this is accepted, provided that the specification 
of the object of teaching specifies a limit (and there are criteria 
by virtue of which B is judged to have learned X), then teaching can 
be terminated necessarily. A has not the option of teaching Peter 
how to swim after he has learned how to swim. He has not got the 
choice of prolonging his teaching of that X indefinitely or not. 
Where the object of teaching (content) specifies a limit, then, 
teaching is a performance verb. 
But not all uses of teaching specify content with a limit. Teaching 
philosophy or science could be prolonged indefinitely, no matter how 
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much the pupil learned - at least on any account of teaching which 
allows it possible to teach that which one does not know, as, for 
64 
example, on a mutual enquiry model of teaching . Even if this is 
not accepted, in practice it would be possible for an authority on 
philosophy to prolong his teaching for a considerable time. If the 
teaching; is ended necessarily, it is because of limitations in the 
agent, not in the object of the teaching (content). 
Whatever the position taken on this, the application of the 
Kenny distinction suggests that teach has an activity use in "A 
is teaching B philosophy" and a performance use in "A is teaching 
B what is meant in philosophy by a conceptual relationship." In 
the latter case the teaching necessarily finishes when B grasps 
the meaning of the term 'conceptual relationship'. But A can 
continue teaching B philosophy indefinitely, in that there can be 
no analogical time after which he (logically) cannot continue teaching B 
the philosophy he knows, as there is after which he cannot (logically) 
continue teaching the meaning of the term 'conceptual relationship'. 
It might be objected that this argument rests on a possibly 
controversial premise about teaching having to stop when B learns 
a specified X. But there can be no controversy if the above 
argument is applied to possible activity and performance uses of 
'learn'. For it is necessarily true that when I have learned what 
a conceptual relationship is, my learning of this must cease. The 
'learn' in "I am learning the meaning of a conceptual relationship 
in philosophy" is a performance verb in that it fulfils the Kenny 
tense implication criteria, and is identifiable as kinesis by 
virtue of the limit. On the other hand, there is no time when it 
is necessary for there to be a termination in the case of learning 
philosophy. The 'learn' in "I am learning philosophy" clearly 
cannot be a performance verb but must be an activity use. 
Both the 'teach' in "A is teaching B philosophy" and the 'learn' 
in "A is learning philosophy" fulfil the criteria for being activity 
uses. One can learn or teach philosophy for a time, and it doesn't 
make sense to ask whether one's learning or teaching of philosophy 
(as opposed to a specific item or even course in philosophy) is complete 
or incomplete. In the sphere of knowledge, it is normally suggested 
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that the impossibility of achieving a final end is a characteristic 
of importance. Both claims are consistent with the Kenny criteria 
for an activity use, because "A is teaching B philosophy" and "A 
is learning philosophy" both neither imply nor exclude, respectively, 
"A has taught B philosophy" and "A has learned philosophy". They 
do not fulfil the criterion Kenny lays down for performances in that 
"A is teaching B philosophy" and "A is learning philosophy" do not 
imply, respectively, "A has not taught B philosophy" and "A has not 
learned philosophy". 
Kenny has suggested that activity uses can sometimes be formulated 
as attempts to bring it about that p, and it would clearly be wrong 
to deny that "A is teaching B philosophy" and "A is learning philosophy" 
can be understood as "A is attempting to bring it about that B learns 
philosophy" and "A is attempting to bring it about that he knows/ 
understands philosophy", respectively, with no implication of success 
at all. This might be described as "mere attempts". But they can 
also be interpreted, in appropriate contexts, as "A is bringing it 
about that B learns philosophy" and "B is bringing it about that he 
knows/understands philosophy" respectively, not as mere attempts. 
But I hope to have shown above that because there is no terminus 
implied in the description the use cannot be a performance use, for 
the concept of a performance requires the possibility of a final 
terminus. And yet it cannot be simply described as an 'achievement' 
use, because it neither marks the maintenance of a steady state 
nor the reaching of a terminus. There thus seem to be uses of 'teach' 
and 'learn' which can be classified as (a) mere attempts (b) activities 
(c) performances and (d) achievements. 
The examination of these different uses in depth has, additionally, 
brought to light a paradox. I have argued that the 'learn' in "A is 
learning philosophy" is an activity use (which may or may not involve 
an attempt, for it might be said of A when is is learning philosophy 
through discussions with his friends, with no intention of learning 
philosophy). I have also argued that the 'learn' in "A is learning the 
meaning of 'conceptual relationship' in philosophy" is a performance 
use. But the meaning of learn is identical in the two uses. It 
does not have different senses when it has different objects. The puzzle 
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arises because "A is learning what a conceptual relationship is in 
philosophy" entails "A is learning philosophy". If 'learn' has an 
activity use in the latter case and a performance use in the former, 
and if the meaning of a word is closely related to, if not to be 
identified with, its use, it would follow that 'learn' both has and 
has not two different meanings in the same context. It can be seen 
that there is a parallel if the two claims "A is teaching B philosophy" 
and "A is teaching B to understand what is meant by a conceptual 
relationship in philosophy" are considered. Thus the inapplicability 
of Kenny's activity/performance distinction to "teaching" and "learning" 
has been shown by a reductio ad absurdum. 
Activities, accomplisiunents and achievements - the Vendler distinctions  
I turn now to an alternative attempt to provide a schema for 
classifying verbs, again by virtue of their time schema, the one 
proposed by Vendler65. 
Vendler also uses the term 'activity' and proposes a distinction 
between 'activities' and what he calls 'accomplishments'. At first 
the distinction seems to be identical with that proposed by Kenny and 
already discussed, except for terminology. If that were the case, its 
inapplicability to 'teaching' and 'learning' would be shown by the 
same reductio. However, on closer examination, the distinctions do not 
appear to be the same, although both are based on the Aristotelian 
distinction between kinesis and energeia, and some discussion of the 
Vendler distinctions is required. 
Examples of activities, for Vendler, are 'running' and 'pushing a 
cart'. Like Kenny (and in contrast to Hirst), Vendler does not define  
activities in terms of the agent's purpose or point. The identifying 
feature of an activity, for Vendler - as indicated by consideration of 
statements such as "A was running (X-ing) at time t"- is that time 
instant t is "on a time stretch through which A was running" (or X-ing) 
(his italics). The identifying feature of an accomplishment (Vendler's 
examples of which are 'drawing a circle' and 'running a mile') is that 
when one says "A was drawing a circle (X-ing) at time t" one means that 
"t is on the time stretch in which A drew that circle" (X-ed) (his 
italics). The central notion involved in Vendler's distinction 
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is the set terminal point which running a mile and drawing a 
circle share, in contrast to running or pushing a cart, and 
which, he says, "casts its shadow backward, giving a new colour 
to all that went before." "In other words," writes Vendler66, 
"if someone stops running a mile, he did not run a mile; if one 
stops drawing a circle, he did not draw a circle." 
It is clear from some of Vendler's remarks that he does not 
conceive of accomplishment verbs in precisely the same way as 
Kenny does of performance verbs, even though both start from the 
energeia/kinesis distinction. For Vendler continues67, "If I 
say of a person....that he is drawing a circle, then I do claim 
that 	 he will keep drawing until he has drawn the circle. If 
they do not complete their activities (sic) my statement will 
turn out to be false." But Kenny does not claim this of 
performance verbs, for he suggests that a man may be walking to 
the pub and yet never walk there. That is, I assume that if 
Kenny says of someone that he is X-ing (where X is a performance 
verb) he does not claim that he will keep X-ing until he has X-ed. 
It is clear that claims can sometimes be made with the kinds 
of implications suggested by Vendler, though perhaps this occurs 
less often than with the kinds of implications suggested by Kenny. 
Perhaps the difficulty is that neither has paid attention here to 
the intentions of the speaker. For though a statement such as 
"A is drawing a circle" may be uttered with the intention of 
implying that if the agent does not complete the circle, the 
claim that he was drawing it was false, it is not necessary for 
it to have this implication. If a person dropped dead before he 
finished the drawing, we could, without abuse of language, say 
he was drawing a circle when he died, and not merely, as Vendler 
suggests in a footnote, that he was trying to draw a circle. 
However, we do not need to produce such dramatic cases to 
indicate that usage does not support Vendler in all cases, for 
if a person is said to have been writing a letter (Vendler's own 
example) between t1 and t2, there is surely no necessary implication 
that the letter was finished during this period. Distinctions 
surely need to be drawn between the logical possibility of a 
- 74 - 
climax, the intention to produce that climax and the occurrence of 
the climax. In general, the logical possibility of the climax is 
the only condition necessary for us to describe anyone as doing 
in terms that include it; we assume the intention to produce it 
if we say of him that he was trying to do it; and the occurrence 
of it is necessary for it to be said truly of anyone that he has 
done it. 
Vendler's suggestion that, if the final upshot is not achieved, 
we can only make "trying" claims is consistent with Ryle's suggestion 
that we "borrow" achievement verbs to denote tasks when the hope of 
success is good. But it is a significant omission to neglect failure 
to finish something as a special kind of failure which merits marking 
out on its own. In some cases, such as writing a letter, we do not 
withdraw to merely "trying" claims if the final upshot is not achieved. 
Some of the terms Vendler calls accomplishment verbs do, in 
normal contexts, imply that the climax will occur, but some of them 
are often used to indicate progress towards a climax without 
implying that the climax necessarily will occur or has occurred. 
But if this is accepted, they are not accomplishment verbs on Vendler's 
criteria. They do not meet the distinguishing time schema. According 
to Vendler, the identifying feature of accomplishments is that "A was 
X-ing at time t" means that t was on the time stretch in which A X-ed. 
If it were accepted that it could be true that A was X-ing (e.g. 
writing a letter) at time t, between t1 and t2  even though he had 
not finished X-ing (writing the letter) at t2  (and, indeed, perhaps 
never finished it) the criterion is not met. A reformulated 
criterion is therefore needed if writing a letter, for example, is 
to be retained as an accomplishment. 
What Vendler seems to have done is to conflate two different 
possibilities, uses of verbs in ways which meet his conditions, like 
'running a mile' where, if the person never finishes the mile, we 
do not say he was running a mile between t1 and t2, and uses which 
do not, like 'writing a letter' where we do say that a person was 
writing a letter between t1 and t2 even if the letter is unfinished. 
On Vendler's account of activities, the time schema indicates a 
continuous time stretch throughout which the activities were being 
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performed. He says`', "'A was running at time t' means that time 
instant t is on a time stretch throughout which (my italics) A was 
running". And he also says, "If someone has been running for half 
an hour, then it must be true that he has been running for every 
period within that half-hour." But such continual, uninterrupted 
goings-on are the exception rather than the rule. To say of a 
person (using Vendler's examples) that he has been walking, swimming 
or pushing a cart for half an hour surely does not necessarily imply 
uninterrupted activity as Vendler suggests. For we would not 
withdraw the claim that A has been running for half an hour if he 
had paused for a moment to catch his breath, swimming for half an 
hour if he has stopped at the side of the pool to chat with a 
spectator, etc. Learning philosophy, having no logical terminus or 
climax, appears to be an activity in Vendler's terms (as it did in 
Kenny's) but "A has been learning philosophy for a year" can surely 
carry no implication of an uninterrupted stretch of time, at least 
not in the sense in which, it seems to me, Vendler must be interpreted. 
It is inappropriate to say that any instant t during the time when A 
was learning philosophy lies on a time stretch throughout which A 
was learning philosophy. There is a sense in which it can be said 
of him that he was learning philosophy throughout the year, but 
this is a sense which is necessarily parasitic on actual occurrences, 
which may be sporadic, of A's learning philosophy. 
"A is learning philosophy", said of A whilst asleep, depends on 
the claim "A is learning philosophy" in respect of A's doings whilst 
conscious. White69 discusses a similar example - where we say "He 
is learning to walk" of a child asleep - to refute the suggestion 
that learning is a process. But, in my view, no satisfactory 
argument has been produced to suggest that this is an 'achievement' 
use of learn, either in Hyle's standard sense, or in Vendler's sense, 
or that it is a case of an 'achievement' verb being borrowed for a 
'task' use. The similarities with Vendler's accomplishment verbs are 
sufficiently great that consideration had to be given to the idea that 
'learn' might be an accomplishment verb. However, enough has been 
said to suggest thatI for this to be so, Vendler's criteria would need 
modification. 
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I have suggested that the interest lies in the fact that we 
do not always withdraw the predication of X-ing when the climax 
involved in the claim is not attained, and an e)tamination of the 
factors which lead us to withdraw the claim in some cases but not 
in others. For example, the use of 'learn' in "A is learning to 
play the Moonlight sonata" would seem to be an accomplishment use. 
But though this implies the possibility of the achievement of a 
state of affairs when, according to specifiable criteria, A can 
be said to be able to play the Moonlight sonata, it is not a 
necessary implication of the claim that this must occur. A person 
may give up before he accomplishes this, as I may give up writing my 
letter, but we do not have to withdraw the "was learning" claim or 
the "was writing a letter" claim even though he never learned to 
play the sonata and I did not write the letter. In the latter case, 
the partly finished letter is evidence that I was writing a letter 
(not merely trying to write one) and the difference in the standard 
of the child's performance between the first and final attempts to 
play the Moonlight sonata is evidence that he was learning something. 
On the other hand, there are cases where we do withdraw the 
"was learning" claim, and these are instances of complete and utter 
failure. If we say of a child "He is learning to play the note C 
on the trumpet" or, of a deaf person, "He is learning to lip-read", 
we tend to withdraw the ascription and retreat to "try-to" constructions, 
as Vendler and Ryle suggest, if the child never manages to produce 
a sound on the trumpet or the deaf person to interpret a single word. 
The reductio ad absurdum argument directed against the application 
of the Kenny distinction equally indicates that the Vendler activity/ 
accomplishment distinction is inapplicable to teaching and learning. 
But the discussion has indicated again the necessity for a schema 
which differentiates between complete and utter failure (mere attempts), 
progress in bringing something about (whether a final outcome or not) 
and the attainment of a final outcome or terminus. 
Intentional vs Instrumental Analysis 
Hirst maintains70 
 , and with this I agree, that it is impossible 
to characterize teaching by producing an exhaustive list of activities 
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which constitute it. From this he has concluded that teaching is 
a polymorphous activity. I have questioned whether a satisfactory 
analysis of teaching as an activity in Hirst's sense (as defined 
in terms of purpose or point) can be given in the previous chapter, 
and in this chapter have argued that neither the Kenny activity/ 
performance distinction nor the Vendler activity/accomplishment 
distinction can usefully be applied to teaching and learning. Since 
I am involved in questioning the assumption that teaching and learning 
are activities (in their central senses), I am necessarily involved 
in questioning whether they can be polymorphous activities. 
The main force of arguments that teaching (and other concepts) 
should be analysed as activities lies in the claim that intention 
is necessary to our understanding of these terms. It is not that 
all cases of teaching are necessarily intentional, according to this 
argument, for explanations can be offered of why we apply the term 
teaching when one of the criteria which are necessary for central 
cases are missing. However, the analysis is intentional, not 
instrumental. 
This section suggests that the polymorphous character of 
teaching activities (in the ordinary language sense), what makes 
a wide variety of different activities instances of teaching, can 
be explained by an instrumental rather than an intentional analysis 
of teaching. It is not that what the activities have in common is 
that they are done by an agent with the same primary intention in 
each case, but that they serve the same function, the bringing 
about of learning. 
I explore this problem with reference to Hirst's brief account71 
of the polymorphous activity of gardening. He suggests that mowing 
the lawn is an activity which is necessarily a form of gardening. 
If Hirst accepts the Kenny activity/performance distinction, mowing 
the lawn is a performance rather than an activity. It is clearly 
parallel to Kenny's example of washing the dishes, and is describable 
as bringing it about that the lawn is cut. However, since it is not 
clear whether or not Hirst is using Kenny's account as the basis of 
his work, the term 'activity' will be used loosely here. 
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Given Hirst's account of an activity in terms of the agent's 
primary point or purpose, it is not plausible that any of the various 
"sub-activities" could ever necessarily be a case of the activity 
in question (i.e. so that a person mowing the lawn is necessarily 
gardening). Either there is no necessity for e.g. mowing the lawn 
to be an instance of gardening, or gardening is not an activity in 
this sense. For a person may mow his lawn with a variety of primary 
intentions - annoying his neighbour with the sound of the mower, 
collecting the grass cuttings to take into school for an experiment in 
science, pleasing his mother who asked him to mow the lawn, or improving 
his garden. If the agent's point or purpose in mowing the lawn was not 
primarily to promote the welfare of his garden, then, on an activity 
analysis of gardening, this agent was not gardening. 
Thus it must follow that no activity (in Hirst's sense) could be 
analysed in terms of other activities or performances which are 
necessarily instances of the activity in question. The most that 
such a list of gardening activities might do would be to suggest that 
gardening, independently understood in terms of point or purpose, 
could not include activities or performances other than those on the 
list. But the difficulty in formulating the list is a logical 
difficulty. Firstly, it would be impossible to claim that one could 
ever know the limitations on what might promote the welfare of a 
garden. This will be dependent on, for example, discoveries in science. 
But, perhaps more importantly, as already suggested, for an agent's 
particular activity (in this sense) it is his subjective beliefs 
about appropriate means to ends which are relevant. 
Now it might be suggested here that one could make a standard 
philosophical move by distinguishing between the point or purpose of 
the agent and the point or purpose of the activity. What makes 
gardening gardening, on this account, is that the point of gardening 
activities is the benefit of the garden. So, though the primary 
point or purpose of a particular agent may be different (e.g. pleasing 
his mother, annoying his neighbour), he is gardening, in a slightly 
weakened sense, because in standard cases an agent gardens to promote 
the welfare of his garden, as in standard cases he runs the race to win. 
However, the distinguishing between the point of an activity and 
the point of a person in this way seems to me to be an entirely false 
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distinction. For, on Hirst's own analysis, a person who hasn't 
as his primary intention the benefiting of his garden (as evidenced 
by the kind of answer he gives to questions like "Why are you mowing 
the lawn?") is not engaged in the activity of gardening at all. He 
may rather be engaged in the activity of pleasing his mother or 
preparing for his job. On the other hand, Hirst does seem to be 
correct in suggesting that this lawn-mower is necessarily gardening, 
for if he were asked "Why are you gardening?", he would probably 
answer "To please my mother", accepting the description of what he 
was doing, rather than answering, "I'm not gardening." 
That is, it is certainly the case that there is a sense in which 
we assert that our lawn-mower is gardening, though it is trivially 
true that we can distinguish this sense from the sense where it is 
implied that the agent's primary purpose is to contribute to the 
welfare of his garden. My suggestion is that gardening is essentially 
understood in functional (i.e. instrumental) rather than purposive 
terms. This is necessary if an activity or performance like mowing 
the lawn or pruning the roses is to be counted as necessarily an 
instance of gardening. If we wish to assert this, it is because we 
know that mowing the lawn, pruning the roses, spraying the green-fly 
etc., do in fact contribute to the welfare of the garden, not because 
any given individual's point in doing it must be for this end. But 
it doesn't seem to me helpful to say that this is "the" point of 
gardening because only agents have points or purposes. 
If we accept the claim that mowing the lawn is necessarily an 
instance of gardening, then we must modify the claim that gardening 
is analysable as an activity. The necessity for mowing the lawn 
to be gardening cannot be because of its point or purpose, for it 
can have no point or purpose apart from the agency of people, and 
they can engage in it for a wide variety of purposes. If a man 
mowing a lawn is necessarily gardening, it can only be because he 
is (de facto) contributing to the welfare of his garden. It necessitates 
the analysis of gardening in instrumental (i.e. functional) rather than 
purposive terms. That activity which contributes to the welfare of 
a garden is necessarily a gardening activity. 
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The important thing to note here, however, is that this suggestion 
does not separate the concept of gardening from men's intentions and 
purposes. For if nobody were interested in bringing about the welfare 
of a garden, we would clearly not have such a concept as gardening at 
all. The whole idea of a garden's 'welfare' presupposes such an 
interest. 
There is thus no implication in the claim that gardening (as one 
example of a large category of terms) is analysable in functional 
rather than in purposive terms that a general account of human behaviour 
must or could be given in functional terms. There is no conflict, as 
I see it, between this view of the analysis of certain verbs, and the 
view that we must take into account the descriptions which people give 
or assent to of what they are doing, or the purposes which they have 
in doing things, in understanding human behaviour. The point I am 
making is that in order to perform actions as an engagement in an 
activity in Hirst's sense, one must have the concept in question. 
Nothing has been said to suggest that one must understand this concept 
in terms of intentions rather than functionally. 
It is a matter of logic that one cannot garden as one's activity 
(in Hirst's sense) without having the concept of gardening. One cannot 
educate as one's activity (in Langford's sense72) without an 
understanding of what it is to educate. One cannot teach as one's 
activity (as Hirst suggests75) without having an understanding of 
what teaching is. Peters74 claims that a person may educate another 
without this being his intention. I have suggested that the same is 
true of teaching. But none of this denies that on malty occasions 
people engage in activities or performances of which gardening, 
educating or teaching is the point. The claim here is that these 
terms are not analysable as activities, for it is through the notion 
of their outcomes that we understand them. 
Kenny has pointed out that if we want to know if A has washed the 
dishes, we look at the dishes. If we want to know if A has educated 
B we must look at B. But if we want to know what A was attempting, 
then, of course, we look at them and not at the objects of their efforts. 
Ey argument merely suggests that in order to engage in attempts, one 
must understand an 'outcome' sense. This can be understood 
instrumentally, with reference to changes being brought about and 
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acts through which this is done. Nothing has been said to suggest 
that intention to bring these things about must be the agent's prime 
reason for performing the acts. 
This whole account rests on assumptions which I believe are 
generally held concerning what we can say of other people's doings 
without conducting a full-scale investigation into the way they view 
what they are doing. The first is that it is possible sometimes to 
deny that A is X-ing (e.g. helping 3) when A would describe himself 
as X-ing. The second is that we can say of a person that he is Y-ing 
(e.g. hurting C) where he would not describe himself as Y-ing if 
we asked him what he was doing because Y-ing may not be the primary 
point or purpose in what he is doing. Of course, it is possible to 
reject these assumptions and accept that no descriptions of what a 
person is doing are valid except the ones he himself gives. This, 
however, I take to be an extreme metaphysical position which ordinary 
language and usage reject. 
Task and Achievement Verbs - the Ryle distinction 
In discussing the activity/performance distinction and the 
possibility of its application to teaching, I mentioned the Ryle 
distinction between task and achievement verbs and suggested that 
though some of Ryle's achievement verbs fall into the category of 
performances, there is a distinction between performance uses and 
achievement uses which is important in understanding teaching and 
learning. Ryle himself has noted the difference between the 
different possible sorts of achievements, pointing out75 that 
some achievement verbs signify more or less sudden climaxes whereas 
others signify more or less protracted proceedings. He writes, "The 
sort of success which consists in descrying the hawk differs in 
this way from the sort of success which consists in keeping it in 
view." However, this distinction was of less importance to Ryle 
than the task/achievement distinction, and the differences which 
led to Kenny's comment that some of Ryle's achievement verbs, like 
keeping a secret or keeping the hawk in view,were activities 
whilst others like curing were performances were blurred by the 
use of one term. 
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But in the kind of case where there is a final upshot, there 
is a further blurring. It is not that verbs like 'cure' are always 
used to signify a sudden climax, even though there will be an 
instant when the patient meets the criteria for being physically 
fit again and is pronounced cured. 'Curing' may be said to be going 
on as the patient gradually recovers from his illness because of the 
doctor's treatment. That is, it could be said that there are two, 
not one, achievement-type senses of 'curing', one signifying the 
final upshot at which the illness is pronounced terminated, the 
other signifying the continuing and mounting success of the treatment. 
Vendier would have probably called the first sense an achievement 
sense and the second an accomplishment sense. However, this does 
not fully accord with ordinary language, in that should the final 
recovery of the patient not occur through the doctor's efforts -
perhaps because the doctor died - we do not necessarily withdraw 
the claim that the doctor was curing as well as treating him. 
This point is also not appreciated by Ryle, who suggests that 
we withdraw the use of an achievement verb borrowed for task use 
if the outcome fails to occur. He writes76, "I withdraw my claim 
to have seen a misprint or convinced the voter if I find there was 
no misprint, or that the voter has cast his vote for my opponent." 
I think Ryle has simply failed to take into account the different 
kinds of circumstances in which the upshot fails to occur, and which 
we do allow for in our language. We do not say of the man who is 
called away just as he is about to solder the final wire that he 
was merely trying to mend the radio. He was mending it in a sense 
which implies progress (and thus differs from keeping the hawk in 
view), even though he never brought about the upshot of getting it 
mended. True, we cannot say of him that he has mended the radio. 
His attempt was unsuccessful because unfinished. The sense in which 
we say of him that he was mending the radio is not logically 
equivalent to the claim that he was merely trying to mend it. It 
is not a sense which simply implies that the chances of success are 
good (as when we say of a runner who is out in front that he is 
winning). It is a sense which implies that the task is partly 
accomplished, that the final outcome is partly brought about. 
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Failure to finish what is partly achieved is a rather special 
kind of failure, a kind which seems to require special note. There 
is no philosophical terminology for presenting adequately the 
distinctions between mere attempts, partially completed attempts, 
and final achievements. 
The general difficulty of the contrast between task and 
achievement verbs as originally presented by Ryle, in addition 
to the above, has been commented on by Scheffler77. He points 
out that if for achievement verbs like spell and persuade, when 
there seems to be lacking a corresponding different task verb, 
the constructions try to spell and try to persuade are allowed, as 
Ryle suggests, such verbs as walk and run also turn out to be 
achievement verbs rather than task, performance or activity verbs 
as one should intuitively judge them to he. Indeed, comments 
Scheffler78, it is difficult to see how we could prevent performances 
generally turning into achievements once trz constructions are 
allowed. "Not only would winning be an achievement, but running would 
also be an achievement; surely, running involves some state of 
affairs over and above the 'subservient task' of trying to run. The 
notion of two exclusive categories 	 would collapse." (I shall 
comment on this later, since it seems that this argument rests on 
certain ambiguities in the notion of trying.) 
At any rate, Scheffler concludes that we should give up 
construing the suggested task/achievement contrast as an absolute 
and general distinction between two classes, whether words or 
things. He suggests, instead, that the distinction be relativised, 
so that we can speak of a task/achievement relationship as holding 
between two verbs or word-users, or even non-linguistic things. 
"We could no longer make lists of verbs as being absolutely achievement 
verbs or task verbs, but we could relate pairs of verbs as standing 
in the requisite relationship and allow for the same verb to relate 
quite differently to others."79 
Certainly it seems that the use of a term in an utterance is 
related to the intention of the speaker, and if try-to constructions, 
used elliptically, can constitute examples of task uses, any verb X 
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might be employed, even if idiosyncratically, by a person in a task 
sense. But this suggestion still does not take adequate account of 
the ways we use achievement verbs, as already discussed. If we 
say of a runner who is out in front "He is winning", thus marking, 
as Ryle suggests, that the chances of his finally winning are high, 
there is no relationship with the runner's intentions. Our claim 
neither implies nor presupposes that the runner is attempting to 
win, any more than our use of one of Ryle's 'failure' words of the 
kind that mark final terminations, such as lose, means or implies 
or presupposes that the person of whom it is predicated is trying not 
to lose. 
It seems to me that what Ryle is rather pointing out is the 
important feature of our use of achievement terms as a means of 
making an assessment of the probability of final outcomes. If 
we are convinced that the likelihood of the final achievement is 
remote (e.g. because the radio is really drastically broken) we 
tend not to use the elliptical form, but to maintain the full 
usage "He is trying to mend the radio." If we are convinced of 
the incompetence of an agent (including ourselves) we tend again 
to use the full expression. The third kind of instance where we 
tend to use the full expression is where the likelihood is remote 
because of constant interruptions. The converse of this is that 
we do borrow achievement verbs where no difficulty is involved, 
where we are convinced of competence, or where progress is being 
made. 
Some verbs, then, seem to have a three-fold use. One is the 
full achievement sense where the final upshot occurs. One is a 
borrowing for a "mere" task use, so that the task sense, X-ing, is 
entirely equivalent to trying-to-X. In some contexts this use 
carries with it implications of a likelihood of success, as in the 
instance of the runner who is in the lead. But there is also a 
further sense, which is not properly an achievement use in Ryle's 
sense, for it marks neither the reaching of a final upshot nor the 
maintenance of a success state like keeping the plane in view. 
Rather it is used to indicate that some progressive bringing about 
is going on. The distinction is easy to see. The runner who was 
winning but who loses has not won. But the person who was learning 
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X has learned something though he never finishes his learning and 
may never achieve learning X. 
Thus a sentence such as "A was X-ing yesterday" can have at 
least three standard interpretations. If a limit is specified 
within the term 'X-ing', it may mean that A terminated his X-ing 
by reaching that limit; or that A made progress towards that 
limit but did not reach it; or that A tried to X and failed 
utterly. The middle case can be distinguished both from the 
'mere' task sense, and also from the sense covered by :kyle as 
'achievements'. My argument is that this is the fundamental 
sense. It has already been shown that attempt uses are logically 
derivative from achievement uses of some kind, and that this is 
the fundamental one is indicated by the fact that this is the 
only one possible when the X-ing does not specify a limit (e.g. 
learning philosophy). 
Attempts, bringings-about and terminations  
It is worth commenting on the use of the term 'achievement verb' 
as a form of art, and suggesting that it is, in many ways, an 
inappropriate choice. The comment kyle makes of the exceptional 
case where no effort has been made to bring about the outcome denoted 
by an achievement verb is that it is "lucky"80. But two objections 
can be raised. Firstly, what is an achievement must be an achievement 
for a person, and can therefore not be thus separated from his own 
intentions, aims and purposes. Secondly, intention and good luck 
do not exhaust the possibilities. There is also bad luck. The use 
of the terms 'luck' and 'achievement' seem to imply that where outcomes, 
such as winning,occur, the person who has made no effort to achieve 
them will be pleased. This may not be the case. Winning is not, in 
any personal sense, an achievement for someone who, for reasons of 
his own, is trying to lose the race, though it is an achievement by 
public criteria and the rules of the competition. 
The elucidation of terms like this rests, therefore, on discussions 
of 'the standard case'. This allows us to characterize a verb, X-ing, 
as an 'achievement' verb without the implication that on every occasion 
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when we predicate X-ing of someone, it is an achievement for him. 
But the problem, then, is that, if we accept Scheffler's suggestion 
about relativising the distinction, there is nothing that winning 
is an achievement relative to in the case of a man who was trying 
to lose. Even more difficulties arise where there are disputes about 
what is to be taken as the standard case. 
It seems to me unfortunate that an individual's failures may be 
described in 'achievement' terms and his successes by 'failure' terms, 
for it seems to me the implications of intention cannot be eradicated 
from the term 'achievement'. But clearly there are difficulties in 
objecting to a writer's choice of terminology. Similar objections 
can be raised to Kenny's use of the term 'activity' such that living 
at Rome is an activity, whereas walking to the shops is not an activity. 
Similarly, for Hirst running would not be an activity. Because in 
normal usage the latter two, but not the first, would be an activity, 
there is always the risk of slippage. I have already indicated where 
Hirst and Vendler use the term 'activity' in its ordinary language 
sense in the same paragraph as their respective technical senses81 
This may lead to confusion. 
In view of this, and of Scheffler's suggestion that these categories 
are relative, I shall, for the purposes of this thesis, maintain only 
the ordinary language use of activity, and write only of attempts and 
outcomes. Final outcomes will be called terminations. Thus, taking 
a Ryle example, treating is attempting to cure. The treatment can 
be terminated because of something internally related to it, the 
attainment of a new state (health) in the patient. The termination 
use of the term 'cure' marks the final upshot of the acts which 
constitute the attempt, so that, as Ryle says, the doctor has done 
one thing, not two, when he has treated and cured his patient. 
The terminology of terminations leaves room for a further class 
of outcome verb-uses, a 'bringing-about' sense which can include 
bringings-about which may logically have no terminus (e.g. learning 
philosophy) as well as bringings-about that do (e.g. learning the 
meaning of necessary relationships in philosophy). This explains 
the use of 'cure' to speak of what is going on while the patient is 
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being treated and getting better, though is not yet well. This 
class of verbs does not merely indicate "that the hopes of success 
are good", though this will be the case if progress is being made 
towards the final outcome. They are rather defined as the growing 
development towards a final outcome, or the maintenance of an 
outcome. 
It is worth emphasizing at this stage that no radically different 
position is being taken up on any wider issues. There is no suggestion 
that there are three different things an agent is doing if he tries, 
gradually brings about, and finally terminates his attempts by 
achieving (if intended) a final terminus. It is rather that a 
range of descriptions or appraisals can be applied to his doing, 
including descriptions in terms of outcomes he does not primarily 
intend. That is, it is not necessary that the agent himself would 
apply these descriptions. But, on the other hand, given that he 
understands the concepts, he should normally recognize the 
appropriateness of their application to him if this is done correctly, 
and he shares the beliefs of the speaker about related states of 
affairs. 
So far in this chapter, I have discussed in depth the terminology 
of 'task', 'achievement', 'accomplishment', 'activity' and 'performance' 
which represent current philosophical frameworks for analysing verbs. 
Learning and teaching have been shown tc have uses which fall into 
all these categories, including the three different senses of 'activity' 
as used by Hirst, Kenny and Vendler. Some of the distinctions have 
been shown to be inapplicable because they involve us in a reductio  
ad absurdum, and this has not involved either the question of intention 
or the question of success because the features involved were the 
marking out of a limit within the objects of teaching and learning. 
I have suggested a return to the 'attempt' and 'outcome' terminology, 
and propose the use of terms of art which mark out the three-fold 
distinction between no progress or outcome, some progress and the 
achievement of terminal states where this is logically possible. 
I have here developed a trichotomous schema which fits only a narrow 
class of verbs, those which can fill for X in "A is X-ing B" where B 
is a person. The development of the logic of what I shall call 
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'perficience' verbs can be clearly seen to be built on, and suggested 
by, the work discussed in this chapter. They are the sub-class of 
Hyle's class concerned with interpersonal transactions. 
Actios, interactions and transactions 
It might be immediately objected that the category I have suggested 
is 'missing' is not missing but is one of the most discussed categories 
in philosophy, none other than the category of actions. For, as White 
says82, an action is the bringing about of something. On accounts of 
action such as White's, "A is raising his arm" means "A is bringing it 
about that his arm is raised (i.e. above the level where it was before)." 
Kenny, too, writes83, "It is thus clear that the form of description 'A 
is bringing it about that p' is the fundamental one for the description 
of voluntary human action." 
White points out, additionally, that not every change that he brings 
about need be known to the agent. "It does not follow that I have not 
done X just because I did not realize or did not intend, in doing Y, 
that I would bring X about," he writes84  . (Here it might have been 
more accurate to have said "...in doing Y that I would do Z i.e. bring 
X about.) 
The category of verbs which I have described as missing and which 
interest me here is, I think, indicated by White's formulation above and 
fall within it. However, it is far more restricted than the category 
of actions. Firstly, it is restricted to verbs which can fill in within 
the utterance "A is X-ing B" where B is a human being. Secondly, there 
is the restriction that one can only do X by doing something else, Y. 
This is indicated by the fact that it is always logically appropriate, 
when discussing X-ing claims, to ask "How did A X B?" The third 
restriction is that X-ing requires what I shall call a response from B, 
so that verbs such as splash are excluded from the discussion. Where 
the response is produced by mechanistic sequences of events, I shall 
speak of interactions, distinguishing them from the verbs in which I 
am primarily interested, where the responses involve understanding and, 
I am assuming, no mechanistic account can fully explain. The latter 
I shall distinguish as transactional. 
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The verbs I am considering here therefore necessitate that their 
object, B, is capable of the appropriate kind of response. Thus "a 
being capable of feeling pain" is a description of the formal object85 
of hurting, "a being capable of dying" is a description of the formal 
object of killing, and "a being capable of learning" is a description 
of the formal object of teaching. 'Teach', of course, takes two 
objects, and I have already suggested that the formal object of 
teaching in terms of content is "that which can be learned" - e.g. 
beliefs, skills, capacities, attitudes, virtues, etc. Given that 
within the context of this thesis the concept of learning is restricted 
by the rejection of a behaviourist analysis of learning and by 
distinguishing learning from conditioning, the formal object of teach 
is thus further restricted to "a being capable of understanding". 
This restriction is done stipulatively, and without further discussion. 
As indicated above, the general category in which I am interested 
is the category of interpersonal transactions, where the X in "A is 
X-ing B" may be filled by such verbs as amusing, embarrassing, boring, 
pleasing, etc. I shall discuss the category generally with reference 
to examples such as teaching, since I believe it is of wider application 
within the philosophy of action, and then try to show that 'teach' is 
a member of the class. Some comments made by Peters86 suggest that 
education, too, is a member of this class. The category of interactions 
is considered at the same time, since the logical attributes seem to 
me to be the same as those of transactions. 
The following section, like the 
be difficult to follow, but this is 
relationships being explored. This 
negative. 
earlier parts of this chapter, may 
again due to the rather intricate 
section is positive, rather than 
Perficiences and perficienary attempts  
I start this section by repeating, in more general terms, the 
argument already used in relation to teaching, concerned with the 
logical relationship between attempt and bringing-about uses of the 
same term. The argument is that the 'bringing about' sense (as a 
partial achievement) must be understood by anyone who employs an 
'attempt' sense, and, more importantly, by anyone who makes an attempt. 
This can be understood as a development of Ryle's point that it 
is 'achievement-type' verbs that are borrowed for 'task' uses and 
not vice versa. I make this point again specifically, because it 
has been suggested87 that I have misunderstood the proponents of 
'activity' analyses, in that they accept the logical priority of 
the 'achievement' sense and the analysis of the 'task' sense is 
equivalent to 'trying-to-teach'. As already mentioned, Hirst has 
specifically denied that he understands the 'activity' sense as 
an attempt to teach. Rather, he says, the outcome sense must be 
understood as the successful upshot of teaching, already understood. 
Smith88, in a footnote to his influential article, rejects the 
buying-selling analogy partly by denying that the 'task' sense of 
teach resembles a sense of 'sell' which is reducible to 'trying-to-
sell'. This also seems to be the implication of Joan Cooper's 
search for criteria for successful teaching89. I conclude, therefore, 
that my analysis is genuinely an alternative view. 
My argument is that if a person is doing something intended to 
bring about a given state of affairs, he must understand what X-ing, 
bringing about that state of affairs, is. For, unless he did so, 
he could not (logically) conceive of what he was doing as X-ing in 
an attempt sense. The ability to conceive of what one is doing in 
a given way is, on the analysis of an activity used, a necessary 
condition for doing it intentionally. This is not to suggest that 
this is all that is required to make an attempt, a matter which 
is discussed later in relation to making teaching attempts. The 
point is to claim the logical priority of a 'bringing about'sense 
over an attempt sense. The 'bringing about' sense I shall from 
now on refer to exclusively as the 'outcome' sense, with the proviso 
that there is nothing implied in this use about any final termination. 
Austin, in an analysis of speech acts90  , distinguishes the 
perlocutionary effect of locutions as consequences in a respondent 
brought about by what was said. For Austin, there is a distinction 
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between perlocutions and illocutions, in which there is a dependence 
on a convention. Perlocutionary effects, according to Austin, may 
be intentional or non-intentional, and he points to the usual 
disclaimers for effects or outcomes which were not intended91. He 
suggests that it is important to distinguish between the act of doing 
X and the act of attempting to do X, since an unintended perlocutionary 
effect may be 'achieved' or an intended perlocutionary effect may not 
occur (if the desired response is not forthcoming). 
With regard to perlocutionary sequels, says Austin92, it would 
often be absurd for the person addressed to ask "Are you X-ing me?" 
Giving the example of tempting, Austin claims that in a perlocutionary 
use, this is often a question which the person being tempted rather 
than the person tempting is in a privileged position to answer. The 
original speaker, like any other observer, must rely on publicly 
observable evidence in order to claim that the effect had occurred. 
The person who is allegedly tempted is in a logically different position. 
It seems here that no general answer may be given to the question 
as to who is the authority as to whether A is X-ing B, since this 
will depend on what answer is to be given, in general, to the question 
as to who is the authority on whether a person is e.g. embarrassed, 
angry, amused, hurt, etc. Anyone who accepts, for example, certain 
positions in psychoanalytic theory, might wish to argue that a person 
is not always the authority on his own feelings or emotions. 
Wittgenstein93 writes of the public criteria required (in a man's 
behaviour) for distinguishing between thinking one has understood 
and understanding. The most which can be said in general terms is 
that whereas for illocutions, the speaker is the authority on the 
illocutionary effect intended, this is not the case for perlocutions. 
It is worth considering the contexts in which a person might ask 
"Are you teaching me X?" 
One of the difficulties of discussions on perlocutionary effects 
is that they necessitate distinguishing the consequences of an act 
from the act itself. Feinberg, discussing this in some detail, has 
suggested the expression "the accordion effect" to cover the fact 
that choice is open to us. He writes94, "This well-known feature of 
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our language, whereby a man's action can be described as narrowly 
or broadly as we please I propose to call the "accordion effect", 
because an act....can be squeezed down to a minimum or else stretched 
out.... We can usually replace any ascription to a person of 
causal responsibility by an ascription of agency or authorship. 
We can, if we wish, puff out an action to include an effect, and 
more often than not our language obliges us by providing a 
relatively complex action word for this purpose. Instead of saying 
Smith did A (a relatively simple act) and thereby caused X in Y, 
we might say something of the form 'Smith X-ed Y'." 
So, for example, we can say that Jones opened the door and 
thereby caused Smith, who was inside, to be startled, thus treating 
Jones's act as the cause of a subsequent effect, Smith's death of 
a heart attack, says Feinberg. Or, he suggests, we can say simply, 
"Jones startled Smith", incorporating the consequences into the more 
complex action and treating Smith's death as the consequences of 
that. Or, he points out, there is the third possibility, that "We 
can say that Jones's opening the door caused his death, or that 
Jones's startling him caused his death, or simply that Jones killed 
him (by doing those things)."95 
This notion ascribes to A causal responsibility for B's being 
X-ed, and the analysis can be extended to cases where reasons and 
understandings are involved, as well as the more mechanistic cases 
of interaction as in Feinberg's example. Language for discussing 
this is suggested by Harre and Secord9°, who speak of 'causal 
mechanisms' whereby A can be said to be causally responsible for 
an event in the world where this event involves a response by B 
based on an intelligible interpretation of A's act, both where the 
consequences were intended and where they were not. 
So, for example, if A embarrasses B, A must do something which 
B interprets in a certain way and is thereby embarrassed. When we 
use the tern 'cause' here, as in "A caused B to be embarrassed", we 
must not let it hide the fact that an appraisal by B is involved, and 
that he might not have been embarrassed if he had seen the situation 
differently. What A did was neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition for B's being embarrassed. There may be advantages to 
saying that A's action was the reason that B was embarrassed, but 
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this does not imply that B's embarrassment was the reason for A's 
act. 
If A convinces B, he must say something which B treats as a 
sufficient reason for changing his views. Thus these examples 
indicate that Feinberg's analysis can be seen as an extension of 
Austin's analysis of perlocutionary effects, including acts which 
are not speech acts more explicitly than Austin. Austin accepted 
that there was a possibility of both illocutionary and perlocutionary 
effects being brought about by non-linguistic means97, but the 
focus of his work was, of course, speech as action. The focus here, 
however, is on the whole class of actions which can bring about 
these kinds of outcomes, and since the term 'perlocutionary' act 
is so closely tied to speech, an associated term which is of more 
general application is needed. In order to stress the analogy 
with speech acts, I propose using the term nerficienary98 acts and 
outcomes (rather than effects, in order to avoid implications of 
causes in either a Humean or a mechanistic sense). 
Thus Austin's "By saying P, A was Y-ing B" is extended to "By 
X-ing, A was Y-ing B." Y is the perficience verb, and some condition 
in B (a response) is the perficient outcome. The distinctiveness 
of perficienary transactions and interactions lies in the criteria 
which are applied for judging the truth or falsity of "A is Y-ing B" 
claims. The outcome in B and the instrumentality of A's acts in 
bringing it about are the conditions of the truth of the claim, 
rather than the intention of A that the outcome should occur. That 
is, perficiences may be intentional or non-intentional. As 
defined, many examples of such verbs can be found - hurt (physically, 
as an interaction, or psychologically, as a transaction), offend, 
upset, interrupt, dominate, embarrass, bore, humiliate (all usually 
undesired by B), interest, satisfy, amuse, entertain, please, convince, 
persuade, or encourage. 
It should be noted that if, under certain conditions, A is told 
that he is X-ing B, where X is one of these verbs, it is intelligible 
for him to reply that he didn't intend to, but unacceptable for him 
to deny that he has done it. If B, for example, is frightened by 
- 
something A is doing, A can't deny that he is frightening B, though 
he may say he didn't intend to. B's being frightened may be rational 
or irrational, justified or unjustified, but A's frightening B does 
not depend on A's intentions, nor is A a special authority on whether 
or not he is frightening B. 
Thus, on this analysis, if B is offended by something A says or 
does, A is offending him, whether or not A intends it. B may be 
over-sensitive, but this does not affect the claim that A is offending 
him. (Whether or not we say that offending is an action of 's 
depends on whether or not we insist that an act be described in the 
terms in which A himself conceives of it.) 
The converse of this argument is that A is not e.g. humiliating 
B if B is unperturbed by what A is doing, no matter what A's intention 
in the matter. If A was trying to humiliate B, he has failed in his 
attempt. Similarly, if B dies as a result of A's shooting him, A 
has killed him, on this account, even though he may not have intended 
this. If A was trying to kill 3, but B does not die, A has failed 
in his attempt. The outcome dominates our understanding of perficierices, 
but they can all (logically) be attempted, and perficience verbs can 
therefore all be used in an 'attempt' sense. Attempt claims are 
made from the agents perspective, but the transactional claims are 
judged by public criteria. Since attention is directed both towards 
the outcome in B and the actions performed by A which bring about 
this outcome, perficience verbs all have a Janus-quality99. I suggest 
that transactional claims of this kind are central to understanding 
interpersonal relationships. 
A perficience verb is used correctly in the transactional sense 
when the speaker believes (or, in exceptional cases, is trying to 
get people to think he believes) that the person of whom it is 
predicated is being instrumental through appropriate acts in bringing 
about the logically required outcome. 3ut the claim is only true 
when it is the case that the person of whom it is predicated actually 
is instrumental in bringing about the outcome. That is, the outcome 
must have been occurring because of what he did. This point 
emphasizes the realist presuppositions of this analysis, as, indeed, 
might have been expected in the light of the remarks on the ontological 
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assumptions embedded in our ordinary-language use of 'teach' in 
Chapter 2. More will be said about what could be counted as an 
appropriate way of bringing about the perficient outcome, in a 
given context, in the case of teaching later. 
The logic of perficience verbs 
Perficienary acts have been defined as those which bring about 
a perficient outcome in a patient or respondent, so that by X-ing, 
A may Y 3 (where Y is the perficience verb). However, it must be 
noted that the perficienary transaction is not, on this account, 
itself an outcome of the act X. It is rather that, in the context, 
the act X constituted part of the transaction. Both A's act X and 
the appropriate outcome or response in B are integral to the 
perficienary transaction. 
An alternative way of bringing out this point is through a 
consideration of the distinction between the contingent consequences  
of an act, and the logical consequence of an outcome. If I kill 
you, intentionally or non-intentionally, by shooting you, my killing 
you is the logical consequence of your dying from my shot. It is 
a matter of logic that if you remain alive I cannot have killed 
you. However, whether or not you die from my shot is a wholly 
contingent matter. Thus, if I shoot you, both contingent and 
conceptual factors are involved in determining whether or not my 
act of shooting is an instance of killing. Your dying is a contingent, 
not a logical, consequence of my shooting you, but my killing you is 
a logical, not a contingent, consequence of your dying from my shot. 
I suggest that the above schema picks out what is distinctive 
about the category of verbs on which I have focused my attention. 
Boring, interesting or entertaining someone are things I do by 
virtue of their (contingent) response to what I am doing - and my 
doings are necessarily describable in other terms - e.g. telling 
jokes, playing music, singing, dancing, describing, demonstrating, 
etc. However, my boring, interesting or entertaining someone is 
not a contingent consequence of my doing these things, it is 
concomitant with them. These doings constitute the boring, interesting 
or entertaining. As Ryle would probably say, I am doing one thing, 
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not two, if I bore or entertain you with my jokes. It is the 
talking, dancing, telling jokes or whatever which is itself 
boring or entertaining you. Thus it can be seen that perficience 
verbs are all polymorphous concepts. 
This can all be rephrased in the language of necessary and 
sufficient conditions. Though B's being bored is a contingent 
consequence of A's talking, etc., it is a logically necessary 
condition of A's boring him. Similarly, B's dying from A's 
shot is a logically sufficient condition for A's killing him, 
though A does one thing, not two, when he shoots and kills B. 
B's suffering pain is a logically necessary condition of A's 
hurting him, but A can't simply hurt B - he must do something 
to him which contingently brings about his pain. 
Perficience verbs all offer examples of Feinberg's accordion 
effect. In such cases, the contingent consequences of A's X-ing 
logically transform his X-ing into the perficienary transaction, 
Y-ing B, which may, as already suggested, have been the agent's 
purpose in acting (intentional perficiences) or not envisaged by 
him (non-intentional perficiences). Though extremes of this kind 
can be distinguished, clearly instances can lie on a continuum, 
ranging from cases where Y-ing B was the primary intention of the 
agent's X-ing, through instances where it was not his purpose but 
he was aware that he was doing it, to cases where the possibility 
of Y-ing B had not even been considered by A. Given this account, 
perficience verbs can still clearly be contrasted with verbs 
where intention is critical. I can't murder or lie to you non-
intentionally, since intention is part of the meaning of murdering 
or lying, as it is in Feinberg's example100 of breaking faith. 
Indeed, perficience verbs such as kill or mislead are often used 
to retreat to from verbs like murder, lie and deceive where 
intention is a necessary condition (defining characteristic). 
On the other hand, it is claimed, we normally distinguish 
perficienary attempts which completely fail to achieve the desired 
outcome by widespread use of the language of tryinK.  
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The Distinguishing Features of Perficienary Transactions 
It is a feature of attempts and activities that the time spent 
on them is in the control of the agent. Attempts and activities 
finish when the agent decides to stop them, though this isn't 
necessarily when he reaches the final goal he set himself, if any. 
Activities and attempts may be abandoned or interrupted by 
circumstances external to them. However, there is no time when 
they can be necessarily terminated by something internal to them, 
and without the agent's being aware of it. 
The principal distinctive feature of a perficienary transaction 
is that the ending of the transaction is not necessarily within 
the control of the agent. There is clearly one sense in which it 
is within the control of the agent, in that he may cease performing 
the acts which constitute the transaction once he is aware that 
they do so. The main point here is that a perficienary transaction 
may be terminated by something internal to it in respect of the 
respondent without the agent's knowing of the termination. They 
may continue after the agent would like them to stop, or stop when 
he is trying to continue them. From the logical relationships 
outlined earlier, it can be seen that some appropriate response 
in B is a necessary condition for A to be Y-ing him (where Y is 
a perficience verb), so that the Y-ing is terminated, for example, 
if there is an appropriate terminal change in the respondent (e.g. 
when a new state is brought about in him, an old state terminated, 
something new - e.g. a skill - produced or developed by him, or 
perhaps by his decision to cease attending to A's doings). To 
illustrate this by an interaction, my hurting you stops when you 
cease to feel pain, though I can carry on with my activity of 
hitting you, or my attempt to hurt you. My dominating you stops 
when you cease to submit, though I can continue my activity of giving 
you orders or my attempt to dominate you. Transactions, in particular, 
require consciousness of A and A's actions by B, so that they always 
necessarily cease if B becomes unconscious or unaware of A's acts. 
The distinctiveness of a perficienary transaction lies in this feature. 
They are differentiated as a class from e.g. activities and attempts 
in that they can be terminated by something internal to them. Both 
contingent and logical factors are involved in the termination. 
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The contingent factor is the change in B, (e.g. when he ceases to 
respond). The conceptual factor is the logical relationship of 
the response in question to the perficience. 
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CIihPTER 4: An Alternative Analysis of Teaching 
Introduction  
In Chapter 2, I discussed the implications of the activity analysis 
of teaching, and suggested that for various reasons it could not be 
used as the basis for a justificatory enterprise concerned with the 
responsibilities of teachers. In Chapter 3, I developed a new 
conceptual schema for discussing certain kinds of transactional 
verbs. This chapter applies the analysis of Chapter 3 to the 
concept of teaching, and in the discussions, implicitly indicates 
the usefulness of the schema. 
The objections to the analysis which might be raised are considered 
carefully, and I conclude that the analysis can provide satisfactory 
answers to these objections. A summary is provided of the reasons 
for preferring this analysis to the orthodox activity analysis. 
Although it is not being suggested that the responsibilities of 
a teacher's role ultimately turn on language usage, for this would 
clearly be wrong, the choice between the two analyses is not simply 
a verbal one. It is my contention that the activity analysis of 
teaching effectively conceals some of the areas in which it might 
be appropriate to hold teachers responsible, and rules out a priori  
suggestions that a teaching role could be properly fulfilled by 
a person who had "fuzzy" intentions or who engaged in genuinely 
open-ended enquiry on the grounds that they were employed to teach 
and these activities are ruled out by virtue of the meaning of 
teaching. 
I argue that the area of responsibility is a matter for ethical 
decision and not for analysis. It is a separate issue from the 
questions about the meaning of teaching as discussed in this section, 
and is dealt with in detail in the latter half of the thesis. 
Nonetheless, it follows that the claims "Teachers are prima facie 
responsible for what they teach" and "The teacher's obligation is to 
teach his pupils something worth learning" make different claims on 
the different analyses. The alternative analyses have different 
implications for the role, and it is argued that the perficience 
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analysis, rather than the activity analysis, explains and justifies 
the teacher's role in schools. 
Since it is being claimed here that there is a derivative sense 
of 'teach' which is elliptical for 'trying to teach', the chapter 
includes a section on trying. 
Teaching as a Perficienary Transaction 
It is suggested here that the primary sense in which we understand 
teaching is as a perficienary transaction. That is, it is claimed 
that the primary sense in which the claim "A is teaching B X" is 
understood in most contexts, including the school context, is that A 
is engaging in acts and/or activities which are bringing the X into 
the 'view' of B so that B is learning X, in the sense of developing 
the understanding, knowledge, skill, attitude etc. denoted by the X, 
the acquisition of which will (for some Xs at least) terminate B's 
learning, and thus, necessarily, A's teaching of that X to B. 
In the same way that we normally need to look at a whole situation, 
not merely at an individual agent, to see whether A is comforting, 
helping, hindering, inspiring, assisting, alarming, antagonizing, 
convincing or persuading B rather than at the intention of the agent, 
I suggest that we discover in this way whether teaching is going on 
or not. Perry has already suggested that we should do this to see 
whether training or educating is going on101, so the suggestion is 
not a new one. In order to teach B X in this central sense, it is 
necessary that A engages in acts or activities which constitute the 
teaching, and these acts and activities must have some relationship 
with the X being taught which is not simply fortuitous. (It will 
later be argued that in the case of propositions there must be some 
internal relationship, and that, though in the case of physical skills 
the connection may be a contingent one, the contingency is of a 
non-fortuitous kind. In the case of other Xs, there may be both 
internal and contingent relationships,) 
The first condition which is claimed to be necessary for A to be 
teaching B X in this sense is that B does not already know (etc.) the 
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X concerned. The second condition is that fora to be teaching B X 
(as contrasted with B's simply learning X) is that A is engaging in 
appropriate acts - appropriate in the sense that they are related to 
the X - which actually are instrumental to (i.e. bringing about) B's 
learning of X. As Hirst has suggested, an important feature of 
teaching is that the acts A performs must be ones which in some way 
bring the X into the view of the pupil such that he can learn from 
them. Thus, though turning up the radiators may help bring about 
• learning to appreciate Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, turning up 
the radiators, having no relationship of a non-fortuitous kind with 
Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, cannot be an instance of teaching anyone 
to appreciate that symphony. In order to be learned, the X must 
be brought by As acts to B's attention and comprehension, and thus 
what A does in respect of that X must be de facto intelligible to 
• - not, as I take Hirst to suggest, believed by A to be intelligible. 
The concepts, language and symbolic systems used must be ones which 
B actually understands. The third condition, as well as the first, 
is, perhaps, implied by the second (that B is learning the X) but 
it seems important here to state both explicitly. 
The acts which A engages in which constitute his teaching 3 X 
may explicitly exhibit the X to 3, but, as all writers on teaching 
have emphasized, a wide range of acts would be appropriate, depending 
on the X being taught, and also upon whom 3 is. Teaching acts may 
display, clarify, exemplify or otherwise indicate the X, or they 
may, in some way, help 3 to draw explicit understanding from what he 
already knows by his own thinking or reflection (that is, teaching 
acts may be maieutic). A may teach 3 an X without indicating or 
displaying it himself, either explicitly or implicitly (through 
structured apparatus or leading questions). This kind of method 
of bringing an X into the view of learners I shall call eliciting, 
and this may be extremely important in relation to teaching such 
Xs as interest, appreciation etc. It is also central to some 
conceptions of teaching by discussion, and can be seen to be involved 
in the teaching of some skills, in instances where the teaching is 
not done by demonstrating the skill (i.e. where no showing is involved). 
If teaching is a perficienary transaction, A's teaching B X can 
be ended by A's ceasing to perform the acts which constitute the 
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teaching, or by B's ceasing to attend. But additionally, for many 
Xs, there is a necessary termination of the teaching of X when B 
learns that X. It is only in such instances, where the description 
'teaching X' itself involves a limit, that we use the term 'teach' in 
the 'final achievement' sense which, as Ryle notes, implies that the 
outcome has been brought about, and that the teaching has terminated 
in a successful final upshot. This means that, in saying "A has taught 
B X (e.g. to ride a bicycle)", we imply not only that there was a period 
of time during which occurred instance(s) of ti's teaching B to ride 
a bicycle, but also that the teaching has resulted in B's being able 
to ride the bicycle. However, on the analysis presented here, there 
is no contradiction involved in claiming that A was teaching B to 
ride a bicycle at time t (in a more than 'mere attempt' sense of teach) 
even though B never reached the stage of being a skilled bicycle rider. 
As in the example of learning to play the Moonlight Sonata given in the 
previous chapter, B may be learning to ride a bicycle at time t even 
though he never completes his learning. Thus we may speak of teaching 
in a sense which is non-elliptical, as long as there is some kind of 
'uptake', a response of the learner involving the learning of something 
which represents a partial learning of the X, even though 3 never learns 
X itself, and we can never claim that A has taught B X. 
This is a contingent world. Teaching is, in a sense, thus people-
dependent103, and, as Kenny has pointed out in respect of performances104, 
for any perficienary transaction involving a termination, for a 
variety of different reasons the termination may never be reached. This 
is not central to our understanding of teaching and learning. My claim 
here is that the differences between the kinds of instance where there is 
a limit (e.g. learning that Henry VIII had six wives) and those where 
there is not (e.g. learning history) do not lie in there being different 
senses of teach and learn but in the objects of teaching and learning. 
It is therefore suggested that the central sense of teaching must 
be the one used in the claim that A is engaged in the perficienary 
transaction of teaching 3 X (whatever the X), and that this occurs when 
the following criteria are met: 
(i) A has not yet learned (or has learned and forgotten) X, or has not 
yet completed his learning of X (i.e. has more to learn in respect 
of X). 
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(ii) A is engaged in a transaction with B, involving meanings and 
necessitating 'uptake' 
(iii) A's actions or activities display, clarify, exhibit, exemplify, 
elicit, confirm or otherwise bring into B's 'view' the X 
(iv) A is using concepts, language or symbols which B understands 
(B is having 'uptake' and A is communicating meanings to him) 
(v) A's acts are instrumental in bringing about some learning by 
B (that is, 13 is learning X) 
Not only is it being suggested that this is the central sense of 
teaching (in that this sense must be understood in order for other 
senses to be understood) but also that this is the sense we are 
mainly concerned with in schools, a point which will later be 
supported with argument. 
It is not being suggested that this is the only sense in which 
the term 'teaching' is used. It is accepted that it is sometimes 
used to speak of completely unsuccessful attempts (where, I have 
suggested, it is entirely equivalent to 'trying to teach (in the 
central sense)'). What is involved in trying to teach is discussed 
later in this chapter, as are other concepts of teaching - e.g. 
more specific concepts such as that of Scheffler, or purely 
institutional concepts. 
Objections to the perficience analysis 
All analyses of teaching suggest that teaching is conceptually 
parasitic on learning. However, vigorous objections have been raised 
to suggestions which have earlier been made by philosophers that 
teaching, in its central sense, implies learning. Learning, it is 
said, is necessary only for correct application of the 'achievement' 
sense of teaching, seen as a successful final upshot of an attempt 
to bring about learning. It is claimed that what is required of 
teachers in schools is the intention to bring about learning X, 
together with appropriate acts which, in the view of the teacher, 
indicate the X in ways that the pupils can understand. 
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The first objection which might be raised to the analysis 
presented here is that it raises the problem that a teacher may 
not know what he is doing. On the activity analysis, there is no 
problem of knowledge, for the teacher's knowledge of his own 
beliefs about the cognitive states of pupils, his own intentions 
in respect of their learning and his performance of the requisite 
indicative acts, provides the sufficient conditions of his being 
able to say of himself, infallibly, that he was teaching B X. 
Others too, with knowledge of his intentions, are in a position 
to say of him that he is teaching B X, but since they are not 
the authorities on his beliefs and intentions, they are not 
infallible, though they may know that he is teaching B X. 
To this objection, the answer is that there is acknowledged 
to be a problem of knowledge here. Teachers and parents do worry 
about what they are teaching their children. I have earlier 
claimed that the distinction between what A is doing and what he 
is trying to do is a useful one. On the analysis presented here, 
there is nobody who is necessarily the authority on whether A 
is teaching B X. This is a matter for discovery, for what must 
be known is (a) that B is learning X and (b) that it is through 
A's acts that he is learning it. The raising of the problem 
of knowledge here is claimed to be an advantage of, not an 
objection to, the analysis. On this analysis, though not on 
the activity one, the worry of parents or teachers "What am I 
teaching my children?" (by which is meant more than "What part 
of what I am trying to get them to learn are they learning?') 
makes sense. Here, it is suggested, is one of the kinds of 
instance where it is already acknowledged that others may know 
what you are doing better than you do. (This, it was suggested, 
is true of all perficiences.) 
The second objection which might be raised to this analysis 
is that it is stipulative, not reportative or descriptive. Komisar105 
discusses this sort of approach in detail. "Suppose," he says, "a 
new meaning of teaching is stipulated by introducing a distinction 
between instruction and teaching." 
"Instruction," he suggests, "is then defined stipulatively as 
any activity done by a teacher to produce learning. When the activity 
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is successful, and the expected learning is achieved, then we can 
say that the teacher was teaching, not merely (?) instructing." 
"Of course," adds Komisarl,°4any such move...has no effect on 
the standard thesis 
	 (which) incorporates a reportative definition 
(what a concept does mean), then no stipulative definition (what 
teaching should mean) can endanger it." 
This objection is answered by the claim that the orthodox 
analysis is not reportative of the language usage of many people. 
Many would wish to deny that 'teach' is properly used for mere 
attempts, and that there is any sense of teaching in which a 
person in a classroom e.g. demonstrating an experiment or writing 
and explaining the solving of quadratic equations on the blackboard 
is teaching them, if not one child in the classroom is paying any 
attention to what is being said or done. That is, it seems to be 
the case that many pupils, trainee teachers and practicing teachers 
simply do not use the term 'teach' as an ellipsis for 'unsuccessfully 
try to teach', because they see some kind of 'uptake' as necessary. 
In cases of complete failure, they use the full 'try to teach' form. 
Indeed, this assumption is needed to explain widespread discussions 
on how to obtain the conditions necessary for teaching to go on -
which (with some methods of teaching, at least,) would seem, on the 
standard analysis, to be nil. One can try to bring about learning, 
as it were, no matter what else is happening, so long as one is not 
being physically prevented from performing the indicative acts. 
An alternative answer might be that 'teach' is properly used for 
mere attempts, but that this sense is derivative and has been clearly 
shown by arguments to be derivative. 
But what position does all this leave us in with respect to 
philosophical problems? It seems to me clear that an analysis 
cannot stand or fall on language usage alone, which is why I have 
tried to show that it is the implications of the activity analysis 
that are unacceptable rather than simply the usage that it 
delineates. But, as Komisar points out, language must square with 
usage. It therefore seems to me to be a valid reply to a charge 
that the analysis is stipulative that it is not so, but reportativei 
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usage indicates a trichotomous rather than a dichotomous understanding 
of teaching, in which the perficience sense 'wears the trousers'. 
Indeed, since the analysis is developed from a claim about the logical 
relationship between a goal and an attempt, it would be strange if 
the analysis did not square with usage. 
Thus the reply to any charge that the analysis is stipulative 
would be that it is reportative; it is not giving an account of what, 
on my view, teaching should mean. 
Komisar's second objection107 to a claim that teaching (in central 
cases) implies learning is that this concept has the disadvantage that 
one can speak of teaching (in this sense) only retrospectively. This, 
I believe, is simply a mistake. To take a non-school example, if we 
watch a man walking round an art gallery, for example, talking to his 
companion about the pictures, and see his companion understanding what 
is said, asking questions, looking interested and seeming to be 
learning, we can make teaching claims on the basis of our observations. 
Though teaching (on this analysis) necessitates learning as knowledge 
necessitates truth, neither teaching claims nor knowledge claims are 
infallible. We can speak of A's teaching B X when we have good reasons 
for believing that B is learning X through what A is doing, and this 
can be while it is going on. If it is true that B is learning X through 
A's actions (that is, that the criteria given on pages 103-104 are met) 
then we know that A is teaching B X while it is going on. 
It is worth noting that Komisar himself is inconsistent about 
the relationship between learning and teaching. "Learningless 
teaching," he says108  , "will have to stop after a time - when it is 
chronic." But if at some time there is no teaching because there is 
no learning, what difference does it make whether it is the first, 
twentieth or fiftieth time? And elsewhere109 Komisar says, "so 
the obvious is true, to teach and leave the learner unaffected is 
not to have been teaching (my italics) at all." What does Komisar 
mean here? Is this not to have been teaching even in a 'task' sense? 
Or is it to suggest that we don't use the term 'teach' in a mere 'task' 
sense? Kyle, too, writes110.Olat A cannot teach B without communicating 
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with him. So my claim that the analysis offered here is reportative 
has support from the language use of even those who deny that teaching 
implies learning. 
Henderson111 has ridiculed the suggestion that if no pupils 
learn, there has been no teaching, by suggesting that anyone who 
wants to hold this view is committed to the view that if the 
patient doesn't recover, the surgeon hasn't operated, or that if 
nobody appreciates the painting, the artist hasn't painted it. The 
second analogy is rejected immediately, since the painting of any 
particular picture is a logically necessary condition of anyone's 
ever coming to appreciate it. However, since I have myself used 
the analogy between teaching and curing, I must examine the first 
example carefully to see whether the objection is valid. 
There seems to be a reasonable analogy between operating and 
curing, on the one hand, and giving lessons or engaging in pedagogy, 
and teaching in the outcome sense, on the other. The analogue for 
learning in the former case is recovering, and the analogue for 
operating is one of the more specific act descriptions (explaining, 
demonstrating, setting up discovery situations etc.) Operating is, 
after all, one specific type of treating. Operations are techniques 
developed to bring about recovery (in general) in the same way that 
pedagogy represents the techniques developed to bring about learning. 
Clearly this discussion refers only to institutional teaching attempts. 
Again, this objection is met by suggesting that the use of the terms 
'giving lessons' or 'pedagogic activities' is not stipulative. 
Thus Henderson's objection is trivial, for, in the same way that we 
would not deny that the surgeon has operated if the patient does 
not recover (though we do deny that the surgeon has cured him), so 
we may deny that the pupil has been taught B if he hasn't learned it 
without denying that the teacher gave the lesson. Indeed, Hirst's 
account accepts the distinction between giving lessons and teaching in 
a task sense. It is clear that no intentions can be logically 
demanded of the surgeon by virtue of the fact that he operated, in 
respect of curing the patient; for his primary intention might have 
been to improve his operating technique or to obtain the patient's 
diseased gall bladder for experimental purposes. But if the patient 
recovers from his illness because of the operation, the surgeon has 
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cured him, and this is independent of his primary intention in 
operating. Similarly, a doctor whose patient was recovering from 
an illness as a result of the treatment was curing his patient 
although the patient was knocked down by a car and never fully 
recovered. This particular objection to the thesis that teaching 
implies learning, then, needs no further discussion. 
Henderson's second objection is that such an understanding 
imposes a difficulty on doing any significant research on methods 
of teaching112  . This, again, seems to be a point implied by 
Hirst's article, which has already been discussed. It is not 
an objection to this analysis, but rather a point in its favour, 
that it permits us to include in investigations persons who are 
admitted to be very good teachers, even though they formulate 
their objectives 'fuzzily' or at a high level of generality. It 
also permits us to include instances outside of school not 
involving pedagogy, where, as discussed, the intention of the 
person doing the teaching may be primarily not that A learns X 
but that Z is done. 
Another objection which is raised to the suggestion that teaching 
implies learning is that this renders unsuccessful teaching a logical 
impossibility, and, it is claimed, we do speak of unsuccessful teaching. 
I have earlier pointed out that we more usually speak of unsuccessful 
attempts to X, rather than unsuccessful X-ing, and the idea of 
unsuccessful teaching can only have application in respect of teaching 
attempts. The objection, however, has, I suggest, been answered 
implicitly already through the extensive discussions of unfinished 
teaching. Unfinished teaching is necessarily unsuccessful in terms 
of the goal. Ryle takes this point113, when he says, "Did you succeed 
in swimming your first lesson? If not, had you learned nothing at 
all that first lesson?" If A is teaching B X but the teaching is 
discontinued before B learns X to the appropriate standard of success, 
then we might say that A's teaching (not merely his teaching attempt) 
was unsuccessful. 
In schools, we are asked to teach classes, and, under many sets 
of conditions, it is impossible for a teacher to teach the whole class. 
Depending on what is to be counted as success, here again is a case 
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where a person can be teaching in the outcome sense, though not 
entirely successfully. The main problem here, though, is whose 
criteria are to be applied. If teaching is an activity, it would 
seem that we must use the criteria of the person who is trying to 
teach B X as the basis of our judgment whether he has succeeded or 
failed in his attempt. (On this account, the surest way to be a 
successful teacher is never to try to teach anything too difficult. 
That would make 100% success easier to attain. Of course, it also 
produces the paradox that the successful teacher could teach his 
pupils much less than the unsuccessful teacher in the hypothetical 
case of the pupils being identical.) But, as Cooper's article 
indicates114 
 , a Headmaster who says "Miss A is teaching Class 2 
successfully" is applying his criteria, not the teacher's. We 
do not know that she might, by her own criteria, judge herself a 
failure. In my view, much confusion has been introduced into such 
discussions of teaching by a continual swing from talk about successful 
or unsuccessful teaching attempts to talk of successful or unsuccessful 
teachers (in the role sense) and vice versa. The teacher referred to 
elsewhere in Cooper's article115, whom, Cooper suggests, we wouldn't 
call successful if he only taught his pupils P.E. (that is, they only 
learned P.E.) might be entirely successful by his own criteria if he 
wasn't trying to get them to learn anything else. This indicates the 
sorts of ways in which discussions of what teaching is have been 
influenced by unargued assumptions about the role of the teacher. 
If we exclude the idea of a successful teacher in role terms at 
this stage, it can be seen that though, on the account of teaching 
given here, all teaching in the central sense involves learning, it 
does not follow that all teaching (in that sense) must be successful. 
Indeed, since the idea of success is conceptually tied to an agent's 
intentions and purposes, it is inappropriate to discuss non-intentional 
teaching in success terms. Since we can't speak of failure here, it 
is inappropriate to speak of success. 
I consider the most serious objection to this analysis to be the 
one raised by Fleming116  , who cast doubt on the analysis by examining 
again the Austinian distinction on which it is based. 
He pointed out that Austin saw three sub-classes as illocutionary  
effects117 
 - namely (i) "securing uptake", by which he meant "bringing 
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about the understanding of the meaning and of the force 
of the locution}" (ii) "taking effect", as when the naming of a 
ship has the effect of naming it; and (iii)anviting responses." 
Fleming suggested that the perficience analysis of teaching is 
seriously weakened by its failure to take into proper account 
Austin's first suggestion, as put by Searlel18  , that "the 
characteristic intended effect of meaning is understanding but 
understanding is not 	 a perlocutionary (my italics) effect." 
Fleming pointed out that there is a large class of acts whose 
intention is to bring about understanding, which we would include 
as teaching attempts. He is quite correct in suggesting that very 
much of the talk about teaching expresses concern that pupils do 
not simply learn to repeat propositions or to perform manipulative 
tricks (e.g. in mathematics) but to know P (which presupposes 
understanding P) or simply to understand Q.  Thus, he suggested, 
this kind of teaching could not be a member of a class of perficienary 
transactions. Because it aims at understanding, he claimed, it 
could not be a perficienary (or perlocutionary) attempt. Thus if 
teaching is a perficience, bringing about understanding would not 
be teaching at all. 
I certainly agree that Fleming is right in suggesting that an 
analysis of teaching which excluded the bringing about of understanding 
as instances of teaching would have to be rejected, for it would 
on that account be inadequate to our understanding of teaching. But 
I do not think that his objection is valid because it takes too 
simplistic a view of what might be involved in teaching someone to 
understand something. Understanding the meaning of an utterance U 
may be an illocutionary rather than a perlocutionary effect, but 
when a teacher speaks of teaching children to understand something, 
he doesn't mean merely that they should understand the meaning of 
what he is saying. Nor does he refer particularly to their understanding 
of his intention in saying what he does. What teachers are generally 
concerned with, I believe, when they talk of 'teaching for understanding' 
as understanding at a different level from the understanding of 
utterances. If, for example, they are concerned that children should 
understand that Columbus discovered America as a historical fact, 
they do not simply want pupils to understand what they mean when they 
utter the words "Columbus discovered America", nor that the 
pupils should appreciate that their main intention in uttering them 
is that the pupils should understand it. Similarly, the science 
teacher who wants pupils to understand Le Chatelier's principle does 
not simply want them to understand the meaning of the utterance 
"When a constraint is applied to a chemical system in equilibrium, 
changes take place within the system which tend to remove the constraint." 
His concern here is that the pupil integrate that which is understood 
into a body of beliefs and concepts so that he understands the place 
of this principle in a body of chemical theory as currently understood, 
the kinds of reactions to which it is applicable, and how it can be 
used to predict and control chemical changes, etc. He is not concerned 
that they understand that this is his intention so much as that they 
understand this. The understanding involved is not mere uptake of 
illocutionary meaning and/or force. In the very large areas of 
learning where teachers customarily seek understanding, learning 
involves understanding and understanding involves learning. More than 
understanding the meaning of utterances is required. 
Even if we accept Searle's suggestion that understanding the 
meaning and force of utterances is an illocutionary and not a 
perlocutionary effect, the illocutionary effect of understanding 
can be at the most necessary but never sufficient for learning. For 
example, what is said may not be new to the pupil at all, and he can 
therefore not learn from it. But even if what is said is new to 
the pupil, understanding the meaning of the utterance may not involve 
learning anything, for learning, even where what is achieved is 
understanding, also involves integrating the proposition in some way 
in one's conceptual and propositional framework, and remembering it. 
It does involve a response. The is the point which is being made 
when it is stressed that learning is not a passive process, even when 
it is, as already discussed, casual rather than intentional. (I 
have already explained that I am not concerned here with causal learning.) 
The objection is thus countered by pointing out that though 
teaching, as analysed here, may presuppose the securing of illocutionary 
effects, it cannot, for the reasons given above, be identified with 
it. Teaching pupilS to understand human activities, scientific 
theories, society or themselves is not simply a matter of securing 
illocutionary uptake. Fleming may have forgotten that perlocutionary 
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effects can be responses brought about by understanding meanings, 
not e.g. just by the tone of one's voice. If I say "There's a 
bull" with the intention merely of informing, and I frighten or 
warn B because he knows that bulls are dangerous, my frightening 
or warning B involves his understanding of what the utterance 
means. It is not the less a perlocutionary outcome because of 
that. 
Understanding A's utterance is, for Searle, illocutionary 
uptake because it is not seen by him as a response. I have suggested 
that learning, additionally, requires responses even when what is 
learned is delineated in terms of understandings, for it is never 
merely an understanding of the utterance. If having an understanding 
of the illocutionary meaning and/or force of speech acts is thus 
presupposed by teaching outcomes as perficiences, then Fleming is 
right in suggesting that illocutionary-type acts, including 
illocutions, are important in teaching. But I think that he is 
wrong in suggesting that if illocutionary uptake is a necessary 
precondition of any perficienary outcome of teaching (including 
teaching people to understand X) this invalidates the perficience 
analysis. For though understanding an utterance may not be a 
response in itself, acknowledging that what is understood is new 
and incorporating the meanings into one's system of beliefs and 
concepts is a response, and it is this sort of thing which is being 
referred to by talk of teaching children to understand something. 
It is because learners have to make an active response that the 
perficience analysis is appropriate. 
A final objection which has been raised to the view that teaching 
in the central sense implies learning is that such a concept would 
denigrate the work of those who are expected to teach "slow learners" 
or children who have brain damage. Since clearly much less learning 
is likely in these circumstances than with 'bright' children who are 
eager to learn the subject matter a teacher is trying to teach, they 
argue that on this analysis much less teaching is likely to go on. 
I do not accept that the objects of teaching (e.g. knowledge, skills, 
etc.) can usefully be compared to commodities here, and suggest that 
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we cannot accept Dewey's 'exact equation of teaching and learning' in 
this way. If children (or adults) find learning X difficult, for any 
reason, then teaching them will be correspondingly more difficult. 
Nobody is denigrated by the suggestion that it is more difficult to 
teach children with handicaps. Quite the reverse is true, for problems 
are encountered in teaching when problems are encountered in learning. 
But this objection is irrelevant if, as suggested, the analysis offered 
here is descriptive. 
This section has considered the various objections which might 
be raised to the suggestion that our normal claim"A is teaching B 
X" implies that B is learning X, and that the distinctions introduced 
by Austin in his work in the philosophy of language can usefully 
be brought into philosophy of education and developed to give terms 
of art for discussing teaching. I have concluded that these 
objections do not stand up, and that, at the very least, this analysis 
represents a viable alternative to the activity analysis. The 
question remains, then, whether and why this analysis is to be 
preferred to the activity analysis. 
Reasons for preferring the perficience analysis of teaching. 
The main reason I suggest for preferring the perficience analysis 
to the activity analysis is that the former is, and the latter is not, 
consistent with the relationship between an outcome and an attempt. 
That is, as already suggested, understanding "bringing about learning 
by the performance of certain kinds of acts" is logically prior to 
understanding "trying to bring about learning by the performance of 
certain kinds of acts". 
If the above claim is true, one should not be surprised at the 
second claim I make here which is that the analysis presented here 
matches up better with our ordinary use of language, since it is 
consistent, as the activity analysis is not, with our ordinary language 
usage in respect of completely (not just grossly) misjudged states 
of learners, instances where attempts are made to teach people what 
they already know, and in respect of writing text-books for putative 
learners where it is not usual to claim to have been teaching anyone 
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whilst doing so. It is also more helpful than the activity analysis 
in respect of the latter's own examples. It provides criteria for 
being able to say, for example, why a person giving an account of 
the Private Language argument to a group of six year olds could 
'definitely' not be teaching them; for it seems that we do, in 
talking of teaching in general, use as a criterion what we take to 
be, objectively, the actual cognitive states of learners, rather than 
the beliefs of the person attempting to teach. To account for such 
usages, the activity analysis is inconsistent, sometimes appealing to 
objective criteria, sometimes to subjective ones. 
A further advantage of the perficience analysis is that it 
squares with common usage, in that it enables us to say legitimately 
what we do in fact say, that a person may teach Xs (propositions) 
that he does not himself know whilst teaching them. I claim, for 
example, to have taught a group of VIth form biology students to 
have some understanding of the structure of D.N.A. and to know certain 
propositions relating to this structure, though at the start of the 
discussions, carried out with the aid of some books, I had only the 
vaguest ideas about the structure of D.N.A. I certainly had no 
propositional knowledge about the structure of D.N.A., but I can, 
I suggest, validly claim to have taught them the propositions they 
learned because my understanding of chemistry and of the symbols 
employed was such that I was able to help them interpret the 
explanations given in the book which they were not able to 
interpret for themselves. But I could (logically) not have 
intended to teach those propositions because I had no idea what 
they might be. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to say that I 
taught them intentionally. It seems to me that the demand that 
to teach an X, one must intend to teach that X, clearly, not 
fuzzily, specified, tends to rule out activities of the above kind, 
where the teacher has only vague aims concerned with 'teaching 
about', and the guiding of genuinely open-ended enquiry from the 
category of teaching. 
There are many areas including those with tightly structured 
conceptual schemes, such as science and mathematics, where a great 
deal of learning, guided by a person who has an understanding of 
general principles, can go on without the specification of learning 
goals. Indeed, it might be true that for some people the pre- 
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specification of aims might restrict the possibilities of teaching. 
I argue that this kind of guiding activity where propositions are 
learned through the help of others warrants the ascription of 
teaching those propositions in a central, not derivative sense. 
This is not possible if an intention to teach specific propositions 
is a necessary condition of teaching them. The same may be true 
of skills, and certainly seems to be true of dispositions. Our claim 
that A taught us to enjoy, or be interested in, philosophy does not 
depend, in ordinary usage, for its truth on A's having this specific 
intention. The claim is that the perficience analysis is preferable 
because it is appropriate to the attributions of teaching we do make 
of people who :act in the ways described above in bringing about 
learning, and whom we could not describe as teaching those Xs in the 
'important' sense of teaching on the activity analysis. 
It is worth noting that nothing can be said a priori about which 
analysis is preferable in relation specifically to discussions of 
a professional role. This would depend on what is to be said about 
the concepts of role and of school. However, this analysis is 
clearly not going to be less demanding than the activity analysis, 
for there is no implication that vague bumblings or hopeful intentions 
can constitute teaching. The suggestion that teaching X can go 
on without the learning of that X being A's primary intention or even 
his intention at all makes the analysis consistent with our general 
usage. Whether a person who is employed as a teacher in school should 
or should not have intentions concerned with learning, tightly 
structured and clearly formulated intentions concerned with learning, 
etc. I take to be a different question. 
Fourthly, it is suggested that this analysis is to be preferred 
as an account of why we understand the possibility of persons teaching 
through books, programmes, films and resource packs. The development 
of technology, from printing onwards, has permitted transactions with 
persons who are not directly present. I have suggested that in 
making work-cards, films, programmes or handouts, a person is not 
yet teaching anyone anything, and pointed out that nobody does describe 
themselves as teaching whilst doing these things. But the makers are 
teaching agents when learners use the resources they have male and 
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learn through them. This, I have suggested, accounts for our wish 
to be able to describe such activities using the language of teaching. 
Related to this is the claim that the perficience analysis, rather 
than the activity analysis, must be preferred by people with certain 
assumptions of an ontological nature - such as, that teaching must be 
of existent persons and not merely intensional objects (which would 
include 'anyone' in whose possible existence the agent believed). 
Fifthly, I suggest that it is a value of this analysis that it 
focuses our attention, in application, on the actual outcomes of 
acts insofar as they depend on meanings, both intended and non-intentional, 
instead of that subset which are intended learning outcomes. For 
non-verbal teaching, in particular, requires that the teacher's 
behaviour be interpreted as actions for teaching to be going on, on 
this account. Thus it requires understanding (as opposed to not 
understanding) but also takes account of the possibility of misunder- 
standing or misinterpretation of the agent's actions. It thus 
emphasizes what every teacher implicitly knows - that it is the 
way pupils interpret what you are doing that is important in teaching, 
not simply the agent's interpretation. For what is 'brought into 
view' is necessarily related to pupils' interpretations rather than 
teachers'. A person can only teach what he intended if he and his 
pupils share the same understandings. 
Finally, this analysis explains more effectively our widespread 
use of the term 'teach' to ascribe responsibility, to commend and to 
blame (though it is not being suggested that whether or not a person 
can be held responsible, or rightly commended or blamed turns on 
whether or not what he has done is called 'teaching'). I may blame 
my child's teacher for the consequence of her acts by saying e.g. 
that she has taught my daughter to be a tell-tale, or that telling 
tales on her friends is the right thing to do; or I may commend her 
for teaching my child to be interested in X, a subject which has 
previously bored him. In doing so, I make no assumptions about 
the teacher's intentions, insofar as I do not necessarily withdraw 
my claim if I know that her intentions in the first instance were 
to get information about what the children were doing, not to get 
my child to believe anything, and that this doing' was not seen under 
the description I give; and in the second place was to get him 
through an examination. The important feature of teaching, on this 
- 117 - 
view, which all instances have in common, is the performance of 
acts by an agent which, being interpreted, bring new Xs into the 
view of someone whose response is learning. 
For all the above reasons, I suggest that the analysis of 
teaching as a perficienary transaction is to be preferred as an 
account of the concept. The choice is not a merely semantic one, 
for the activity analysis embodies certain assumptions which have 
implications for the role of the teacher that are different from 
the implications of the perficience analysis. The adoption of 
the perficience analysis is not being advocated simply because 
it permits us to question these aspects of the role, though clearly 
this is the main purpose for which it is being utilised in this 
thesis. 
Trying, and trying to teach  
I have suggested that it is only by virtue of understanding 
teaching as a transaction that one can understand teaching in a 
'task' sense, or as I prefer to call it, the idea of trying to 
teach. This section looks more closely at the question of the 
relationship between teaching and attempts to teach. 
It is clear that the presupposition involved in all such 
questions as "What are you trying to teach them?" or such assertions 
as "I was trying to teach them X but they didn't learn it," is that 
trying is no part of the meaning of teaching. For in one sense, 
trying is, as White suggests119, the idea of intention-in-action. 
This presents some difficulty for the activity analysis. 
The criteria for teaching, on this analysis, involve both 
intention and action, since condition (i) of Hirst's three120 is 
an intention criterion and condition (ii) an act criterion, demanding 
the performance of an indicative act. On this analysis, teaching 
means trying to bring about learning by the performance of certain 
kinds of acts. Trying is part of the meaning of teaching121. 
If this is the meaning of teaching involved in the use of the 
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word in the above sentences, which represent fairly typical utterances, 
they would be translatable, respectively, as "What are you trying to 
try to get them to learn?" and "I was trying to try to get them to 
learn X but they didn't learn it." The proponents of the activity 
analysis are thus involved in the problem of whether it is possible 
to try to try, to which the standard philosophical answer seems to 
be that it is not. Acceptance of the view that one could try to try 
would involve an infinite regress, for 'try' is being used in the 
same sense in both places. 
However, it is worth noting that many writers who accept an 
activity analysis of teaching (which involves the view that teaching 
necessarily involves trying) still use the above constructions 
extensively in their writings and speech. Either they have failed 
to notice that their use of teaching in these constructions cannot 
have presuppositions concerned with trying, or they accept the 
possibility of trying to try. The move of suggesting that in these 
special contexts the 'trying' condition of teaching is missing (i.e. 
that this is a 'derivative' sense that doesn't involve trying) seems 
to me unacceptable. I have suggested that central uses of teaching 
do not necessarily involve trying, so the analysis offered here has 
no problems with the uses given above. Clearly it is possible to 
try to teach and to fail in one's attempt. (It is, however, also 
worth noticing that this objection also holds in respect of analyses 
of learning as an activity, for we also ask people e.g. what they 
are trying to learn. Questions about trying thus raise problems 
for the activity analysis of teaching at two different levels for 
anyone who also accepts that central senses of learning also involve 
trying.) 
However, there is another sense in which a person may say, "I 
was trying to teach B X all morning." This is in the context of a 
constant stream of interruptions, and what the speaker wishes to 
indicate is that he has been unable to perform the actions which 
would have constituted the attempt. Thus the perficience analysis 
is faced with the same problem in relation to different contexts. 
Does the perficience analysis here involve an infinite regress of 
tryings? For if teaching is seen only as the goal of A's acts and 
activities, rather than as a description or appraisal of them, the 
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sentence seems to be only translatable as "I was trying to try to 
teach B X all morning." I hope to show, however, that no regress is 
involved here. 
It is important to distinguish two ways in which a person may 
fail to achieve a desired upshot. Firstly he may perform the acts 
which constitute his attempt, but these acts may fail to bring 
about the result which was desired. This is the more usual situation. 
But it is to be clearly distinguished from the situation in which the 
failure to achieve the result is due to a failure to perform the acts 
which were to have constituted the attempt. If the two uses of 'try' 
in the construction under discussion are different, then no regress 
is involved. 
"Try to" is a construction normally followed by a verb X, and 
it is true that we can as often say of someone that he tried and 
succeeded as that he tried and failed. But trying is, nonetheless, 
a notion which draws attention to difficulties, for when something 
is so simple that it requires no effort, there is little point in 
talk of trying. This is perhaps why Scheffler's comments, already 
referred to, that running surely involves something over and above 
the subservient task of trying to run sound so odd. For we do not 
normally talk of trying to walk or run, though there may be good 
reasons for speaking in this way of someone who is recovering from 
paralysis. Doctors do ask paralysed patients to try to e.g. wiggle 
their toes, and though the person concerned could give no account  
of what he did to try, and the doctor be unable to tell him what to 
do to try, we can distinguish between the case of the man who tried 
and failed and the man who did not try. This seems to involve 
rejecting Danto's suggestion that, for the case of moving one's arm, 
one loses the power of trying together with the power of doing222 
But this does not involve us as construing trying as a kind of 
willing, as some kind of mental cause. A paralysed person himself 
is aware of whether or not he tried. 
The important thing here seems to be to distinguish the problem 
of knowledge from the problem of meaning. There are surely problems 
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as to what would count as evidence that a paralysed man had tried 
to wiggle his toes. It would seem that one could have no alternative 
here but to accept his word. But this does not prevent us from 
understanding the difference between trying to run and failing, and 
not bothering to try. This indicates that a special account is needed 
to provide a context in which walk and run would be task verbs, and 
perhaps this is the point Scheffler is trying to make when he suggests 
that the task/achievement distinction be best understood as a 
relativised one. 
My suggestion here is that the sense in which we speak of trying 
to teach to imply additional difficulties (such as interruptions) thus 
refers to a context in which difficulties arise in actually performing 
the actions which are to constitute a teaching attempt. Seen in this 
way, there is no regress, for the 'try' in the sense of teach which is 
equivalent to try-to-teach refers either only to the bringing about 
of the perficienary outcome of teaching which is the logical 
consequence of the pupils' learning from his acts, or to this and 
the bringing about of some final upshot, whereby the learning is 
terminated by the attainment of some specified end-state by the pupil. 
In the other use, the 'try' refers to attempts to perform certain 
acts, and implies difficulties in their successful performance. 
Interruptions have been given as one example, but of course there are 
other reasons why actions which are attempted may not be performed 
successfully, such as lack of skill or resources on the part of the 
agent. Research into teaching needs to take these distinctions into 
account. 
Given that attempts are made by virtue of the acts which constitute 
the attempts being successfully performed, there are a number of 
different kinds of reasons why the attempt may fail. In order to 
discover whether the attempt is successful or not in terms of its 
goal, it is necessary for a researcher to know what the goal is. 
Similarly, it is necessary for him to know whether or not pupils 
already know the X which the agent is attempting to teach, since it 
is logically impossible that they learn what they already know or 
can do, and pupils who have previously learned the X must be excluded 
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from the investigation. The failure to teach in these circumstances 
is due to a special kind of ignorance on the teacher's part, since 
he is unaware of the logical impossibility of achieving what he is 
trying to do. 
The attempt may fail because of a different kind of ignorance, 
an ignorance to do with the actual instrumentality of the actions 
being performed to the bringing about of the desired outcome. The 
agent's belief that actions X, Y and 2; could have certain consequences 
may simply be false. On this kind of account, a witch-doctor 
engaging in certain rituals considered appropriate in his society 
will fail in his attempt to cause it to rain, even though it may 
rain. He may be accounted a very successful witch-doctor if rain 
usually occurs when he performs his ritual, but anyone who denies 
that there is a causal relationship between the ritual and the rain 
is committed to saying that he failed to make it rain. The parallel 
with teaching is not completely straightforward, since the instrumentality 
involved in teachin is not causal in this sense. It is rather that 
certain acts are appropriate to the learning of Xs and conducive to 
that learning, and others are not. For example, the person who 
believes that you cannot get children to appreciate Shakespeare's 
plays by instructing them to appreciate them is committed to saying 
that any teaching attempt which consists only of such instruction 
must fail. Since appreciation, like interest, cannot be compelled, 
the attempt fails even if pupils do come to appreciate Shakespeare's 
plays. For, on the account given here, a teacher may teach his 
pupils something through things that he does that do not constitute 
the attempt, and which could not constitute his attempt if he were 
unaware that these were acts that were conducive to such learning. 
It is therefore appropriate to say that his attempt fails even if 
he teaches what he intended. The ignorance involved in this kind of 
failure is of a different kind from that of the first example. 
A teaching attempt may fail even though the acts are appropriate 
and would, all other conditions being right, have been conducive to 
bringing about the desired outcome, because some other empirical 
condition necessary for the required outcome to occur is not met. 
in the way that a person planting seeds in an attempt to produce crops may 
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fail because of missing minerals in the soil, a teaching attempt may 
fail because of children's inattention to their doings, their tiredness, 
etc. Already mentioned is the fact that teaching attempts may fail 
because the teacher has incorrect beliefs about what his pupils can 
understand. This account is not intended to be exhaustive. 
The important point that is being made here is that for teaching 
attempts to succeed, the teacher must (i) perform the actions which 
constitute the attempt and (ii) the bringing about of the learning 
outcome desired must be through those acts. For the teacher may teach 
what he intended and yet not succeed in his teaching attempt if the 
acts through which the teaching is actually brought about are not 
themselves being performed with the intention of bringing about the 
learning of X. 
This distinction seems to me to be important for empirical research 
on teaching methods, and has implications concerned with the understanding 
of the subject matter required of people who engage in research, and 
for research methodology, which, I suggest, must include in addition 
to the usual investigations as to whether the pupils have learned the 
X, investigations as to which acts brought this learning about. For 
a teacher may adopt a new method, the method under research, but it 
may be through acts which fulfil the criteria suggested for teaching 
but which the teacher is not performing as part of the new method that 
he brings about the learning. The researcher needs to take account 
of how the teacher's actions are interpreted by his pupils, which 
may be of particular importance when the new method (e.g. discussion) 
is misunderstood by the pupils used to the old one (e.g. instruction). 
The interpretations need to be brought into line before it is possible 
for the method to succeed. Research which only takes account of the 
teacher's perspective (i.e. what he intends to get children to learn 
and his views on their cognitive states, and what counts as an 
indicative act) may give invalid conclusions, for it has failed to 
understand the difficulties of innovation. 
However, the comments above about a person teaching through 
actions which are not part of the 'method', or teaching related Xs 
(either desirable or undesirable) are intended to point to something 
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else important. It is, I suggest, not good enough to say simply, 
"How nice we have all this spin-off:" or "Too bad he's learned all 
these other things," and to refuse to call this 'teaching'. The 
plausible hypothesis that we could come to understand more about 
teaching (and thus what to do in our teaching attempts) from looking 
at non-intentional teaching than at teaching attempts should not 
be made false by definition. 
Finally, it is worth noting the failure of teaching attempts 
because they have not been carried on long enough. Attempts may 
be abandoned (for a variety of reasons including lack of time) when 
'on the brink' of success. Research into teaching methods should 
not brand methods as failures when this is the reason for the 
failure. 
Other concepts of teaching and their relationships 
I have suggested that the concept of teaching as a perficienary 
transaction is the central concept of teaching, and that it is 
only by virtue of understanding this that one can understand what 
is involved in engaging in a perficienary attempt, and the notion 
of trying to teach has been explored. But no discussion on the 
concept of teaching would be complete without reference to some, at 
least, of the many other suggestions which have been made regarding 
more specific concepts of teaching than the two already discussed. 
The first of these is Scheffleri s123 well-known suggestion that 
teaching involves submitting oneself to the independent judgment 
of pupils and making available to them the underlying rationale of 
what is to be learned. Cooper124 has pointed out that this analysis 
is stipulative regarding general usage, being far more appropriate 
in respect of philosophy than in respect of many other subject matters. 
Without commenting on the possible intentions Scheffler might have 
had in introducing this analysis, it is interesting to note that, as 
Smith125 pointed out in respect of other definitions of teaching, 
"it smuggles in its own particular view of how teaching is to be 
carried on." By his analysis, Scheffler is implicitly recommending 
to teachers who see their job as to teach the practice of providing 
the underlying rationale for beliefs etc. These practices cannot, 
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however, be shown to be justifiable by bending the ordinary language 
uses of terms. This is not to deny that good reasons could be 
provided for teaching the underlying rationale for beliefs, but rather 
to suggest that "the underlying rationale for beliefs" is an 
appropriate object for the verb 'teach' (the formal object of which 
is "that which can be understood and/or learned), rather than a 
part of the meaning of the term in common usage. Additionally such 
a view renders it possible for a person to teach the underlying 
rationale of that which he does not himself accept as true (e.g. 
astrology, Freudian theory) which would seem, on Scheffler's view, 
to be logically impossible. 
Bantock126 and Jackson127 have suggested that teaching is a 
moral activity (which cuts out Fagan), and Aiken128 seems to ascribe 
to teaching the evaluative nature which, in the context of English 
philosophy of education is normally ascribed to education, in that 
he contrasts teaching with 'merely educating' on the one hand and 
with 'indoctrination' on the other. However, Nei11129 appears to 
equate teaching with instruction, as does much non-philosophical 
writing on schools, though this is not surprising in view of the 
predominance of instruction as a teaching method. Musgrove and 
Taylor130, on the other hand, contrast teaching with lecturing or 
instruction. Again, it might be suggested that discussions such 
as these smuggle in either value judgments or a particular view 
about how children learn best. These defects, I suggest, have only 
been avoided by Hirst, who said of his discussion on teaching131, 
"I have been concerned with teaching and learning in general, whatever 
the ends concerned, be they bad habits, perversions, concepts, 
physical skills, etc." The advantage of this is that it enables us 
to consider separately both the objects of teaching (content) and 
the manner in terms of justification. The analysis of teaching 
presented here has similarly been in general terms, for, as already 
suggested, it seems particularly important that the value judgments 
should be separated from the problems of meaning. 
Finally it is worth noting that the development of institutions 
such as schools, specifically concerned with teaching/learning 
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has led to the development of many derivative, or, as I prefer to call 
them, 'institutionalized' uses of 'teach' and 'learn' primarily 
associated with the giving or taking of courses or lessons and 
associated with pedagogy. For example, one commonly finds talk 
about a person who is learning French at school, but isn't learning 
any French, and a teacher who is teaching children French but they 
aren't learning it. It does not seem to me to be true to say that 
these uses are always equivalent to 'trying-to-learn' or 'trying-to-
teach' respectively, for the giving or attending of French lessons 
may be a routine. It does not seem to me important to the understanding 
of the role of the teacher to consider these types of utterance in 
an analytic way, asking whether anything more than a mere attempt or 
even whether a mere attempt is involved. The point being made is 
that these senses must be derivative, and the attenuation of uses is 
shown by the fact that there is now a school sense of teach which 
involves no more than sitting in a classroom keeping an eye on a 
group of children. The sense of teaching equivalent to giving lessons 
1 is to be found in philosophical literature. 2  . 
It does not seem to me to be important to argue about whether or 
not a teacher can properly be said to be tacking the whole class when 
five children are not attending or when he believes that what he is 
doing is conceptually inappropriate for five of the children. Whether 
or not the situation is one which should be encouraged or discouraged 
does not turn on the language we use to describe it. Deciding that 
one cannot, logically, punish the innocent does not decide the question 
of whether or not pain should be inflicted on the innocent e.g. to 
deter rule-breaking. My interest here is to investigate what is 
necessary to the role of the teacher and what is contingent, and the 
kinds of justification which can be given for different aspects of the 
teacher's role, and it is claimed that for this we must examine the 
understanding of teaching which these institutions presuppose rather 
than the senses which have developed within them. For the latter may well 
embody the very assumptions which are up for question. 
It might be, however, that some stipulation is in order in this 
area. For example, we may be tie-witched by our own language into 
believing, for example, that all primary school children are 
learning French (in the sense of acquiring skills and vocabulary 
for understanding the language and communicating with others in it) 
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because all are now learning French (attending French lessons). If 
we were becoming satisfied with schools and what was going on in them 
as a result of talking in this way, in my view this would be 
sufficient grounds for being prescriptive and suggesting that certain 
institutionalised uses of terms be abandoned. 
Indeed, the original comments made by 3cheffler on the Dewey 
analysis of teaching were made in the light of its use as a slogan, 
and Komisar points out that if teaching implied learning, the slogan 
"No Learning then No Teaching" could become a crisp rule of pedagogic 
language133. The last thing I would support would be that if this 
analysis were accepted, it should be used as the basis of slogans 
of this kind. My point in presenting the analysis is more serious 
than this. Insofar as I am right in claiming that all our under-
standing of teaching (particularly our understanding of its 
institutionalised senses) presupposes an understanding of the 
concept of teaching which implies learning, then investigations into 
what is justifiable for teachers must be based on this sense and not 
on institutionalised senses which may embody assumptions which are up 
for question. If this point is accepted, then this in itself would 
be adequate justification for the lengthy attempt I have made to 
establish the entitlement of this analysis for serious consideration. 
Conclusion 
This section has examined in detail the various terms of art which 
have been suggested as giving an adequate account of teaching, and 
concluded that none of them are adequate for this purpose. Therefore 
the concept of a perficience was developed, and it was suggested 
that the schema 'perficienary attempt/perficienary transaction/ 
perficienary termination' was one which could fully account for our 
current concept of teaching 3 X. The advantages of this analysis 
were discussed, and the idea of teaching attempts explored. The 
centrality of teaching acts was emphasized, insofar as I suggest that 
we cannot claim satisfactorily that A has taught 3 X (or that he is 
teaching B X) until we can give some account of how this was (or 
is being) done. 
My suggestion, at this stage, is that intention to bring about 
the learning of particular Xs by B is not a necessary condition of 
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A's teaching B that X in the central and fundamentally important 
(outcome) sense of teach. In the early stages of my consideration 
of problems in this area, I was of the view that it was useful to 
make a fairly sharp distinction between intentional and non-intentional 
teaching. In my original paper I distinguished three categories, 
as follows: 
(a) non-intentional perficiences 
(b) intentional perficiences (successful perficienary attempts) 
(c) unsuccessful perficienary attempts 
However, it now seems to me to contribute more to our understanding if 
we recognize that though this distinction may have its uses, there 
are often difficulties in deciding whether the action was intentional 
under that particular description or not. We use the term 'teaching' 
in discussing outcomes by applying it across a continuum of instances, 
ranging from those where the bringing about of the learning of 
tightly specified Xs is the primary concern of the agent, through 
cases where the intention to bring about learning exists but what is 
to be learned is formulated at a high level of generality, cases where 
it is of incidental concern though the agent is aware of the likely 
outcome of his acts, to cases where it is of no relevance in that the 
person of who teaching is predicated has not considered the possibility 
of bringing about that learning. There are also cases where an 
insistance on intention requires us to postulate unconscious intentions. 
At this stage the difficulties in respect of empirical investigation 
become extreme. 
I also suggest that it is to miss the philosophical importance of 
discussions on teaching as an area within social philosophy to discuss 
at length whether or not a person is teaching, on Hirst's analysis, 
when they deliberately demonstrate the correct pronunciation of a word 
in front of a Frenchman with a poor accent with the intention of 
bringing it about that he learns to pronounce it correctly, although 
the Frenchman has no idea of this purpose and may not even be listening 
to his talking; or whether, on the analysis presented here, we would 
have to call it 'teaching' if a great many people sitting in a bus 
learned the practice of leaping off while the bus is in motion because 
I perform this act regularly on the 8:15 a.ui. Both analyses have 
problems with such cases which no-one has previously considered calling 
teaching. Discussions on such cases, which was a primary focus when 
the paper on teaching just referred to was presented, seem to me to be 
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of little relevance in that, since both analyses have borderline 
cases of this kind where they conflict with language usage, the 
existance of such cases cannot provide a criterion for choosing 
between the analyses. 
My claim is that our fundamental understanding of teaching 
arises from our standard predication of teaching of persons when 
we see that they are performing acts which are instrumental in 
the ways discussed in bring about learning. We do this without 
consideration of whether or not their primary intention in performing 
those acts is that the specified others should learn those Xs. 
It is not, as Hirst suggests, that we have to provide some kind of 
special explanation of why we use the term 'teach' in cases where 
it is not the agent's intention to bring about learning. It is 
simply that these are instances of the standard case. 
Secondly, I have shown that an understanding of this sense is 
logically required of anyone as a precondition of engaging in a 
teaching attempt. This analysis, on my view, should be preferred 
for these reasons alone. But, more importantly, on this view and 
on this view alone, is it a separate and controversial question 
as to how far the role of the teacher requires him to engage in 
teaching attempts directed towards highly specified Xs and how 
far he might be justified (e.g. by teaching his pupils a lot in 
the outcome sense) in having only generally ("fuzzily") formulated 
objectives. The question cannot be legislated out of existence 
by the assertion that teachers must teach and that teaching (logically) 
requires tightly specified rather than fuzzy intentions. It is my 
view that it is an empirical matter to determine whether the tight 
and clear specification of learning objectives helps or hinders 
teaching, and that this might vary from teacher to teacher, or even 
for the same teacher in respect of different content or different 
groups of pupils. This analysis thus opens up an area of empirical 
research which is excluded a priori by the activity analysis of 
teaching. Additionally, if it is concluded that the framing of low-
level objectives is not demanded by the nature of teaching, then 
it is necessarily the case that the framing of behavioural objectives 
is not necessary. This may have important implications for policy 
making. 
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I will later argue in more detail that the only valid justification 
for making teaching attempts involving clearly specified low-level 
objectives rather than working in school with only general high-level 
aims can be that the former teach more or more valuable Xs than the 
latter. It seems at least possible that this is done in some 
instances by intentionally keeping aims "fuzzy" rather than by 
carefully thinking out at a low level what it is that one wants 
children to learn, for it may be that, for various reasons, the 
latter could militate against teaching for some people in some 
circumstances. This at least seems a matter worthy of empirical 
investigation. I do not believe I have misunderstood Hirst's 
article when I suggest that the possibility of testing this hypothesis, 
and claiming that teachers might fulfil their professional role 
better without clearly specifying low-level objectives does not 
exist on the understanding of teaching he presents. It is 
necessarily mistaken. 
Finally it must be pointed out that the activity analysis 
necessarily leaves out of discussions of teaching the main concern 
of those who attack the institution of schooling through discussions 
of 'the hidden curriculum'. These discussions are couched in the 
language of teaching, and if philosophers of education are to show 
willingness to meet and answer the objections raised by deschoolers 
to schools, and to engage in discussions with them, we cannot do 
so by forcing them to change their language, or by analysing their 
problems _out of existence. They are not philosophical problems which, 
as Wittgenstein suggests, may dissolve on analysis, but conflicts 
of persons and of values. It is clear that the activity analysis 
patently fails to provide a context in which fruitful discussions 
on the hidden curriculum can go on. For a 'hidden curriculum' 
is not a curriculum at all, in Hirst's sense of the term. The 
relationship between curriculum and teaching is, for him, conceptual, 
13 for, as he says , "I see a curriculum arising only in a teaching 
situation, where a set of objectives is clearly specifiable." 
The perficience analysis of teaching is such that someone who supports 
it has language for discussing the issues concerned with both Hirst 
and with the deschoolers. 
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The final section of this thesis asks questions about a 
justifiable role for teachers, and treats as problematic the 
specific intentionality which Hirst takes to be a necessary 
° feature of school. He writes13 
 , 
6 
"the greater the degree of 
specificity the better, and 	  as tight a description of 
what is to be learned as is available." He describes discussions 
which focus on children's interests as 'unsatisfactory' because 
they "can be used to evade the detailed specification of what is 
being aimed at and even to suggest that specification is 
unnecessary or undesirable." I am not convinced that the tight 
specification of objectives is desirable, or that a greater 
degree of specificity is necessarily better than specifying to 
a lesser degree. This seems, at least, a point which it should 
be possible to question, but the activity analysis of teaching 
rules this out a priori if it is accepted that a teacher's 
responsibility is to teach in this sense. An alternative viable 
analysis is important for any serious consideration of these 
questions, and this new analysis, besides being important for 
the reasons already discussed, is the indispensable foundation 
of the rest of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
 The Concept of Role 
Introduction  
A great deal of the work in sociology and social psychology 
devoted to role, and in particular to the role of the teacher, seems 
contradictory and confusing. There is reference to role expectations, 
role set, role conflict, role playing, role distance, role selection, 
achieved and ascribed roles, role performance, role enactment, role 
distance - and many more. The first question which arises, then, is 
whether the same concept of role is being used throughout. 
Different writers certainly define their terms in ways which are 
inconsistent with one another. For example, as Banton1 has already 
pointed out, what Linton2 and Newcomb3  define as a role, Davis calls 
a status. For Linton, however, the 'status' was a model for 
organizing the attitudes and behaviour of the individual, and the 
'role' represented the dynamic aspects of this status. Again, what 
Davis5 defines as a role, Newcomb6 calls role behaviour, and Sarbin7 
role enactment. There is a decision to be taken here. Are we to 
say that there are several concepts of role used by sociologists, or 
that there is one concept for which different writers use different 
terminology - i.e. that they speak different languages. In spite of 
the difficulties involved, I shall take the latter position, and the 
reader must remember this. 
Levinson8 has suggested that there are three different senses 
in which the term 'role' has been used by different writers, or by 
the same writer on different occasions. Firstly, he suggests, role 
may be defined or understood as the structurally given demands (norms, 
expectations, responsibilities and the like) associated with a given 
social position (or, since there is no agreed terminology here, one 
could equally say status). In this sense, a role is something outside 
any given individual - a set of pressures and facilitations that 
channel, guide, impede and support his functioning. These, says 
Levinson, may be more precisely called role expectations or role set. 
Secondly, according to Levinson, role may be understood as the 
member's own orientation or conception of the part he is to play in 
the organization (or institution) - that is, his inner definition 
of what someone in his social position is supposed to do or think 
about it. This, Levinson suggests, can be called role conception, 
which, since it seems to refer to particular individuals, seems to 
me to be a psychological concept whereas the first sense seems clearly 
sociological. This sense is what Banton9 calls role cognition. 
Finally, according to Levinson, role is commonly defined as the 
action of the individual member. In this sense, role refers to the 
ways in which individual occupants of the position actually act, and 
here Levinson suggests the consistent use of the term role performance. 
Perhaps because it was not of any concern to him - his aim seemingly 
being to urge consistency in usage among sociologists - he has begged 
here a number of important questions. 
For example, if a person is to be guided (or as Levinson put it, 
impeded or supported) by his role set, what description to we apply if 
it is part of his role set both to do and not to do X: This simply 
means that people have conflicting expectations, and, given the 
definition of role set, is logically possible for any role, and, 
in the case of teachers, is empirically most likely. Does a person's 
role conception include expectations about his role partners' actions 
towards him in standard role situations? If so, then one cannot 
define role conception simply in terms of one's own role. But if 
not, then mustn't he necessarily have an infinite role conception, 
since he will have to have an 'inner definition' of what someone in 
his social position is supposed to do in an infinite number of possible 
role situations. Or, to take a different kind of example, one might 
wonder whether the expectations of Xs themselves about the role of an 
X have a different logical status in a role set from the expectations 
of other groups. 
The references to action rather than behaviour suggest that whether 
or not a person is conforming to expectations is not a matter for 
merely 'behavioural' observation. But it is not clear whether 
Levinson interprets the term 'action' as including the kinds of 
description the agent himself would be prepared to give of what he 
is doing, or whether he believes that, in a given context, there can 
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be no disagreement about what an individual's actions are. 
Further questions which might be raised are ones concerning 
the relationship between these three different senses of role. And -
in connection with role performance which Levinson defines as 
referring to the ways in which members of a position act - there is 
the question of how many members must act in any particular way for 
it to be a non-idiosyncratic role performance. Finally (with no 
suggestion that the difficulties are anywhere near exhausted) questions 
must be asked about the justification of roles and of the obligations 
and expectations which different people ascribe to them. The analysis 
offered by Levinson may help sociologists reach some terminological 
agreement, but it takes no account of the questions which one might 
ask about role which are not sociological questions. The analysis 
he presents seems far too crude to allow this. 
The inconsistency in usage, the over-simplicity of previous analyses 
and the impossibility of using them to ask important philosophical 
questions constitute, in themselves, sufficient reason for a new 
attempt at analysis. There is, however, particular urgency in 
respect of the fact that Colleges and Departments of Education are 
supposed to prepare teachers to fill a role in society. It is surely 
important to examine that role and ensure that it is a justifiable 
one. Since the teacher's role set is a set of conflicting expectations 
- one group expecting teachers to do X and another expecting them not 
to do X - a role set is, by its very nature, not something that can 
be justified. 
Furthermore, it may be that it is through sociological writings 
that intending teachers learn their role conception. The work of 
social psychologists and sociologists on role is claimed to be purely 
descriptive and, insofar as it is accepted that this can be the case, 
value-free. Writers do not examine the justifications for the 
different aspects of roles which they describe, though they sometimes 
allow themselves a value comment. The examination of justifications, 
however, is a philosophical, not a sociological enquiry, and as far 
as I can see, philosophical writing on the role of the teacher is 
fairly limited10. Thus, if the writings of sociologists and 
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on the role of the teacher (such as "The Role of the Teacher" by 
Hoyle") are the full extent of a student teacher's work in this 
area, it would not be surprising if he took it as not merely 
descriptive, but also as prescriptive, no matter what the intention 
of the authors12. Thus the writings of social scientists would 
teach intending teachers, at least in part, their conceptions of 
their own future roles, conceptions which may then be the subject 
of further empirical investigation. Not only is the uncritical 
acceptance of descriptive writings as prescriptive undesirable, but, 
in this case, perhaps it also acts as a sociological self-fulfilling 
prophecy. 
This chapter offers an analysis of the concepts of role as a 
necessary preliminary to the further task, undertaken in Section III, 
of examining the kinds of justification which can be offered for 
various aspects of the teacher's role, and their adequacy, with 
particular attention to conceptual demands. Because of the suggestion 
of de-schoolers such as Reimer13 and Illich14 that schools are 
pernicious institutions (and thus that the role of the teacher in a 
school is a pernicious role) there is a discussion on role and the 
Naturalistic Fallacy. 
Concepts of role - a new analysis  
This section looks at the different senses which can be 
distinguished of the term 'role' (and thus implies different meanings 
for role set, role conception etc.) It takes as its starting point 
the analysis of R.S. Downie15, but claims to be an improvement on 
Downie's in that it makes an important distinction between the sense 
which is the legitimate interest of the legal theorist and the sense 
which is the legitimate interest of the philosopher alone, in that 
questions related to it are questions in moral, social and political 
philosophy (not in that only professional philosophers may be interested 
in them). 
Sense (1) - Theatrical  
Setting aside for the moment Downie's first sense of role as a 
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mere class concept, the original use of the term 'role' as a part in 
a play may be distinguished. Parts in plays are, of course, still 
called roles. When roles in plays were all stereotypes, the audience 
had standard expectations about the ways in which characters would 
behave, and although roles in plays are not now stereotypes in the 
same way, they can still only be understood in terms of expectations. 
When the plays are particularly well-known to the audience, the audience 
shares the expectations each actor has of what other actors will do. 
jut, importantly, even when the audience has not expectations, "from the 
inside" (that is, from the point of view of other actors) this is the 
only way in which roles can be understood, including each actor's own. 
It must be assumed that they, and other actors, will behave in ways 
related (to variable extents) to a script or rehearsal pattern. 
Extreme deviations by any one actor would make it is some degree 
impossible for anyone else to fill his role in the agreed manner. This 
is true even of improvised drama, where no sense could be made of what 
is going on unless those participating characterized themselves in some 
way. 
This suggests that the relation between role and expectations is 
conceptual rather than contingent. We would be unable to understand 
what a role would be apart from understanding its relationship with 
other roles and expectations, rigid or diffuse, of how those in other 
roles will or should act or behave. 
It is interesting to note that this sense is being brought 
closer to other senses the more one tends to look upon life as the 
acting out of social "plays" (as, for example, does Goffman16 
 ) and 
thinks of those who enact roles as "actors" rather than as "agents". 
The rather closer relationship between this sense and the use of the 
term 'role' by symbolic interactionists (as opposed to functionalists 
or social phenomenologists) will be referred to again later. 
Sense (2) - Descriptive Expectations  
This sense of the term is an ordinary language usage, though, of 
course, discussions involving the concept may not employ the "short-hand" 
tern 'role'. The more technical use of the term in this sense was its 
use by social anthropologists with reference to primitive societies 
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where certain patterns of behaviour were ritualized. However, 
it can also be used with reference to similarly ritualized patterns 
of behaviour in our own society. To take an out-of-school examples even 
a non-religious person would be just as astonished to learn of a 
sermon given in a Christian church in which agapae  love and the 
Good Samaritan were condemned as the actor playing Polonius would 
be if Hamlet killed his uncle in the first few moments of the play. 
This use of the concept of role by social scientists to indicate 
expected (anticipated) patterns of behaviour is identical with one 
of its uses in the public language. A description of what it is to 
be a hospital doctor can be given (and whether the term 'role' is 
used seems to me to be irrelevant since the concept can be employed 
without a single-term connotation) in terms of a description of what 
one would expect to find, in the sense of directly observable (though 
not unconceptpalized) features of the hospital doctor, such as asking 
about one's pains, possibly wearing a white coat, carrying a 
stethescope, etc.18 A person whose expectations include these must 
(logically) feel surprise if they are missing. This indicates that 
the point of role expectations for a person is to enable him to 
predict roughly what a role filler will do. This enables him to 
prepare himself for what is to happen, and thus to experience, in 
general, what occurs as mediated through that set of expectations 
which functions as a conceptual framework in respect of the social 
world. Of course, if his expectations are not fulfilled, he may 
conclude either that his expectations were mistaken, or that this 
doctor, for example, was not behaving appropriately. It seems a 
contingent fact that most people, on the first occasion of having 
their expectations unmet, will think the latter. 
This second sense of role I call the sense of descriptive  
expectations19. In principle this could include attributes; for 
example, it might be expected that hospital doctors be friendly or 
impersonal, patient or brusque, etc. The term "descriptive" is 
used to imply the absense of evaluation. This is just the way (it 
is believedthat) things are. 
In this sense, all jobs are necessarily roles, whether paid or 
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not, including their temporary assumption e.g. in a commune, though, 
of course, not all roles are jobs. The point being emphasized here 
is that because the unfulfilled expectations are logically associated 
with surprise, the relation of role with expectations is again a 
conceptual one. I suggest that such a conception is necessary to 
social life, if by social life is meant some understanding of social 
activity that avoids treating each situation as entirely new. The 
latter is something which may not be simply empirically impossible 
but logically impossible because one cannot conceive of or experience 
a situation without the use of class concepts which pick out 
similarities to other experiences and situations. 
Downie stigmatizes social scientists for using a concept of 
role which he describes as "merely a class concept".20  This use is 
included in my sense of role as descriptive expectations, and it should 
be clear that I believe Downie's dismissal of this use as being 
uninformative to be somewhat hasty. Downie claims that to say a person 
has a role in this broad sense (e.g. of opera fan) adds nothing by 
way of description or explanation. However, this does not seem to 
be correct. To tell us that a person has certain aims by virtue of 
which he is a football or opera fan is to classify him (for those who 
understand what football or opera is), but yet tells us nothing about 
the ways in which he can be expected to behave. Aims may be identical 
across cultures or sun-cultures, whilst behaviour expected within 
different cultures or sub-cultures may be quite different. Opera 
fans, presumably, have similar aims in Italy and in Britain, but 
the description of the role of an opera fan is not necessarily the 
same simply because of this. To say that someone is an opera fan 
tells us nothing about whether we can expect him to react throughout 
the opera with enthusiastic shouting, or to be quietly contained 
during the performance, with applause (and perhaps a small amount 
of verbal applause) confined, in general, to the ends of the acts. 
Thus I argue that the role description, in this sense of descriptive 
expectations, does tell us more than the class concept alone, 
especially if the latter is understood, as Downie suggests, in terms 
of aims. Talk of the social role of 'old man' (and this is done 
with reference to a social context) or 'father', by implication 
suggests much more than the biological class concept which it 
presupposes. 
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However, even this apparently simple concept involves many 
difficulties. When any individual gives his account of a role (e.g. 
hospital doctor) in the sense of descriptive expectations, by 
explaining what behaviour he anticipates in a hospital doctor, and, 
perhaps, the expected attributes of a doctor, he can be seen by 
a social scientist as giving his personal expectations. The 
problem arises in respect of what is to be said if such a person's 
expectations are completely at variance with the consensus of 
opinion of any group to which he might belong. Because of the 
way in which the term 'role' has been defined (as discussed in 
the introduction), several possible descriptions of him can be 
given. 
It could be said, for example, that his account of the role 
is "incorrect", which assumes that a "correct" account of the role 
can be given as the sum of the expectations held of it in the 
society without including him. But how does one justify excluding 
him? Or it could be said, without implying any evaluation, simply 
that he was a "deviant" from his group(s). But what is to be said 
if his description is consensual with that of the majority of one 
group to which he belongs but deviant from another? Of course, 
his description can be both correct from one perspective and 
incorrect from another, but what could be meant by saying that he 
is both correct and incorrect, or that he is both deviant and non-
deviant2 Perhaps he could be said to have given a description 
which is incomplete rather than incorrect. But the difficulty with 
this is that it would follow that in that case it could be that 
there are roles which nobody in the society can give a full account 
of. This would be the case if it were a part of an Xs role set 
both to do Z and not-Z, and the member must have one belief or the 
other about what Xs will do. This puts the observer in a privileged 
position. 
It must be remembered that the role set is not an account of 
what Xs actually do. A role is not investigated by finding out 
by observation whether or not most or all encumbents of the role 
do Z. This again indicates that the relationship between role and 
expectations is conceptual. The relationship between practices 
and expectations is contingent. If the expectations change, the 
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role is necessarily changed. But the relationship between 
expectations and practices is such that there can be a change in 
expectations followed by a change in practices, a change in 
practices followed by a change in expectations, or a change in 
one without any change in the other (leading to increased incongruity 
which will necessarily alter the amount of surprise felt). The 
relationship between role set and role performance (what people 
actually do in fulfilling a role) is thus shown to be a contingent 
one. 
Role performance and role enactment are thus derivative concepts 
for they presuppose a sense of role involving expectations. It could 
be argued that we could not have a concept of role involving expectations 
without a prior understanding of what it would be for individuals 
actually to enact roles. But one could only look at what a particular 
individual was doing as role enactment if one had a set of expectations 
about what he would do as a role-filler. For otherwise it would be 
impossible to differentiate what he was doing as a role filler 
from behaviour which was personal. Furthermore, a role may be 
conceptualized in advance of anyone's actually performing it, so 
that there has been no role enactment. In the absence of such 
conceptualization and expectations, there is no role to be enacted. 
As Levinson suggested21, the term'role' is sometimes used as an 
abbreviation of 'role enactment', but it could also be that the use 
indicated a failure to differentiate between expectations and practices 
because they happened to be congruent. What is required for understanding 
this sense of role is the grasping of the features of (for this sense) 
behaviour which are picked out as common to al],/most individuals 
enacting a role regardless of who they are22. 
It can immediately be objected that some roles could not be 
defined in terms of any shared behaviour, since there may be no 
"bit of behaviour" which is either necessary and/or sufficient for 
filling the role. Perhaps it might be possible here to speak of 
'family resemblances', though this is difficult to imagine. Other 
roles (e.g. ticket collector) may be capable of being more tightly 
delineated, perhaps even in terms of necessary and sufficient 
behaviours. The difference that it makes to abandon this positivist 
conception and discuss all this in terms of actions rather than 
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behaviour will be discussed in the next section. 
This sense of role seems to be that defined by Newcomb23 as 
follows: "The ways of behaving which are expected of any individual 
who occupies a certain position constitute the role associated with 
that position." He fails to appreciate the distinction between 
expectations and practices to which I just referred, which is of 
importance since it assumes the possibility that people may not do 
what is expected of them. This is indicated by his further comment 
that "it refers to the behaviour of the occupants of a position -
not to all their behaviour, as persons, but to what they do as 
occupants of the position." But the question is how one is to know, 
from an "externalist" position such as Newcomb's (or any social 
scientist or observer), whether a given 'bit' of behaviour is done 
by the individual as an occupant of a position or, as Newcomb put 
it, "as a person". This surely cannot be known by observation of 
the behaviour. 
However, the definition is defective in another way, in that 
it does not specify whose expectations are to count24. This might 
be interpreted as presupposing consensus among the whole of the 
community, as may the definition of Havighurst and Neugarten25, 
who similarly say, "A role is a coherent pattern of behaviour common 
to all persons who fill the same position or place in society, and 
a pattern of behaviour expected by other members of society." Gross26 
and his associates discuss the problems of consensus in detail, and 
other sociologists have commented on the fact that different groups 
in a society may have different sets of expectations. This led 
Merton27 to suggest the notion of role set, already referred to, 
to relate the status or position to the expectations of each of the 
other groups "with whom the incumbent of the status has to deal." 
Dividing the whole society into sets of groups and considering 
the expectations of each group does nothing to overcome the logical 
possibility of lack of consensus (complete agreement). However a 
group is defined, it is possible that there will be no consensus 
within it - unless it is defined by such consensus, in which case 
the whole idea involves a vicious circularity. Thus there is the 
problem of explaining what is to count as consensus - majority opinion, 
75;0 of respondents, etc., with the burden of justifying the dividing 
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line, or showing that it is not merely arbitrary. Additionally, such 
ways of proceeding involve what might be called "the aggregative 
fallacy", arising because of the possibility that many persons (if 
not all) are members of more than one group. As already pointed out, 
any individual's expectations may be at variance with e.g. majority 
opinion in one or more of his groups, but not of others. Therefore 
they will, at the same time, be used both to determine what is to 
be counted as the expectations of one set of people and to oppose 
what is to count as the expectations of another set. 
Finally, any social scientist who wants to do work of this 
kind is faced with the problem of providing non-arbitrary criteria 
for his choice of group. For example, if he is examining parents' 
expectations of the teacher's role behaviours, he will need to 
justify sub-grouping parents further into groups of one kind rather 
than another - e.g. by social class rather than the age of their 
children, their own schooling, the Authoritarianism scale28, their 
political leanings, their religion, their interest in their children's 
education, the size of their families etc. Presumably he does this 
to suit the kinds of question he wants to answer, by reference, in 
fact, to his research interests. His data is thus collected to 
answer specific questions or kinds of questions, and cannot be used 
outside this work range. 
Of course, it is interesting for teachers to know what other 
people expect of them, but questions can be asked about whether it 
is right to teach College of Education students about this sort of 
research if it is known (and this is a contingent matter) that this 
has a general influence on what Levinson called their 'role conception'. 
For, even in a democracy, it does not follow that because groups of 
persons (divided, somewhat arbitrarily, to suit a researcher's interests) 
have certain expectations, those expectations are necessarily 
justifiable. Since the justifiability of the expectations is never 
discussed, the implicit assumption is that they are justified. 
The limited nature of the data and the aggregative fallacy 
were perhaps not noted because early studies utilizing the concept 
of role concerned themselves primarily with societies in which, as 
a contingent matter, there was little difference between expectations 
of what role incumbents would do and what they actually did, and also 
between the expectations of such different groups as were identified 
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about what behaviours constituted a role. But in a pluralist 
society, though it may be the case that there is consensus, the 
fact that there is no necessity becomes important if the data 
is not being treated as simply interesting to know, but is being 
used as the basis for recommending action. 
There is finally the difficulty that measurements, about the 
techniques of which and the statistical methods involved there is 
often controversy, are made at a given time, and may be invalid 
only a short time later as people's expectations change. 
Role set, as can be seen, has been presented as an objectively 
determined set of sets of expectations. What it is difficult to 
understand, however, is the claim which is implied by much of the 
work of symbolic interactionists that this concept has explanatory 
force. Firstly, there is the moral question as to how far a 
person filling the role of an X should act on the basis of the 
expectations which others have of his role. There could be no 
explanatory force if role incumbents did not feel that this was 
what they ought to do. Secondly there is the logical point that 
even if all role-fillers accepted that this was what they ought 
to do, they cannot act on the basis of these actual expectations. 
Each role-filler must act on the basis of his own beliefs (which 
may be wrong) about the expectations others have of him29. 
The principal difficulty with a concept of role which defines 
it in terms of behaviour is that it seems to bear little relationship 
with coming to understand from "the inside" what it is to be an X -
such features as the way the agents view the behaviour (i.e. what the 
actions are), the purposes of role incumbents insofar as they are 
associated with the role, the part incumbents see themselves as 
fulfilling in the larger community, or even within a limited 
institution. It offers merely ways of recognizing individuals 
as Xs (for example, being able to tell that a woman is married by 
the way she wears her hair), of enabling people to "play the role of" 
an X, or to be counterfeit Xs. This is of importance if "role-
playing" is suggested as having educational value in schools, for 
role-playing on this conception of role could have no educative value. 
Students have recounted how children asked to play the role of the 
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school caretaker just rush around shouting. They obviously have 
this behaviouristic conception of role. 
The adoption of behaviour which others are believed to have 
assigned, so that an individual may see himself as nothing but 
what his label says he is, is Sartre's "mauvaise foi"30 
 . Downie, 
commenting on this31, suggests that we could speak of "playing the 
role of the X" in the case of a person behaving as he thinks an ideal 
X would act, and that this could be a morally good thing to do and 
not necessarily involve any kind of insincerity. But Downie, though 
correct in suggesting that it might not involve any kind of 
insincerity to act as one thought an ideal X would act, would be 
clearly mistaken if he were thinking that one could have a concept 
of an ideal X merely in terms of external behaviour. (He is probably 
not thinking this, because he speaks of actions rather than behaviour.) 
Unless you could relate the behaviour to something beyond itself, 
you would, logically, be unable to find criteria for formulating an 
ideal in Downie's sense. The idea of an ideal X, therefore, cannot 
be related to this behavioural sense of role but must rather be 
related to a further sense. 
Some sociologists also see role as an ideal pattern of conduct 
which actual behaviour never quite fulfils (though this is surely 
a different sense of 'ideal'). Newcomb32 
 uses the term 'role 
behaviour' to refer to the way in which particular people translate 
their ideals of a role into behaviour. Banton33, however, talks 
instead about translating roles into action. If he is using the term 
'action' in the usual philosopher's sense, his discussion would not 
fall, without qualification, under this sense of role, in terms of 
behaviour, since people's actions are incomprehensible without some 
reference to the way in which they see what they are doing, and 
perhaps to their aims and purposes. 
For conceptual clarity, therefore, the sense of role as 
descriptive expectations must be subdivided into a sense (2a) in 
terms of action, which takes account of how the agent sees what he 
is doing, and one in terms of behaviour, which does not. In the 
first sense (2a), it is impossible for a person who is acting in 
a role to be unaware of it. This raises the first difficulty for 
a sociologist who employs this concept, for it is possible for an 
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observer such as himself to be mistaken. This is presumably why 
there was, for such a long time, attempts to avoid a concept based 
on action. The second difficulty is that even when there is no 
disagreement about expectations, there may be disagreement on what 
counts as fulfilling them. For example, a teacher, the pupils and 
a group of observers may all be agreed that a teacher will speak 
firmly to his class. Where they may be in disagreement is on what 
is to count as "speaking firmly". Thus a teacher may act in accordance 
with the expectations everyone has of his role, yet at the same time 
live up to the expectations of one group whilst failing to meet the 
expectations of others even when the expectations are the same. 
Finally there is the problem for functionalist sociologists that 
the spelling out of role in terms of actions necessarily blurs the 
distinction between role and function made by some54, where function 
refers specifically to the consequences of what is done. This relates 
to some of the discussions of Chapter 5, in that there may be a number 
of correct descriptions of an action, some of which may encompass 
consequences through several stages of a causal chain. Thus there 
are the usual problems in saying where the act can rightly be said 
to end and the consequences begin. It is these sorts of difficulties 
which have tended to push positivist sociologists towards the 
conceptualization of roles in terms of observable behaviour, in 
preference to a concept based on actions. This sense (2b) is the 
one discussed in detail, and the advantages, such functionalists 
believed, was that all consequences could be described in functional 
terms. 
For functionalist sociologists, using this sense of descriptive 
expectations, it follows that a person with a given role may be 
unaware that he has it, with consequent methodological difficulties 
for those who stress the explanatory value of the concept. Perhaps the 
most usual example is the reference to "the role of the criminal in 
a society as a unifying force for that society"35, where the 
unintended (from the criminals' point of view) consequences were 
stressed. Again, this usage blurs the distinction between role and 
function, here seeing the function as part of the role. Merton 
refers36 to this as "latent consequences", though, as Ryan37 has 
pointed out, Merton's use of the terms 'latent' and 'manifest' merely 
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offers simplified language for expressing the distinction between 
intended and unintended, recognized and unrecognized, useful 
consequences and adds lttle. 
Here it seems important to point out that this may be either 
a question of different values (what the consequences are useful 
for) or of looking from different perspectives, since something 
can be functional for one part of a system, whilst being disfunctional 
for another. Institutions as well as people are described as filling 
roles in this sense, an examige being attempts to understand and 
explain schools as agents of social mobility or of selection, whilst 
accepting that teachers (actual agents) are possibly unaware of this 
role the institution had. The theoretical difficulties of a position 
which takes no account of the way the agent views what he is doing 
has been discussed at length by many philosophers, among them Winch 
and Ryan39, and cannot be developed further here. 
The main point to be stressed about this sense of role, whether 
one is talking about role set, role cognition or role performance, is 
that it is not invested with normative overtones in any evaluative 
sense, no implication that the aspects discussed are either desirable 
or undesirable. The account is an account of the way the world is 
expected to be. 
Sense (3) Normative expectations 
The sense of role discussed above4o can be conceptually distinguished 
from a third sense by contrasting the surprise which is the logical 
accompaniment of failure to fulfil role expectations in the descriptive 
sense with the kind of failure which is associated with moral 
indignation. It is clear that there is no conceptual relationship 
between expectations of a descriptive kind and those of a normative 
kind, since there is no contradiction involved in my saying that an 
X ought to do P, but I don't expect Xs to do it. The distinction, then, 
is between expectations about what Xs are likely to do and expectations 
about what Xs ought to do. (Presumably the degree of congruence here 
would also be a matter for empirical investigation.) Banton41 quite 
explicitly distinguishes between expectations and norms as two 
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different senses of role; the point of calling them normative  
expectations is to emphasize that norms are expectations, though 
not simply expectations of behaviour. I wish to emphasize that 
expectations about what incumbents will do and about what they 
ought to do may be contrasted with one another. This can be so 
even when actions are referred to, since the agent's way of viewing 
what he does, and his aims and purposes, have no necessary relationship 
with what he sees his obligations to be. To assume this is to assume 
that everyone's every action is moral. This is why there may be 
role cognitions in both senses. 
In addition, both descriptive and normative expectations can be 
contrasted with doings. Thus one might believe that Xs ought to do 
P, as well as believing that most Xs will not do P (that is, that 
Xs tend not to do P, or even to do not-P), and be wrong on either or 
both counts. For example, group A may be agreed that infant school 
teachers ought not to rush away from their classrooms at the end of 
the day, but also be agreed that most teachers are likely to do so. 
It may, on the other hand, be the case that infant school teachers 
do not see it as part of their obligation to remain in school after 
3:30 p.m., but in fact do so simply because they have things to do 
which prevent them from leaving at that time. 
Downie claims42 that the descriptive sense of role is "the 
sociologists' sense" and makes the distinction between descriptions 
and norms his criterion for calling the third sense distinguished 
here "the point of view of the political and legal theorist". It 
is not clear whether he intends to be prescriptive, but, if so, 
his prescription is unjustified. Many sociological studies (e.g. 
Gross's study of school superintendents43) are on normative rather 
than descriptive aspects of role. This seems quite proper, since 
the moral beliefs of individuals and groups at any particular time 
about what role incumbents ought to do constitute an 'is' which 
is open to empirical enquiries of different sorts - sociological, 
psychological, historical, etc. 
It has already been pointed out that the distinction can be 
seen to be a valid one as there is no logical inconsistency in an 
empirical claim that a given group (including possibly As themselves) 
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hold both the descriptive expectation that As will do X and the 
normative expectation that As ought not to do X, cynically believing 
that most As will not fulfil their obligations. Also, since both 
senses can include attributes, there is no contradiction involved in 
e.g. believing that doctors ought to be intelligent, patient and 
competent, but that most doctors will turn out not to be so. 
Gross44 suggests a distinction within the normative concept 
of role which is of interest, between obligations seen as mandatory 
and those seen as discretionary. Here the existence of a legal 
requirement that encumbents do X usually provides the grounds for 
the obligation's being seen as mandatory, but this is clearly not 
necessary. Incumbents (and others) may not see the legal requirements 
as mandatory, and mandatory requirements need not be restricted to 
those prescribed by law. Indeed, many roles have no obligations 
prescribed by law, but merely by custom, or agreed rules within a 
group. These points must all count against Downie's suggestion that 
this can be considered the sense of the legal theorist, whilst the 
sociologist is restricted to discussing the descriptive aspects of 
roles. All that can be said is that, insofar as legal theorists 
are interested in roles, it must be in this sense that their interest 
lies. 
It therefore seems more helpful to view this sense of role as 
being defined by the criterion of norms in general as expectations, 
rather than as the sense of the legal theorist, since it is widerthan 
any sense of the legal theorist and is of concern to anyone who is 
interested in normative states of affairs, be they legal theorist, 
sociologist, psychologist or historian, etc. Similarly, I suggest 
that there is no one sense which can be "assigned" to social scientists, 
who, as we have seen, may employ a descriptive interpretation, a 
normative interpretation or, like Goffman, lean towards the "drama-
turgical" sense. Much of Goffman's writing seems to see life as 
a theatre with roughly scripted parts, so that the sense in which 
he uses the term is nearer to the sense which I have called "theatrical". 
My positive thesis here is that the difference of the interest 
of the social philosopher from the interest of the sociologist does 
not lie in the "fact" (if it were the case, which I have indicated 
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ought to be the obligation, this is not necessarily so, and a person 
is not contradicting himself if he accepts that it is at the moment 
part of the role of an X (in sense (3)) to Z but denies that it is 
a part of the role (i.e. that which can be justified). There clearly 
must be a further sense of role which Downie has failed to distinguish. 
Sense (4) - Evaluative: 
It has been stressed already that the accepted obligations (legal, 
social, etc.) or claimed obligations within a society for a particular 
role themselves constitute an 'is' which is always open to further 
evaluation in moral terms, and whose possible justifications can be 
examined critically by social philosophers among others (though, of 
course, not by those who hold extreme relativist positions in ethics). 
Both phenomenological sociologists and philosophers examine assumptions, 
but the examination of the validity of the arguments and presuppositions, 
and of their logical status is a philosophical enterprise (whoever does 
it). The sociological enterprise seems rather to be concerned with 
how it has come about that certain groups of people hold these 
particular assumptions. Though the subject matter of the sociologists 
and philosophers may appear to be the same, the sorts of investigations 
carried out by philosophers and social scientists are not identical 
(though, of course, some sociologists may additionally carry out 
philosophical investigations of their own concepts). That is, I am 
arguing that there is an epistemological demarcation, though from a 
'professional' point of view there may be none. 
To put the point another way, the term 'role' may be used by a 
person who recognizes existing normative expectations to discuss, not 
obligations and expectations which are given, but a view of obligations 
and expectations which ought to be given, or to see how far existing 
roles conform to an ideal or proper conception of them. This idea of 
an ideal is not to be identified with Downie's reference45 to an 
ideal (already mentioned), since for him this constitutes a refinement 
and perfection of an existing 'is' (the normative expectations) which 
is accepted. In contrast, this fourth conception of role is one which 
often criticizes such an ideal, and possibly uses the term 'role' in 
an attempt to re-define what is to be normatively accepted. Such 
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is open to doubt) that one examines norms and the other behaviour. 
It lies rather in the nature of the problems which concern them. 
The sociologist concerned with norms is, presumably, interested in 
relating them to other empirical factors in society - power structures, 
educational institutions, family patterns - with a further concern, in 
some cases, for formulating general laws and/or finding correlations 
and causal relationships. 
The concern of the social and moral philosopher with these norms, 
however, is different. He would be concerned to understand the 
nature of the normative claims, the meanings involved in the concepts 
being employed at a particular time. Secondly, and this is the point 
of this analysis as far as this thesis goes, social philosophers 
may be concerned with the justifications of norms (that is, the 
justifications offered for the social practices which are normatively 
part of the role). There is a clear distinction, I believe, between 
the interest of the social philosopher and the empirical researcher. 
For it does not follow from the fact that people have certain normative 
expectations that these expectations are justifiable. 
I therefore suggest that there must be a fourth sense of role 
which is clearly not the province of the sociologist as long as he 
claims (rightly or wrongly) to be engaged in non-evaluative work. 
It might be immediately be objected that I have not shown the need 
for a further sense of role, but simply that Downie is mistaken in 
suggesting that the different senses form the subject matter for 
particular interest groups. My claim that there is a further sense 
of role, however, does not derive from such a premise. It derives 
from the possibility which is open to philosophers but not to 
eny empirical workers to consider hypothetical roles, ideals and the 
justifications of practices which are not yet engaged in, and to 
delineate a role for an X which is not normatively accepted (e.g. in 
that certain obligations are denied). Thus,for example, it mi;ht be 
claimed that it is not part of the role of an X to Z, not in the 
descriptive sense (Xs can be expected to Z), not in the normative 
sense (it is an obligation of Xs to Z), but in a further sense (which 
I shall call the evaluative sense) in which the claim means that it 
ought to be an obligation of Xs to Z. Though there may be congruity 
for an evaluator between what is the obligation and what (he argues) 
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discussions could, in fact, alter either or both the normative and 
descriptive aspects of the role set, role filler's cognitions and 
role performances. Indeed, social psychologists and sociologists 
might well empirically investigate the claim that discussions using 
this sense of role account, in part, for changes in social roles 
over periods of time. 
For example, a few years ago it could have been said, correctly, 
in both descriptive and normative senses, that it was part of the 
teacher's role to supervise school dinners. The claim that the N.U.T. 
made - that "it was not part of the teacher's role" - was a claim that 
it was not a proper part. They were not suggesting that the legal 
obligation and the expectations held by the community that teachers 
would supervise school dinners did not exist, but rather that they 
were not justifiable. Thus, in principle, similar claims could be 
made about the other aspects of the teacher's role as discussed in 
books like Hoyle's46 - that is, that it is no proper part of the 
teacher's role (that is, that it is not the teacher's role (4)) to 
be e.g. policeman, judge, detective, friend, therapist, agent of 
selection for society, etc. Such claims are now being made in 
respect of examinations, when it suggested that it is not the role 
of the school to provide employers with selection procedures in 
the form of examination results, and that therefore they should have 
to develop their own forms of examination or aptitude tests in order 
to free the schools from the pressures of examinations. In the 
general introduction I explained that the aspects of the teacher's 
role which were to be examined in this thesis were those which were 
coming under challenge in this way. 
These examples seem to me quite sufficient to substantiate the 
claim that the fourth sense of 'role' which I distinguished analytically 
is clearly understood and used in our language, and that it is not to 
be identified with any of the other three senses, in particular sense 
(3). Sense (4) is thus the primary sense in which the social 
philosopher is interested, and his interest in sense (3) is instrumental 
to consideration of sense (4). 
There is, however, a sense in which role (4) is parasitic on 
role (3), though not, perhaps, in the more usual sense of parasitic. 
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It is more in the way in which the concept of ought might be argued 
to be parasitic on the concept of is . That is, unless one could 
distinguish between what is and what might be, unless one could imagine 
what it would be like for things to be otherwise than what they are, 
one could not have the concept of an ideal, or certain conceptions of 
ought. Thus, in general, one could not consider the justifiability 
of a social role without having already the normative concept of 
role which I have called sense (3). 
To speak of role (4), then, is to suggest that certain expectations 
which might be held of the role are justifiable and othezunjustifiable 
(where the might neither implies that they are held by anyonetur that 
they are not). Thus, on the argument of Chapter 1, the drawing of 
a conclusion about the justifiability of some aspect of a role is 
to imply the prescription that the community ought to hold such ex-
pectations. The sense in which they 'ought' would vary. Some aspects 
of the role (4) of an X might be shown to be in some way necessary 
to the role, and these would thus be aspects which (logically) ought 
to be institutionalized as role obligations. Other aspects of the 
role might be shown to be justifiable on moral grounds, and, except 
for the moral subjectivist, would suggest that people ought (morally) 
to hold such expectations. Again, some might be argued to be 
permissible, whereas others might be argued to be obligatory. 
It should be pointed out that a discussion which showed that 
certain aspects of a role were logically (conceptually) demanded 
would not, if accepted, necessarily end disagreement over a role as 
actually instantiated in the social life of a community. For the 
discussion will necessarily be at a high order of generality. But 
it must be more than formal, for if it were merely formal, there would 
be no limit on the ways in which it might be translated into practice 
given appropriate beliefs. If there was no disagreement in respect 
of empirical beliefs, claims about role (4) 
 would have to have 
substantive implications to be of interest, for if this were not 
so, any existing role (3) would be justifiable, and the distinction 
between role (3) and role (4) 
 would collapse. 
A philosopher can approach the question of the justification of 
different aspects of particular social roles in two different ways. 
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Firstly, he can take an account of the norms which are held by groups 
about the existing role and examine the possible justifications for 
each aspect in turn. Alternatively, he can make assumptions about 
what would justify the institution (e.g. the legal system, the State 
school system, the nuclear family) within which the role is located 
(that is, give an account of the role (4) of the institution) and see 
which aspects follow necessarily from those assumptions and an 
analysis, and which are merely contingent. Only for contingent aspects 
can the case for abolition or retention be argued. For necessary aspects, 
the only discussion possible is about the ways in which they can 
justifiably be instantiated. 
It may be that the second of these two approaches will suggest 
that certain Zs (responsibilities, rights, intentions, attributes, 
or whatever) are, given those assumptions, inescapably part of the 
role. Here the claim would be that they are conceptually demanded. 
If the arguments are accepted as valid, it would be self-contradictory 
for a person to accept the assumptions and deny that Z was part of the 
role (4) of an X, even if Z is not a part of the role (3). 
This clearly indicates the validity of the suggestion that there 
is a fourth, evaluative sense of role. For it is an empirical 
possibility that Z is not a part of the role (3) of an X at the time 
of the discussion simply because people have failed to spell out the 
implications of their own assumptions. This thesis thus concentrates 
on the role (4) of the teacher, using the second approach to 
justification outlined above. 
Role re-definition 
Some writings on role (3) - discussions of the normative aspects 
of a role - suggest that there are only two options open - that, in 
principle, roles must be either accepted or rejected. Downie, for 
example, specifically asserts this47. He writes, "A man may reject 
or accept the social role of son, though the biological role is 
thrust upon him." It seems to me to be stretching the concept of 
role untenably to speak of the biological role of son, since, in 
biological terms, 'son' seems to indicate a relationship only - that 
one is the male offspring of a particular male and/or female. To 
speak of the biological role of son adds nothing, and if, as 
suggested here, we understand the concept of role in terms of 
expectations, confuses the issue. 
I argue that Downie is mistaken in suggesting that there are 
only these two options, but he is not alone in this view. Ruddock48 
discusses the case of a teacher who was asked to teach 19th century 
history, of which she knew little, saying, "In fact, she declared 
her position openly to them and invited them all to help her, to 
help each other and to help themselves. They responded strongly, 
and the results were very good." The significant sentence is the 
following: "It will be seen that this was a teacher not in the role 
of the teacher, and the pupils' roles were also abandoned." However, 
since the teacher in question still, presumably, accepted that it was 
a responsibility of her role to help her pupils learn the 19th century 
history in question, it is difficult to see why he should speak of 
her role being abandoned at that level of description. It is only 
at a very low level of description that this claim could be made. 
Ruddock and Downie seem to have an inflexible view of role, which 
must be contrasted with the view that sees roles in a constant 
process of re-definition, where one may talk of (suddenly or slowly) 
abandoning the traditional role in favour of a new formulation (perhaps 
only implicit and unexpressed) of the role of an X. However changed, 
there must still be some common feature with the old X if it is to be 
recognized as a new X and not some entirely new role. I suggest that 
this common feature must be within the area fundamental to being an 
X (connected, that is, with defining features of Xs) and not some 
peripheral area. For surely if no fundamental features remain in 
common, we would not speak of redefining the role of an X but of 
creating a new role. 
The concept of role is not generally seen as inflexibly as 
Downie and Ruddock suggest. Indeed, that there is meaning in the 
discussions of Musgrove and Taylor49 and others on claims that "the 
role of the teacher is due for re-definition" presupposes this. 
The difficulties seem to be that neither side has specified the 
level of description at which they are working. In particular, 
Ruddock's claim and the narrow view in general would have difficulty 
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in coping with the necessity for role-players to alter actions (as 
described in fairly low-level terms) in the light of new problems, new 
techniques or new evaluations. If we accept this view, we are left with 
no language appropriate for the new relationship. In the case of the 
history teacher example, at a high level of description and obligation 
there was no change. The teacher and pupils did not 'abandon' their 
roles in the same sense as they would have done if they had spent the 
history lessons playing canasta. We also need to be able to distinguish 
between the cases where the intention is appropriate but the means 
selected for realising it inappropriate, and cases where it is the 
intention itself which is judged inappropriate. 
However, the continual change/re-definition view has its own 
difficulties. Uho should be entitled to do the re-defining? Or is 
it simply a matter of power - of some 'imposing' their definitions on 
others, or reaching a power equilibtium? If Musgrove and Taylor 
believe that the role of teacher should involve a contractual relationship 
between parents and teachers, surely they should offer some justification 
for this - claiming an analogy with a social worker-client or solicitor-
client model is insufficient. It assumes a particular view of the 
parent-child relationship involving rights almost akin to ownership which 
might well be challenged 1,e.g. by persons concerned to promote children's 
rights). Shipman'-Eso  writes of gradual modifications of roles within a 
school, and Esland51 of their being negotiated between each group of 
pupils and teacher. Not only does this kind of talk fail to differentiate 
between changes based on power and other kinds of changes, but it raises 
difficulties for talk of justifications. Modifications which take place 
gradually, un-noticed and unplanned need to be distinguished from those 
which are deliberately chosen as part of a policy, for in some 
circumstances that something has been chosen after serious deliberation 
and with the consent of all parties is justification enough. 
The re-definition or modification of roles, could be based on many 
different kinds of grounds - the results of empirical discovery, changes 
in moral view, economic considerations, expediency, etc., and even 
when carried out intentionally, might be unjustifiable. I have also 
suggested that changes might result from the spelling out of what is 
implied in assumptions which have been held all the time. It is quite 
clear that at certain levels, the teacher's role is capable of re-definition. 
The questions which arise are concerned with how far changes can yet leave 
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the role recognizably the role of the teacher. 
The investigations of the teacher's role in this country and 
others deemed to be culturally similar, such as America,52 have, 
quite understandably, concentrated on the more traditional kinds of 
schooling, carried on in a building designed in ways which structurally 
push the organization into one where a single teacher has responsibility 
for a class. Though the various aspects of the teacher's role have 
been described in relation to this, the presuppositions of a claim 
that a teacher has responsibility for his class have not been examined. 
For it is usually taken to follow from this that the obligations of 
a teacher involve 'controlling' his class, and the presuppositions 
e.g. that the children cannot be self-controlled, and would not 
voluntarily accept reasonable standards but require having them 
imposed on them have not been examined. Should any of the assumptions 
which under-pin the teacher's role (3) be incorrect, then that role 
requires re-definition. The importance of the possibility of role 
re-definition for this thesis is clear. For it may turn out that 
certain practices which could be shown to be conceptually demanded 
of the role (4) are not part of the role (3), or that practices which 
are part of the role (5) are unjustifiable. The prescriptive implication 
would be that the role should be re-defined to be a justifiable one, if 
it is not so now. 
Sense (5) Consequential description 
Finally, a further sense of role, related to sense (2), may be 
distinguished, particularly in ordinary language usage. Here role 
simply refers to the part actually played by X (whether functional 
or disfunctional) in whatever is the subject of discussion. That is, 
here role means simply 'function' in the ordinary language, as 
opposed to the sociologist's sense. That is, whereas the sociological 
use excludes unwanted, unvalued consequences, the ordinary language 
use refers to consequences without any evaluation. So one might ask, 
"What is the role of radical teachers in school X?" and answer that 
they are continually producing confrontations without committing 
oneself to judgments about the desirability or undesirability of the 
consequences produced from any point of view. It is worth noting 
that since the non-evaluative use in ordinary language requires 
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contrasting with the sociologicfl use, there is a sense in which it 
calls into question the sociologists' claim that their work is value-
free. This final sense of role is mentioned specifically, because 
unlike the others it seems to be a retrospective use. Since the 
other senses were claimed to have a conceptual relationship with 
expectations, this sense is clearly very different. 
The redundancy of the role concept in sociology 
Since the foregoing section of this chapter was written, my 
attention has been drawn to an article by Coulson53 suggesting that 
role is a redundant concept in sociology. Coulson discusses some 
of the difficulties of the role concepts which I have mentioned, 
with far more detailed reference to published work. I mention this 
paper because Coulson sets up the opposition 'roles or expectations' 54 
and suggests that role concepts should be replaced by what she calls 
"a structured network of expectations"55. This concept is seen 
as an alternative to role concepts because Coulson is a social 
phenomenologist and views role concepts as being essentially 
functionalist. It is also sometimes suggested that an objection 
is that roles involve a reification. 
I have indicated my belief that the concept of role and the 
concept of expectations are inextricably linked, and that class 
concepts unavoidably involve one in expectations. On this view, 
the concept of role (though not role terminology) is seen as 
fundamental to all social life. This is to agree with a suggestion 
of Nadel's56, who wrote, "the role concept is not an invention of 
anthropologists but is employed by the very people they study.... 
it is the existence of names describing classes of people which 
makes us think of roles". 
The paper by Levinson to which I referred at the beginning of 
this chapter was concerned to urge social scientists to give up a 
unitary conception of social role in favour of what he called 
'independent conceptual status' to the three aspects of role theory 
he separated out, and to secure agreement among them regarding role 
terminology. Coulson's paper seems to be an attempt to persuade 
sociologists to give up this language entirely. She suggests, as I 
- 165 - 
have said, that the language of expectations is an alternative. My 
own view is that she is not suggesting alternative concepts but merely, 
alternative terminology. I hope to have shown that this must be the 
case by demonstrating the conceptual connection between four central 
senses of role and expectations. 
At the beginning of the chapter, I also pointed to the divergencies 
of language use by sociologists which is Coulson's starting point as 
well. I asked the question, "Are we to say that there are many concepts 
of role, or that there is one concept" - or rather, as I hope to have 
shown, several concepts - "for which different sociologists use 
different terminology, i.e. that they speak different languages?" My 
answer was that it seemed useful to take the latter position. 
In considering Coulson's suggestion that "the role concept" is 
redundant in sociology and should be replaced by concepts involving 
the language of expectations, I have come to the conclusion that 
she is proposing no more than a changed terminology. The distinctions 
which this alternative terminology is to pick out remain, I suggest, 
roughly the same distinctions. Whether the language used to express 
our interest in these distinctions is the language of role or the 
language of expectation is of less importance than that it is impossible 
to do without the concepts. They were understood before the language 
of'rolel was invented, through the relationship of class concepts of 
the kind involving behaviour, action, obligation, right and/or 
responsibilities with expectations. They will be understood if the 
language is changed, for, it seems to me, they are fundamental to social 
life and basic to even the most primitive understanding of it. 
Role and the Naturalistic Fallacy 
A position has been taken up in this chapter which suggests that 
there are two senses of role which might be called 'first-order' and 
'second-order' normative senses. Sense (3), the sense of normative 
expectation is a first-order use of the term 'role' to denote 
obligations which are associated with particular positions in a society 
according to legal, customary or accepted moral criteria. The fourth 
or evaluative sense is second-order, in that it implied that these 
norms were themselves open to evaluation. This position is sufficiently 
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controversial to warrant some discussion, though this is necessarily brief. 
Firstly, it presupposes a fundamentally non-relativist position 
in ethics, for to accept relativism in the sense explained by e.g Brandt57 
or Hospers58, or a moral position of a fundamentally relativist kind 
as held by leardsmore59 or Mounce and Phillips requires one to reject 
the possibility of evaluating norms. I am not suggesting that there 
are no problems involved in this assumption, but merely making explicit 
the position taken in this thesis. Of course, to claim that the analysis 
is non-relativist does not imply that the roles must always be the same, 
for circumstances may differ. 
Secondly, this distinction is important in respect of some recent 
discussions on the Naturalistic Fallacy which have a direct application 
to the role of the teacher and therefore merit discussion in this thesis. 
Dorothy Emmet suggests61 that the concept of role provides a link 
between factual descriptions and moral pronouncements, so that the 
non-deducibility aspect of the Naturalistic Fallacy may be brought 
into question. From the empirical fact that the person is an. X, says 
Emmet62, it follows that he ought to do P. "If," she says, "we choose 
to ignore what is presupposed as background to the situation, these 
entailments (i.e. of 'ought's from 'is'es) can be found." In this 
connection she quotes Prior's examples of undertakers and Church 
officers63 and Searle's 'promising' paper64. One wonders, however, 
whether she would have been equally happy with examples such as the 
role of slave-dealer, concentration camp Commandant, or slave. 
But the question is really whether we are entitled to ignore what 
is presupposed as background to the situation simply because we wish 
65 to find entailments. Earlier in her book Emmet writes, "Whenever an 
ethical proposition appears to follow from statements of fact, there is 
some value judgment, explicit or assumed, lurking in the background, or" 
(and this is the more relevant in respect of my earlier discussion) 
"there is a tacit commitment to accepting the norms of some role or 
institution which is being referred to." On the analysis of role offered 
here, it is one of the meanings of role (and the meaning to which Emmet 
refers) that a role is a cluster of rights and obligations, and thus of 
responsibilities. Gne can immediately ask, therefore, whether it can 
be validly claimed that an 'ought' is being derived from an 'is' here. 
For Emmet's 'is' is of a special kind. Where 'ought's of a non-
criticizable kind (in contrast to my sense (3) which is criticizable) are 
part of the meaning of 'role' as used by Emmet in her argument, the 
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other 'oughts' have been deduced, not from an 'is' as Emmet implies, 
but from an 'ought'. Even then, it is subject to a ceteris paribus, 
as the discussions66 on Searle's "promising" article show. 
Emmet further argues67 that "to accept the role is to accept the 
obligation". This apparently simple suggestion is fraught with 
difficulties because of intra-role conflict. However, even without 
these complications, Emmet's suggestions would have to be rejected. 
For the question "Ought he to accept the role?" can always be put. 
Some roles might be pernicious, or some institutions (which would 
imply that roles within them are pernicious). Illich and Reimer, as 
I have mentioned, suggest that this is true of schools. 
The most, therefore, that one could deduce on Emmet's argument 
would be the claim, "If it is the case that he ought to have accepted 
the role then, ceteris paribus, he ought to do P." (For, otherwise, 
one is committed to the view that the Commandant of Belsen ought to  
have exterminated millions of Jews. This is related to comments in 
Chapter 1 about being unable to show that P is what teachers ought 
or ought not to do by an analysis of such concepts as education, 
teaching or indoctrination.) 
But the above proposition derives no value judgment from fact 
(even if Emmet's earlier claim were correct, which I argued was not 
the case) since in order to assert that A ought to do PI one has 
first to assert the value judgment that the role was one which A 
ought to have accepted (or, perhaps, less strongly, that it was not 
one which he ought to have rejected). 
What I am arguing here, then, is that to claim that X, Y and 
Z are currently obligations of the teacher's role (that X, Y and Z 
are part of the teacher's role (3)) is not, in itself, to be 
committed to the moral judgment that persons who occupy the role 
position should do X, Y and Z. In arguing that, one would be committed 
at least to the further judgment that the institution and the role 
(or those aspects of it) are morally justifiable. 
In my view, the arguments of this chapter suggest that Emmet's 
claim that moral obligations can be deduced from a tacit commitment 
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to a role (3) are very dubious. 
Role Conflict  
Suppose it is accepted that a given role (3) is not pernicious. 
There are still great difficulties in respect of Emmet's claim 
that to choose the role is prima facie to be committed to certain 
obligations which are inherent in the role. 
Intra-role conflict has interested social scientists mainly in 
the kinds of situation where there are conflicting expectations of 
what an X will or ought to do - as might be held by a Headmaster and 
the pupils of a teacher. The first problem to be faced is whether 
these expectations are to be viewed from the point of view of the 
agent (in this case, the teacher) or that of an outside observer. 
Jacobson, Charters and Lieberman68 define role conflict as "the 
situation in which there are differences between criterion groups 
with respect to a social role." As Gross says69 it is the objective 
assessment by an investigator which is involved here, and problematic 
whether the subject sees the discrepancies. The crucial issue is that 
conflicting sets of expectations as noted by an observer offer only 
potential sources of difficulty to the agent. 
Parsons70, on the other hand, in referring to "the agent choosing 
between sets of expectations", clearly assumes that the agent has 
perceived the conflict, since without such perception there could be 
no question of choice. Since the concept is that of role conflict, 
it can be argued that logically only the point of view of the agent 
is valid here. It is only he who could experience conflict, and no 
meaning can be given to the idea of conflict within a role which is 
not experience (except in a trivial sense meaning merely conflicting). 
It seems, however, equally mistaken to suggest that there is 
any necessary relation between the actual existence of conflicting 
expectations and role conflict as subjectively defined e.g. by Parsons71, 
Gross 72  and Musgrove and Taylor 3. An agent will subjectively 
experience role conflict if he believes that conflicting expectations 
are held, even if this is not the case. That is, there is no 
-169- 
necessary relationship between role conflict and role set. Conflicting 
sets of expectations are neither empirically necessary nor sufficient 
for an agent to experience role conflict. - There can only be a 
possible relationship between them if the agent perceives them 
correctly. 
Two further related points have been neglected by these writers 
both in this connection and in relation to dilemmas of a prudential 
kind engendered by sanctions. Possible sanctions, like expectations, 
may be correctly perceived, incorrectly inferred (misperceived) or 
imagined. The agent may attribute to others the power to apply 
Sanctions which they do not have, so that actual power or authority 
to administer sanctions is, again, neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient empirical condition for role conflict of a prudential 
kind. Additionally the perception or imagination of expectations 
or sanctions is itself not sufficient to provoke conflict, since the 
incumbent may perceive them but be indifferent. In order for conflict 
to be experienced, they must mean something to him - he must fear the 
sanctions, and the expectations must be from those who, in Meadian7  
terms, are 'significant others'. 
It should also be pointed out that an agent's own role conception 
could be sufficient to engender role conflict if he sees them as 
incompatible with only one other set of expectations providing those 
are from someone who matters to him. Additionally, his knowledge of 
guilt feelings he might experience could provide as effective a 
sanction as the kinds of external sanctions Gross discusses. It 
therefore seems that empirical studies have taken insufficient 
account of the subjective elements of role conflict, even where they 
have expressly attempted to do so.75 
I return, then, to Emrnet's claim that "to accept the role is to 
accept the obligations of the role". Enough has been said about the 
role of the teacher in a pluralistic society to show that a full 
understanding of it in terms of the expectations of others involves 
role conflict. Accepting a given role (3) may 	 (by virtue of our 
understanding of role (3)) be accepting a set of equally legitimate 
and possibly conflicting obligations. If a role is accepted with a 
knowledge of the expectations (which might be claimed to be a 
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necessary condition for fully understanding what one is undertaking) 
then to accept the role (3) is not to accept a tidy set of prima  
facie obligations simply, but also a set of prima facie prudential 
and moral dilemmas. 
One way of approaching the moral dilemmas is to consider how 
far the various expectations which might be held of a role are 
justifiable - that is, to examine the role (4). Though it cannot 
be imagined that such consideration will solve all the problems, 
it may well be helpful. The next section therefore attempts a 
study of the role (4) of the teacher. 
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SECTION IV 
The Role (4) of the Teacher in Schools 
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INTRODUCTION TO SECTION IV 
It has been suggested that a major objection to the analysis 
of teaching given in the second section of this thesis might be that 
it did not render intelligible how there could be institutions, namely 
schools, staffed by teachers, if the intention to bring about learning 
was not as important in our understanding of the concept of teaching 
as the actual outcome. It is necessary to consider this objection 
before attempting to apply the analysis to the different aspects of 
the teacher's possible role in schools. 
The concept of a perficience was introduced in order to overcome 
certain logical difficulties which I believe are encountered in 
understanding the language which is used to discuss inter-personal 
transactions - those types of goings-on which embody implications 
about responses, where the performance of actions by agent A brings 
about an outcome in another person, B, by a means which involves some 
kind of understanding of what A is doing on B's part. The claim was 
made that a person who failed to understand that the performance of 
certain kinds of acts was a way through which these outcomes could 
be brought about could not perform that kind of act with the intention 
of thereby bringing about the outcome. That is, I have claimed that 
for perficience verbs, the outcome sense is logically prior to any 
attempt sense and that an understanding of the outcome sense of these 
verbs (which, I suggest, include teaching) is presupposed by the 
concept of a teaching attempt. The analysis is required, in my view, 
to enable us to understand teaching attempts, so that if it is to be 
argued that schools are places where teaching attempts are made, the 
analysis helps us understand schools. 
This section discusses the role of a teacher in schools and, 
in particular, whether various aspects of it are merely contingent. 
It is clear that difficulties are involved here because assumptions 
must first be made about the role of schools in a society for this 
to be possible. Though sociologists may investigate the expectations 
which people actually hold of schools, or it may be accepted that 
certain obligations are associated with schools in our society, this 
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is not the perspective from which I shall proceed; for questions can 
still be asked about the justifiability of these expectations or 
obligations. I propose rather to make certain (formal) assumptions 
about the kind of institution a school ought to be (i.e. about its 
role (4) as discussed in the previous chapter), and argue from this 
to some conclusions about what is necessarily involved in the role (4) 
of the teacher within a school, given an understanding of teaching 
as a perficienary transaction. 
My first assumption is that the concepts of teaching and learning 
are central to the concept of school. Schools are primarily institutions 
set up for the purpose of promoting learning through teaching of 
individuals who attend them. The justification usually given for 
setting up institutions which all children are required to attend is, 
in a democratic society, that the learning of certain things is 
sufficiently important that some attempt must be made to ensure that 
all have the opportunity of learning them. Universal schooling is 
thus necessarily associated with the principle of impartiality in a 
society where, for example, the range of human activities is so wide, 
the knowledge and skills so complex, or the resources necessary for 
learning them so complicated, expensive or not generally available, 
that the learning cannot be left for the child to acquire by chance. 
The role (4) of the school involves the promotion of learning which 
is worthwhile for the individual pupils and for the community. 
The justification of schools as institutions within a community 
must be a consequentialist one, resting on the worthwhileness of the 
learning which they promote. Indeed, this is presupposed by the 
attacks on schools by deschoolers, who claim that they are places 
where children are taught to be passive and conformist by acts that 
penalize initiative and destroy curiosity and the desire to learn; 
to be competitive rather than co-operative, uncritical rather than 
critical; and that the knowledge which they do acquire is 'dead' and 
'useless'. Their claim is the strong one, that no matter what might 
be learned in school that was worthwhile, its value would be outweighed 
by the learning of that which was worthless or even positively harmful. 
However, if Illich wishes to claim not only that this is true of 
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schools now (that is, that their role (3) is pernicious) but that 
any school system would be pernicious (that is, that there is no 
role (4) for schools), more is required than an indictment of schools 
as they are at present. This he fails to provide. Indeed, the more 
detail he gives us of his own alternatives, the more much of it sounds 
like a re-constituted school system. 
Although Illich stresses1 that his aim of "deschooling society" 
is not to be confused with "transforming the whole world into a 
classroom" or "establishing new free schools, independent of the 
system", both of which he deplores, he advocates not only "the 
provision of institutions", and "a good educational system", but 
also that children should have "confrontation or criticism by an 
experienced elder who really cares"2. He later calls such people 
"professional personnel" and suggests that they be paid from public 
funds and be given the buildings which had previously belonged to 
the school system to work in. Why, one wonders, can these institutions, 
have a role (4) when schools, apparently, cannot7 
I take it, therefore, that even Illich would agree that schools 
were justifiable institutions if they did bring about learning 
through teaching of that which (he accepted) was worthwhile, at least 
on balance, and that it is simply that he does not believe that this 
can be done. I assume that it can be done, and that it follows from 
this that the role (4) of schools is associated with an obligation 
to be organized in such a way that the children who attend do 
actually get taught that which is worthwhile. Now there is a sense 
in which a claim like this evades almost as many issues as it solves, 
since no attempt is being made in this thesis to give a general 
account of the criteria by virtue of which learning may be assessed 
as worthwhile or not. However, a position is taken on this issue, 
in that certain conditions are argued to be necessary for learning to 
be worthwhile. Here, however, it is merely claimed that the 
justification in a democratic society for supporting and expending 
a great deal of money on institutions for the promotion of learning 
by younger members of the community (if not older ones as well) must 
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be the expectation that something that is worth learning will be 
learned there. The suggestion that schooling should be compulsory, 
coupled with the claim that without compelling attendance, some 
children would not attend and would thus be deprived of the benefits 
of schooling, clearly shows the evaluative assumptions which are 
made in respect of the learning which ought to occur. 
I wish to emphasize the form of the argument being used here. It 
is not being claimed that it is part of our understanding of what a 
school is that what is learned and taught there (if anything) is 
worthwhile. The point is rather that unless something worthwhile is 
learned there, there is inadequate justification for schooling and, 
in particular, for compulsory schooling, It is part of our understanding, 
not of what a school is, but of what a school ought to be. 
It was suggested earlier that most learning, since mediated 
through language and other symbolic systems, involves teaching 
transactions (formal or informal, direct or indirect). There are, 
of course, assumptions in this position concerning the dependence 
of each individual on a community which involve the rejection of 
any extreme indivualistic position in epistemology. On such an 
account, teaching itself does not require justification, since it 
is only through this that much learning (and most early learning) 
can take place. What require justification are the content and 
manner of teaching, and the making of unsolicited teaching attempts. 
The recognition of the importance of teaching (though not 
necessarily teaching attempts) for learning is, I suggest, a necessary 
precondition for the deliberate establishment of schools, staffed 
by'teachers' whose role (4) must therefore involve an obligation to 
bring about, through teaching, the worthwhile learning which is the 
primary justification of the institution. It follows therefore that 
the role (4) of the teacher involves the intention to bring about 
learning. For clearly men believe that outcomes of a certain kind 
are brought about more effectively if attempts are made to bring 
them about than by chance. 
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I argue therefore that the institution of school can only 
be understood in terms of general aims connected with learning and 
its bringing about, and the engagement of 'teachers' to work within 
them only on the understanding of the importance of teaching 
transactions in bringing about learning. That is, it is through 
the concept of role that one understands how, even though the 
central concept of teaching does not, on my account, involve 
intentions on the part of the agent primarily concerned with learning, 
the idea of a teacher in a school is unintelligible without reference 
to such intentions. Since, on my argument, making a teaching attempt 
presupposes an understanding of the perficienary transaction of 
teaching, it is clear that my earlier account, far from rendering 
it unintelligible that there could be institutions such as schools 
staffed by teachers, can be argued to be presupposed by the existence 
of such institutions. 
The role (4) of the teacher, on this view, necessarily involves 
a general intention to teach (in the outcome sense) something worth 
learning to the pupils. Or, to put this another way, it is being 
claimed that a person who accepts the role (4) of a teacher ought to 
have such intentions.4 It can therefore be seen that the claim that 
the intention to bring about learning is not a necessary condition 
of teaching in its logically prior sense does not entail the claim 
that intention to bring about learning is not a necessary part of the 
teacher's role in a school. But this latter claim rests not on a 
claim about its being part of the meaning of 'teaching' but rather on 
the assumption that outcomes are achieved more often by those who 
attempt to bring them about than by accident. The specificity of the 
intentions concerning learning required of teachers as part of their 
role (4) then becomes a topic for discussion, justification and 
empirical investigation, rather than an a priori of analysis. 
The necessity for an alternative analysis is now clear. For 
on the Hirstean analysis, in order to teach a pupil an X, a person 
must have an intention to teach him that X, and, he has suggested, as 
clearly and tightly specified as possible. So, insofar and to the 
extent that anyone might want to argue that a teacher should or need 
not have low-level, tightly and clearly specified objectives (learning 
outcomes) in mind, to that extent, on a Hirstean analysis, it is 
being argued that he should or need not teach. On that analysis, it 
is not open to anyone to argue this, for if it were argued, this would 
be to claim that the role of the teacher need involve no teaching. 
I suggest, therefore, that the Hirstean analysis is inadequate for 
a genuine asking of this question, for it rules out of court one 
possible answer in advance - the conclusion that teachers need not 
or ought not to teach being, if not self-contradictory, rather foolish, 
for if they are not under an obligation in relation to teaching, what 
could be distinctive about the role of a teacher? 
The analysis of teaching offered in the first section thus 
permits us to formulate the following questions: (a) Does the role 
(4) of the teacher necessarily involve him in clearly and tightly 
specifying the learning which he wishes the children to achieve? 
(b) Does the role (4) of the teacher necessarily involve him in 
in assessing what he is teaching and evaluating that learning as 
worthwhile or not? (c) May a teacher opt out of teaching in certain 
areas - most importantly, the area of morality and of values in 
general. Put in similar terms to the first two, this question asks 
whether teaching in the area of morality and of values is a necessary 
part of the teacher's role (4). These are the problems discussed 
in the first two chapters of this section. 
The third chapter considers the authority aspect of the teacher's 
role (4) but in only certain, limited respects. There is a general 
discussion of authority as an epistemologically rooted concept, and 
a consideration of problems related to children's being expected to 
learn certain things 'on authority'. The question here is again 
whether the relationship between the teacher's role (4) and authority 
in this sense is a necessary one. Since there are implications in the 
answer for the pupil-teacher relationship, the final section of that 
chapter briefly considers this. 
The procedure I am adopting is not that of simply examining 
accounts given by sociologists of the teacher's existing role and 
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trying to justify either the descriptive or normative expectations 
that people hold of it. I am rather starting with certain assumptions 
(already stated) about what would justify schools as institutions, and 
what I suggest is our current understanding of what it is for A to teach 
B something, and investigating, with an open mind, whether certain 
aspects which it is currently being suggested should (or should not) be 
part of the teacher's role (i.e. are not part of the teacher's role (4)) 
are necessitated by those assumptions and understandings. Since 
the necessity involved in each case is dependent on our current 
understanding of the term 'teaching', (which might have been different, 
or could change - e.g. we might have used, or come to use, the term in 
such a way that giving someone a pill the result of which is that he can 
speak French can count as an instance of teaching), it cannot be a matter 
of strict logical necessity. I speak here, therefore, of conceptual  
necessity. 
The basis of the discussion are therefore the following: (a) the 
analysis of teaching developed in Section II, which I suggest is 
neutral and embodies no value judgments; (b) the claim that the school's 
role (4) involves teaching its pupils something which is of value to 
them; (c) the assumption that teachers are prima facie responsible 
for what they teach and (d) the judgment that it is part of any 
justifiable role that an incumbent should try to know what he is doing 
and to consider whether or not he is fulfilling his obligations. Also 
presupposed is the value position that an agent may sometimes be 
morally responsible for the non-intended consequences of his actions. 
The qualification which must be added is clear. For I am here 
concerned with only one aspect of what a school might do (though clearly 
the aspect which I believe is the most important). The claims derived 
from discussions of this aspect can be accepted as over-riding only 
insofar as it is accepted that this purpose of the school is logically 
over-riding. On this account, if the pupils learn nothing worthwhile, 
the schools have failed to fulfil their role. It is a further, open, 
question, far beyond the scope of this thesis, as to whether or how far 
anyone may be held blameworthy for this. 
There is no conflict, it should be noted, between this position 
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and one which claims that schools ought to be agencies of societal 
change (on the one hand) or preserve and transmit the status quo, 
(on the other), as long as suggestions in this regard argue that the 
change (or lack of it) should be brought about by what is learned  
through teaching in the schools. In such cases, the disagreement 
will be on a different level - disagreements about what learning is 
worthwhile (which may include the manner in which what is learned 
is believed, i.e. rationally or irrationally), and/or as to what 
actions are to be counted as socially responsible or irresponsible. 
There would, however, be a conflict between this position and 
one which claimed e.g. that the major obligation of the school was 
to make children happy, and which therefore used no criterion 
concerned with learning to support a claim that the schools and their 
teachers had succeeded or failed in their roles. However, the strong 
conceptual connection between schools, learning and teaching seem to 
me to be such that the onus would be on such a person to show why 
any other aim than learning through teaching should be considered 
over-riding. In my view, to suggest this would be to deny what is 
distinctive of schools, and I am not here concerned to argue the 
point. I have merely tried to make clear the form of the arguments 
of this section, and the set of assumptions on which they are based. 
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Chapter 6:  Bringing about capacity-enlarging learning 
Introduction  
It was explained in the introduction to this section that no 
sustained argument will be presented concerning what constitutes worth-
while learning, but that some comments will be made on criteria which, 
it is argued, are necessary for learning to be of value. 
The first criterion suggested is that, in order to be valuable, 
the learning a person does must have as its outcome knowledge, 
understanding, skills etc. which are psychologically and socially 
operative, by which is meant that it must not be 'inert'. This sort 
of point has consistently been made by philosophers in relation to 
education, examples being Whitehead5, Peters6 and Freire7. I have 
no wish to be entangled in the analyses of education, which many 
have suggested is what Gallie8 has called "an essentially contested 
concept". For one could either adopt a 'tight' analysis of education, 
as do Peters9 and Downie et a1.10, and then have to deal with the 
claim that education is not the only business of the school or not 
its business at all, or adopt an analysis such that whatever learning 
is considered to be the business of the school is to be called 
'education', the position taken by Barrow11. Since nothing definitive 
therefore follows for the role (4) of the teacher from any analysis 
of education, the arguments in this thesis are being put forward 
without the use of the term 'education' except insofar as it is 
needed to discuss the writings of others. There is no discussion, 
therefore, about whether any learning ought to be considered 
intrinsically or instrumentally worthwhile, or educationally worthwhile. 
Although there are always objections to a suggestion that any 
claim is self-evidently true, there is a sense in which, I believe, 
the above point about inert knowledge may be taken as self-evident. 
For it seems to me that the onus would be on anyone who claimed 
that knowledge etc. that was inert was valuable to explain what he 
could mean by such a claim. Though it may not be sufficient for 
learning to be valuable that it is not inert, it is argued here that, 
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prima facie, to be worthwhile the learning must, in some way inform 
a person's view of the world and/or increasehis capacity for 
experience and/or increase his capacity for responsible social action. 
All these require that the learning be psychologically available to 
the learner, and the latter that it can be used instrumentally 
in a morally acceptable way to pursue some justifiable goal (e.g. 
happiness, friendship, truth, justice, work or leisure activities). 
It can be seen, therefore, that learning which is psychologically 
available only to the extent that it can be produced to provide an 
answer to a set of questions (e.g. as asked by a teacher or an 
examiner) does not adequately fulfil this criterion, even though 
it may be, in a sense, being used to pursue a justifiable goal, 
being a 'ticket' (as Whitel2 put it) to higher education or some 
career to which it bears no internal relationship. The arguments 
against 'compartmentalising' knowledge are relevant here, since 
school learning, to be worthwhile, cannot be separated from other 
learning and knowledge. What is learned in school needs, to be 
non-inert in the sense meant, to be grounded in and emeshed with 
what is learned elsewhere, enabling the pupils to constructively 
criticize and extend the latter. In this extended sense of the 
term, school learning must be useful to be of value. 
Though specific learnings are being justified pragmatically, 
the justification rests ultimately on the basis of a non-instrumental 
value judgment about persons as such - rational (as opposed to non-
rational) social beings with interests, values, intentions, purposes, 
feelings, knowledge, understandings and skills; a judgment about the 
importance of consciousness in a person's life (as opposed to apathy); 
and it involves having a view of what is to count as being a human 
agent in a social community. These are normative assumptions which 
no attempt is being made here to justify? But if they are accepted, 
then it is clear that learning which is not, in some sense, 'alive' 
cannot contribute to the consciousness of a person and thus to his 
life. 
Though it is being claimed that social and psychological non-
inertness is a necessary condition for learning to be worthwhile, it 
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is not being suggested that all non-inert learning is worth having, 
nor is a subjectivist position on value being taken that suggests 
that no distinction can be made between what a person values and 
what he ought to value. This can be seen by consideration of two 
possible ways in which a person could be said to be wrong to value 
having learned X. 
Much learning is valued by people instrumentally, and thus 
there is a sense in which a person is right to value learning X 
instrumentally. This is if he is correct in his belief that this 
learning will help him achieve some goal he is pursuing. In a 
similar sense, he is wrong to disvalue learning which, in fact, might 
have helped him to achieve his goal, or to value learning which he 
erroneously believes will help him achieve it. But this position 
remains essentially subjectivist, since the question of whether or 
not the individual should have valued the learning is settled 
with reference to its instrumentality towards his goals. It 
remains subjective as long as it is implied that no objective 
judgments can be made regarding the worthwhileness of goals. 
The subjectivist position is rejected here, since it is 
assumed possible to say objectively that there are some goals which 
ought not to be pursued. Given this assumption, it cannot be 
sufficient for learning to be in any non-subjective sense worthwhile 
that it is useful to a person for pursuing his goals. Since it 
would be impossible to make an exhaustive list of goals which might 
be justifiable and whose pursuit would be a responsible social 
activity (for these cannot be described, let alone evaluated,without 
a context), the criterion suggested - that learning which increases 
a person's understanding of the world and his capacity for experience 
and responsible social action within it is worthwhile - is formal. 
Further criteria would be required for its concrete application in a 
given society, in the sense of giving a substantive account in terms 
of propositions and skills. 
The criterion that it is necessary for learning to be worthwhile 
that it is not inert is, however, claimed to be a substantive criterion. 
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Furthermore, it is possible to know that a person's learning is 
merely rote, lacks understanding, or is seen by him as pointless, 
and is thus at that time inert, and therefore of no value to him. 
Though the first criterion is formal, there are certain 
important substantive implications due to factors of human life 
which all societies have in common. Though no specific knowledge, 
understanding or skill can be said a priori to be of no value, it 
can be argued that some special account needs to be provided to 
suggest that some learning is of value, whereas other non-inert 
learning can be taken a priori to be of value without the provision 
of a special account. Skill in wiggling one's ears would be an 
example of a skill in the first category, whereas learning one's 
native language and to communicate with others, to understand other 
people and the society in which one lives, and moral understanding 
would come into the second. The reason that no special account 
would have to 4e given for the potential value of the latter is 
that these are things which are partly constitutive of what is 
meant by being a human agent. Similarly, the value of knowledge 
(e.g. of the physical world, and of other people, and of how to 
find out these things) which enables a person to predict the possible 
consequences of his actions, and thus know what he is doing14  , requires 
no special justification since a failure to consider the consequences 
of one's actions is constitutive of what is meant by acting 
irresponsibly. 
It can be seen that the position taken in this thesis is neither 
that taken by Peters15 or White16, nor that taken by Wilson17. Peters 
and White argue that there is some learning which is valuable to anyone 
who has it (the former that it can be intrinsically valuable, the 
latter that it can be educationally valuable), no matter who they are. 
Against this, it is argued that learning cannot be evaluated as 
worthwhile or not independently of a consideration of the individual 
learner, since a necessary condition of learning's being worthwhile 
to an individual is that it should be 'alive' for him and available 
to him for 'use' in certain kinds of ways. This denies the claim 
that there is learning which can be specified (proposition X, skill 
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Y or how to engage in activity Z) which is necessarily of value to 
anyone who learns it. 
On the other hand, as against !ilson, it is denied that the 
non-inertness of knowledge, understanding, skills etc., provides 
a sufficient condition for its value in any objective sense. Thus 
a child's interest in learning X (a sufficient condition for the 
non-inertness of X), which entails that he values learning about 
X, is not, on my view, a sufficient condition for its being valuable. 
A distinction is accepted here between what an individual does value 
and what is worth valuing (what he ought to, or would be right to, 
value) . 
Even though the position being adopted here might, at first 
sight, have appeared to be the same as one of the more orthodox 
positions, I have attempted above to indicate that it cannot be 
viewed in this way since on this account there are both subjective 
and objective criteria to be satisfied for worthwhileness. 
Increasing a person's capacity for responsible social action 
If a human being is seen primarily as a person who has 
experiences and performs actions in a social context, then it 
can be argued that, prima facie, learning which increases one's 
capacity for experience and for responsible social action is 
worthwhile. This suggestion does not formally commit the 
Naturalistic Fallacy, since it has already been pointed out that 
this concept of a person is an evaluative rather than a merely 
descriptive one. 
Increasing a person's capacity for responsible social action 
implies either increasing the capacity for action of a sociaMei.e. 
morally) responsible person, or increasing the social (i.e. moral) 
responsibility of an agent, or both. This chapter is concerned 
with learning which might increase a person's capacity for experience 
or action, and the next with the learning of values. Since actions 
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can be performed in a variety of contexts, the same act may be 
sometimes responsible and sometimes irresponsible (unless, of 
course, one uses a concept of action which rules out the possibility 
by definition). It follows from this that we cannot be sure that 
any given increase in a person's capacity for action will be 
desirable in the long run. But it cannot follow from this that 
attempts to help people increase their capacity for action are 
unjustifiable. It merely indicates that learning needs to be 
viewed in a moral context, and that in teaching people there are 
inescapable risks. In the same way that no guarantees can ever 
be offered that teaching attempts will be successful, no guarantees 
can be offered that what is learned will be used by the learner in 
a responsible manner. It would be unjustifiable to suggest that 
because we cannot be certain of this, we should never try to teach 
anyone anything. For the justification of teaching attempts must 
be instrumental since teaching attempts involve trying to change 
people. 
Learning which increases a person's capacity for action, 
including expressive acts, involves the acquisition of concepts, 
knowledge and beliefs, understandings and skills. Traditionally, 
discussions of learning have separated 'learning that' and 'learning 
how to'19, following Ryle's distinction20 between knowing how and 
knowing that. A brief reference to this distinction will be made 
later in discussing the nature of the relationship of the teacher's 
acts to the learning outcome in the cases of propositional and 
physical skill learning. At this stage of the discussion I shall 
not separate concept learning, learning to understand, propositional 
learning and skill learning, in an attempt to avoid the difficulties 
involved in separating them because the formal distinction is sometimes 
untenable in practice. 
Learning a concept, for example, involves both learning that and 
learning how to. A person cannot learn a concept in isolation but 
learns it in use within a framework of concepts related in some way 
to human beliefs, purposes and activities21  . It may be possible to 
give a formal account of learning a concept as learning a principle, 
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but in practice this involves learning how to use the relevant 
language and that given instances are instances, how to use the 
concept and to recognize instances which one has not encountered 
before as falling under the concept. As Hirst says22, "To learn 
a new concept is to learn how to use the concept in relation to 
others and how to apply it. It is not to learn a series of truths 
about its relations with other concepts. Learning a concept is 
like learning to play tennis, not like learning to state the rules 
and principles that govern play." But additionally, as Hamlyn 
points out23, "..in the process of acquiring concepts (there is) 
a delicate balance between a kind of abstract understanding of what 
it is to be an X and a knowledge of what things conform to this 
criterion." 
Similarly, there are cases where, given the motor skills a 
person already possess, the acquisition of propositional knowledge 
is sufficient to give him new know-how. If I learn that turning 
the key starts the car engine, I now know how to start the car. 
The distinction rests on those cases where the reduction is untenable 
(no amount of learning of propositions will teach me how to swim) 
but it does not follow from the fact that not all cases of learning-
how-to can be reduced to learning-that that none of them can. 
Concept learning, skill learning and learning-that will, for these 
reasons, not be considered separately. 
The first requirement of the performance of an intentional action 
is that the person must have some conception of what it is that he is 
doing or trying to do. Since there is a relationship between having 
a conception and having some kind of language in which to formulate 
this, there are indications here that learning to perform new actions 
(and also to have new experiences) often involves the acquisition of 
new language. I do not wish to suggest that having appropriate 
language is a necessary condition of performing any actions or having 
any experiences at all, since it would follow from this that 
pre-linguistic children could not perform actions or have experiences 
and it seems undeniable that they do do these things when they have 
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not yet acquired the requisite language that would enable them to 
give an answer to the questions "What are you trying to do?" or 
"What are you experiencing?" 
However, it is equally clear that some actions or experiences 
are impossible for a person with a limited range of understandings 
and a limited vocabulary. Being able to write another's name is 
not a sufficient condition for being able to forge a cheque, and a 
very young child cannot experience hope. There are thus seen to be 
limitations on the range of actions and experiences open to children 
by virtue of the limited range of intentions which they can formulate 
or concepts which they have. For this reason, learning new concepts 
may be a necessary condition of learning to perform new acts, and 
teaching children new concepts may increase their capacity for action 
and the range of experiences possible for them. 
But learning new concepts is not sufficient to ensure that the 
actions which a child can formulate an intention to perform can be 
successfully performed. The child may lack requisite knowledge - e.g. 
of the physical world, of the beliefs, intentions ar character of 
others, or even of his own character. Equally relevant to the 
successful performance of actions is the possession of skills, for 
even with the requisite knowledge-that, a person may lack the skill 
(know-how) required to perform the action (not all know-how being 
reducible to know-that). It follows, therefore, that people in 
general can perform only a limited selection of those actions 
potentially available in the society to which they belong, and not 
all members of the society can experience the full range of potential 
experiences. 
lidditionally, it is clear that relevant learning is not always 
sufficient for a person to be able to perform a given action, for the 
performance of some acts (e.g. conducting a Mass, performing a legal 
marriage) are further restricted by other conditions (i.e. the 
possession of relevant authority) necessary for this to be done. 
Other acts require complementary action by others for their successful 
performance (e.g. buying, accompanying on the piano). These points, 
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however, do not undermine the relevant claim, that for the performance 
of a given act, a person must have the appropriate concepts, knowledge-
that and skills. As Hamlyn also points out24, concepts can be viewed 
as both tools and as keys. 
Thus the teaching of concepts, know-how and know-that to people 
who do not have them is teaching them how to perform new actions which 
previously they were unable to perform, and increasing the range of 
experiences open to them. 
Knowledge and Teaching 
It is a commonplace assertion that it is impossible to teach that 
which one does not know. Dearden25 states categorically, "To teach 
something in ignorance of it is not just difficult; it is logically 
impossible." So widely is this view accepted that Ryle devotes two 
papers26 to exploring how it is possible for a person to teach himself 
something. "There is a semblance of a conceptual paradox," he writes27 
 . 
"Here his teacher was as ignorant as the pupil, for they were the same 
boy. So how can the one learn something from the other?" 
This contention must produce great insecurity in a teacher at a 
time when demands are being put forward for open-ended and flexible 
curricula. One may be forgiven for wondering how, if it is logically 
impossible to teach what one does not know, what justification there 
could be for promoting situations in which teachers will be unable 
to teach. Indeed, Dearden's point is made precisely to indicate that 
such demands are misguided. 
However, the assertion that it is logically impossible to teach that 
which one does not know seems to me to be a mistaken one in respect of 
both propositions and skills, and I shall try to show this by examples 
of intentional teaching so that it cannot be claimed that I have 
indicated that Dearden is mistaken simply by using a different concept 
of teaching. In suggesting this, however, I am not implying that 
ignorance is something to be deliberately sought after as a qualification 
for teachers28. As Passmore suggests29 in a discussion of Plato's 
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"Theaetetus", to teach one must know something which the learners 
do not know. Indeed, it may turn out that much more knowledge and 
understanding is required if a person is to teach what he himself 
does not know than if he is to teach what he does know. But before 
any investigation of what might be involved in teaching that which 
one does not know can start, it is necessary to indicate how it is 
possible for a person to teach an X "in ignorance of it", and to show 
that Dearden is mistaken in his claim. 
There is nothing new in an example of a person teaching another 
a skill he does not possess. A man may have been paralysed from 
birth and not know how to swim, never having been in a position to 
have even tried to swim. Nonetheless, he may be a most efficient and 
effective swimming teacher, in a position to teach swimming by 
instruction and elicit swimming skills from pupils, having learned 
to do this from other people who could teach swimming. Now he could 
clearly not do this without having some understanding of what was 
involved in swimming and what techniques were effective for keeping 
afloat and propelling oneself through the water, but this surely is, 
for him, entirely theoretical knowledge (neither a necessary nor a 
sufficient condition for knowing how to swim). He can thus teach 
someone to do that which he himself does not know how to do. 
Similarly, a person who does not know how to play the trumpet 
but who has at his disposal an elementary instruction book and can 
hear whether or not the pupil is blowing the correct note, can teach 
the child the first skills of trumpet-playing, without himself knowing 
how (in the sense of being able) to play the trumpet. Though he himself 
may not know what to do with his lips in order to produce the required 
note, he can tell whether or not the child is doing the right thing 
and guide his learning to play. Again, it may not be necessary to 
the teaching of a skill that the teacher knows how to do it, for he 
can sometimes teach the skill if he has other, requisite knowledge. 
Of course, in this type of instance, certain methods of teaching 
are not open. The person who does not know how to Y cannot teach A 
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to Y by demonstrating Y-ing himself, for example. But since teaching 
activities are polymorphous, it remains possible for a person who 
does not know how to Y to teach others how to Y. 
A quite different kind of example is that of a person who, e.g. 
because instructed to do so, teaches content X as true though he 
himself does not believe it (e.g. he is agnostic). If it is the 
case that X is true, and that the grounds which the teacher indicates 
as grounds are good grounds for the belief, the pupil who learns 
X (a theory, proposition, explanation, etc.) can be said to know X 
and to have been taught it by a person who did not himself know it. 
A may teach by the performance of exactly the same acts which a person 
B who did know X could have performed. It is clearly not being suggested 
that anyone, irrespective of what they did or did not know, could have 
performed these actions (as the comments in the previous section of 
this chapter indicate) but merely to illustrate that though to teach 
X one must know something (as a necessary precondition for performing 
appropriate actions), it is not necessarily X that one must know. 
Finally, one may take an example of a teacher whose pupils were 
working with books or structured apparatus, and seemed unable to 
learn an X which the apparatus had been designed to teach (e.g. because 
it assumed knowledge or understanding which the pupils did not have). 
By working with the pupils and the apparatus, a teacher who did not 
know that X may still be instrumental in bringing about the learning 
of X which the pupils were unable to achieve alone. This, like the 
three previous examples, is quite acceptably and generally considered 
a case of teaching, and though it may be the case that at the end both 
teacher and pupils have learned the X, it remains an example of teaching 
where a teacher has taught pupils what, at the start, he himself did 
not know or understand. In this example, again, it is clear that in 
order to teach X, the teacher must have known something that the pupils 
did not know (for otherwise he could not have helped them to do what 
they could not have done alone) but what he needed to know in order to 
teach them X was not necessarily X. 
I conclude from consideration of the above examples that Dearden 
is wrong. To teach something in ignorance of it is not logically 
impossible. But it may be difficult. 
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Formulating teaching aims and objectives  
A teacher who believes that he (logically) cannot teach what 
he doesn't know must limit his teaching aims at any time to that 
which he knows at that time. Similarly, if he believes, with 
Hirst, that in order to teach a particular X (proposition or skill) 
he must intend pupils to learn that particular X, he is required, 
if rational, to formulate his aims clearly and tightly. The tight 
formulation of objectives is the only reasonable course of action 
for a teacher under these conditions for otherwise there is the 
tacit acceptance that it does not matter whether he teaches his 
pupils relatively little or rather more. 
If, as has happened, teachers are willing to try an "open-ended 
approach", or "enquiry" as opposed to discovery teaching, or to 
formulate their aims "fuzzily" or at a high level of generality 
only (as in the example given in Section II of teaching about pond 
life) they have laid themselves open to charges (i.e. by Hirst) 
of being professional frauds. These charges are based on claims 
about the nature of teaching. Indeed, some of the suggestions that 
teachers should formulate their aims behaviourally seem to be based 
on a similar belief, that the nature of teaching demands it. 
However, if it is accepted that it is possible to teach without 
the tight formulation of objectives, whether behaviourally or 
propositionally, and that it is possible for a person to teach that 
which he does not know (provided that there are other, related 
things that he does know which enable him to perform the necessary 
teaching acts30) it is then possible to ask whether the tightest 
possible formulation of aims (as advocated by Hirst31) is a help 
to teaching children that which it is worthwhile for them to learn 
or not. This is to question whether it is a necessary part of the 
teacher's role (4). 
There is no suggestion here that a teacher should adopt a 
laissez-faire attitude to what goes on in a classroom, or that he 
could be teaching his pupils if he simply turns them loose to do 
what they like, but rather that there is not necessarily a definitive 
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answer to the question about the formulation of aims. For it might 
be empirically the case that a tight formulation of aims militates, in 
some instances against the achievement of those aims, or that more 
worthwhile learning is promoted by teachers in some instances if their 
primary intentions are concerned with sustaining children's interest, 
or helping them achieve some desired practical end (e.g. making 
something). In other cases, the tight formulation of aims may help 
children's learning. The point which is being made here is that, on 
my view, this is an empirical, not a conceptual, problem. The tight 
specification of objectives (and thus, a fortiori, the specification 
of behavioural objectives) is not demanded by the nature of teaching, 
but is a matter for sustained empirical investigation. 
Whitty and Young32 have given an account of a girl who, in 
pursuit of an aim of designing a boat hull, studied what would have 
been traditional 'A' Level Physics work in viscosity. I can see no 
reason why it should be construed as a failure of role obligation if 
teachers formulated their aims "fuzzily" in terms of whatever the 
pupils need to know in order to achieve some appropriate (and not 
necessarily learning) goal. since the learning is intrinsically 
instrumental33 to the pupil in achieving his goal, it is necessarily 
non-inert. 
That impressive teaching and learning can occur governed by 
its usefulness in solving problems (this Dewey-based conception of 
the teacher's role) has been illustrated on television by the Young 
Scientist of the Year programmes, where the goal has sometimes been 
practical (e.g. to design X) and sometimes theoretical (to find out 
Y). Given that skills and theoretical knowledge can be needed for 
achieving either, I suggest that this kind of view and the structured 
curriculum view can be understood not as alternative conceptions of 
the teacher's role, somehow in competition with one another, as is 
sometimes suggested, but rather as different ways of conceiving the 
means of achieving the same goal - that of worthwhile learning. 
I suggest that the advantage of the former kinds of methods is that 
learning is less likely to be inert, from which it follows that the 
probability of the means achieving the end is higher. However, since 
the demands on a teacher's knowledge, imagination and flexibility may 
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he much greater than in the use of a tightly structured curriculum, it 
may be that for some people and in some circumstances the latter may be 
more appropriate, whilst in others the former may be. 
Recent writings in the sociology of knowledge (e.g. Keddie34) 
have pointed out that because the teacher has traditionally decided 
(on the basis of objectives worked out at both lesson level and over 
longer periods) what will and what will not be discussed in the 
classroom, educational failure has been created in the classroom. 
Flew35 and others, looking at Keddids examples of questions asked by 
'lower stream' pupils, have admitted that they are sometimes more 
interesting and sensitive than those asked by pupils in 'higher 
streams' who accepted the problems as given, often whether they were 
interested in them or not. They have, however, attacked Keddie as 
trying to make a case by using "bad teachers" for her examples, 
with the implication that a "better" teacher would have allowed the 
questions to be discussed. This seems to me to misunderstand the position. 
If it is demanded of a teacher (because of what teaching is) that 
he has clearly defined objectives, and that, in order for him to be 
teaching, he must pursue the learning by his pupils of that which he 
has organized his lesson with the intention of teaching them (e.g. by 
making work-cards, etc.), then questions of the type illustrated in 
Keddie's article must be dismissed as irrelevant. Though it might be 
true that they could have led to the learning of other worthwhile Xs, 
if the teacher's role is seen in terms of teaching a curriculum 
content in terms of which he has devised his lesson, then he cannot 
seriously be expected to consider questions which preclude starting on 
the designated work as helpful. If his intention is that pupils learn 
X, Y and Z, it is a matter of logic that questions which take the 
discussion in a completely different direction, which treat as problematic 
the starting point of the lesson, are unhelpful in respect of that 
intention. They prevent the teacher, on this account, from fulfilling 
his role. 
I suggest that it is helpful to view Keddie's point in terms 
of the institutionalized role of the teacher, and avoid discussions in 
the emotive language of "creating educational failures". If it is the 
case that children cannot see the point of the work-cards and the 
questions on them in relation to the material that the teacher has 
presented, then it may be the case that their failure to see the 
point prevents their learning anything from the material in a way 
which is non-inert, a condition which has been suggested as being 
necessary for the learning to be worthwhile. If this is sometimes 
the case, then the teacher's role (3) may have been institutionalized 
in a manner which, for some teachers and some children in some 
situations, acts against the achievement of that which constitutes 
the justification of schooling. If this is so, this is a reason 
for wondering whether this type of institutionalization of the teacher's 
role is justifiable. The insistence by teachers that pupils engage 
in activities which it is hoped will promote the learning which the 
teacher intends may have the opposite consequences in the long run 
from those which are intended. It is therefore suggested that 
research is needed as to how extensive such consequences are, that 
teachers will learn to assess more carefully the unintended 
consequences of their own actions36 and that considerable attention 
should be given to the question of the exercise of judgment as to 
when and how the teacher should be flexible in the classroom. Teachers 
need to listen to their pupils to see what sense they can make of 
the material, and, as Barnes writes37, "If we are honest, we may... 
admit that our determination to teach what we want to teach can also 
add to this failure to listen: the voice of our own intentions is so 
loud that it blots out the voices of our pupils." 
I suggest that much of this can be attributed to an 
institutionalization of the teacher's role which is based on an 
understanding of teaching in which the teacher's intentions are 
central. This understanding leads teachers to discourage pupils' 
digressions from specified subject matters, even if it is the case 
that such digressions are fruitful, or even needed for any worthwhile 
learning to take place at all. For it may be that without such a 
digression, pupils will be unwilling to consider the proferred 
subject matter or unable to see the point of it. They may need 
to engage in tentative or exploratory talk to help them relate the 
subject matter of the lesson to what they already know of the world. 
And, to make a more positive point, valuable teaching and learning 
may go on during such deviations (though, of course, the teacher could 
not know in advance what it might be). 
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To argue this is not necessarily to deny that there may be 
circumstances in which it would be right for the teacher to insist 
that pupils work on material which is offered with the intention of 
teaching a specified X. It is, however, to deny that this is 
necessarily the teacher's role, as, it seems to me, Hirst's analysis 
of teaching and his comments on "professional frauds" seem to 
suggest. Nor is to be taken as supporting an extreme position which 
suggests that the initiative in any enterprise must always come from 
the pupilse It is not being suggested, either, that teachers should 
not plan lessons or prepare materials for pupils to work with, or 
adopt curriculum packages. It implies that rather than having a 
lesson plan to which he will adhere, a teacher should have a wide 
range of possibilities for pupils to follow and also be open to 
pursuing lines of thought or investigations which he himself had 
never thought of. For doing this may be the only way in which a 
teacher may sometimes teach anything at all (a necessary condition 
for teaching anything worthwhile). 
In suggesting that a person can teach an X that he does not know, 
I am also not to be taken as suggesting that ignorance is a quality 
to be sought in teachers. I would certainly argue that, all other 
things being equal, it is more appropriate to choose A rather than B 
as e.g. a history teacher if A has a greater historical understanding 
than B39. The claim that it is possible for a person to teach that 
which he does not know is rather to be interpreted as suggesting that 
restrictions which an activity analysis of teaching imposes on teachers 
in terms of what they can try to teach or areas in which they are to 
be considered capable of teaching their pupils are unjustifiable. All 
other things being equal, the contributions of a person with greater 
historical understanding to such activities as an unstructured 
discussion (i.e. one which was not aimed at teaching children to 
believe certain propositions) are likely to be greater if his own 
understanding is wider and deeper than if it is shallower. He may 
teach his pupils much in the way of historical understanding by 
comments which get them to reflect on what they have said in the 
light of available evidence (what is learned is elicited rather than 
indicated). And much teaching may be required to help pupils 
see a problem as a problem, which is important for pupils to come 
to see the point of what they are to do. 
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"Learning How to Learn" 
Much has been said recently about the importance of pupils being 
taught 'how to learn'. As stated, of course, the idea of "learning 
how to learn" is merely a slogan. It cannot be taken literally, for 
taken literally it involves a vicious regress such that it would be 
impossible for anyone ever to start learning. It is more sympathetically 
interpreted as suggesting that it is desirable that persons should 
acquire the ability to learn whatever they will later choose to 
learn, and implying that there are skills involved in learning complex 
Xs which may be generalisable, and which it is important to be 
explicitly aware of. In particular, learning in any content area 
involves coming to an understanding of a co-ordinated network of 
concepts, the propositions in which they are embodied and through 
which they are learned. The implication is that this should lead to 
a development of the individual's ability to structure what is being 
learned in an internally consistent and disciplined way, and that 
this is achieved better by pupils structuring their own thinking 
than having the teacher structure their thinking for them. 
It has already been suggested that new learning helps an 
individual perform actions previously not open to him. Most 
important among these are acts appropriate to finding out what 
is and is not true, and to generating new knowledge. For the 
learning of propositions alone is inadequate. Propositions now 
believed to be true may be shown to be false, or new grounds may be 
discovered to support propositions now believed to be false. 
Propositional learning will be rigid and inflexible unless accompanied 
by an understanding of what is involved in evaluating the truth 
of propositions. Since these skills are, by definition, of a 
high order of generality, and must be applied,with modification 
where appropriate, to subject matter other than that through which 
they were learned, the slogan is best interpreted as suggesting that 
in a rapidly changing society, learning the skills of acquiring 
knowledge etc. is more important than learning any particular 
subject matter. In 1958 Margaret Mead wrote4°, "No-one will live 
all his life in the world into which he was born, and no-one will 
die in the world in which he worked in his maturity." 
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In such a rapidly changing society (where it is necessarily the 
case that what is true of that society is changing) emphasis on the 
need to learn, and thus on the skills involved in learning, is 
understandable. But it seems a mistake to interpret this, as some 
do, as implying that no propositional learning is of any value to 
children. Firstly, one cannot simply learn the skills of learning, 
even in a particular content area. These skills must be developed in 
use, and some are only developed in the course of learning-that. Secondly, 
it is being suggested that these skills are valuable instrumentally. 
This presupposes that, at any given time, some knowledge-that is valuable. 
I have already suggested that socially responsible actions require 
knowledge-that for their performance. Rational action, such as taking 
means to ends, requires beliefs about the world, and though some ends may 
be achieved fortuitously, in general people employ means to ends success-
fully only if the beliefs underlying the choice of means are true beliefs. 
Moral action demands a consideration of the accompanying consequences 
of possible methods of attaining one's ends, and for this, too, 
knowledge about the world and other people is needed. 
This discussion of what learning can be considered as worthwhile 
without further justification is admittedly loose in the sense of being 
high order. This is, however, unavoidable, since at a lower level of 
description, what is worth learning changes. I am suggesting, primarily, 
that if a teacher succeeded, through his various activities which fulfil 
the criteria suggested for being teaching, in bringing about learning 
which was not inert and which conformed with other criteria to do with 
being non-trivial, non-harmful and non-immoral41, he would have 
fulfilled his role. (What learning fulfils these criteria will 
undoubtedly often be a matter of dispute.) 
If this is accepted, then, given some agreement on the value 
issue (which I suggest is possible since some things are valuable in 
any society), it is a matter for empirical investigation to determine 
under what circumstances tightly structured, closely adhered-to 
curricula would promote this. If it could be shown that only through 
such curricula could teachers fulfil their role (as outlined here in 
general terms), then this would justify the tight specification and 
regular adherence to low-level objectives in the classroom. But the 
justification would then be an ethical and empirical one (i.e. of the 
appropriate kind), and not be written into the role through an analysis 
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of teaching. 
The teacher's enactment of his role 
It has been accepted that a general intention to bring about 
worthwhile learning should be part of any teacher's conception of 
his role, but it is claimed that this does not entail that this 
intention should be, as it were, to the forefront of his mind 
throughout the time he enacts his role, nor that, in order to be 
teaching (and thus doing what he is employed to do) he needs to 
consciously direct all his actions towards the learning by his pupils 
of some specific Xs. These comments, which can be interpreted as 
suggesting that a teacher need not always be consciously enacting his 
role, bear some relationship to what Sartre42 has to say about 
role-playing: "The attentive pupil who wishes to be attentive, his 
eyes riveted on the teacher, his ears wide open, so exhausts himself 
in playing the attentive role that he ends up no longer hearing 
anything." 
What Sartre says of the pupil may be enlightening for a teacher's 
conception of his role, for to adequately enact the teaching role 
in a school, it may be important for the teacher to lose consciousness 
of his role. If he is constantly thinking of himself as a teacher, 
and continually thinking of what he is doing from his own point of 
view, if he is over-concerned with his own conception of what he is 
doing and acting in the ways he thinks R teacher ought to act, he may 
lost his ability to engage in genuine dialogue with his pupils, or 
his concern with his own self may effectively block his ability to 
fulfil his role. For pupils do not learn through some kind of direct 
confrontation with "knowledge", but rather in a transaction with a 
person who helps them create knowledge for themselves. Though 
teaching has been analysed as an instrumental transaction, it does 
not follow that a teacher should view himself as merely an instrument. 
The idea of a teacher as a person whose role involves him in 
choosing objectives and employihg means to reach them, as suggested 
by the activity analysis of teaching, has produced some interesting 
discussions which are helpful in understanding the sorts of actions 
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a teacher must engage in if he is to be teaching43. As already 
suggested, though there is nothing he can do which guarantees that 
he is teaching anyone anything at all, much less anything worthwhile, 
this cannot be taken as implying that it does not matter what he 
does. For not any action can be instrumental, in the sense used, 
in bring about the learning of a given X. Philosophical work done 
from the point of view of means taken towards an intended end must 
be relevant for any consideration of teaching acts. 
If act A is performed as a means to a given end B and can 
succeed in bringing about that end (i.e. is appropriate as a means), 
then it must be possible for that outcome to be brought about by act 
A even if it were performed without that specific intention. If there 
are logical relationships which a person who wishes to adopt a means 
to an end must respect, these logical relationships must be relevant 
in picking out the acts which teach B X from the range of actions 
which the teacher may perform. 
This assumption has already been made, in the repeated claim 
that turning up the radiators cannot be an action by virtue of which 
a person can teach a child e.g. Pythagoras's theorem, for it was denied 
that all acts which are instrumental in bringing about learning outcomes 
are teaching acts. It has been argued that being taught involves 
understanding meanings, and, as a corollary, it has been denied that 
anything of importance can be learned about teaching by going into 
classrooms and observing some kind of "raw behaviour". In that 
sense, therefore, this thesis is anti-positivist. The same logical 
limits which are restrictive on what can be chosen as means by those 
who understand what they are trying to do and are aware of all the 
empirical facts involved must be restrictive equally of what can be 
counted as teaching acts from the point of view of the observer, who 
needs, as do the pupils, an understanding of the act. The argument 
is that in both kinds of case the limits arise because not just any 
action can be instrumental in the sense meant. 
It is worth noting, however, that the limits are different in 
the case of conceptual or belief learning than in the case of learning 
physical skills, though in all cases of teaching the relationship must 
be more than a fortuitous one. 
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In the case of physical skills, it makes sense to speak of a 
merely contingent relationship. Though keeping on pedalling hard 
may be instrumental to learning how to balance on a bicycle, and 
turning one's head and looking down one's arm may be a way of bringing 
one's body into a twist whilst diving, the relationship is a contingent 
one, resting on the structure of the physical world. Though a line 
between physical skills and skills with a significant cognitive 
component may be hard to draw, examples of the latter may easily be 
found. The relationship between acts which, explicitly or implicitly, 
display, clarify, exhibit, elicit or otherwise bring into a learner's 
view an X which he learns and that X itself cannot, in such cases, 
be an entirely contingent one. There must be internal relationships 
as well, A detailed examination of the epistemological considerations 
involved is, however, outside the scope of this thesis. 
The claim which is made here is that in order to evaluate 
a teacher's performance and decide whom, whether and what he is 
teaching (and thus if he is adequately fulfilling his role), one 
needs to be able to view the teacher's actions through the conceptual 
frameworks and meaning structures of the pupils rather than simply 
through those of the teacher himself. No proper judgments on this 
can be made, in my view, either by employing the activity analysis 
of teaching, by observing only what the teacher does (from his 
point of view) or simply by seeing how well pupils perform on tests. 
In view of the implausibility of having teams of investigators 
examining all our classrooms, there is the implication that teachers 
and their pupils may have, in the end, to act as researchers themselves. 
In the interests of promoting non-inert, non-immoral and non-trivial 
learning, they will have to discover for themselves how far, in their 
circumstances, rational curriculum plans assist the teacher in 
fulfilling his role. There may be more merit than, for example, 
Hirst and Peters have allowed in the progressive suggestion, which 
they describe as "weak on content", that teachers should be freed 
from the use of pre-specified curricula, even that pre-specified by 
themselves. Some teachers may fulfil their roles more effectively 
if they deliberately keep their aims "fuzzy" and reject rational 
curriculum planning. Whether or not this is possible is, however, 
an empirical and not a logical matter. 
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My conclusion, therefore, is that it is not a necessary part of 
the teacher's role that he adopt a pre-planned curriculum for his 
pupils to follow. because it has yet to be shown that more teaching 
of what is worthwhile is promoted by the use of such a curriculum 
than by open-ended enquiry, it cannot be an obligation of the teacher s 
role (4) that he specify his objectives as tightly as the nature of 
the subject matter allows. If, in following pupils' own interests, 
and pursuing fruitful deviations from his original plans, he is 
instrumental (in the relevant sense) in bringing about worthwhile 
learning, then he is fulfilling his obligations as a teacher. Aside 
from the support of common usage, which does not investigate a person's 
primary intentions to find out if they are teaching, I suggest that 
a claim that "this may be worthwhile but it is not teaching" can only 
be understood as denying that such a teacher is fulfilling his role. 
I can see no reason for suggesting this, or for adopting a language 
use which implies it. 
If a teacher fails to fulfil his obligation (to bring about 
worthwhile learning) there is no implication that he must be blame-
worthy, for many kinds of circumstances can be responsible for pupils' 
failure to learn. The suggestion that the teacher has fulfilled his 
obligation if he has tried seems to me unhelpful. Though I do not 
accept a maieutic view of teaching in general, the classroom can better 
be compared with a maternity ward than with a geriatric ward. In the 
standard case, it is reasonable to expect a teacher to bring about 
worthwhile learning, given adequate facilities (of which more later). 
If this were not so, then what justification could there be for 
compulsory schooling? 
Interest and non-inert learning 
The concept of interest is one which is central to child-centred 
views of education, and it is of great importance in relation to the 
criterion of non-inertness which I have suggested is necessary for 
children's learning to be of value to them. Much has been written about 
the distinction between the normative and the psychological concepts of 
interest45, and Wilson has recently discussed the relationship between 
interest in the psychological sense and value46. Attempts to 
- 206- 
elucidate the importance of interest, in the psychological sense, 
for learning have concerned themselves mainly with the motivational 
aspects of interest47, and though this is not the aspect I wish to 
discuss here, there is no doubt that this is of importance. To be 
interested in X is to have a reason for wanting to pursue activities 
appropriate to that interest. 
There is much that I agree with in Wilson's account of interest, 
and it is therefore with his discussion that I start. He offers 
a dispositional account of interests48, so that being interested in 
P is having a disposition to notice, to pay attention to, and to 
engage in some activity appropriate to one's interest. But this 
cannot be a complete account of interest, as Wilson himself sees, 
for if I like chocolates, I am indeed disposed to notice, pay attention 
to appropriate activity (eating) with respect to them. A dispositional 
account on its own does not serve to pick out being interested in P 
from liking P, to take but one example. 
Clearly something further is needed to fill out this account, 
for we know from our own experience that to be interested in something 
is not merely to have tendencies to do things. It is, in a very 
important way, to see something in a certain light, to have a view 
of it which in some ways accounts for the disposition to act 
appropriately. If interest was simply a disposition to act (appropriately), 
then accounts of behaviourist psychologists would be adequate as 
explanations of the creation or engendering of interest; for 
engendering of interest would simply involve the 'reinforcement' of 
(what the psychologist considered to be) appropriate behaviour, so 
that we simply found ourselves 'disposed' to act. If, on the other 
hand, being interested in P involves seeing P in some particular light 
- as having a point or significance, of being capable of variety or 
of being understood and performed better, for example - then this 
cognitive component which is involved in interest, and a 'proneness' 
not simply to act appropriately but to decide to do what one sees 
oneself as appropriate, makes interest understandable as something 
which can be taught rather than something that is conditioned. 
I am not sure how far I am further in disagreement with Wilson, 
- 207 - 
for thou,;h we are agreed that exactly the same observable behaviour 
may be engaged in by a child who is interested in P, side by side 
with a child who is bored, he denies49 that there is any "internal" 
or "private" going-on, which, if disclosed or discovered would 
provide an infallible mode of distinguishing between the two. If 
I am correct in my suggestion that being interested in P is not 
simply to have a psychological disposition or proneness, but also, 
as suggested, to view P, the object of one's interest, in a certain 
light, then such an additional condition necessary to feeling interest 
in something would, indeed, refer to some "private" going-on; the 
difference in attitude, in the way the child viewed what he was doing, 
would, in principle, be sufficient to distinguish an interested child 
from a bored one. Of course, this does not, in practice, give us an 
infallible method for distinguishing between the two children, but 
then we have very few infallible methods for anything. It certainly 
is the case that there are instances in which we can know that a 
child is interested in something. His actions in respect of it provide 
us with the grounds of our belief, but whether or not we know that 
the child is interested in P does not rest on the infallibility of our 
inferences from his actions, but on the truth or otherwise of our 
belief that he has these dispositions and this attitude towards P 
which are constitutive of an interest in it. 
On such an analysis of interest, a person who is interested in P 
is necessarily motivated to (has a reason for) engaging in activities 
related to P, or, as Wilson puts it50, "wanting to become more skilful, 
more informed, more understanding, more appreciative, more experienced, 
etc." at P. However, it doesn't follow, as it seems to me that Wilson 
implies, that if a person is interested in an activity, he must necessarily 
be pursuing it for its interest. If I am doing P for its interest, then 
I must necessarily expect to find P interesting, but if I am finding P 
interesting, nothing follows about my reasons for doing P. I may be 
engaging in P for any number of different reasons. All that can be said 
is that if I am interested in P, my interest would provide me with a 
reason for continuing to do P if the reasons for which I actually am 
doing P are no longer operative. That is, though an interest in P 
can provide motivation for doing P, it is not necessarily the case 
that my doing of P at any time is motivated by my interest in P, 
even though I am finding P interesting. 
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Nor is there any reason to suppose that if I am doing P as part 
of my interest in 	 I am necessarily finding P interesting. I may 
be doing it because of my interest in 	 (that is, my interest in 
is my reason for doing P) but this cannct ensure that I am not bored 
by P. A further complexity is that though a person's interest in P 
gives him a reason for pursuing as part of his interest, he may 
also have a reason related in some way to (, against pursuing 
For example, he may find itself boring or difficult, and if this is 
so, as far as he is concerned, there is a reason against pursuing (. 
The motivational aspect of interest is therefore seen to be more complex 
than child-centred theorists suggest. Interest is a matter of degree, 
and thus gives one strong or weak reasons for acting, which must be 
weighed up against other reasons against acting. That is, an interest 
in P is not a sufficient reason for action, in all cases. 
As already suggested, an interest in P may be a reason for an 
agent's pursuit of q if the latter is necessary for the development of 
his interest in P, both where the relationship of P to is an internal 
one and where it is not. But if is boring or difficult, for example, 
then he also has a reason against pursuing 	 Whether he decides to 
pursue L4, then, is a contingent matter, depending on how he evaluates 
his interest in P in relation to his boredom with, or difficulty in 
doing,(. And it is worth noting that if q is necessary for his pursuit 
of P, then abandoning Le necessitates abandoning P. If the necessity is 
of a conceptual kind (e.g. as mathematics is for the pursuit of certain 
scientific activities) there can be no substitute. This kind of 
discussion suggests that it is a mistake to talk of interest as if there 
could never be any problems of motivation in classrooms where children 
are allowed to pursue their interests. 
"Making their lessons interesting" is sometimes said to be an 
obligation of the teacher's role (3) and Wilson has some scathing things 
to say about this. He quotes from Dewey51, "When things have to be made 
interesting, it is because interest itself is wanting. Moreover, the 
phrase is a misnomer. The thing, the object, is no more interesting than 
it was before. The appeal is simply made to the child's love of something 
else."52 
Wilson discusses this manipulative use of children's interests by 
teachers to which Dewey seems to be referring53, where the latter use 
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children's existing interests to make them do or learn other things 
that they are not interested in doing or learning, this being the 
price the child has to pay in order to be allowed to do the things 
he does find interesting afterwards. The way in which he makes 
this point seems unnecessarily tortuous. It would seem sufficient 
to simply query whether it is moral to manipulate children "for their 
own good" in this way (and thus be asking whether doing this can be 
regarded as part of the teacher's role (4)) than to engage in 
stipulation in respect of the standard usage of the term 'education' 
as a way of making the same point. For it doesn't seem that many 
people are willing to regard the learning of e.g. the skills of 
teacher-baiting as part of someone's education. Such manipulation 
certainly seems to require justification, for there is an obvious 
incompatability between such manipulation of a child and treating him 
with respect as a person. Wilson seems to have a point when he 
comments54, "And would it not be begging the question yet again to 
reply merely that children, as a matter of 'fact', are not 'really' 
persons....and that they do not merit or need treatment as persons, 
therefore, while they are being educated." (Here he seems to be 
using the term 'education' in a more usual sense, since, in the sense 
in which he himself generally uses the term, it seems logically 
impossible for a child who is being manipulated into learning to be 
being educated.) 
The question raised here, then, is whether or not we can 
justify institutionalizing as a standard role obligation of a teacher 
either the manipulation or the coercion of children into learning 
what we think it is good for them to learn. If the answer to this 
question is "No", it would not follow that there could never be 
circumstances in which such manipulation or coercion might be right, 
for there is a parallel in our acceptance that though, in general, one 
ought to tell the truth, there may be situations in which telling a 
lie might be the right thing to do. If we agree with Wilson that 
this ought not to be done in the standard case, then of course some 
further account of the ways in which it is justifiable for the teacher 
to act in the standard situation must be given. It does seem, prima 
facie, that there is nothing about children that makes them obvious 
candidates for manipulation or coercion in schools. Clearly there is 
some relationship between the view that manipulation or coercion is, 
in many, if not most, instances necessary and the view that pupils 
must learn what the teacher intends them to learn. They must be 
made to learn what he intends, for otherwise, on this view, he is 
not teaching them anything they learn55. If this position is 
abandoned, as I suggest it is logically permissible and empirically 
justifiable to do, at least in some cases, it may be that our views 
on manipulation or coercion lose some of their support. 
Wilson accepts the activity analysis of teaching insofar as 
teaching is attempting to bring about learning 6. His work thus 
implies that it is an educator's (and thus a teacher insofar as he 
is an educator) obligation to try to bring about the learning by 
children of that which they are interested in learning, unless it 
is the case57 that the activities in which the child wishes to engage 
are immoral or harmful, in which case it is the teacher's obligation 
to stop him. It seems that Wilson assumes that in this way motivational 
problems will be avoided, but I have earlier pointed out that though 
interest in learning P may be a reason for the child's engaging in 
appropriate learning activities, from the child's point of view it is 
not necessarily an over-riding reason. Thus it does not follow that 
pursuing a child-centred course of action will ensure that all 
children will engage in learning activities and therefore that the 
school will fulfil its responsibilities in respect of all children. 
It is worth commenting that this position, as it stands, seems to 
involve a very considerable reduction, if not an elimination of, 
teacher autonomy. The same objections which can be raised to the 
'traditional view' by child centred theorists in respect of the child's 
pursuing activities which he does not value simply because the teacher 
values them (i.e. that this view defines for the pupil a role in which 
he is not respected as a person) seem to be open to the child-centred 
conception of the teacher's role. If the only activities a teacher 
can pursue must be the ones the child values, and he must pursue them 
even if he does not value them himself, then a role has been defined 
for the teacher in which he does not seem to be respected as a person. 
This discussion, however, points to a more positive point which 
can be made about interests, and this relates to the earlier suggestion 
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that a necessary condition of worthwhileness of learning was that 
what was learned was not inert. If we accept the modified account 
I have given of being interested in something, it is clear that 
the dispositional aspect of interest makes it necessarily the case that 
what is learned with (not through) interest is not "dead" or "inert". 
However, since this is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
learning's being worth promoting in school (some interesting activities 
being harmful, immoral or trivial) further criteria must be employed 
to judge which of children's existing interests should be promoted, 
and also to justify attempts to teach them new interests. Teaching 
new interests is justifiable and therefore part of the teacher's role 
(4) because of the non-inertness of the learning involved, but, given 
that it is accepted that all interests are not equally worthwhile, 
reference needs to be made to other criteria of value to justify trying 
to teach the interest of this new activity rather than that one. The 
teacher's own interests (as suggested by some of the writings of 
free-schoolers and deschoolers) would be too arbitrary, though it is 
clear that the teacher must understand the interest of X in order to 
teach children to be interested in X. This point, too, has practical 
implications which will be discussed later. 
The original Dewey comment quoted earlier can now be interpreted 
as suggesting that it is a mistake first to choose content (subject 
matter or problem) and then try to "make" it interesting. Rather 
the teacher and pupils must choose subject matter for its interest. 
The activities engaged in must also be ones which reveal rather than 
conceal the subject matter's potential for interest. It is not a 
matter of'haking" the inherently uninteresting interesting, but of 
helping children to see what there is about an enquiry or subject 
which is interesting. 
Teaching new interests 
It seems to me that when teachers talk about making their lessons 
interesting, they are often talking about teaching children the 
interest of something. Interest cannot be coerced, and Wilson is 
clearly right in his suggestion that we can't make children interested 
in things any more than we can make them like strawberry jam if they 
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don't58. But one can't choose to feel interested in something either, 
so Wilson is correct when he suggests that teaching children the 
interest of something involves the teacher in communicating to his 
pupils whatever it is about the subject matter that he himself finds 
interesting, and that this must be related to its point. But 
interest, then, is taught by eliciting. 
What else can be said philosophically about teaching the interest 
of something? White says59 of the relationship between interest and 
attention, 'lie may attend because we are interested. We are not 
interested because we attend." But when it comes to learning to be 
interested in something, we can get no guidance, as Wilson seems to 
suggest by quoting White's comment60, from the claim that we are not 
interested because we atten4 but attend because we are interested. 
Attending to X is a necessary condition of learning what it is about 
X that is interesting. It is true that we don't become interested 
simply because we attend, but attention to X is not simply a necessary 
empirical condition for becoming interested in X. There is a contradiction 
involved in suggesting that I could be learning (or being taught) the 
interest of P without attending to P in any way. The comments White 
makes, important though they might be when it comes to considering 
what interest is, have no implications, as Wilson seems to think, 
for the teaching of interest. 
61 Wilson says of teaching the interest of something , "4e cannot 
get children interested in something by getting them to do anything." 
Now if it were the case that he meant that getting children to do 
something is not sufficient to ensure that they come to see the 
interest of the activity, there would be no disagreement between us. 
But this doesn't seem to be his point, for he contrasts "getting them 
to do it" with "teaching them the interest of it." The point is 
that we cannot teach children what is interesting about P without  
getting them to do something related to P. The argument is the same 
as the one above, and the claim is that children must do something 
related to P as a necessary part of our teaching them the interest 
of P. 
Thus the discussion of the importance of interest has led us to 
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two conclusions: there are good reasons for including in our concept 
of the teacher's role (4) obligations concerned with teaching 
children the interest of and sustaining their interest in learning 
that which is accepted as worthwhile on grounds other than interest. 
I have earlier suggested that there are certain kinds of learning 
which need no special justification, such as learning about the 
physical world, learning about other people, learning about one's 
own society (including the understanding of it provided by the study 
of other societies), moral learning, and possibly the expressive 
arts. In order to teach children the interest of these activities, 
teachers must engage with children in activities through which they 
can learn the interest of knowing, understanding or doing these 
things. Such an interest is important for it ensures that whatever 
is learned with interest is not inert, in that it is not dominated 
by or restricted to wanting to give "right answers" to the teacher, 
and is available for use by pupils in the enlargement of their 
capacity for experience and the performance of responsible social 
action. 
Some children will be willing to engage in the activities 
which are necessary if they are to learn to find the subject matter, 
skills and ways of looking at the world interesting because they 
are instrumental to goals which they already have. Other children 
will already be interested in doing them. But some will need other 
reasons for engaging in these activities. If we find it objectionable 
to institutionalize as the teacher's standard role either coercion 
or manipulation because of the lack of respect this shows for pupils 
as persons, some further account is necessary to cover this aspect 
of the teacher's role. Finally, if teaching is centrally concerned 
with interest in schools, there will be implications for the conditions 
under which schooling needs to be conducted in order to achieve 
such goals, as briefly mentioned by Wilson on his book62. These 
problems will be returned to later. 
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CLAPTER 7:  (a) The Teaching of Values and (b) Assessment  
PART (a): The Teaching of Values 
 
Introduction 
Whether or not it is part of the role (4) of the school to 
teach values, and, if so, what values a school ought to teach, is 
an important topic of current concern. There have been suggestions 
that schools are simply the instruments whereby a ruling class 
imposes its values on children, and counter-suggestions that schools 
can be instrumental in changing the values of a society. Both of 
these positions imply that it is a matter of choice whether or not 
the schools teach values, and a matter of decision as to what values 
are taught. On the other hand, there are claims that the schools 
cannot but reflect the values of a society. 
Most of the roles which have been suggested in the past for 
schools - education65, indoctrination64, socialization65, enculturation66, 
training in citizenship 1, adjustment - have implicit in the meanings 
of the terms used the teaching of values. The 1944 education Act69 
includes "the moral development of the community" as one of the ultimate 
0 purposes of schools, and the Plowden Report states?  that "a school....  
..must transmit values and attitudes". Durkheim71 saw the goal of 
the schools as the maintenance of a moral consensus in a secular 
society. Oeser's72 list of the teacher's sub-roles includes reference 
to the teaching of values, as does Hoyle's75. There is no doubt that 
the teaching of values is part of the role (3) of the school and of 
the teachers within it. 
Today, however, there are some people who suggest that the schools 
should accept more responsibility for moral teaching, because the 
family, where, according to the proponents of this view, this really 
belongs is failing in its task. It is not clear whether the claim 
is that the families concerned are failing to teach their children 
any values, or that the values which the families are teaching are, 
in some way, the wrong values. Is the suggestion that the schools 
should step in to fill a gap - or that they should teach their pupils 
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to give up the values they have in favour of other values? If the 
latter, it is presupposed that there is some way of showinv that some 
values are more justifiable than others. 
Both the position that schools should increase their concern 
over the teaching of values, and the contrary view that they should 
give up the teaching of values (e.g. because they have no right to 
'impose' their preferences on children) share the assumption that it 
is a matter of choice whether the school teaches values or not. As 
suggested earlier, this thesis asks and attempts to answer the question 
as to whether or not teaching in the area of values and of morality 
is in some way a necessary part of the role of the school, or whether 
it is entirely contingent, and therefore a matter of choice. It 
can be seen that the necessity involved cannot be quite a matter of 
strict logical necessity, but it is not a matter of simple empirical 
necessity either. The case being argued here is that the school 
cannot opt out of the teaching of values, so that it is, in that sense, 
necessary for them to make decisions in the light of what values are 
taught and what values one can justify teaching. 
The implication of this, if the arguments which follow are valid, 
is that empirical investigations are required to ascertain what values 
teachers in schools do teach, and how they teach them. For unless 
this is known, it would be impossible to decide whether or not the 
values being taught are justifiable, and thus to ask whether or not 
teachers should choose to continue or to cease performing the actions 
through which these values are taught. For changes in the kinds of 
actions embodying etc. values which teachers perform could alter what 
values are taught in schools. 
On the account of teaching given earlier, even if it is the 
case that schools cannot opt out of teaching in the area of values and 
of morality, some choice is open to them regarding what values are to 
be taught once it is understood how values are taught. And, in the 
light of claims that schools "impose middle class values on children", 
it is important to enquire whether all values are 'imposed' or whether 
the teaching of some values can be clearly shown not to be a matter 
of imposition. 
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The teacher's role and value teaching on an 'activity' analysis  
On the Scheffler/Hirot analysis of teaching, it is clear that 
a person can only be involved in teaching (in the sense important in 
schools) in the area of morality and values by his own decision. 
However, the discussions of role in Chapter 5 indicate that a decision 
to try to bring about the learning of values, taken by an individual 
teacher, is not sufficient to make it a part of the role of a teacher, 
either in the sense of normative expectations or in the sense of 
descriptive expectations. Similarly, a decision to refrain from 
teaching values is not sufficient to exclude it from the role. 
If a teacher claims that it is part of the teacher's role to 
try to teach values, there are two ways of interpreting this. Firstly, 
it may be interpreted as an empirical claim, that groups of people 
in the community hold the expectations of teachers that they will, or 
ought to, try to teach values. Like any empirical claim, this may be 
mistaken. It is also the case that expectations change, so if it is 
a part of the teacher's role (2) or (3) at one time, it does not 
follow that it will continue to be so in the future. In distinguishing 
the evaluative sense of role (role (4)), I pointed out that simply 
because groups of people expect something of the teacher, it does not 
follow that what they expect of him is justifiable. Thus an alternative 
interpretation of the claim may involve sense (4) and be a suggestion 
that this is what others ought to expect him to assume an obligation 
to do; this implies neither that they do nor that they do not now 
have such an expectation. 
Various objections might be raised to the suggestion that it is 
part of the teacher's role (4) to try to teach values. For example, 
it might be argued that values are not 'taught' but 'caught'. If it 
is impossible to teach values, it would follow that it would be 
foolish to attempt to do so, for such an attempt would be bound to 
fail. It could therefore not justifiably be part of a teacher's role. 
On such an argument, it might be claimed that the school and its 
teachers could not be held responsible for the values that pupils 
learn there, on the grounds that no-one could be responsible if the 
values are merely 'picked up'. This objection is sophistic. For 
though the school and its teachers cannot be held responsible for 
everything that pupils learn there, the distinction between values being 
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'taught' and 'caught' as used here is unacceptable. Values are not 
like measles, caught unwittingly from someone who has them, nor, on 
the other hand, like stones to be picked up casually because they 
are lying around. Values involve meanings, and, I suggest, we are 
taught values (by our parents, friends and others) in the same informal 
way that we are taught our native language. Indeed, this is not 
surprising since we employ language, including moral language, to 
communicate and think about values with. 
Hare74 has pointed out that learning moral values and, I would 
add, values generally) is not like learning-that, nor is it like 
learning-how-to. To learn to value something new is to adopt, in many 
cases, new ways of acting, or even new ways of living, and to learn 
new moral values may be to learn to be a different kind of person. 
Learning values is an example of what Scheffler75 has distinguished 
as learning-to or learning-to-be. Hare suggests' that values are 
not taught simply by telling or informing children that this is what 
they ought to accept as being of worth, or what they ought to accept 
as a way to live. This is not to be taken as implying that there is 
no learning-that involved in learning-to, but simply as a claim that 
learning-to is not reducible to learning-that and learning-how-to. 
Therefore teaching-to is not reducible to teaching-that and teaching-
how-to. Nonetheless, values are claimed to be teachable, as other 
learnings-to-be are. We can teach others to be impartial, punctual 
or honest, to appreciate music, to experience the pleasure of X-ing, 
or to be interested in P. 
Other, more serious, objections to the view that schools should 
teach values as part of their role would be moral ones. On the one 
hand, it might be suggested that parents ought to have the responsibility 
of teaching their children values, for, on this view, the schools would 
be having quite enough expected of them if they were responsible only 
for teaching-that and teaching-how-to. An extension of this argument 
sometimes offered is the claim that if it were accepted that value 
teaching was the schools' responsibility, then the parents would simply 
opt out of value teaching altogether. Since, it is argued, parents 
play a far more significant part in their children's lives than schools 
do and, anyway, the up-bringing of children is, in our society, primarily 
their responsibility, anything which might lead parents to take this 
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attitude would be unjustifiable. 
On the other hand, there is the objection that since, in a 
pluralist society, there are conflicts of values, the values a 
school might teach could be in conflict with the values which 
parents wished to have their children taught. Such an objection 
is concerned with the rights of the parents to have their children 
taught only values which they accept. This position has received 
support, for example, from Musgrove and Taylor77in an influential 
book. They write: 
"During the past hundred years there has grown up in 
our midst a new despotism: the rule of the teachers. 
Today they claim (sic) to decide what kind of people 
we shall be. This is not a joint and generally agreed 
decision, even among the teachers themselves. One 
school has decided (sic) that Englishmen shall be 
decorous and self-restrained; another that they shall 
show greater spontaneity and even gaiety; a third 
that they shall be rooted in the ancient values of 
their locality; a fourth that they shall have broad 
horizons, that they shall be "universal men".... 
"Even within a given school, one teacher may be 
organizing his work and modifying his methods to 
produce Englishmen who approximate to the Pueblo 
Indians, encouraging co-operation and discouraging 
competition, using group methods, placing stress on 
creativity; he aims (sic) to produce human beings 
who place the common good above individual reputation; 
next door his colleague aims (sic) to produce English-
men who approximate to the Commanches; courageous, 
individualistic, enterprising, full of dash and 
initiative; for him mark lists and orders of merit 
are important instruments of policy. Individual work 
is encouraged. Punishment is inflicted to produce 
stoicism, rather than effect reformation. It is 
conceivable that the parents of these children want 
neither Pueblos nor Commanches. This is an irrelevance. 
Only if children are being trained to be neo-Nazis of 
Polyginists would protest be likely, or even seem to be 
in order. 
"A school will decide in a hundred ways what kind of 
human beings to produce (sic) when it decides to run 
a Scout Troop rather than a Combined Cadet Force; to 
stream or to de-stream; to teach Chinese and Persian 
rather than commercial French; to enforce or to abolish 
school uniform; to have prefects elected or nominated; 
to let boys sit with girls. These vital decisions - and 
a thousand others - will be made by the teachers themselves; 
they need the ratification of no higher authority. They 
are, in the strict sense, irresponsible." 
Musgrove and Taylor are quite right in suggesting that by 
marking out one pattern of conduct which they approve and one which 
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they disapprove, one which is deemed to merit punishment, one deemed 
to merit reward, teachers may be teaching pupils values and/or 
dispositions of a moral type. They may, however, be wrong in their 
belief that teachers do these things in order to produce Englishmen 
of the type they have decided. They may not see themselves "producing" 
people at all. They may have made no conscious decision to produce 
particular types of person - indeed they may believe it wrong to 
"mould" children. The teacher who uses mark lists, stars or orders 
of merit may do this because it is the school custom, because he is 
told to, because he believes that there is considerable motivational 
value in mark lists or orders of merit, because the college where he 
trained approved of them (or perhaps because it disapproved of them), 
or for many other reasons. I am not suggesting that they are not 
being used deliberately, but the teacher's using them intentionally 
does not indicate that he has carefully-thought-out intentions to 
"produce" particular kinds of people and is using them as a means to 
this end. However, the outcome will be the same, since this is not 
determined by the teacher's intentions. The decisions, as Musgrove 
and Taylor suggest, provide the framework of schooling, and thus 
structure the situations in which teachers act. In this way they may 
impart values to children who do not hold them already - that is, 
they may teach children new values. 
Musgrove and Taylor, categorizing the present position as 
"arrogant disdain of their clients"78, and contrasting it with the 
American position which they categorize (equally scathingly, it 
appears) as "subservience to local communities and 'subcultures "'79 1 
offer their own solution. They suggest that there should be available, 
in the public sector of the school system as well as in the private, 
a choice of possibilities, so that the parents rather than teachers 
will 'decide' what sort of people the children will become. 
This position is open to several objections. Firstly, it ignores 
the point that there may be conflict between parents' ideas on what 
sort of children they want their children to become and the conditions 
which facilitate the teaching and learning which the parents also 
desire for their children and which may embody a different set of 
values. For example, there is conflict in a desire to discourage 
competitiveness and a desire that children learn "a lot" for anyone who 
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believes that children only "leara a lot" in a competitive situation, 
for this may teach them to be competitive. 
Secondly, this particular judgment made by Iusgrcve and Taylor 
fits inadequately with their own other judgment that "justice requires 
the elimination of parents from direct involvement in education and 
the disregard by teachers of local community traditions and values."8o 
The debate about community education, which Verson and Campbell have 
called "instruction for inequality"81   , is far from finished. Discussions 
about voucher systems suggest that the poor and the ill-informed will 
end up with the worst schools. 
Thirdly, it has been argued already that it is possible for 
people to value what ought not to be valued, and that not all values 
are justifiable 	 So from the fact that their parents value X it 
cannot be concluded that their children ought to be taught to value 
X (which argument would, additionally, commit the Naturalistic Fallacy). 
Finally, the whole basis of this judgment itself can be 
questioned for it seems to assume that children are parents' property, 
with which they are entitled to do as they wish, enlisting the 
co-operation of the teachers in a contractual arrangement to do so. 
They neglect the difficulties inherent in any 'rights' claim*, 
including the 'rights' claims of parents. Furthermore, in considering 
only the relationship of parents' rights and teachers' rights, they 
pay only lip service to the rights of the child (who, at the age of 
thirteen or fourteen is conceded a "right to choose what he will become"83). 
As Roe8 says, one can "have sympathy with a child who interprets a 
holy alliance between his parents and teachers for the most noble 
educational purposes (as advocated by most text-books) as an unholy 
conspiracy against him." With this view many might agree. 
There can thus be seen to be two alternative positions stressing 
parents' rights in the teaching of values. The first sus.gests that 
the school should refrain from teaching values at all. The second 
suggests that the parents should be able to back up the values which 
they are trying to teach at home by choosing a school with the same 
values. The values taught are thus seen as, in the long run, the 
most important part of what a school teaches, more important than 
knowledge-that or knowledge-how, as embodied in the curriculum. 
-221 - 
narrow, too, has recently argued that the role (4) of the school 
is primarily concerned with teaching 'virtues' - that is, value 
teaching85. This has always been a primary concern of the public 
schools here, and there have been recent reports of groups of American 
Indians asking for separate schooling for their children because 
they object to the teaching of competitiveness which, they 
claim, goes on in ordinary schools. Deschoolers have referred to 
this implicit teaching of values as "the hidden curriculum", and 
claim that, however much teachers have the intention of teaching 
their pupils to be autonomous, the schools will, as they always 
have done, continue to teach the value of conformity. The values 
of the school, as a means of consensus, and their transmission through 
ritual, are discussed by Bernstein et al.86, who call the activities, 
procedures and judgments involved in the transmission of values "the 
expressive culture of the school." 
If it is accepted that schools have always taught values implicitly 
in this kind of way, a person who finds this in some ways objectionable 
can, theoretically, propose two possible solutions. One is that the 
school should give up value teaching. The other is to teach values 
explicitly rather than implicitly and make value teaching part of the 
school curriculum. 
The latter view has seen the production of a number of curriculum 
projects for value teaching, most of them taking as their basis the 
claim that rational discussion of values is possible. Though some of 
these claim to be neutral between values, clearly they cannot be seen 
as neutral in respect of the values of autonomy, truth and rationality87,88; 
thus, the logical possibility of conflict with parents' values remains. 
Others explicitly seek to teach a way of life (e.g. the teaching of a 
rational morality as against a religious one, or of a 'considerate 
life-style'89) which, again, may conflict with parents' values, particularly 
in a pluralist society. Thus, whatever the position taken on values 
by the curriculum project or the teacher, it is still open to those 
who believe,with Musgrove and Taylor, that parents are entitled to 
decide which values their children shall learn, to deny that such 
explicit curriculum projects are part of the role (4) of the school, and 
argue that in a school which caters to the whole community, value 
teaching should be given up. The most that might uncontroversially be 
supported might be the teaching of moral concepts9°. Even here there is 
difficulty because of fundamental disagreements on issues related to the 
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meaning of moral language; and if MacIntyre91, for example, among 
others, is right, it may be that different groups have different 
moral concepts. 
How plausible is the suggestion that schools ought to give up 
teaching values altogether? On the Hirst/Scheffler analysis of 
teaching, this position is plausible enough. Value teaching, like 
any other teaching, logically requires an intention to bring about 
learning. If all teachers accept that it is unjustifiable to try 
to bring about the learning of values by children in schools, on the 
basis of some such argument as above, value teaching could simply 
be crossed off the list of teachers' responsibilities, and teachers 
could refrain from teaching values in the same way as they could refrain 
from teaching mathematics - by deciding not to do so. This is the 
position adopted by Neill at Summerhill, for example. 
Neill suggests in all his writings that the teaching of values 
is wrong, and in his school, where a child's freedom to choose is made 
the highest value, there is both fear of, as well as moral disapproval 
of, 'moulding' the child, which is equated with teaching him values. 
Yet one is continually made aware in his writings that Neill has very 
strong moral views92, that he takes it for granted that his pupils will 
"think of the consequences for Summerhill" of doing X (a moral position 
for both them and him). Can it be consistently maintained that the 
question of responsibility is solved by a nominal 'opting-out' in this 
way? Does not the intention-based analysis of teaching help covr 
up the very real inconsistencies in Neill's position? Is he not teaching 
his pupils values, implicitly rather than explicitly, teaching them, as 
Ryle put it93, "in a familiar sense of 'taught'(to) treat, and sincerely 
to treat, certain things as of overwhelming importance"? The values 
which Neill's school teaches are not the same as those of, for example, 
the public schools, but the children who are 'successes' at Summerhill 
learn Neill's values though Neill claims not to intend this. Neill 
surely has some responsibility here, and I wonder whether his refusal 
to admit to teaching values is merely semantic, or whether it is a way 
of abdicating responsibility. The question is whether it is important 
to deny what Neill claims, and what Hirst and Scheffler could claim, 
that whether or not we teach children values is a matter of choice. 
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Value teaching on a perficience analysis of teaching 
On the analysis of this thesis, we can speak of someone teaching 
values without the implication that he performed the acts which were 
the instrument of value teaching in order to get others to learn 
values. Indeed, it was earlier claimed that this analysis was 
needed in order to make sense of the idea of a moral person's teaching 
moral values by example. It was suggested that there was a paradox 
involved in the suggestion that a claim that A was e.g. teaching B 
to be considerate by example necessarily implied that A was being 
considerate with the intention of getting 3 to learn to be considerate. 
On this analysis, what values are being taught is discovered. 
Of course, there will often be a relationship between what is being 
taught by A and what A is trying to teach, if anything, since teaching 
attempts are often successful. However, it is not sufficient to 
support the claim that A is teaching B to value X by showing simply 
that B is learning to value X. To know that A is teaching B to value 
X, grounds are required for believing that it is A's actions of a 
certain kind which are bringing about the learning. Most moral 
teaching seems to go on either implicitly (thus involving pupils in 
interpreting their teachers' actions on a moral dimension) or through 
discussions in which people's primary intention is to decide what 
they ought to do, or whether, in a particular case, what has been done 
is morally justifiable. One objection to a claim that schools might 
teach values only through special curriculum projects might be that 
only in the ways previously mentioned (and in similar ways) can morality 
be taught as something that is lived. On such a view, curriculum 
projects could, at the most, help in moral teaching, but they could 
not constitute it on their own. 
Particularly if Piaget94 and Kohlberg95 are right and moral 
learning takes place in stages, a person who seeks a significant 
relationship with children cannot 'opt out' in the area of moral 
and value learning. A teacher who refuses to condemn or stop bullying 
can be seen by children as giving it his tacit approval, and he may 
thus teach them that there is nothing wrong with bullying, that there 
is no need to have moral concern for it. Telling children that they 
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should be concerned is not the way in which concern is taught. 
Similarly, it is arguable that no teacher should be seen by children 
to be indifferent e.g. to injustice, racism, violence or cruelty, 
for this may either teach these as acceptable values, or may teach 
children actively to disvalue concern for these kinds of actions. 
We must not forget that teaching children to disvalue something is 
also teaching values. 
Many writers have commented on the teaching of values through 
06 the operation of punishment systems in schools, and Wilson' casts 
doubt on whether children can be taught new values by the operation 
of such systems (or, as he calls them, penalties). Giving children 
as a reason for obeying a justifiable rule the punishment which will 
accrue if they disobey will be more likely to teach them to be 
prudent than to be moral. Indeed, it may be true that, as deschoolers 
argue, the schools' and teachers' operation of a punishment system 
is the main way in which the value of conformity is taught, even if 
the schools have the declared aims of developing autonomy. If 
teachers themselves really value confori,iing behaviour by children 
(for it makes their lives much easier) it should not be found 
surprising if they non-intentionally teach it as a value, for their 
actions embody their values. The operation of the punishment system 
often makes it clear that teachers will insist that pupils do X or 
refrain from doing Y even if the pupils believe (possibly justifiably) 
that X is wrong or that they ought to do Y. If this is the case, 
it is impossible that the schools could teach the value of moral 
integrity. 
It is not being suggested here that all teachers must, at some 
stage in fulfilling their roles, necessarily bring about the learning 
of values, simply because they may have extensive close contact with 
o7 
children and be viewed by them as "significant others"1 at a stage 
in their moral development where this is critical. I am only 
suggesting that it is impossible to avoid the possibility of this. 
The claim is a negative one only, for the teaching may not occur 
because other conditions necessary for teaching are missing - for 
example, there may be an identity of the teacher's values and the 
child's, so that, logically, the child cannot be taught them. But 
since, on this account, it is impossible to ensure avoiding the 
teaching of values, it is argued to be impossible for the teacher to 
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'opt out' of value teaching in the same way that he can 'opt out' of 
mathematics teaching. He does the latter, on the perficience 
analysis, not by refraining from having any intention to teach in 
the area of mathematics but by refraining from performing any mathematical 
acts. 
The reason he cannot opt out of value teaching is that one 
cannot, in the same way, refrain from acting in ways related to 
values, because of the relationship between valuing and action. The 
significant factor is the nature of values, and the way that valuing 
pervades all aspects of life. Since 'ought' in some sense implies 
'can', the conclusion must be that since it is impossible to ensure 
that one teaches no values, there can be no question of justifying 
either the inclusion or elimination of value teaching from the teacher's 
role. The proper question is therefore not whether or not to teach 
values, but, insofar as it is possible to choose, how to ensure that 
that which we may teach children to value is justifiable, and that 
where possible they learn to assess values rationally. It is this 
latter aspect which justifies explicit discussions on value issues, 
for the implicit teaching of values may leave pupils unclear about 
the justifications and unaware that there is not universal agreement 
on all value issues. This does not, itself, suggest that value 
curriculum projects should be used, and there is no space to discuss 
this issue here. Certainly, however, they could never succeed if 
pupils came to view them as embodying content to be mastered in the 
same way as e.g. mathematics or swimming. 
Interests and valuing 
In the previous chapter I suggested that interest (in the 
psychological sense) was important for learning because it ensured 
the non-inertness of what is learned. It is, additionally, important 
in another way, for interest is a value. This point has been 
raised by Wilson98, who offers an analysis of valuing, suggesting 
that "valuing is having a reason for action."99 However, it is by 
no means clear what he means here. What is the meaning of the 'is' 
in the claim that valuing is (my italics) having a reason for action? 
There are several possible interpretations. 
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(a) Perhaps he is suggesting that what I mean when I say I value 
something is that I have a reason for acting. But this sounds 
implausible, for when I say I value something, I am referring in 
some way to the way I view what I claim to value, that I see it, 
for e:ample, as worth having. When I say that I value the friendship 
that I had with someone in the past, I need mean nothing about acting 
at all. 
(b) Perhaps he is suggesting that when I have a reason for acting I 
am necessarily valuing something, so that valuing something is simply 
an alternative description of what I sin doing when I am acting for 
a reason. But the problem with this is that reasons for action relate 
to purposes, and purposes presuppose valuing. If I value something, 
then I have a reason for action where action is appropriate. But 
presupposition relationships are not usually explicated using the term 
'is'. 
(c) Perhaps it is a mistake to think that the 'is' denotes an 
equivalence at all. Perhaps the suggestion is rather that valuing 
is a necessary condition of having reasons for action. But since, 
on a commonly accepted view of meaning, giving necessary conditions 
would be explicating meaning, this returns us to (a). 
Perhaps there is some assistance to be gained from Wilson's claim 
that values are explanatory reasons100  . If I am asked why I am 
saving something from a burning house, to answer that it is because 
I value it is, as Wilson says, to give an explanatory reason. But 
this is precisely why valuing cannot mean having a reason for action. 
For if it did, my assertion that I value the P that I am saving from 
the burning house could be no explanation at all. It would reduce 
to the tautology that the reason I saved P was that I had a reason 
for saving it. The fact that reference to valuing can function as an 
explanation surely indicates that further explication of the notion 
of valuing is required. I have already suggested that this involves 
seeing something as worth having, as worth acting to support, gain or 
keep where action is appropriate, and if I am correct in this 
suggestion, this would account for the explanatory force of valuing 
claims. 
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My suggestion is that when we say that a person values P, we 
mean that he sees P as being of worth, so that in circumstances where 
it is appropriate for him to act to support, gain or keep P, he has 
a reason for action. On such an account, for example, to value truth 
or honesty is to see it as of worth, and thus, on occasions where there 
is a choice between truth or falsity, honesty or dishonesty, to have 
a reason for acting in ways appropriate to truth or honesty. The 
analysis is the same as for material values. It would not follow, 
though, from the fact that a person valued P that he would always 
act, where appropriate, to support, gain or keep P, for (as parallel 
to the discussions on interest as a reason for action), there may be 
other reasons, which over-ride the reason provided by the fact that 
one values P, against performing the action which is appropriate for 
a person who values P. This is simply to say that values may 
conflict with one another, or, if one wishes to suggest that desires 
can be distinguished from e.g. moral values (thus distinguishing 
between different kinds of pro-attitudes101), to say that a person's 
desires may conflict with his values. Valuing P is not always a 
sufficient condition for appropriate action. 
It was earlier suggested that finding P interesting could not 
be analysed simply as a psychological proneness, and this is an 
important point if one wishes to suggest, as Wilson does102, that 
interest in the psychological sense is a value. I earlier suggested 
that being interested in P involved seeing P in a certain light, and 
that this was related to having a disposition to act in ways 
appropriate to P. If the way of acting which is appropriate to 
an interest in P is, as Wilson put it, to do things which enable one 
to "become more skilful, more informed, more understanding, more 
appreciative etc."103 of P, then learning more about P is a way of 
acting which is appropriate to an interest in P. Put in another way, 
an interest in P gives one a reason for wanting to learn more in 
respect of P, and a person who is interested in P must see P as 
something in relation to which it is worth learning more. To learn  
to be interested in P is thus to learn to value P, and also to learn  
to viillue learning more in respect of P. Teaching a child the interest 
of P is thus teaching him values. Insofar as he also learns that 
certain of what are commonly known as "the intellectual virtues" -
clarity, honesty, imagination, etc. - are idirortant for the development 
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of his interests (whatever they are) he will additionally learn to 
value them. These are values which it is surely justifiable to 
teach, and the important things to note here is that (a) since this 
learning is an accompaniment of his learning of interest, and the 
learning of interest cannot be coerced, he must come freely to value 
these intellectual virtues and the skills of learning and (b) that 
the child who learns these values in this way learns to value them 
rationally. 
If the P which a teacher teaches a child to be interested in can 
be shown to be, prima facie, worth valuing, then his subsequent 
learning in respect of P will necessarily fulfil the other criterion 
necessary for his learning of P to be worthwhile, that it should 
not be inert. This is so because interest, as we have said, involves 
dispositions to act. The relationships between a child's interest 
in P, the non-inertness of his learning and the values he has been 
taught are not merely contingent ones. 
Teaching a child the interest of P is, of course, not claimed 
to be the only way of ensuring that he values learning about P, but 
it is an important way, and the non-contingency of the relationship 
is one of the factors which makes it important. For, in contrast, 
where the P that is learned is valued only because it is being used 
instrumentally to achieve some goal, if the goal is abandoned the 
learner has no further reason to value knowing etc. about P. There 
is also no reason for the learning related to P to remain non-inert. 
In contrast to Wilson, I suggest that there are two senses in which 
we can speak of the instrumentality of learning in relation to interestlok, 
one related to the reasons for which a person learns P, and the other 
related to what it can be used for. Learning through interest may be 
instrumental in the sense that it was learned in order to enable the 
learner to pursue further knowledge etc., as Wilson suggests105, but 
it may be non-instrumental in that sense in that it way simply be 
learned for its own sake, or, as Holt might say, through curiosity and 
in pursuit of no further goal. 
But learning through interest which is non-instrumental, in the 
sense that the agent did not have as his reason for learning the 
pursuit of some further goal, may yet be instrumental in a different 
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sense, in that it does enable one to learn more, and could be argued 
to be valuable for this reason. Finally, the learning may be 
instrumental for pursuing some morally acceptable goal to which it 
is intrinsically related, as, for example, mathematics might be 
to a career as a design engineer, and may be valued for this reason. 
(It is worth pointing to the contrast between learning P to pass an 
examination to qualify for a job to which P is not related. In the 
previous example, the learning has a permanent value, whilst in the 
latter one, it may become inert or be forgotten as soon as the 
examination has been passed. The learner has no permanent reason for 
valuing it.) 
But the main point about interest, value and the non-inertness 
of learning is that even if the learner decides to learn no more, that 
which was learned through interest does not thereby become inert 
because the goal to which it was instrumental (further learning) has 
been abandoned. On my account, one can give up pursuin, an interest 
(because other reasons against learning more over-ride the reasons 
for learning provided by the interest itself) without losing interest. 
As long as one remains interested in P, what has been learned remains 
non-inert and valued. On this point, however, I imagine Wilson would 
disagree, since he seems to imply106 that an interest will necessarily 
be evidenced in action at some time or other, and would, presumably, 
wish to say that if there was never any evidence of an interest in 
action, that interest must have been lost. 
One final point can be made about the teaching of new interests, 
which is of great importance at a time when all teaching of values is 
coming under fire by virtue of the claim, already mentioned, that 
schools should not 'impose (middle-class) values on their pupils'. 
It is that the teaching of interest provides an example of the teaching 
of values where talk of 'imposition' is conceptually out of place. The 
teaching of interest cannot be regarded as the imposition of values. 
It has already been pointed out that interest is something which cannot 
be compelled, and it follows from this that though teaching children 
new interests is necessarily teaching them new values, the charge that 
they have imposed their values on children can be emphatically rejected. 
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One answer, then, to the question of what values a school may justifiably 
teach a child is (a) the interest of (or a greater interest in) 
important human activities, such as coming to understand other people, 
the natural and social world in which he lives, moral considerations, 
etc., (all of which are claimed to be constitutive of responsible 
human agency) and (b) through the child's interest in other things, 
the value of intellectual and other virtues which are instrumental 
to pursuing any interest. Not only are these justifiable in their 
own right, but the teaching of them does not involve the imposition  
of values by teachers on their pupils. 
Though for the purposes of analysis, the teaching of values such 
as the interest of P has been separated from the teaching of knowledge 
and skills, in the teaching of anything of any complexity there is a 
necessary inter-relation of fact and value. As I have already suggested, 
a person cannot teach or be taught the interest of P without doing 
something related to P, so that the interest (and thus the value) of 
P must be taught in the context of activity related to P. It cannot 
be taught in isolation (as Oakeshott107 has commented in relation 
to judgment). Similarly, in engaging in activities related to learning 
more about certain kinds of subject matter, children may be taught the 
values embodied in different modes of enquiry, such as impartiality, 
consistency, coherence, relevance, respect for and co-operation with 
others, or critical concern. Much lip-service is paid to the teaching 
of such values in schools, but classroom activities are not always 
conducted in ways which embody them, so that, for this reason, they 
are often not taught. Again, it may tentatively be suggested that 
teachers' concern that pupils learn tightly specified content may 
militate against the teaching of these values, however sincerely they 
intend to teach them,because of certain testing and examination 
procedures which are used. 
With regard to these latter values, I suggest that no special 
justification is required for teaching them (that is, for teaching 
children to value them and thus act in ways appropriate to them when 
action is required) for they are intrinsic to what I have elsewhere 
described as'important human activities'. Without these particular 
values, talk of attempts to understand oneself and one's society, 
the natural world, etc., and the idea of acting responsibly within 
it is self-contradictory (as MacIntyre108 has pointed out 
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in relation to the views of Lawrence and Tolstoy). This is, of course, 
not to deny that there may be disagreements about e.g. what is to 
count as understanding (as opposed to misunderstanding) and what is 
to count as responsible. But it is only with these values that 
existing norms and criteria can themselves be constructively evaluated 
and criticized, or criteria for a better society developed. 
The conclusion, therefore, is that the teaching of values is 
intrinsic to the teaching of anything else that is worth learning, 
and that the role of the teacher cannot be divorced from responsibility 
in this respect. In particular, it was earlier suggested that (unless 
this is rendered impossible by definition) any act or activity can be 
performed or engaged in either responsibly or irresponsibly (scientific 
activity providing a paradigm here), and therefore it is argued that 
teaching children merely how to engage in any activity, and the interest 
of it, would be unjustifiable unless they are also taught to view any 
subsequent performance of the activity in a social context and from a 
moral point of view. (For example, a child could come to use his 
understanding of other people simply to manipulate them to his own 
advantage109 and without any respect for them as persons.) 
Since I earlier suggested that one way in which a teacher may 
help a pupil increase his capacity for responsible social action is to 
increase his capacity for taking responsibility, this clearly involves 
teaching in the moral sphere. It is in this connection that perhaps 
some reservation should be made about the importance of interest, 
particularly in view of what might be involved in becoming interested 
in moral education projects. It is something to do with the sui 
generis nature of morality, perhaps, that interest seems inadequate 
here, for teaching children to be responsible involves teaching moral 
dispositions. How the teaching of moral and social responsibility 
as evidence in action is best carried out must be a matter for further 
investigation, but there is no reason to assume that putting 
interesting moral education projects on the curriculum will, of itself, 
lead to moral learning of a socially operative kind. This would 
seem to require that all teachers realize that they cannot opt out 
of teaching in the moral sphere. 
Finally, it could not be possible to exclude from the teacher's 
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role (4) the possibility of teaching by example in the moral sphere, 
for this would imply that it would bea morally justifiable part of 
a teacher's role to act immorally. Though teachers are human, and 
like anyone else, individual teachers may act immorally on occasions, 
if schools are to be justifiable institutions and the teacher's role 
within them is to be a morally justifiable one, they must be places 
where children are treated morally. In particular, it is suggested 
that treating them with respect as persons, not subject to sarcasm 
or contempt, nor having their views held up to ridicule (acts which 
certainly now seem to be acceptable in some quarters as part of a 
teacher's role (2) or even (3)), is important, not simply for its own 
sake, but also because it may be necessary for responsible development 
Thus an obligation to treat children with respect is necessarily a 
part of a teacher's role (4), and it may be that it would be in his 
fulfillment of this obligation that he would be most likely to fulfil 
his obligation to teach moral values of a fundamental kind. 
PART (b): Assessment  
Introduction  
Until recently nobody would have thought of suggesting that perhaps 
it was not the case that a teacher should be a judge of achievement and 
an assessor of his pupils' learning. Indeed, it might have been 
suggested not that assessment was a part of a teacher's role, but 
that it was a part of teaching itself. The plausibility of this view, 
on alternative analyses of teaching, is examined below. 
Nowadays, however, it is often argued that assessment is not a 
part of the teacher's role (4) at all, and many young teachers seem 
to feel that it would be wrong for them to judge or assess the work 
of their pupils in any way, even when by assessment is meant something 
very informal, such as the application of some criteria to see what 
children have learned, or to judge something they have produced. There 
seem to be a number of different perspectives on this. 
The first kind of view emphasizes subjectivity in knowledge and 
understanding, and is argued by teachers particularly in the case of 
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art. Only the pupil, they suggest, can be the judge of his own work, 
since only he knows how far it achieves his goals. There are no 
objective criteria for judgment, nor even intersubjective ones. This 
view is often accompanied by a reluctance to intervene in any way, 
and could, in extreme instances, prevent the teacher from performing 
any teaching acts at all. Such a view of the teacher's role seems 
to reduce it to that of a provider of materials, and it might be 
asked in what sense such a role could be described as that of a 
teacher. This view, it seems, can be held most strongly in the arts, 
and only with some difficulty in the sciences and mathematics. 
The second kind of view stems from recent work in the sociology 
of knowledge110, and is related to a relativist view of standards as 
opposed to a subjectivist view (mentioned above). The teacher who 
thought that whatever standards he used were merely those arbitrarily 
developed by a sub-group (the ruling class, the 'establishment' within 
the discipline) of a society might argue that there was no justification 
for 'imposing' them upon his pupils. Since, on this view, all 
standards are ultimately arbitrary, the pupils' own standards are 
neither to be preferred nor to be denigrated. They cannot be compared 
as better or worse sets of criteria, but are simply different. From 
this view, too, it follows that teachers should refrain from assessing 
or judging children's work and learning. Both these views are 
fundamentally rooted in epistemological considerations. 
A third perspective also suggests that teachers should not 
evaluate their pupils' work and that self-evaluation by pupils is 
more appropriate. This position stems from the work of Rogers111, 
who insists that a teacher should never suggest that this rather than 
that is 'right' or 'better'. On this view, the pupils themselves 
should be the judges of their own and other children's work. For 
Rogers, the term 'teacher' has authoritarian overtones, and he 
prefers the term 'facilitator'. The use of assessment and the judging 
by facilitators of their pupils' work, however, remains authoritarian, 
and his objection to assessment is thus based on moral rather than 
epistemological grounds. However, there does seem to be evidence112 
that when pupils are asked to judge other pupils' work, they are less 
likely than the teachers to use criteria appropriate to what is being 
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judged, but rather to praise or condemn on the basis of a child's 
popularity. 
Finally, there has been some evidence113 that judging pupils 
may act as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Pupils, it is suggested, come 
to work at the level which is expected of them as a result of 
assessment of their past work. Therefore, it might be argued, a 
way to avoid this is to avoid judging their work at all. This may 
bear some relation to suggestions of people like Holt114 that 
because assessment involves the teacher in asking questions to which 
there are 'right' answers, some pupils become simply seekers after 
'right' answers in order to measure up to teachers' expectations of 
'the good pupil', whilst others see themselves as unlikely to succeed 
and give up trying. 
Anti-assessment and anti-evaluation positions, however, are 
opposed by those who argue that not enough attention is being given 
to assessing and judging achievements, culminating in the suggestion 
in the latest Black Paper115 that standardized tests of achievement 
should be given to all children at 7, 11 and 14, and that passing on 
these tests should be mandatory for transfer to the next "stage" of 
the school system. Several different kinds of argument are provided 
as backing for this. 
The first is motivational. It has often been argued that some 
kind of extrinsic target is necessary for children to be motivated to 
learn (there being some kind of assumption here that children are 
"naturally" lazy). As a corollary, it is sometimes suggested that 
these "targets" are necessary for teachers, too, to be motivated. 
The abandonment of the 11+ was regretted by many primary school 
teachers, who saw in this examination a goal towards which both they 
and their pupils could orient their work. A different argument 
related to motivation is used by psychologists who stress 'the need 
for achievement'116 
 . By definition, people must have some standard 
by which they can measure whether they have achieved or not, and which 
they can aim at, for otherwise their need for achievement must 
necessarily be frustrated. To deprive people of the chance to achieve 
is thus to neglect the most important source of motivation. 
- 235 - 
A different argument is based on a Skinnerian claim117 that 
knowledge of results is the most important form of reinforcement, 
and that without it, teaching attempts must be inefficient. Such 
assessment claims are often associated with programmed learning 
techniques, and the introduction of "business efficiency" techniques 
and language into the schoolroom (though whether or not this is 
appropriate is another matter). Similarly, there have been extensive 
developments, especially in the U.S.A., of curricula linked to 
behavioural objectives118  , and there is currently flourishing a 
new language of 'performance-based' or 'competence-based' teaching119, 
;inked with an accountability movement and sometimes a modern form of 
'payment-by-results' whereby teachers contract to bring about certain 
pre-specified learning in a given time. 
The existence of these conflicts over assessment and evaluation 
is clearly sufficient to suggest that the judging of achievement, 
clearly a part of the teacher's role (2) and (3) in our society, should 
come under more careful scrutiny. Is this an aspect of the teacher's 
role which is justifiable? Is it associated with the role of the 
teacher merely contingently, so that, if desired, it could be abandoned, 
or is it implied for the teacher's role (4) by the set of assumptions 
suggested - that we understand teaching in a certain way, and that the 
school should teach something that is, in some sense, worthwhile 
Since so many teachers give an account of what they are doing 
which makes explicit reference to "feed-back", the answer which one 
is tempted to give is that it is too important to be abandoned, and 
that it is in some way necessary to the teacher's role. But this 
would be hasty, and the arguments for and against this must be 
discussed fully. These are discussed below on both an 'activity' 
analysis of teaching and on a 'perficience' analysis. Even though 
the former has been rejected, it is interesting to see whether the 
implications for the teacher's role are different or similar on the 
two analyses (and thus whether it makes any substantive difference 
to the way the teacher sees his role which analysis he accepts). 
Assessment and teaching as an activity 
On the intention-based (Jcheffler-Hirst) analysis of teaching, 
- 236 - 
the learning of Xs by B is not a necessary condition of A's teaching 
them to him. If A is teaching B X irrespective of whether he is 
learning it or not, it cannot conceivably be a part of teaching B 
X to find out whether or not he is learning it. Assessment of whether 
B is learning X is not constitutive of teaching him it. 
An attempt to defend the view that assessment is constitutive 
of teaching might be made by arguing that if A does not try to find 
out whether or not the pupil is learning X, he couldn't seriously 
intend him to learn it. But this seems to be writing far more into 
the concept of intending than is warranted. I intend my friend to get 
the letter I have posted to him, but this does not imply that I must 
ring him up to find out if he received it. There are some things 
which one may take for granted, and someone with confidence in his 
own ability to bring about the learning he intends may not merely 
take it for granted that his pupils are learning, but also be justified 
in doing so. 
This argument also fails because it does not accept a distinction 
between intending something seriously and being concerned that it 
happens. It is at least logically possible (though perhaps psychologically 
unlikely) that a serious intention may involve no more than a 
disposition to do one's best, without a concern to find out whether 
or not the result sought occurred. I may enter the essay competition, 
writing the best essay I can and seriously trying to win, but, having 
done my best, decide to forget the matter. It is concern about the 
result, not a serious intention to bring P about, that necessitates my 
attempt to find out whether P has occurred or not (e.g. that B has 
learned the X I was trying to teach him). It is easy to find convincing 
school examples. A teacher may think the X he is trying to teach 
trivial, but be trying to teach it just the same because he is paid to 
do so. For a person who holds the view that "it is better to travel 
hopefully than to arrive", which, in the case of teaching, gives more 
importance to the engagement in activities than to what is learned by 
them, it would be irrational to spend a lot of time finding out what 
had been learned. The activities (sic) of teaching and learning may 
be seen as important in themselves. Or a child-centred teacher who 
believes it of fundamental importance that schooling should be 
pleasurable for children, could not ask them to engage in activities 
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designed for assessment rather than carrying on learning what they 
are interested is if these assessment activities are seen by the 
children as unpleasant. 
Put in 'activity' language, Holt's other point is that assessment 
prevents successful teaching. If a teacher believes this and seriously 
intends his pupils to learn X, it would be irrational of him to set 
up assessment situations in his classroom. Holt suggests that in such 
classrooms, pupils are so concerned to get 'right answers' that they 
become fearful and incapable of genuine learning. They prefer picking 
up clues from the teacher, through his actions, tone of voice, etc., 
to enable them to give the expected answer, rather than trying to 
understand. Indeed, according to Holt, they seem often to be unable 
to make this distinction. The principal difficulty with assessing 
learning is that it is only through what the pupil does that one could 
judge whether or not he had learned anything, but being able to give 
the right answer is not a sufficient condition of having learned, or 
learned with understanding. 
It is interesting to note the two opposed psychological positions 
- one that being tested, judged and assessed, particularly in relation 
to other people, acts as a powerful motivating influence for children, 
the other that testing is an inhibiting influence on learning. It 
may be that neither of these beliefs is true for all children, and it 
would seem therefore that there are important reasons for finding out 
more about their truth for different children and under different 
conditions. 
It can thus be seen that an intention that pupils learn an X 
does not imply the necessity of assessment of whether or not they 
have learned the X unless it is accompanied by a belief that pupils 
will only learn that X if they are tested to see whether or not they 
have learned it. Since this is not a position that many people hold 
in general, thus far no adequate justification has been offered for 
the suggestion that it is part of a teacher's role to assess and 
judge their pupils' learning. 
The problem may be approached in a different way. According to 
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the activity analysis, if A is to be teaching X to B, he must present 
X to B in a way that he believes120 B will understand, that employs 
concepts that he believes B has, to some extent, grasped, etc. It 
might, then, be the case that though assessing whether or not B 
has learned X is not a necessary part of teaching X to B, it is a 
necessary part of the teacher's role (4) on that analysis because it 
is a precondition of teaching X to B that A has assessed B's 
conceptual structure and current knowledge and understanding. This 
might be taken as being implied, for example, by Hirst's use of the 
term 'misjudging'121. 
This argument, however, cannot be supported. Although it is 
true that if A is trying to get B to learn X (teaching B X on the 
activity analysis), it is presupposed that A has beliefs about the 
cognitive states, knowledge and skills, etc. of his pupils, on which 
he bases his pedagogic activities, this does not imply the necessity 
of judging or assessing. A may have firm (and true) beliefs about 
e.g. the "averageness" of 13, and rely on what he already believes 
"average" pupils are able to learn. Or he might rely on information 
he is given about the content of the curriculum studied the previous 
year as a basis of his beliefs about his pupils knowledge and 
understanding. There is no reason why a teacher who relies on 
these methods must be wrong about what his pupils are capable of 
understanding (though, of course, on an activity analysis he would 
still be teaching them even if he were incorrect). 
It might be argued that, even though one might be correct in 
this way, personal assessment is more reliable, but this is an 
empirical claim which might be true only for some teachers. Certainly 
it is not enough to justify assessment as necessary to the teacher's 
role. If true, it provides a reason for suggesting that assessment 
is part of a teacher's role if he is engaged in a teaching 
enterprise, a sustained attempt to teach a structured curriculum, 
though Holt's claim about assessment inhibiting learning provides a 
reason against, if true. The teacher is justified in assessing 
whether or not his pupils have learned any particular X in order to 
assure himself reliably about the pupils cognitive states before 
proceeding to the teaching of Y. On this argument, it is not 
necessary for him in order that he can teach his pupils Y, but is 
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justified because it increases his chances of teaching them that 
particular Y successfully, and thus succeeding over-all in his 
teaching enterprise. 
If this is the argument, several objections can be raised to 
it. Firstly, there is the logical objection that it may presuppose 
what Dearden has called "the fallacy of perfected steps.122 " Hirst, 
too, has pointed out123 that one can begin to build higher order 
concepts on partial knowledge of simpler concepts. Secondly, it 
makes some assumptions about pupils - that they will not act either 
as Holt has suggested124  (giving the impression that they know X 
when they don't) or in the way illustrated by Koh1125 (pretending to 
lack knowledge, skills etc. which they have). These writers 
question whether tests will reliably inform the teacher about the 
pupils' level of understanding. Thirdly, it assumes the re;.ative 
unimportance of any psychological side-effects of tests, such as 
reducing either the child's ability or desire to learn. It is 
worth noting that the more extended the teaching enterprise, the 
more testing will be required, on this argument, so that if there 
are these side-effects, they will be cumulative. Finally, it must 
be pointed out that this only justifies assessment in the case of 
structured curricula, and that it offers no justification for 
assessment in the case of open-ended teaching attempts. This is 
not surprising, since open-ended teaching is a contradiction on 
the activity analysis. 
The conclusion of this argument is that assessment, like 
the pre-specification of objectives is, at the most, a permitted 
but not demanded aspect of the teacher's role. It is only 
justifiable if it promotes success in the teaching enterprise, and 
whether this is so or not is a matter for further empirical investigation. 
It should be noted that all these arguments stress again that it 
is not simply the teacher's perspective on what he is doing that is 
important. His reasons for assessing may be entirely laudable and 
the assessment intended in the best interests of his pupils. However, 
on this account, whether or not his testing is justifiable as part 
of his role will rest on the outcomes of his assessing procedures, and 
that will depend also on how the pupils interpret what the teacher is 
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doing, and their attitudes to it. 
This discussion of assessment from the point of view of the 
activity analysis should not be taken as implying that those who 
support it would agree with the conclusions drawn here about the 
implications of the analysis for assessment as part of the teacher's 
role (4). 
Assessment and teaching as a perficience  
A parallel discussion to that of the relationship between 
assessment and teaching is required for the perficience analysis. 
Is assessment either a part of teaching or a precondition of it 
in the case of intentional teaching, or is the relationship again 
merely a strong contingent one? In cases of non-intentional 
teaching, of course, it makes little sense to suggest either of 
these two necessary relationships, since the idea of assessing 
either as a part of or a pre-condition of what one is not necessarily 
aware of doing is incoherent. 
Given that it is accepted as a part of a teacher's role (4) 
that teachers intend to teach something worthwhile, and that, on 
this analysis, pupils must be learning something worthwhile for the 
teacher to be teaching it to them, there is still no necessity for 
assessment. B can be learning as a result of A's activities without 
A's knowing whether or not B is learning an intended X, related Xs, 
or any other Xs. 
There is, however, a difference here which is of psychological 
importance. On the activity analysis, a teacher always knows what 
he is teaching (though not whether he is being successful). On the 
perficience analysis, some kind of judgment and assessment is 
necessary (though not necessarily by A himself) to provide grounds 
for A to know he is teaching B X even when this is the case, since 
to know he is teaching A must have grounds for believing this true 
statement. Thus, though there is no conceptual relationship between 
teaching and assessment, there is a necessary relationship between 
assessing that B has learned X through A's actions and knowing that 
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A has taught B X. Since, on this view, assessment is not necessary 
for teaching itself, it would only be justified by this argument on 
the basis of a claim that it was important to know if and what one 
was teaching. Anyone who argued that the important thing was to 
teach the pupils worthwhile Xs rather than to know whether or not 
one was doing so would not accept that this argument justified the 
claim that assessing was part of the teacher's role. 
Although the demands of the perficience analysis in respect 
of the teacher's doing things which are appropriate to his pupils' 
cognitive states is more severe than that of the activity analysis, 
because it is an objective rather than a subjective demand, the 
arguments used in discussing the activity analysis can be applied 
directly to the perficience analysis. A teacher can be objectively 
correct about the concepts etc. his pupils understand without himself 
engaging in assessment. It must be concluded that, as on the activity 
analysis, assessment cannot be demanded of the teacher as a 
necessary pre-condition of teaching. The strongest argument for 
assessment is the claim that it reliably informs the teacher about 
what his pupils know, and, as we have seen, this claim has been 
seriously queried by Holt. As far as I know, there have been no 
investigations into ways of distinguishing between what Holt has 
called pupils' real and apparent learning126  . 
There is thus no difference in the conclusions drawn from 
an activity analysis and a perficience analysis of teaching on the 
assumption that it is a teacher's role to teach his pupils something 
worth learning. On neither account is assessment necessary for a 
teacher to do this, in the different senses ofteach' deemed 
important. 
A discussion in terms of role itself 
Though it has been shown that a person may teach, in the relevant 
senses of teach, without assessing his pupils and their learning, the 
foregoing discussion does not exhaust the ways in which it might be 
argued that the assessment and judgment of his pupils might be a 
part of a teacher's role (4). For something might be demanded for 
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the role of the teacher by virtue of what we understand by 'role', 
not simply by virtue of what we understand by 'teaching'. Indeed, 
to a teacher, the suggestion that assessment and evaluation are 
not necessary may sound as strange as the naive dualist suggestion 
that there is only a contingent relationship between my mind and 
my body. Interestingly, it is at this stage that the differences 
between subscribing to an activity and a perficience analysis of 
teaching become apparent. I shall show below that, though it is 
clear from the above discussions that no relationship of an internal 
kind can be shown by a consideration of the concept of teaching alone, 
however analysed, and assessment, such a relationship can be shown 
through the concept of a teaching role, for a perficience but not 
for an activity analysis, assuming that it is a part of any role (4) 
that a role-filler should try to know if he is fulfilling it. 
I start, as before, with a discussion of the activity analysis, 
in order to substantiate the claim made earlier that the understanding 
of teaching put forward in this thesis has different practical 
implications from the activity analysis (i.e. is a substantive 
difference) and the dispute over how we understand teaching is not 
merely a semantic one. 
Let us assume that a teacher in a school is being asked to 
teach a curriculum project embodying subject matter of the kind which, 
I have argued, requires no special justification to be considered 
worthwhile if learned non-inertly by a group of pupils. It seems to 
me that proponents of the activity analysis must accept that the 
teacher has fulfilled his role if he engages in the pedagogic 
activities deemed appropriate to that project (and probably set out 
in some way in a Teachers' Guide) with the primary intention of 
bringing about that learning. I take this to be indisputable on the 
basis of Broudy's and Scheffler's claims that it is not necessary for 
the pupils to learn for it to be right for the teacher to claim his 
salary, and Hirst's suggestion that we allow that teaching has been 
going on even when not only do the pupils not learn anything but their 
cognitive states have been grossly misjudged. 
Since, on this view, the teacher is fulfilling his role whether 
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his pupils learn or not, there is no need for pupil assessment in 
order to find out if this is the case. The only assessment appropriate 
would be in respect of whether or not the teacher is performing the 
appropriate indicative acts, had the appropriate intentions and had 
a set of beliefs (not necessarily correct) about the pupils' 
cognitive states that substantiated his claim that he considered his 
acts appropriate for the pupils as well as the subject matter. 
It seems to me that it is the case that this is the view many people 
have of the teacher's role (2). Many people don't expect the children 
to learn anything. They have lost confidence in the schools. For 
Broudy, Scheffler and Hirst, this is the teacher's role (3). Teaching, 
in the attempt or activity sense, is the limit of the teacher's 
obligations. 	 However, I believe that this belief is open to 
question. Is it right that, in the standard case, the limit of 
our normative expectations of teachers is that they should go into 
schools to perform some kind of activity? Can we not expect more of 
our teachers than this? Is it not part of their obligation to achieve  
something (I have earlier argued that it would not follow from such 
a claim that a teacher who failed to bring about worthwhile learning 
would necessarily be blameworthy. My point is that role discussions 
concern what we are entitled to expect in general.) 
Perhaps proponents of the activity analysis would argue that 
we should hold the normative expectation that teachers should teach 
(in the activity sense) as effectively as they can. This does not 
entail assessment of pupils as part of the role (4), because it is 
not a logical point that teachers who judged or evaluated pupils' 
learning would be enabled thereby to teach more effectively. In 
addition, a teacher who believed that assessment and evaluation 
militated against learning would be doing what he believed was most 
effective if he refrained from testing, not if he tested. And, as 
already pointed out, the activity analysis lays stress on the teacher's 
beliefs about what he is doing, the way he sees what he does. 
The paradoxical conclusion of the activity analysis, on my view, 
is that it follows from it that the full responsibilities of a teaching 
role can be fulfilled by anyone with knowledge of the Xs to be taught. 
Nothing else is required of him. The conditions necessary are to have 
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a set of beliefs (which may be wildly mistaken) about the pupils' 
cognitive states, a clear and tightly structured set of intentions, 
and the ability to perform a set of appropriate indicative acts. 
The teacher whose pupils learn something worthwhile is fulfilling 
his role, but so, equally, may be the one whose pupils learn nothing, 
through no fault of their own. Thus it is possible to argue that 
talk of "the schools failing the pupils" would be grossly out of 
place ("for logical reasons") even if no pupils learned anything 
because their teachers' understanding of them was poor, and he could 
not communicate with them. 
The teacher, and those to whom he is accountable, do not need 
to know what, if anything, the pupils are learning, and they do not 
need to learn anything, in order to know whether or not the teacher 
is fulfilling his role (and, also, that the schools are fulfilling 
theirs). This is because the obligation of teaching is that of 
engaging in an activity, not that of bringing about outcomes. Whether 
this is the view of proponents of the activity analysis, I do not know. 
But it seems to me to follow from the analysis. This view, T suggest, 
is quite unjustifiable. 
On the analysis of this thesis, the person who accepts the role (4) 
of teacher in a school undertakes to teach in the sense of bringing 
about those outcomes of worthwhile learning by pupils which, on the 
account presented here, the justification of schools as institutions 
and the requirement that pupils attend. If he is failing to teach 
his pupils anything worthwhile (or if he teaches them more that can 
be shown to be harmful than that can be shown to be valuable) he is 
not fulfilling his role obligations. As suggested earlier, and at 
the risk of repetition, it does not follow from this that he is 
necessarily blameworthy, nor that he does not deserve to be paid. 
Not all cases of failure to fulfil obligations are blameworthy. 
I have suggested that it is part of the obligations of any role (4) 
that the agent try to find out whether or not he is fulfilling it. On 
the perficience analysis of teaching, assessment of (a) what pupils 
are learning (b) whether they are learning it through acts by the 
teacher which satisfy the criteria for them to be teaching acts and 
(c) whether what is learned is non-immoral, non-trivial and non-inert 
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(i.e. an evaluation of whether it is worthwhile to the particular 
pupils) are necessary for ascertaining this. Such assessments can 
be carried out by teachers, pupils or outside observers, provided 
they have the appropriate knowledge and skills to do so. 
The first point that can be made about this is that it does 
square with our generally held belief that whether or not an individual 
is fulfilling a role is a public matter and does not rest (as it 
does in the case of the activity analysis) ultimately on his own say-so 
(his claims about his intentions and beliefs). For, given that he 
has actually performed the indicative acts, no claim that they were 
in fact completely inappropriate to his pupils can undermine his 
claim to fulfil his role. 
On the other hand, a teacher who accepts that role (4) obligations 
involve him in teaching his pupils something worthwhile in the sense 
that they learn something worthwhile, assessments of the three kinds 
mentioned are necessary for him to know whether he is fulfilling his 
role or not. There is no epistemological position which suggests that 
A can come to know what B is learning except through his observation of 
B's actions. The teacher needs also to 'observe' his own actions, 
in the sense that he has to try to 'look at them from the outside', 
to see whether they may be plausibly interpreted in ways other than 
the ways he intended and thus bring about a variety of non-intended 
perficienary outcomes, including ones which might inhibit further 
learning (as Holt suggests). 
Finally, he must try to understand how his pupils are interpreting 
them, what, if anything, they are learning, and whether or not this 
is inert. This necessarily involves him in further assessment - of 
what they already knew, of how their new learning is being brought 
about, and some evaluation of it as worthwhile or trivial, including 
understanding their valuations of it. For if all the pupils' learning 
was inert and/or trivial, the criteria which, it is argued, must be 
met to justify their compulsory attendance at school would not be 
satisfied. Though there are great difficulties associated with 
teacher accountability, it is not unreasonable that teachers should 
be asked for justifications, since people are no longer willing to 
take the value of particular learnings on authority. Before a teacher 
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could consider justifications, he would need to know what he was 
teaching and to whom he was teaching it. Assessment is thus, on 
these grounds, necessary to the teacher's role (4). 
There is another way in which assessment can be argued to be 
a necessary part of the teacher's role. This rests on the claim 
made in section II that it is logically impossible to teach people 
what they already know. Assessment of what pupils already know is 
a necessary part of the teacher's role if he wishes to find out 
what he should avoid dealing with as subject matter. Of course, 
it is possible to teach people without first assessing what they 
know because one can assume ignorance and be correct. The justification, 
like the previous one, rests on an obligation claimed for the teacher's 
role (4) to try to know what he is doing as part of his role. Any 
counter-argument that what is important is that certain worthwhile 
things are taught, not that anyone knows about it, must be rejected. 
Both are important in schools. Again, there may be implications here 
for the conditions under which people are expected to teach. 
There is no suggestion here that because assessment and judgment 
of pupils' achievements are a necessary part of the teacher's role, 
only he should judge. '.'hat is, there is no implication that the 
claim that pupils ought to judge their own or other pupils' work 
should be rejected because of this. Indeed, if interest is of the 
importance I have suggested, and interest involves the child in 
"wanting to become more skilful, more informed, more experienced 
(more knowledgeable, in other words)"127, then the child himself 
will need to assess this to know if he is achieving what he wants. 
That is, the child's assessment of his own learning is clearly as 
important as the teacher's, on this account. 
We do, however, need to look at the question of whether or not 
the teacher should communicate his assessments and evaluations to 
his pupils (which I shall call 'grading'), and at what is to be said 
if the empirical claims about the inhibiting effects of assessment 
on learning discussed earlier are true in the majority of instances. 
But even if these claims were mistaken, a justification for the 
suggestion that teachers need not always grade can be offered in 
terms of teaching. There is no contradiction involved in suggesting 
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(except where the consequences would be disastrous) that a teacher 
should encourage his pupils to make anirely on their own judgments 
even if these might sometimes be wrong. Such acts could be teaching 
acts, in that pupils could learn judgment partly by having the 
experience of the consequences of making poor judgments. What might 
be more important was the teacher's ability to make public, and have 
discussion about, the criteria which might be used. These two kinds 
of acts - making public and discussing criteria of judgment, and 
allowing pupils to experience the consequences of making poor 
judgments - are ways of bringing to the pupils' views' the ways 
in which their judgments were mistaken. But to choose to do this, 
the teacher needs still to make judgments himself. 
I have argued here that assessment of pupils' learning is not 
merely a contingent part of the teacher's role (4) on a perficience 
analysis of teaching, but a conceptually demanded part, demanded by 
this conception of teaching and the concept of a responsible role-
filler. If it is not a merely contingent matter, the question of 
justifying assessment Per se does not arise. The proper question is 
therefore not whether or not a teacher ought to assess and evaluate 
children's learning, but how to ensure that the assessing and 
evaluating they ought to do helps (if possible) and certainly hinders 
as little as possible the learning of what is worthwhile which is 
the justifiable aim of schools. In the end, I argue, this matter 
is one for empirical investigation, but a few further comments can 
be made at this stage. 
What does the teacher assess and evaluate? 
What the teacher must evaluate in his attempt to find out what 
his pupils are learning are the pupils' activities and performances 
and the products of these. We have to judge if a child is learning 
how to swim by watching how he performs in the water, to assess if 
he can do certain mathematical calculations by whether or not he does 
them correctly and what he says about his reasons for doing the things 
he does, whether he understands a scientific principle by seeing 
whether he can apply it and solve problems to which it is relevant. 
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But we must remember that it does not follow necessarily from a 
child's failure to perform that he cannot, for he may be unwilling, 
or uninterested, or the context may inhibit him. Nor does his 
success always indicate understanding. We must remember not to confuse 
that which we take as evidence for understanding for the understanding 
itself. 
Observations of classrooms show the prevalence of questioning 
in lessons, whereby teachers ask their pupils questions to which they 
already know the answers in order to find out whether their pupils 
know. The normal convention for the speech act of questioning (the 
assumption that the questioner does not know the answer) is missing. 
3earle128  has classified these kinds of questions as "exam questions" 
and empirical studies129 indicate that such questions are understood 
well by children as requiring them to re-produce for the teacher what 
he has previously said to them. That is, the illocutionary force of 
questioning in schools is not the same as it is elsewhere. Holt's 
analysis makes sense to us because we so readily understand how it is 
that pupils see themselves as being constantly tested; so that, if 
Holt is right, their main desire is often simply to give an acceptable 
answer and thus relieve the tension of the testing situation. This nay 
also be related to situations in which the criteria for judging answers 
as correct or incorrect are not available, so that pupils can be more 
successful at getting right answers by attending to the teacher's manner 
and the clues it gives than to the subject matter itself. For Holt's 
claim that assessment must militate against learning to turn out to 
be wrong, children must either not interpret assessment by teachers as 
threatening, or teachers must make their judgments in ways which the 
children do not recognize as assessment. 
It is surely naive to assume that because a teacher is assessing 
pupils' learning and making judgments about their difficulties, the 
pupils must know either that this is being done or what the assessment 
is. In all Holt's examples, the pupil is being engaged in what might 
be called "typical school question-and-answer sessions." He is not 
merely being asked for answers, but is being asked for them in a 
competitive and public situation. It is clear to him that he is being 
judge through his answers, assessed and tested not only in the eyes of 
the teacher but also in the eyes of his peers, and he can be forgiven for 
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assuming that failure will in some way diminish him, in the eyes of 
the teacher at least, as "stupid". 
But written tests and 'conversations' which consist of 
complex sentences from the teacher alternating with single words 
or short phrases from various pupils is not the only way in which 
a teacher can find out what his pupils are learning. Pupils can 
produce e.g. written work as part of the business of coming to 
understand, and show that they understand X by using that learning 
in the doing of Y. From the pupil's point of view, he is simply 
learning X or doing Y. If a child is interested in learning X or 
doing Y, he will not see himself simply as being tested, or the 
teacher as concerned to evaluate and possibly condemn him, but 
rather see the situation as one in which the teacher is concerned 
with teaching him and helping him achieve a goal he desires for 
himself. In such a case, even if he realises evaluation is going 
on, he need not resent it, for he may see it as helpful. This 
necessitates his being able to distinguish between constructive and 
destructive criticism. It is the latter which always involves the 
possibility of the pupil seeing himself judged a failure no matter 
how hard he is trying. It is analytic that what is seen as constructive 
criticism involves seeing oneself as being helped. It is not, as 
Downie suggests130 that criticism is always resented unless there is 
some special relationship to mediate it, as we know from our own 
experience. If one is being criticized as a pupil, it is oneself 
that is being criticized. For criticism not to be resented, it 
must be seen as constructively helpful towards a desired goal. 
It must be noted that the suggestion that teachers must learn 
to evaluate their pupils' learning without undesirable side-effects 
does not imply the need for prespecification of specific responses 
to questions, much less responses specified in behavioural terms. 
Pupils' work as part of their learning can be used by teachers as 
the basis for judgment, as opposed to work specially done to be 
judged. In this way, pupils can be encouraged to explore, reshape, 
re-interpret, make suggestions, be critical, etc., and this will 
enable the teacher to assess how far his pupils are thinking for 
themselves and the way in which they are learning, not simply what 
they are learning. 
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The main conclusion seems to be that an analytic scheme which 
sees teaching as one activity and assessing as another is unhelpful 
in understanding the teacher's role. He needs to assess, but he 
does not thereby need to engage in separate activities of assessing. 
Even if he is using diagnostic tests, he may teach whilst using them. 
This discussion does not suggest that objective tests should be 
condemned out of hand, though the extent of their usefulness needs 
to be investigated, and it does not follow that all psychometric 
testing (e.g. of I.Q.) has much to offer. Objective tests can be 
useful for finding out where pupils' difficulties lie, and sometimes 
for self-referential comparison (i.e. for noting improvements on 
past performances). But such tests can only be subsidiary, at the 
best, to the teacher's informal assessments carried out as his pupils 
are being taught. 
It might be argued that if pupils are interested in their 
learning, they render such assessment unnecessary. They are the 
most likely, it is sometimes argued, to know things about their 
own difficulties which teachers cannot know, and if they are not 
concerned to fake achievement in order to give the impression that 
they have learned, they will be able to ask frankly for help. Although 
Holt may be right131 in his suggestion that pupils may not always know 
if they don't understand, a pupil who thinks he does not understand 
is likely to be right. 
However, a pupil coming to ask the teacher for help provides 
an assessment of learning difficulties rather than rendering one 
unnecessary. Furthermore, as Wittgenstein has shown132, there is 
a distinction between thinking one has understood and understanding, 
for to understand something one must have got it right. A pupil 
may think he has understood and be mistaken, so that even if the 
classroom climate is such that pupils are willing to ask for help, 
the teacher cannot assume that pupils who do not ask have no 
problems. But because there are degrees of understanding, there 
are teaching advantages in assessing pupils' learning by seeing how 
they use what they have learned in new learning. For in this way, 
that learning is integrated with the new learning, so that the 
teacher who uses his teaching for assessment or his assessment for 
teaching can create a deeper understanding. In the earlier example 
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given of learning about viscosity in order to design a boat hull, 
the successful designing of the hull is sufficient to indicate to 
the teacher whether or not the work on viscosity has been understood. 
Discussions with the pupil on what she was doing would also be 
useful for both teaching and assessing. 
On my view, the most positive contribution to making judgments 
about assessment comes from considering the child-centred theorist's 
question "What reason has the child for doing these things?" In 
schools as they are, what is assessed is produced by the child for 
assessment. He knows that this is, in most cases, the reason why 
he is asked to do it. It is not a part of his learning activities, 
but rather the evidence tp be produced that he has learned. If its 
purpose is seen only being to satisfy the teacher, then its production 
is necessarily, for the child, instrumental only to this. That is, 
such work can have no intrinsic value. So we see our students 
"learning things up" for examinations and promptly forgetting them. 
We have done the same thing ourselves. If the pupil sees no 
intrinsic point in the learning and the teacher can be satisfied 
by rote-learned work or inert learning, he has no reason for learning 
in any other way. For this reason, it is suggested that, if possible, 
the child should engage in the performance which is being assessed 
for reasons other than for assessment. 
However, a different perspective can be taken on this. Is 
assessing in this kind of way justifiable at all, for might it still 
not lead pupils to produce work which they know will be acceptable 
regardless of whether or not they themselves accept it Would 
discussions in which any questions asked are 'genuine' as opposed 
to 'exam' questions be more likely to encourage pupils to formulate 
their own beliefs and views? On the view of this thesis, such a 
change in teaching practice would have to be made clear to pupils, 
for simply rephrasing questions to ask for pupils' own views would 
not be adequate, for it might not be seen by them as a significant 
change. And this is not to suggest that all views or arguments 
might be equally valid, nor to accept a crude epistemological 
relativism. It is rather to look at the way in which an insistance 
on 'right' or 'acceptable' answers may cause learning to be inert. 
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It does not follow, as Holt sometimes seems to imply, that 
there is always something wrong with wanting to know 'the right 
answer'. Such a desire can be related not to wanting to please 
the teacher but to a concern for truth. Sociologists who see the 
classroom as a market place where performances in school work are 
exchanged for grades and approval may, in many instances, not be 
far wrong from the pupils' point of view. But if they are right, 
some change in practice is required to ensure that pupils' concern 
is more with understanding than with getting grades. This is why 
this thesis has stressed the importance of interest. 
Nor is it necessary, as Holt sometimes seems to imply, to accept 
that because there are not always single right answers that there 
never are, nor that some answers might be known to be wrong even though 
we do not know what answers (if any) might be right. Furthermore, 
if a concern with 'right answers' is sometimes destructive of learning, 
it does not follow that it always is. Holt himself plays games like 
Twenty Questions (where there is always a right answer) with his 
pupils in order to teach them to understand certain skills and 
strategies; and it has already been pointed out that to value the 
skills of finding out presupposes that some knowledge-that has value. 
One teaching goal, at a high level of generality, that all 
teachers might have is that their pupils learn to be self-evaluative, 
something which is stressed by Rogers. For this, however, a person 
must have some criteria, and the teacher would be surely involved in 
an epistemological fallacy if he led the children to believe that any 
set of criteria was as valid as any other. Even the youngest children 
come to school already able to some extent to evaluate the success of 
some of their projects, and to teach them to be more self-evaluative 
requires their involvement in evaluations with their teachers, not 
the withdrawal of the teacher from evaluation altogether. Indeed, 
for some practical projects, the criteria almost force themselves on 
you. For theoretical projects (those concerned with finding out what 
is true) criteria are intersubjective in a different way, and in some 
areas pupils have criteria which they apply outside of school (e.g. they 
are not usually undiscriminating in their choice of 'pop' music or 
films). Criteria in different areas of learning must be made explicit, 
discussed and debated. Talk of 'imposing' or 'rejecting' teachers' 
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criteria is meaningless without this, for the teachers' criteria must 
be taught to the pupils before they can reject them. This is to 
argue that there can be worthwhile things to be learned in respect 
of the criteria themselves. 
As Oakeshott suggests133 ,judgment in the application of criteria 
is often taught by imparting. Disagreement in judgment between teacher 
and pupils often arises because of the employment of multiple criteria, 
and an understanding of this is necessary not only for the pupil but 
also for the teacher if he is to join with his pupils in continually 
applying and modifying criteria both as a part of teaching and of 
finding out what is being learned. To paraphrase Aristotle, we learn 
to judge by judging. 
It is nonsense to talk about 'imposing' judgments in the sense 
of getting children genuinely to agree with them, in the same way 
as it is nonsense to talk about 'iriposing' interests, for children 
cannot be made to judge in a given way. This is self-contradictory. 
Teachers must think seriously about whether they can responsibly 
'opt out' of making judgments (e.g. refusing to differentiate between 
valid and invalid arguments) because of difficulties in this area. 
Perhaps there is simply too much concern about disagreements in 
judgment between teachers and pupils, which may be related to teachers' 
concern about their authority position (see chapter 8), for it is not 
necessarily the case that the teacher's judgment will be the right one. 
This applies, too, to the necessity for the teacher to make judgments 
about what learning is worthwhile. It is sometimes asked how it could 
be argued that the teacher's evaluation of the children's learning as 
worthwhile or otherwise can be the most valid (this is not being claimed 
here). The various proponents claim that the teacher ought to promote 
the learning he believes is most worthwhile, or that the learning that 
should be promoted is what the children think is worthwhile, or that 
the learning promoted should be what the community as a whole thinks is 
worthwhile. The latest contender is the educationalist, the 
curriculum planner, whilst much actual control has come from the 
Universities through examination syllabuses. There is space for only 
a few comments here. 
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The position taken in this thesis has been that values are 
neither entirely subjective nor entirely relative, and that what 
an individual values, or what a group values or even what a whole 
community values may not be worth valuing (examples of the latter 
being illustrated by Nazi Germany). There is, I suggest, no 
reason to assume that any group is more likely than any other to 
have better judgment, including teachers and curriculum planners, 
and the suggestion that teachers must evaluate their pupils' 
learning along a value dimension is not made on the grounds that 
they are most likely to be right about what learning is of value. 
An alternative way in which the problem is sometimes viewed is 
to ask who should have the right to decide what is learned, but this 
question, too, has difficulties, as discussed earlier in relation 
to the work of Muiigrove and Taylor. For on what ought these rights 
to be based? 
It is clear that giving content to what specific learning might 
be worthwhile for our society is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
the comments made indicate a perspective which avoids the difficulties 
both over whose views are most valid, and over rights, for it is not 
formulated in these terms. To be substantively helpful, it requires 
agreement to some extent on the normative concept of a person, an 
individual living a responsible human life in society. I suggest 
that there is a larger measure of agreement on this value issue than 
is sometimes implied by discussions of differences between "traditionalist" 
and "progressive" educators, or between individualist and communitarian 
political perspectives, for they all share the rejection of cultural, 
social and political apathy and passivity. 
The claim that the justification for institutions such as schools 
and the teacher's role within them is that they teach their pupils 
something worth learning entails that teachers must make day-to-day 
judgments about this - that what they teach must, at the least, be 
what is non-immoral, non-harmful, non-trivial, and non-inert. For, 
it has been argued, a responsible role-filler must try to evaluate 
whether or not he is fulfilling his role, and teacher cannot do this 
without evaluating the children's learning on a value dimension. 
To have a view, then, about whether he is fulfilling his role or 
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wasting the children's time, a teacher must have beliefs about the 
value of what he is teaching as well as about what it is, unless a 
value relativism so extreme as to be cynical is being adopted. 
It is concluded, therefore, that assessment of what children 
are being taught and some evaluation of it is not merely a contingent 
aspect of the teacher's role (4) but a necessary part. Any claims 
that it would be possible to responsibly reject this part of the role 
(re-define the teacher's role without this aspect) must be 
unacceptable. For it is through these evaluations that the teacher 
must choose to modify his own actions (as is necessary for filling 
a role responsibly). This is very different, however, from a set of 
evaluations obtained for the purpose of putting children in some kind 
of hierarchical order of merit, and this thesis has not been concerned 
at all with the kind of assessment involved in examinations for other 
purposes (e.g. admissions to institutions of Higher Education). 
And it is worth speculating that the continual evaluation by pupils 
and teachers together of the worth of what is being learned may make 
teachers themselves more aware, and is for that reason also to be 
preferred to a situation where teachers have little autonomy (as in 
many secondary schools at present) and never evaluate the worth of 
what they are trying to teach, either taking it for granted or being 
indifferent to it. 
In chapter 10 I discuss the implications of this conclusion for 
the conditions which must be provided for schooling to be justifiable. 
The discussions of this part of this chapter suggest that they must be 
conditions in which teachers will be able to assess what they are 
doing through assessment of their pupils' learning in ways which do 
not militate against their pupils' chances of learning what is 
worthwhile. If present forms of assessment are destructive, they 
must be replaced by less destructive ones, but assessment and the 
application of criteria for judging learning and teaching cannot 
be abandoned in schools if they are to be justifiable institutions 
staffed by responsible teachers. 
Assessment, innovation and change 
I have suggested that a responsible teacher must try to satisfy 
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himself that he is teaching his pupils something which, at the 
minimum, satisfies the criteria of worthwhileness of non-inertness 
and non-triviality. In particular, I have suggested that much 
investigation may be needed about how to assess without encouraging 
purely verbal and thus inert learning. Should a teacher decide that 
he is teaching his pupils nothing of value to them, if he is 
genuinely concerned that he should fulfil his role, he would be 
rationally required to change what he is doing. On the view offered 
here, he should be more concerned with the person-dependent question 
"What can I teach these children that will be valuable to them?" than 
the person-independent question "What learning is of most worth?" 
A teacher's role (4) must therefore include responsibility for 
innovation and change, wherever it can be shown that such change is 
likely to ensure that pupils' learning is more "alive" than what is 
being brought about at the time, or where it is shown that current 
learning is trivial. This has practical implications in respect of 
competing curriculum projects, in a way which can be seen to bear 
some resemblance to what Lakatos134 has said about competing scientific 
theories. There are triadic considerations in both. The adequacy 
of a scientific theory is assessed not simply by looking at the theory 
and at the world, nor simply by looking at the two competing theories. 
All three must be considered. The same is true for curriculum 
projects. They must be chosen not by purely abstract consideration 
of the 'merits' of the content and the method which is suggested, but 
also in respect of the particular group of pupils who, it is suggested, 
are to use them. 
Now it might be argued that this has always been acknowledged by 
teachers and, indeed, is implied by the activity analysis of teaching 
which has stressed the logical appropriateness which is necessary 
for a teacher's acts in respect of pupils' conceptual states. This 
is not the point being made here, for this has already been accepted, 
and, indeed, is incorporated also within the perficience analysis of 
teaching. The distinction made here is concerned with the manner in 
which the Xs are learned psychologically. The suggestion, therefore, 
is that teachers of a school, individually and collectively, have a 
responsibility for ensuring not merely the learning of theoretically 
justifiable Xs but that this learning is psychologically non-inert. 
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This requires that the teacher have the right to promote change and 
be flexible in the classroom, and (insofar as the whole organization 
of the school and the kinds of role relationships within it promote 
values) in the organization of the school. I have mentioned choosing 
between curriculum projects, and earlier suggested that some teachers 
might fulfil their roles more effectively if they worked without 
tightly structured curricula and deliberately kept their aims "fuzzy", 
indicating that the way in which roles would need to be substantively 
instantiated would depend on empirical factors relating to individual 
teachers, groups of teachers and groups of children. similarly, if 
it is the case that non-inert learning is promoted by wide opportunity 
for pupil choice, a matter which again requires empirical investigation, 
the role of a teacher in a school which offered its pupils no such 
choice would involve promoting it (and vice versa). This indicates why, 
at this stage of our empirical knowledge, claims about the teacher's 
role (4) must be made at a high level of generality. Its instantiation 
in the future will depend also on philosophical work (epistemology, 
ethics and social philosophy, and theory of value) but will always 
relate to the personal characteristics of particular pupils and teachers. 
In respect of this aspect, therefore, it must be concluded that 
the teacher's role is neither necessarily conservative nor necessarily 
radical (in the sense of promoting change). It cannot be a teacher's 
role (4) obligation to promote change per se, for not all change is 
for the better. The claim is rather that, as was claimed for both 
the teaching of values and for assessment, the teacher cannot 
responsibly "opt out". This implies having views about new ideas 
and the possibility of change, and the evaluation of the likely 
consequences of various possible changes as compared with the consequences 
of retaining the status quo. For as I have already suggested, a failure 
to do the latter is partly what is meant by being irresponsible, and 
the relationship between responsibility and role (4) is a necessary one. 
There are implications here in respect of in-service training. 
The conclusion of this chapter is therefore that the teaching of 
values, assessing what one is teaching and being open to change are 
not merely contingently associated with the teacher's role. 
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CHAPTER 8: (a) Authority and the Teacher's Role  
(b) Pupil-Teacher Relationships 
PART (a): Authority and the Teacher's Role  
Introduction 
It had originally been my intention to carry out a wide-ranging 
enquiry into the possible authority aspects of the teacher's role (4), 
both in relation to knowledge and understanding, and in relation to 
social control and decision-making in schools. However, the limitations 
of space render this impossible now, and the work on authority presented 
here is restricted to epistemic considerations, and to the teaching of 
rule-governed activities, including the teaching of those aspects of 
them which are not themselves rule-governed, such as judgment in the 
application of criteria. In particular, I shall raise some objections 
to something which shows signs of becoming a new orthodoxy - that there 
is something wrong with the acceptance of authority, that the authority 
of the teacher in some way inhibits the development of autonomy by 
pupils and involves risks of indoctrination, and thus that the authority 
aspect of the teacher's role is fundamentally objectionable. 
Being an Authority 
Peters has suggested135 that what is meant by saying that a person 
is an authority in the sphere of knowledge is that he has a special 
right to pronounce or to be heard on those matters concerning which he 
is an authority. Though he agrees with Winch136 that talk of 
authority presupposes that there is a right and a wrong way of 
doing things, he points out137 that the pronouncements of any person 
who is an authority can always be challenged by appeals to evidence 
or grounds. (In a school context, this would mean that it was 
always a possibility that a pupil might have an insight that over-
turned beliefs that were well established.) I suggest, however, that 
it remains to be shown that there is any conceptual relationship between 
being an authority and having a right. Peters may be extrapolating from 
institutionalized situations within which those who are considered 
to be authorities have additionally been given special rights to 
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be heard, for there seem to be no reasons for accepting that such 
rights are generally associated with being an authority. However, 
since one cannot become infallible by becoming an authority, Peters 
is clearly correct in his claim that nothing in the sphere of 
knowledge is ever made right (i.e. true) because authorities say so. 
I suggest, nonetheless, that the meaning of 'an authority' is 
related to 'right' in the sense of 'correct' or 'true' rather than 
with having a 'right' in the sense of 'entitlement' as Peters 
suggests, and agree with Downie138 that to say someone is an authority 
is to suggest that what he has to say on the subject matter on which 
he is an authority is likely to be 'right' in this sense. 
Obviously, if this is so, it would be a rational course of action 
for a person who wanted to know something to listen to those who are 
authorities in that sphere. However, it does not seem to be part of 
the meaning of authority, and the demand that one listens to those 
who are authorities cannot be a demand of conceptual necessity. The 
point that authorities can make mistakes is, on my view, better made 
by suggesting that the statements made by authorities should only be 
taken as provisionally true (that is, that it is sometimes right to 
be sceptical about the pronouncements made by authorities), rather 
than by saying, as does Peters, that all authorities should only be 
treated as provisional. However, this does not mean that no individual 
who claims authority should be treated as provisional, for there can 
be spurious 'authorities', and we cannot always know if an individual 
is an authority or not. 
Talk of authority in the sphere of knowledge and understanding 
requires spelling out in two spheres. Firstly, there is a content 
area. A person may be an authority on the Incas, on the history of 
Greece, on the migration of birds, on the breeding of dogs or on 
the strategies of playing chess. But there must also be a context 
of persons in relation to whom one is an authority. A person may be 
an authority on X within group A, where others know a great deal less 
than he about X, but not in group B, where most people know a great 
deal more. If so, authority is a relational concept, and it is an 
error to suggest that a person must either be an authority on X, 
or not be one, unless by the former is implied 'in any context'. 
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If it is accepted that what is true is, in some sense, independent 
of people's beliefs, decisions and choices, in the sphere of knowledge 
authority must, in the same sense, be independent of people's decisions, 
beliefs and choices. If I am an authority on Malaysian postage stamps 
in relation to members of the Malaysian Postage Stamp Society, this 
is the case even if I do not hold a position of authority in the society; 
even if all the members of the society refuse to acknowledge me as an 
authority or admit me as a member; and even if I find myself 
stranded on a desert island without any Malaysian postage stamps. 
In particular cases, a person's authority is independent of other 
people's knowledge of it. What is required for epistemological authority 
is for there simply to be others with whose knowledge the knowledge of 
that authority can be compared. Neither their presence nor their 
recognition is needed. 
This concept of an authority presupposes a non-individualist 
epistemology and a view that knowledge is essentially social in 
character, and an acceptance of Winch's statement that it is not 
possible for knowledge to be "a property of the individual mind"139, 
by which I assume he means 'not all knowledge can be a property of 
individual minds alone' since clearly something might be known to 
only one individual at any time. Though epistemological authority is 
necessarily personal and not positional, authority is derived from 
a community. This is not, however, to deny the distinction between 
'being an authority' and 'being recognized as an authority' in relation 
to a given group. Recognition is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition of being an authority. 
This distinction is clearly part of our current concept of an 
authority, for we may say intelligibly to someone, "I wasn't aware 
you were such an authority on X." A student could be more of an 
authority on Y than his professor was, and we speak of discovering 
that someone we had believed to be an authority was spurious. The 
concept of a spurious authority is, of course, parasitic on the concept 
of a genuine 1;.uthority in the same way as the concept of counterfeit 
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money is parasitic on the concept of genuine money. 
I have rejected Peters' suggestion that it is part of the 
meaning of authority that we are obliged to listen to what those 
who are authorities in this sense have to say. Is there nothing 
further to be said than that listening to authorities is a rational 
course of action? I turn now to an alternative suggestion as to 
why we must accept authority, the one made by Winch140 
 - that very 
often we have not the choice as to whether to accept or reject 
authority. We are, claims Winch, compelled to accept it for we 
have no choice as to whether or not to participate in some rule-
governed activities. 
Rule-Governed Activities and Authority  
The relation between rule-governed activities and authority, 
Winch claims1  , is not merely a contingent one. There is a conceptual  
connection (an internal relation) between the two which constitutes 
the difference between an exercise of authority and an exercise of 
power. He says142, "To participate in such an activity is to accept 
that there is a right and wrong way of doing things" (for the 
determination of which the rules function as criteria) "and the 
decision as to what is right and wrong in a given case can never 
depend on one's own caprice." It follows in such cases, argues 
Winch that143 "when it comes to following rules, I must (as a matter 
of logic) accept what certain other people say or do as authoritative." 
He suggests that144 
 "a relation of authority, as opposed to one 
of power, is an indirect relationship between X and Y, involving as 
an intermediary the established way of performing the activity on 
which X and Y are engaged." This is to say that whereas instances of 
power relations involve one party's actions having a direct effect on 
the other, where authority is concerned, both parties are obliged to 
recognize authority by virtue of the rules which both accept and 
share. The rules, therefore, mediate between the parties to establish 
authority in the context of the activity concerned. However, Winch 
has, by this explanation, moved from the acceptance of the authority 
of persons to the acceptance of the authority of rules. 
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There is surely a gap between accepting that the rules are 
authoritative, and even that certain persons may be more authoritative 
than oneself, and accepting that certain individual persons must 
be more authoritative than oneself, or even as authoritative as 
oneself once one knows the rules. Though Winch may have established 
that where there are rule-governed practices, there must be 
authorities, he has failed to show how we are to know who they are. 
A paradox therefore arises in relation to the epistemological 
questions "How, in general, can we come to know the rules of a 
rule-governed activity?" and "How do we know who the authorities 
are?" 
The answer to the first question leads to the second, for it is 
that we must, in the last resort, learn the rules from those who 
know them, that is, from those who are the authorities on the rules. 
That is, we must take them on authority. The reason that Winch's 
discussion is so relevant to this thesis is that what he has illustrated 
is not so much the importance of the internal relation between rule- 
governed activities and authorities (which, though it may be correct, 
is trivial as stated because unless we have some way of learning who 
these authorities are, it could have no possible substantive implications), 
but the relation between learning the rules of an activity and 
accepting the authority of particular persons. 
Winch's example is of a person's being taught to play chess. 
"Here," he writes,145 "the pronouncements are authoritative for me 
because of my recognition of the fact that he is telling me the correct  
way to move the pieces.... And I can only learn to play by accepting 
the pronouncements or examples of some mentor or mentors as authoritative." 
But he has not yet explained why we cannot simply accept the authority 
of the rules themselves. Why must we additionally accept the authority 
of particular persons? 
We cannot clearly accept the idea that there might be rules 
which are authoritative for us without .E12  reference to the authority 
of persons, for this would imply some kind of Platonic understanding 
of rules and their existence independent of any human activities. So 
Winch's suggestion - that rule-governed activities logically imply the 
authority of persons - is more acceptable in that it gives due account 
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to the social nature of rules and the fact that they cannot exist 
independently of any persons at all. But since rules can, and do, 
exist independently of any particular persons, understanding that 
there is a relation between rules, a right and wrong way of doing 
things, and authority, does not help us to decide which particular 
persons are, in the context, genuinely authorities on the rules, from 
whom we can learn both them and judgment in following them correctly. 
For it is not the case, as Winch seems to imply, that my belief that 
my teacher is telling me the correct way to proceed entails that he 
is doing so. 
The paradox is that until we know the rules, and thus already 
have some idea of, as Winch puts it146 ,the right course to pursue 
in the context of that activity", we have also to accept that any 
particular individual is an authority on the rules on authority. This 
is so even in cases (like chess) where, according to Winch14 7 there is 
"no dispute about what moves are legitimate." It is not merely a 
contingent matter that for theoretical activities the beginner is 
not in a position to assess whether he is being taught the correct 
way to proceed or not, and this is true for any activities which 
do not carry obvious criteria of success and failure with them. 
This indicates that there may be some unexplored difficulties 
involved in some of the current discussions about authority and its 
relation to "publicly accessible rules", for the public accessibility 
of the rules is subject to our already having accepted authority on 
authority to enable us to learn to understand them. Ceuinton puts it 
that14-8 "we can weigh the purported pound of sugar only on the scales 
the grocer himself provides." But we have to accept not only his 
scales but his instructions on how to use them. 
The person who does not yet understand what the rules of the 
activity in question are cannot first evaluate for himself who "knows 
the right way to proceed" and thus rationally choose an authority 
as his teacher, but has to accept the authority of particular persons 
even to get into such a position. In relation to activities where 
there are disagreements over the current nature of and interpretation 
of the rules themselves, through which the changes in the rules and 
thus the nature of the activity historically come about, accepting 
- 264 - 
authority of this particular person rather than that may lead 
to quite different understandings of the activity in question. The 
view one gains of X depends largely on the views of the person who 
has taught it to you, though this is not to suggest that this view 
cannot later be abandoned. This point is very relevant for schools, 
where pupils tend to have a succession of different teachers. 
Winch suggests149 that when it is not clear who knows the 
right way to proceed in a particular activity (which, I suggested, 
was the case for anyone who has not yet started to engage in the 
activity in question), we can only evaluate candidates for authority 
on the basis of whether or not they seem to know. He claims150 that 
a further necessary condition will be that the individual to be 
considered sincerely believes that he knows "the right way" and 
"cares about what is right and what is wrong". Now, even if it were 
acceptable to recognize the authority of the person who most seemed 
to know what he was doing (which does not seem to be the case because 
of the obvious distinction between seeming to know and knowing), it 
would not be possible to fulfil the necessary condition of finding out 
whether or not a person was sincere in his belief that he knew what 
he was doing. Winch accepts the former, for he agrees that confident 
demeanor cannot be a criterion of authority. But not only is sincerity 
no criterion of correctness either, but it is notoriously difficult 
for observers to determine. It may be possible to seem more sincere 
when actually insincere and trying to give the impression of sincerity 
than when one actually is sincere. 
As a method for a would-be learner to choose his teachers, then, 
this solution of Winch's is totally unacceptable (and being based on 
a phenomenally comprehensive access to other minds, raises more 
problems than it solves in relation to authority generally). But 
this argument is interesting, for it calls into question some of 
the suggestions of deschoolers, who write of children being left 
free to choose anyone as a teacher. It follows from it that, for 
many activities, the children could have no way of knowing whether 
or not those they choose know enough to teach them what they want 
to learn. (Would children tend to gravitate to "quack" teachers, 
who really had nothing to teach, but who had the appearance of knowing?) 
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Telling objections can be raised, also, to Winch's other 
suggestionljl that we can look to tradition for direction, for, 
he claims, even charismatic authority is unintelligible apart from 
an understanding of the tradition within which it arose. Winch 
is quite obviously mistaken in his main example of Christianity, 
where he claims that what Jesus said was completely unintelligible 
apart from an understanding of the Jewish religious tradition. Can 
he really be suggesting that the religion that Jesus Christ 
introduced was completely unintelligible to Africans, upon whom, 
Winch would presumably have to say, the effort expended by missionaries 
was necessarily in vain, and to Romans who, if Winch were right, were 
prepared to be eaten by lions for that which they could not understand: 
Now it may be that all Winch is saying is that Christianity was 
not understood in precisely the same way by the early Christians in 
Rome as it was by the first Jewish converts, but what further 
understanding is gained from this? The point is that if it is 
Christianity which is understood in each case, it is rather that the 
understanding of the Romans was not quite the same as that of the 
early Jewish converts than that no understanding was possible for 
the Romans. Even if there must be, as Winch suggests, a tradition 
within which any new rule-governed activity arises (which may involve 
a vicious regress), it does not follow that the practices and 
pronouncements of those who have knowledge of that tradition must 
necessarily be superior. So the existence of a tradition is of no 
assistance in our problem of locating those who are the authorities 
on particular rule-governed activities in our group. They need not 
be those with the greatest understanding of the tradition from which 
the currently practised activity arose and its history. 
At first sight it looked as if he had the choice of either 
accepting the authority of some particular persons without question 
or ourselves becoming authorities in order to make an informed choice 
of whose authority to accept in the sphere of knowledge. But, it 
was then suggested, these are not distinct options. If we become 
authorities, our own authority is based ultimately on the acceptance 
of the authority of others. We learn from other people (those whose 
authority we are trying to assess) the language, the logic and the 
methodology by virtue of which we assess their statements, their 
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evidence, arguments and grounds, and thus their claims to know. We 
cannot reject all we have learned on authority, for this would leave 
us without language to intelligibly question parts of it. 
But this surely cannot constitute an objection to accepting authority 
in the sphere of knowledge, for it is impossible to raise objections 
to that which is necessary. The important issues would rather be to 
attempt to show that it was necessity, to discuss what kind of necessity 
was involved, and to show that the regress which has been indicated -
the appeal to authority in order to decide who the authorities are -
is not a vicious one. 
Winch's argument seems to show nothing about the acceptance of 
the authority of particular persons except in the case of learning 
new rule-governed activities, which I have argued in more detail 
above. If this is so, it cannot be (as Winch suggests) a matter of 
logic that anyone must accept authority, for it is not a matter of 
logic that anyone learns anything, and this has no relationship with 
choosing. Learning is not an intentional activity, though one can 
learn intentionally. 
But that children must accept authority is not an arbitrary or 
wholly contingent matter either. It is a contingent matter that 
human beings need to learn, for they might have been made otherwise, 
but given that it is part of our concept of a human being that he 
needs to learn how to engage in human activities and to come to 
understand, either explicitly or implicitly, what the rules are, then 
he must accept the authority of particular persons. It is a condition 
of his admission into the various forms of social life, including 
speaking his native language. In teaching him, for example, to 
speak, his parents and others exercise authority in the sense that 
the child willingly accepts what they say as right. In trying to 
communicate with them, he has no choice; and though this is therefore 
quite different from choosing to learn to play chess, his acceptance 
of what other people say and do as authoritative is similar. 
The claim which is being made here is that accepting the authority 
of particular persons is a necessary condition of learning how to 
engage in activities which are roughly rule-governed, and where (as 
in many important areas of life) there are no formal rule books, (and 
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where such rule books do exist, for knowing that one has properly 
understood the rules. For if one goes directly to the rules one 
may misunderstand, so that completely independent knowledge of 
one's own understanding is not possible.) But accepting the 
authority of particular persons is not sufficient to ensure that 
what is learned is the established way of engaging in the activity 
in question. It is not a sufficient condition because those who 
claim epistemological authority may not be the possessors of it. 
The necessity of the acceptance of authority is derived from 
the necessity of human learning. It might be called a conceptual 
necessity. Very young children cannot opt out of accepting authority 
because learning, and thus accepting the authority of particular 
persons, is a condition of their admission to their society. The 
persons whose authority they must accept are simply those who are 
there. They have no choice. Accepting authority is argued here to 
be a pre-condition of choosing, rather than, as sometimes suggested, 
choice being a precondition of accepting authority. 
What, then, of the regress, which appears to be involved in the 
1 
suggestion that one s teacher must be accepted as an authority on 
authority, or without question, because the learner is not in a 
position to judge whether he is an authority or not. Here an argument 
may be employed similar to the one used by Wittgenstein152 in 
considering the problem "How do I know that I know?" Although for 
the majority of assertions we can cite reasons and evidence for their 
truth or falsity, there comes a point at which reason-giving must 
end, because this just is the way we think. As he writes153, "What 
stands fast...is..held fast by what lies around it." 
We have to accept authority in the sphere of knowledge on 
authority because that is the way things are. No other possibility 
is open to us. If accepting authority is a precondition of knowing 
anything, then the regress, if that is what we wish to call it, 
is an acceptable one. Wittgenstein writes154, "The child learns by 
believing the adult....I learned an enormous amount and accepted it 
on human authority, and then found some things confirmed or 
disconfirmed by my own experience." 
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Thus there is a sense in which, as Peters suggested, our 
acceptance of authorities is provisional. For we do not permanently 
accept what we originally learn, including the ways of doing things 
and the rules of activities, as we originally learned it. We also 
learn to criticize, to look at the ways of doing things which others 
who claim to be authoritative employ, at their evidence, and at their 
conclusions. And the rules themselves are changed. Thus the 
possibility of seriously asking questions about whether we were right 
or not to accept our first teacher as authoritative is opened up to 
us. It is not until we ourselves are relatively authoritative about 
X that we are in a position to make judgments about who the authorities 
on X in our group are, at least in respect of some Xs. 
Authority and the Teacher 
Waller155 and Geer156, writing in 1932 and 1968 respectively, 
show the long—term prevalence in sociological writing of the view 
that teaching is a form of dominance and submission institutionalized 
through the notion of authority. It is becoming a new orthodoxy that 
the teacher should give up any claim to be regarded as an authority 
in the classroom, particularly in the sphere of values. Followers 
of Rogers suggest that the teacher and pupils should simply be 
regarded as peers, all concerned with the same end, learning. It 
is true that teachers can often learn from their pupils, and that, 
as Rogers suggests, there can be a blurring of the roles, in one 
sense, if pupils teach and their teachers learn. But, in another 
sense, teachers and pupils cannot be regarded as peers, for in 
that sense their roles are not interchangeable. Schools, I have 
suggested, are institutions developed primarily to promote the 
learning of those who go to them as pupils, and the presence of 
the teachers is in furtherance of this aim. By definition they 
are not peers with their pupils in the role sense, because schools 
are not institutions to which pupils come in order to further the 
learning of teachers. A teacher who comes to school only to 
learn has inappropriate aims, whereas if he thinks his pupils can 
teach him nothing, he is arrogant, not mistaken about his role. 
Those who write of the necessity for abandoning teacher authority 
see the acceptance of authority as in some way an infringement of 
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freedom. I am not here concerned with whether or not this is 
ever the case, but simply with how far this might be the case in 
respect of teaching/learning transactions. The previous section 
will have indicated that I am in agreement with Winch that, in 
a transaction in which someone is being taught how to engage in 
a rule-governed activity, the acceptance by the pupil of the 
pronouncements or examples of the teacher as authoritative at some 
stages of his learning are necessary (but not sufficient) for him 
to learn how to engage in that activity according to the rules 
(however flexible and liable to alteration they may be). As Winch 
says157, "If I make a wrong move and he corrects me, this is not 
in any intelligible sense an encroachment on my freedom of action. 
Until I know how to .... the question of my being free or not to 
.... cannot arise." That is, the kind of teaching and learning 
discussed in Chapter 6 - of that which enlarges a person's capacity 
for action - involves the acceptance of authority instrumentally in 
the way Winch suggests, where its acceptance is necessary to 
teaching. The child who accepts authority in this sense sees the 
teacher as someone who knows how to do things. If he himself wants 
to learn how to do these things, he needs to see the point of the 
school's having teachers as being instrumental to helping him learn 
and his teacher's understanding of "the right way to proceed" in the 
activity in question as necessary for his learning success there 
(though, of course, this is not to say he could not learn elsewhere). 
The suggestion that it would be better if children did not see their 
teachers as authorities seems to me misguided and confusing. For 
if they took their teachers to be as ignorant as themselves about the 
ways in which activities were conducted, they could not see their 
teachers as being in a position to teach them at all. Sometimes, of 
course, they may be wrong, and their teachers may not understand the 
activity in question, in which casethey need to learn it along with 
their pupils, both in order to help them learn and to see what they 
are learning. 
I have argued that teachers must know something their pupils do 
not in order to teach them that which they could not learn alone, and 
it seems to me that this is something which pupils also must accept. 
To suggest that pupils should give up seeing their teachers as 
authorities in relation to themselves is to suggest that pupils give 
up seeing their teachers as persons who can teach them. Furthermore, 
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if the pupils view the teacher's authority as being for their 
benefit, then there seems no reason why such authority should be 
resented. This parallels the point made about constructive 
criticism. But, of course, this argument on both scores requires 
that the pupil should want to learn. 
Where the activities in question are academic disciplines, or 
broader or more general perspectives based on themes, topics or 
problems, or traditions in the expressive arts, what the learner 
is required to accept the teacher as authoritative on are general 
rules for the engagement in the activity in question, rules that 
guide his attempts and help them work, which enable him to engage 
in disciplined thinking or skill learning, to structure the subject 
matter for himself, to see problems and engage in disciplined 
attempts to solve them. The teacher is not required to structure 
the pupils' thinking but to enable the pupil to structure his own 
thinking. It is to exercise epistemological authority, the authority 
of knowledge or experience, in a different way, not to abandon it. 
This does not suggest giving up the flexibility of approach which I 
argued for earlier, for it is usually the case that there are many 
appropriate things to be done to engage in the activity in question. 
Nor is it to suggest that there cannot be ways of doing things that 
the student could invent for himself that are better than the 
established ways, known to the teacher, of engaging in that activity. 
But these must bear some relationship to the established ways for it 
to be the same activity. 
But perhaps this is not what those who suggest that the teacher 
should give up his claim to be an authority have in mind. Perhaps 
they are more concerned that pupils should not accept on authority 
particular statements by the teacher which embody content of a 
different kind, not that associated with the right ways to engage 
in the activity but with what has been claimed to be true by previous 
practitioners of the activity in question. For it may be that seeing 
the teacher as the authority on this may lead pupils to regard the 
important part of school as the remembering of extracts of subject 
matter that the teacher knows, rather than as learning to engage in 
an activity according to the somewhat flexible rules for participation 
which are current at the time. That is, they learn in this way not 
so much about the world as about what others have said about the world. 
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This is, perhaps, understandable since these are the learnings which 
are easily examinable. 
Since, in schools, it is through the teachers that various ways 
of understanding the world are made accessible to the pupils (and 
there would be no point in their coming to school to learn these 
things if they were readily accessible or more easily accessible 
elsewhere, as the deschoolers rightly point out), it is important 
to note that if the pupil is to accept no authority in school, he 
rejects the opportunity of being taught. For these are areas in 
which there are no rule books. It is important, I suggest, for 
genuine intellectual authority to be accepted by pupils where appropriate. 
This doesn't imply that teachers must know everything, for indeed they 
could not, nor that their pupils may not sometimes be able to teach 
them. 
The primary difficulties lie in the paradox that at the start 
learners cannot be in a position to decide whether their teachers 
are authorities or not. Being assigned a status as an authority 
does not, I have argued, make one an authority in the context, for 
there is a distinction between being seen as an authority and 
being one. The responsibility of ensuring that children do not 
accept as authorities those who are ignorant lies with the people 
who appoint teachers, but the responsibility of ensuring that 
the children do not equate authority with infallibility lies with 
the teachers themselves. 
I have further argued that distinctions must be drawn between 
that which it makes sense for learners to refuse to accept on 
authority (e.g. particular propositions) and that which it makes 
no sense for them to refuse to accept on authority as, at least, 
provisionally true if they are to learn. These are things related 
to the constitutive rules of human activities, in the learning of 
which the child learns how assertions are made in the context, 
how they are tested, improved, discussed and used to solve problems, 
how and which skills are relevant, and how to formulate problems 
in such ways that answers may be sought. At the same time is 
learned the point and interest of the activity itself, for, as 
already suggested, these cannot be learned in isolation. What can 
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be given up is the idea that teacher's answers are authoritative 
in the sense that they should be accepted without question and 
memorized, the idea that teachers have once-and-for-all answers. 
I suggest that it is only in this sense that the claim that pupils 
ought not to regard their teachers as authorities, that teachers 
should relinquish their authority, can be seen to make sense. 
In what way, then, is being an authority and being seen as 
an authority argued to be part of the teacher's role (4) and 
justifiably institutionalized? Certainly it is argued that it is 
part of the teacher's role that they be authorities relative to 
their pupils on the ways of understanding the world which are 
current in their society, or on some specified selection of these 
for which they have a special responsibility. This is to say 
that, in relation to this, they ought to know more than their 
pupils. But we cannot at the same time argue that it is a part 
of their role (4) that they have the right to be accepted as 
authorities by their pupils, for their pupils ought to accept 
them as authorities only if they are so. A person cannot be 
entitled to be regarded as an authority simply because he has 
taken a job as a teacher, regardless of what he actually knows. 
I have argued that at the start pupils do have to accept 
their teachers as authorities on trust. This cannot be institutionalized 
as part of a role, for talk of obligation is out of place. Thus 
teachers will have to establish relationships with their pupils 
through which they show that they can be trusted to help them learn 
"the right way to proceed." The authority of the teacher in the 
sphere of knowledge need not be viewed as a dominance/ submission 
relationship, but rather, as Winch suggests, as the necessary basis 
from which a pupil must start. The dominance/submission view is 
necessary only where the pupils have no wish to learn, no wish to 
engage in activities suggested, and are coerced into doing so. Thus 
it ceases to be associated with epistemological authority. 
Though the acceptance of authority may, in some cases, lead to 
over-dependence and in the end to the inhibition of autonomy, nothing 
has been said to suggest that this must be the case. Scudder158, 
who argues strongly that authority is necessary, writes, "The teacher's 
primary responsibility is .... to his students, not to offer them a 
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cafeteria of ideas from which to select, nor to subtly guide their 
personality growth, nor to impersonally initiate them into the 
prescribed principles of a discipline or ethical system. He openly, 
honestly and personally shares his relationship with his discipline 
and the meaning he has found from this in such a way as to 
	  
evoke response and decision." Similarly, Herbst159 questions whether 
we are entitled to try to "fashion the young in the image of their 
elders," and perhaps the same thought has led Wilson to ask160 if 
 
schools might not "sometimes be more educative places if we thought 
of them as providing opportunities occasionally for children to 
become less, not more, like us?" 
On these views, the child's acceptance of authority must not 
violate his own integrity and must not be used by teachers for the 
manipulation of their pupils. Provided that these conditions are 
fulfilled, they argue, the acceptance of authority need not violate 
autonomy, for there is no reason to accept that autonomy involves 
the rejection of all authority but one's own or to worry that later 
stages of teaching must fail to promote and encourage autonomy if 
pupils are asked to accept certain things on authority. 
Quinton's arguments 	 have been further developed by Coady162 
who argues convincingly that they cast doubt on the view developed 
by Telfer163 and implicit in some of Dearden's writings164 that 
autonomy must decrease if appeal to authorities increases. Indeed, 
it is more plausible to suggest that autonomy lies in judging for 
oneself when appeals to authority are appropriate, what one can 
rationally accept on authority and what must be questioned. (The 
autonomous chemist takes it on authority that his reagent bottles 
contain what the labels say, at a mundane level, and at a less 
mundane level, accepts on trust the reports of large numbers of 
experiments performed by other people.) If this were not so, the 
autonomous man would be required to reject not just the route-plan 
but also the map. Sometimes an autonomous person may rationally 
ask somebody who knows, for authority and autonomy are complementary. 
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PART (b): Teacher-Pupil Relationships 
i conclude this investigation into some aspects of the teacher's 
role by briefly discussing what is demanded of the teacher in his 
relationships with his pupils. It is sometimes suggested that there 
is a sense in which the teacher-pupil relationship is necessarily and 
fundamentally impersonal - firstly because it is a role relationship 
and secondly because it is mediated by authority. I suggest, however, 
that neither of these aspects necessitates impersonality in any sense 
- that is, that there is no sense in which a teacher is required to 
view his pupils impersonally. This is not, of course, to deny that a 
teacher should treat his pupils fairly (and impartiality is an 
impersonal virtue) but the practice of impartiality in school requires 
taking individual pupils' interests, goals, difficulties and under-
standings of the situation into account. The commitment to 
impartiality within a face-to-face social group like the classroom 
is not like the commitment of an administrator within a legal system. 
It requires the teacher to know the pupils as individuals as far as 
he can, for hew else could he be fair? 
Downie suggests165 that impersonality is required because the 
relationship is a role relationship, because it has aspects which are 
independent of persons in that they are required of anybody who 
undertakes the role. This position seems to make the invalid 
assumption that a person can only fulfil a role by doing what the 
role obligations require him to do because it is an obligation of 
the role. This can be illustrated to be invalid by considering that 
though it may be a role obligation for a parent to provide food for 
his children, parents feeding their children generally do not do it 
because it is their duty, i.e. as an impersonal fulfilment of a role 
obligation. There is no reason why some reciprocal roles cannot be 
seen as entirely personal by those who fulfil them, and they do not 
thereby fail to fulfil the obligations of the role. Winch166 offers 
the example of the father who plays with his children merely from 
a sense of duty. If he plays with his children for the sake of 
playing with his children, he does not thereby fail to fulfil any 
role obligation there might be for fathers to play with their children. 
All this relates to earlier comments167 on role enactment. 
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Furthermore, it does not follow that because a person is doing 
that which is an impersonal obligation of his role (e.g. as a 
husband) the corresponding role-filler (i.e. his wife) ought to view 
him impersonally. To argue this would involve the Naturalistic 
Fallacy. The impersonal aspects of role (obligations independent 
of persons) implies nothing for the relationship between role incumbents. 
It is therefore a mistake to claim that the fulfilment of role 
obligations must have an impersonal aspect, and that there is a sense 
in which all role-fillers must view each other impersonally. 
Downie claims168  that the teacher-pupil relationship'ought'to 
be seen as a role relationship because if it is not, the question of 
whether teacher and pupil like each other would become important. 
He suggests that if they did not like each other (or liked each other 
too much) then the teaching relationship would be disrupted. As I 
understand it, it seems to imply that there is something wrong with 
the teacher and pupils seeing each other as involved in a personal 
(as opposed to a role) teaching relationship, though I am not sure 
about this as I do not know what sort of 'ought' is intended here. 
I assume, however, in the light of Downie's general account of roles 
that it is intended as an 'ought' of obligation. If this is so, 
I argue that he has failed to substantiate his case. There seem to 
be no reasons why a teacher could not fulfil his role properly 
without seeing his pupils impersonally as role fillers. Rather than 
being mandatory, such a way of viewing his pupils might be something 
which a teacher can be required to do if personal factors are 
inhibiting the teaching relationship. One might, indeed, even argue 
this for parents - it could, at the most, be something which might 
be required if things were going wrong. But this is a long way from 
the claim that it is an obligation of the role 
The necessity for authority relationships to be impersonal seems 
to involve the same fallacy, for to accept someone as an authority 
need not involve one in viewing him impersonally. That some authority 
relationships might do so does not entail that all must be, as cases 
of charismatic authority clearly show.170 A distinction can be 
drawn between impersonal authority (illustrated by a judge within a 
country's formal legal system) and personal authority (as illustrated 
by the relationships between some parents and their children). No 
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valid reasons have been given for suggesting that the authority of 
the teacher which is involved in learning must be viewed as of the 
first rather than of the second type. I have already argued that 
it is the authority of particular persons which must be accepted 
in learning. Though authorities max be viewed impersonally, it does 
not fallow that they must be. 
The appeal to rules (on which, it is argued, the teacher must 
have understanding) cannot take the possibility of uniqueness out 
of each teaching situation, nor can it render it necessarily impersonal. 
I thus conclude that though impersonality of relationships in this 
sense is part of the teacher's role (2) and (3), it is not conceptually 
demanded (necessary to) the role. That is to say, unlike the aspects 
of value teaching and assessment, it could be given up, and the onus of 
justification would fall on those who suggest that teachers ought to 
view their pupils primarily as role-fillers to show why this is so. 
One argument which might be used would be the suggestion that such 
a relationship in some way increased the chances of pupils learning 
that which is worthwhile. For this, however, evidence would be 
needed. The fact that young children cannot learn easily in this 
kind of relationship has already modified many people's current view 
of the infant teacher's role (3). It may be that empirical evidence 
will show that this is true of the majority of school-age children. 
I am not suggesting here that the majority of our pupils cannot 
learn anything from a person with whom they have a relationship which 
is impersonal in this sense, but, in the absence of other 
justification, the grounds for institutionalizing the demand that 
teachers view their pupils impersonally in this sense would have to 
rest on the claim that their pupils learned more and more valuable 
things from them than they would have done in a relationship in which 
they were essentially viewed as persons rather than as role-fillers. 
There is no reason to believe that in general, teachers and pupils who 
do not view each other primarily as role fillers would be unable to 
have a relationship in which the one taught the others something 
worthwhile. Thus I argue that there is no necessity for teachers 
to view their pupils impersonally in this sense suggested by Downie. 
Downie points out that there is another sense in which all 
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role relationships must be seen as personal, in a sense which he 
calls171 "the basic sense". He speaks of this sense as involving 
pupils and teacher in "seeing each other as persons" (i.e. rather 
than as objects) "acting in ways to which a purposive explanation 
is appropriate." That is, as Downie puts it172, "We take seriously 
what he says and does as proceeding from rational policies and 
responsible decisions, and see in his behaviour the significance 
which he himself attaches to it." Downie claims173 that this is 
"pedagogically and morally appropriate", and also that it may be 
logically appropriate in that persons are not, logically, explicable 
in causal terms. 
However, there seems to be a certain tension between these 
claims which most writers would accept and many of the other things 
they say. For example, it is often argued that children are not 
yet fully persons - Peters, for example, writes of them as 'potential174  
persons' and speaks of them as 'embryonic persons'1,2krhilst Langford 
implies this by his claim that education is "learning to be a person".176 
Alternatively, it might be argued that other principles, such as the 
consideration of the child's own interest, justify teachers in over-
riding children's wishes to pursue their own learning purposes and 
insist that they learn what they are told to, at least to a limited 
extent. This seems to return us to viewing pupils primarily as 
learners rather than 	 persons. Downie et al. take this view when177 
they argue that some measure of coercion or paternalism is justifiable 
in schools. White, also, argues that it is not to be up to the pupil 
e.g. whether or not he should reach a certain standard in science178  . 
Peters, also, seems to be reminding teachers not to view pupils only 
as learners when he suggests that they are not "just pupils but 
additionally are moral agents."179 It is, I suggest, this kind of 
position which Wilson was attacking in the section of his work quoted 
earlier180 and which is objected to by advocates of 'free' or 'open' 
schools, all of whom urge the pupil's right to learn nothing if there 
is nothing he values learning. 
It is difficult to see why age makes any difference when it comes 
to seeing in someone's behaviour "the significance he himself attaches 
to it", and I suggest that no reservations need be placed upon Downie's 
claim that the teacher-pupil relationship is personal in this basic 
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sense. It would follow from this that the role (4) of the teacher 
involves the obligation to regard the pupils as persons. This is 
not to be identified with the claim that teachers ought to act 
morally, for, on some moral views, a teacher might argue that 
the right way to act in a school did not involve treating his 
pupils as persons. The important point I wish to make here, however, 
is that this does not conflict with the claim that the teacher-
pupil relationship is a role relationship but is rather derived from 
it. 
To speak of the role of the pupil is to make the claim that there 
are rights and obligations associated with being a pupil. This 
presupposes that pupils are appropriately regarded as persons, for 
only persons (or artificial persons such as companies) can be said to 
have obligations. To claim that a pupil, however,young, has any 
obligations (and this claim is usually made even of infant school 
pupils) is to commit oneself to the view that pupils are persons (in 
the sense used by Downie) at that time, not that they will become 
'fully' persons at some time in the future. It is to accept that 
they already have goals, purposes and values, some ideas of right 
and wrong, and the ability to follow a rule. Some support for this 
position can be found in the empirical work of Piaget181 
 and Kohlberg 
and that the assumptions are made is indicated by the fact that claims 
are made by teachers (e.g. that pupils ought to be responsible for 
their own learning, that children ought to help tidy up the classroom) 
about what even very young children ought to do. Neill writes of 
the responsible way in which six year olds participate in the Summerhill 
parliament, and Holt and other deschoolers continually urge us to 
accept how responsibly young children can act183 if they are trusted 
to do so. People who could be responsible must, I suggest, logically 
be treated as persons in a role relationship.184 
 . 
It is surely wrong to suggest that pupils can be regarded first 
as learners and then additionally as moral agents. The regarding of 
pupils as moral agents is implicit in any suggestions that there are 
proper ways for them to act (of which engaging in activities through 
which they are taught is considered to be one). Similarly, teachers 
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are not both enacting the role of the teacher and also acting as 
moral agents. In attempting to fulfil a role (4) they must be 
acting as moral agents. It is unjustifiable to promote a 
distinction between a role-filler and a moral agent, and therefore 
any conception of a teacher's role which denied that pupils should 
be viewed as primarily persons would fail to imply that the pupil 
had a role in any normative sense. If pupils are role-fillers, 
they are at the same time individual moral agents, and in treating 
them as such, the teacher must be concerned with their view of 
both his and their roles, and thus with their concerns and interests. 
The teacher's role must therefore include trying to get to know his 
pupils as persons. 
Here perhaps it is worth reminding the reader that this 
discussion is on a justifiable role for teachers. There is no 
suggestion that if a teacher fails to treat his pupils as persons 
in the above sense, he cannot teach them anything, for this is 
clearly empirically false. What is the case, however, is that 
the majority of children in our schools form different kinds of 
relationships with different teachers. Some of these are of 
the kind which inhibits their learning. I do not believe that 
one can generalise here, for though Holt has suggested that 
children have difficulty learning anything of value when they are 
frightened of the teacher, this is an empirical matter and may be 
true for some people and false for others. Some people claim to have 
been taught more by teachers of whom they have been frightened than 
when relationships have been more friendly, for they have then tried 
harder to learn. But if this is not the case for most pupils, then 
it can be argued that it is part of the teacher's role (4) to try to 
establish friendly relationships with all his pupils. This is not 
to suggest that it is his obligation to like them all, for liking is 
not a matter of choice, nor is it to suggest that, in some schools, 
it is easily achieved. 
Downie seems to me to be mistaken in his view185 that the pupil 
sees the teacher only by reflection from subject matter. It is rather 
through the teacher and his actions that the pupil views the subject 
matter, and where he engages with subject matters directly and without 
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any mediation by the teacher, then there is no teaching. Herbst 
writing of teaching as he ideally conceives of it (i.e. his 
conception of the teacher's role (4)) says, "For teachers all of 
this insists on one commandment: Be honest, genuine and real." 
He adds187, "A teacher teaches as he is, that is to say, he teaches 
by his personal example." Though this is not Herbst's concern, 
it is worth noting that since learning in school will involve some 
teaching in the area of interpersonal understanding, the relationship 
between a teacher and his pupils is itself a means of teaching. Thus 
if a person dislikes children, cannot get to know them (when the 
circumstances are reasonable) and cannot act towards them with good 
will, perhaps he is incapable of fulfilling the role (4) of the 
teacher, the role of a teacher as we ought to ,:onceive of it. 
Earlier I suggested that schools ought not to be coercive 
institutions, and that it would not be justifiable to institutionalize 
the manipulation or coercion of children in respect of learning as 
part of the teacher's role (4)188. Thus I accepted Wilson's view 
that, if schools are to be moral places, the children themselves 
must have reasons for engaging in the activities which their teachers 
suggest, and in particular, activities through which teachers may try 
to teach the children new interests. Some pupils may be willing to 
engage in the suggested activities because the learning is instrumental 
in some way to other goals which they already have. But this will 
not be true of all of them. 
Aside from a small minority of children who may need to be taught 
to be curious (for some children come to school appearing, at least, 
to be no longer curious about anything), the answer to this may lie 
in a combination of the child's curiosity and his relationship with 
his teachers. It is the children's own past experiences which can 
provide them with the best reasons for engaging in the activities their 
teachers suggest - that they have learned from these experiences that 
the activities
89 
 their teachers suggest are often interesting and/or 
pleasurable,1 
 and that their teachers can teach them that which they 
themselves think (or come to think) worth learning. Conversely, their 
past experiences can provide them with the best reasons for not wishing 
to try these new activities - that they have learned from these 
experiences that school activities are neither interesting nor pleasurable. 
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If they have had the right early experiences, they will be willing 
to trust their teachers to show them the interest of at least some 
of the activities proposed. This is why it is so important that 
primary school children should not simply be required to acquire 
skills etc. If they see no value in what they are doing, or have 
no interest in what they are learning, this experience will count 
as a reason for expecting nothing of value in the future. 
If pupils did trust their teachers, this would imply that 
they would have no reason to deceive them in the many ways already 
mentioned - pretending an interest or an achievement that they do 
not have, or concealing those they do have. This is, indeed, a 
part of what we mean 'oy trusting someone. The relationship of 
acceptance and trust may be of a purely intellectual kind at 
University level, and even, perhaps, for some children in school. 
But for most children, and certainly in the primary school, there 
is an affective component, which means that for trust, the pupil must 
view his teacher as a person. One cannot have an affective relation-
ship with a role-filler whom one sees purely impersonally. 
This argument suggests that each teacher's ability to form 
satisfactory relationships has a greater importance than for his 
own teaching relationship with that child alone; for unsatisfactory 
relationships with some of his teachers may lead him to be unwilling 
to enter relationships appropriate for learning with others. It is 
surely a mistake to think that there are no consequences extending 
beyond the relationship itself, for the child's judgments of his 
new teachers can only be based on a form of inductive reasoning, an 
extrapolation of his past experiences with teachers, together with 
what he is taught by other children about what his future teacher is 
thought to be like. Each teacher, therefore, has, for better or for 
worse, the consequences of the children's relationships with their 
previous teachers and his own relationships with his former pupils as 
the basis of his own future relationships with his pupils. 
These are, of course, empirical points. But I suggest that in 
the past, in our concern with what pupils are learning at a given time, 
we have paid insufficient attention to the personal aspects of the 
teacher's role. Now many teachers go into schools and encounter only 
hostility from their pupils. Sometimes their pupils simply ignore 
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them. Often many of them aren't even there. Sometimes this may 
be because pupils have seen teachers as authoritarian and schools 
as hostile places in which they have been kept busy at activities 
which have seemed to have no point or purpose. At other times, it 
may be the result of a vacuous 'progressivism' which has lost sight 
of the learning goals of school. If simply left to their own 
devices, with no help and guidance from a teacher, pupils may 
not experience the satisfaction of developing their interest in 
something in a disciplined way, and have come to regard their 
teachers as little more than benign child-minders. They, too, as 
they get older, can see no point or purpose to school. It may 
be that child-centred theorists, in their concern to emphasize the 
importance of the child's view of what he is doing and that he should 
value what is to be learned, have seriously under-estimated the 
importance of the child's view of his teachers. The traditionalists, 
on the other hand, in their concern with the 'intellectual' relationship 
between teachers and pupils, may have neglected other aspects of the 
relationship. 
I believe that it is important that teachers be seen not as 
"transmitters of knowledge" (as on the so-called 'traditional' view), 
nor simply as "friend and guide" (the friendly psychological 
manipulator of so many so-called "progressive" views) but rather as 
a person, with an understanding of and an interest in various important 
human activities and problems, which he is willing and able to share, 
concerned to know his pupils and their interests, able to engage 
in discussions with his pupils about the various activities which all 
are engaging in, and to help them to see what it is about them which 
makes it worthwhile for them all to spend their time on them. 
It would follow that if the pupils were to be right to view 
their teachers in this way, this is what their teachers would have 
to be. These are the attributes associated with the role (4) of 
the teacher. It would surely be too pessemistic to suggest that 
this is a role which not many people would be willing or able to fill. 
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CHAPTER 9:  Conclusions, Prescriptions and Further Questions 
Introduction  
This thesis has explored a number of related questions concerned 
with philosophy of education, teaching and the role of the teacher, 
each section being concerned not only with clarification but also with 
justification. In this chapter, I draw together the conclusions 
reached in the body of the thesis, and point to ways in which they 
open up some directions for future research. 
(1) Philosophy of Education 
In Section I, I presented a view of philosophy of education which 
is, in one way, distinctively different from the commonly accepted 
view. I have suggested that justifications must be taken as implying 
prescriptions, and that particular works in the philosophy of education 
which draw conclusions about the justifiability of certain practices 
must be taken as presenting the analysis or the social practice which 
has been justified as being one which, ceteris paribus, ought to be 
adopted. 
This principle is one which, unlike some, can satisfactorily be 
applied to itself. My claim, therefore, that I have justified a 
conception of philosophy of education as itself an activity without 
bias and value neutral but within which particular enterprises can 
issue in justificatory claims with direct prescriptive, and therefore 
value, implications, if correct, implies that this view of philosophy 
of education ought to be adopted. 
(2) Concepts of Teaching 
I first became interested in the analyses of teaching when I 
discovered that it was impossible to use the standard analysis to 
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explore the role of the teacher with an open mind because it embodied 
certain assumptions about the teacher's role which had not been 
supported with argument and which could, indeed, be questioned. In 
offering this new analysis of teaching, therefore, I have reversed 
the orthodox approach which limits its conclusions about what we 
must say about teaching by views about what we ought to say about 
teachers, and offered an analysis which, I believe, embodies no 
assumptions about teachers in schools. I made, instead, the reverse 
point that, if valid, the analysis presented must have appropriate 
application to schools, on the grounds that it was presupposed by 
the existence of such institutions. 
A major part of Section II was devoted to justifying the claims 
of this analysis as against those of the more orthodox analysis, and 
the belief that the 'outcome' sense of teaching has logical priority 
over other senses. 	 I have therefore argued not only that this is 
the way in which we do understand teaching1, but additionally that 
this is the way we ought to understand teaching in the future. The 
distinction between descriptive and prescriptive analysis does not 
prevent any analysis being offered and accepted as both descriptive 
and prescriptive. The concept of teaching as analysed here is 
offered as a conceptually normative one` , and I suggest that persons 
with certain ontological assumptions should prefer this analysis to 
the standard orthodox analysis as it does not embody some of the 
internal inconsistencies of the latter3. 
(3) The Concept of a Perficienary Transaction 
In order to have a framework for the alternative analysis I was 
trying to develop, I suggested the concept of a perficienary 
transaction, and of a class of verbs which can fill in for X in 
claims such as "A is X-ing B" where B is a person. This work is 
philosophically important, I suggest, in more than one way. 
Perficience verbs, as I have distinguished them, are Janus-concepts 
which draw attention at the same time to actions by an agent A and to 
outcomes in another person, B, to which those acts are instrumental. 
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I believe that this concept should have a wider application than 
simply to the consideration of teaching for which it was developed, 
in that it may be helpful for further understanding of inter-personal 
relationships and be useful within the area of philosophy of action 
in general 
If this is so, it again implies a revision of certain views 
of philosophy of education which suggest that a distinctive feature 
of work in this area is that it simply draws on relevant work from 
other branches of philosophy, the implication being that philosophy 
of education itself has nothing to contribute to these other areas. 
If the concept of a perficienary transaction, which was developed as 
a conceptual tool from a concern with a problem in the philosophy of 
education, has this wider application, then this indicates that work 
with potential for use in other areas of philosophical enquiry can 
be anticipated from philosophy of education - i.e. that it can 
contribute to "pure" philosophy rather than bein simply parasitic 
upon it. 
(4) The Concept of Role  
In seeking to examine the question of a justifiable role for a 
teacher, I found it necessary to develop a more sophisticated 
analysis of role than that of Downie, which I have criticized in 
Section III. This analysis is, I suggest, of importance to anyone 
who holds an essentially non-relativist position in ethics, a position 
which accepts that obligations associated with a role in a given 
community can be examined in the light of fundamental principles to 
see whether they are justifiable. The concept of role (4) is 
necessary as a contrast with role (3) in order to be able to entertain 
the view that some social roles, as instantiated, might be pernicious5. 
Once again, this analysis may be of wider application by being 
useful for anyone who wishes to examine other social roles from the 
philosophical perspective. 
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(5) The Role of the Teacher 
This thesis is, I believe, the first systematic study of the 
teacher's role investigating whether various aspects are necessarily 
or contingently associated with it, given certain assumptions. Such 
work has implications outside the philosophy of education. 
For example, if certain sociologists imply that there are no 
limits to the ways in which roles may be re-defined, then my claims, 
if correct, that there are necessary elements to the teacher's 
role cast doubt on these sociological views, which could therefore 
not be correct. I suggest that there is the implied prescription 
here that such sociologists should re-consider their claims in the 
light of these arguments. The aspects of the teacher's role claimed 
to be necessary are not simply judged to be so a priori, but derive 
from assumptions which would be valid for any society - namely, the 
relationship which must hold for anyone between an attempt and its 
goal, and the necessity for human beings to learn through teaching 
(intentional or non-intentional) in order to become social agents. 
These aspects are necessary, but the claim is not simply analytic. 
(a) Bringing about capacity-enlarging learning 
I have argued that for learning to be worthwhile in the sense 
of enlarging a person's capacity for experience and responsible 
social action, it must be non-inert. This implies that we need 
seriously to reconsider some of the justifications which are offered 
for certain aspects of the school curriculum. For example, the 
justification for attempting to teach children to read that stresses 
its instrumentality to "reading poetry with sensitivity and 
expression or to reading George Eliot's novels"6 is no justification 
at all if children are taught at the same time to dislike reading 
and leave school determined never to read anything they don't have 
to again. If children's capacities are to be enlarged in any practical, 
as opposed to merely theoretical, sense, it follows that we ought to 
pay a great deal more attention than we do to the ways in which 
pupils regard their learning, and what they are disposed to do with it. 
Secondly, I have claimed that the following of tightly structured 
curricula was, at the most, contingently demanded of the teacher, 
and suggested that some teachers might fulfil their roles better 
by leaving their aims at a high level of generality, or by keeping 
them "fuzzy". I refer later to the implications of this for 
empirical research. At this stage, I point only to the prescriptive 
implications of this claim for policy-makers, particularly in view 
of some American trends which are lurking on our door-step. 
As long as it has been considered to be demanded by the nature  
of teaching that a teacher have aims as tightly specified as the 
nature of the content permits, claims that teachers should have 
behavioural objectives have been rejected on the grounds that certain 
objectives cannot be spelled out behaviourally. The work of this 
thesis provides an alternative ground for rejecting the claim. 
Behavioural objectives are, by definition, a low-level specification 
or break-down of higher level aims. I have suggested here that no 
low-level spelling out of aims for particular enterprises is demanded 
by the nature of teaching itself, and that some people might fulfil 
their roles better by deliberately keeping their aims "fuzzy". If 
this is correct, then, a fortiori, the specification of behavioural  
objectives cannot be demanded by the nature of teaching. Unless 
alternative justification can be offered for the demand for pre-
specified behavioural objectives, there is the implied prescription 
from the work of this thesis that administrators cannot justifiably 
demand this of teachers. 
(b) The teaching of values 
In this thesis I have argued that teachers cannot opt out of 
value teaching, and that schools and teachers are thereby committed 
to justifying the values which they do in fact teach, and to 
changing their practices if it is the case that they cannot justify 
them. This implies the prescription that teachers examine more 
carefully the practices they employ in their attempts to teach 
knowledge and skills in respect of the values taught at the same 
time (for it is impossible to separate the teaching of knowledge 
and skills from the teaching of values) and also the social 
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organization and practices of the classrooms and the school. 
Particular attention was paid to the claim that schools 'impose 
values' (in particular 'middle-class' values) on children. A 
careful examination was carried out of the teaching of interest (in 
the psychological sense) and it has been shown that teaching 
children to be interested in various kinds of activities cannot be 
correctly regarded as the imposition of values. Furthermore, it 
was argued that where children are learning about that which they 
are interested in, or are interested in that which they are learning, 
they must (by virtue of what is meant by being interested) come to 
appreciate what can be described as 'intellectual virtues' - such as 
clarity in thinking, imagination, consistency, the structuring of 
concepts and beliefs into a coherent system, self-discipline, a 
willingness to entertain new ideas, etc. These can clearly not 
correctly be described as 'middle class' values for they transcend 
social class in that they would be of value to anyone in pursuing 
any interest (since all interests are necessarily cognitive to some 
extent). It was also argued that if these values are taught through 
children's interests, the learners come to value them because they 
enable them to pursue their interests more successfully. It is 
therefore inappropriate here, as well, to speak of values being 
'imposed', for the pupils have come to value them rationally. 
These are, I believe, important claims, and suggest openings 
for further philosophical research to discover other instances of the 
teaching of values in ways such that the charge that they have been 
'imposed' can be firmly rejected. Further work in the philosophy of 
value is also relevant here, to establish claims that there are other 
values which it would be justifiable to teach (not 'impose' on) any 
child, insofar as they transcend social class. 
(c) Assessment  
It has been argued that a teacher must assess what his pupils 
are learning from him in order to fill his role responsibly, for if 
he does not do so, there is a clear sense in which he does not know 
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what he is doing. This is to claim that assessment, involving 
discussions with pupils in which the criteria for assessment are 
themselves evaluated as well as the value of what is learned, is 
a necessary part of the teacher's role. 
The claim that assessment cannot be responsibly eliminated 
from the teacher's role again implies that any sociologist or 
psychologist who suggests that this is the case should re-consider 
his position. In particular, this has implications for those who 
suggest that teachers should 'suspend their categories' in the 
classroom. I have argued that in order to fulfil his role 
responsibly, a teacher must perform actions. The performance of 
actions presupposes that the agent has beliefs about his role, 
about his pupils and about the world. For this reason, it seems 
clear that teachers cannot 'suspend their categories' in the 
classroom, for such beliefs require categories. Without categories 
a teacher could not act, and thus could not teach anyone anything. 
The rejection of this claim therefore raises further urgent 
questions regarding the justifications for using certain categories 
for assessment rather than others. These are philosophical questions. 
(d) Authority  
The conclusions drawn from the discussion of learning and 
authority are that it is necessary for pupils to see their teachers 
as authorities in relation to much of their learning for epistemic  
reasons, and that suggestions that teachers should try to avoid 
being seen as authorities by their pupils are therefore mistaken. 
However, the sense in which it is claimed here that pupils 
should accept their teachers as authorities is a limited one. It 
has not been claimed that it is a sense which gives the teachers 
a special right to be heard (which would entail the obligation of 
the pupils to listen) nor that what they say must be right. It is 
rather argued that insofar as someone wants or needs to learn or 
to do something for which learning is a pre-requisite, there are 
areas in which he must accept what others say as authoritative, at 
least temporarily. 
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If I am correct, and it is justifiable that learners accept 
authority in this sense, there is the implied prescription that 
schools should ensure that both teachers and children understand 
the relationship required in this kind of way, rather than, as 
sometimes occurs, equating 'being an authority' with 'being 
infallible 's?. It is necessary to emphasize that the relationship 
between being an authority and being right on any particular 
occasion is not a necessary one, in order to reject the view that 
the claim that teachers should 4e authorities relative to their 
pupils, and should be seen by their pupils to be so, implies either 
a kind of arrogance on the part of the teacher, or that what is 
required of pupils is that they be submissive. In particular, 
it should be remembered that the authority in question is personal. 
Casting people in roles (i.e. as teacher and pupil) cannot, of 
itself, render the one an authority and the other relatively 
ignorant8. 
There is a further implication here for those who appoint teachers, 
that what they should seek is not so much (or only) those who know a 
great deal more than pupils in the way of propositional knowledge, but 
rather those who understand the ways in which many important human 
activities can be effectively pursued and what can be found interesting 
about them, and who can communicate this understanding to their pupils. 
Finally, since I was unable here to consider whether the various 
'in authority' aspects of the teacher's role are necessarily or only 
contingently associated with it, there remains this further important 
area for philosophical investigation in respect of the teacher's role. 
(e) Pupil-teacher relationships 
The section on pupil-teacher relationships in this thesis was 
curtailed through lack of space, and is an area in which I hope to 
do further work. In this thesis I have suggested that the claim that 
there is a proper role for pupils commits us to the view that it 
is part of the teacher's role to treat his pupils as persons, rather 
than as 'embryonic' or 'potential' persons. This claim was made in 
conjunction with an earlier one that no justification exists for the 
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suggestion that it should be a standard obligation of the teacher's 
role to manipulate or coerce his pupils. At the same time, I 
criticized the view that there was any sense in which it could be 
claimed as necessary for a teacher to see his pupils impersonally, 
by showing that the arguments presented for this in terms of role 
were invalid. If this is so, it follows that teachers are not 
under an obligation to view their pupils impersonally, and that 
pupils are entitled to be viewed as persons by their teachers. This 
latter claim implies that many teachers ought to re-consider their 
views of their pupils. 
(6) Implications for Empirical Research 
It is an interesting feature of philosophical research of this 
kind that it has direct implications for empirical research, both 
in terms of suggesting new research, and new foci of attention fur 
on-going research. wince suggestions in this area could be but 
speculative, I do not discuss them in detail, but illustrate this 
point briefly by example. 
Although I have argued that it is not demanded by the nature of 
teaching that a teacher has a well-structured curriculum to which to 
work, it does not follow from this that all teachers would be 
equally able to fulfil their roles without a structured curriculum. 
There are important individual differences between teachers as well 
as between pupils to be taken into account, and each teacher may 
need to develop a range of teaching styles for which his own particular 
personality characteristics, knowledge and skills fit him, and learn 
to exercise judgment in respect of which ones to employ in different 
contexts and with different groups of learners9. 
Research is clearly needed to find out how, in what contexts 
and with what people the adoption of tightly structured curricula is 
more helpful or less helpful than the abandonment of such curricula. 
As a pedagogical method, the latter may make much greater demands on 
teachers' imaginations, knowledge and understanding, which not all 
teachers may be able to meet, though the possibility that groups of 
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teachers with complementary strengths working together may overcome 
this should not be ignored. 
The main claim, however, is that this is not decidable a priori  
but is essentially a matter for empirical investigation. 
In arguing that much can be discovered about teaching by the 
investigation of cases of non-intentional teaching, I suggest that 
this may be of particular importance when it comes to value teaching, 
for we do not yet have a clear understanding of how people are taught 
their values. In respect of the teaching of knowledge, understanding 
and skills, there is the claim that investigations should be 
extended to groups outside of schools where the primary intention 
is 'doing' rather thanlearning' and which have been excluded from 
investigations by the orthodox analysis of teaching. In respect of 
teaching interest, it is clear that we need a great deal of research 
into the kinds of activities children find most interesting (and 
their reasons for finding them so) and how far other factors, such 
as the teacher's personality, the social climate of the classroom, 
structured or unstructured curricula, rigid or flexible timetabling, 
a high or low level of pupil choice, etc., either contribute to or 
militate against the teaching of interest. 
Since 'ought' implies 'can', clearly the claim that one of the 
main tasks of the teacher is to help children learn through or with 
interest those things which can be justified on grounds other than 
interest alone has important implications for those who provide the 
conditions under which teachers and pupils work. If they accept the 
importance of interest as a means of ensuring that schools justify 
themselves by teaching children only that which is non-inert, they 
are committed to a policy of providing the conditions (as discovered 
by the kinds of research suggested above) which enable the teachers 
to fulfil their roles. 
There was serious consideration in the body of this thesis of the 
claims of writers such as Holt and Barnes that current school practices 
used by teachers at least in part as a means of assessing what their 
pupils are learning militate, in many cases, against their learning 
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anything of value. However, if I am correct in suggesting that 
assessment of pupils' learning is a necessary part of the teacher's 
role, this problem cannot be overcome by giving up assessment 
altogether. There is the implication here, therefore, that research 
on assessment should broaden its terms of reference to include 
consideration of whether the assessment itself militates against 
teaching anything worthwhile. 
In this thesis as a whole, great stress has been placed on the 
importance of the pupils' view or interpretation of the teacher's 
actions. The empirical research required thus must include not only 
observations in the classroom of what the teacher does, interpreted 
non-behaviourally in terms of meanings, but investigations of both 
how the teacher himself and how the pupils, individually and collectively, 
view them, to see how far interpretations are shared. It suggests 
that an important way for some teachers to become more successful in 
fulfilling their roles might be to engage in this kind of research 
with their pupils for themselves. It is often surprising to teachers 
to discover how very differently their actions have been interpreted 
from the way they were intended. 
These suggestions indicate the kinds of implication for empirical 
research which this thesis offers. 
Final Conclusions 
In claiming that there is a role (4) for teachers and schools, 
I have suggested an essentially reformist view of schooling, though 
this is not to imply that the reforms required might not be fairly 
radical. The grounds for the claim that schools need to be reformed 
have been that it is the case that so many pupils, particularly in 
secondary schools, learn only to pass examinations, see no value in 
much of their learning on its own account, and forget most of what 
they have learned there as soon as they have left school. Thus 
schooling as it is fails to fulfil the criterion of teaching many 
pupils that which it is worthwhile for them to learn - a condition 
which, on the arguments of this thesis, is necessary for schooling 
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to be a justifiable institution. 
On this score, the deschoolers have stirred our consciences by 
pointing out how the schools fail so many of their pupils - even, I 
would suggest, many who have strings of 0-level and A-level successes 
to their names, for these have often been acquired and valued only 
as a 'ticket' to something else. But deschooling cannot be the 
answer. We must rather find out what needs to be changed about schools 
to make them justifiable institutions, for there is nothing in their 
primary purpose that makes this impossible. 
A person who takes a job as a teacher may be prepared to regard 
himself merely as an instrument, accepting (that is, insofar as he 
can ignore the conflicts within it) society's role (3) for the teacher. 
But there are grounds for concern about this, for any teacher who 
fulfils his role is responsible for changing his pupils. A case 
can therefore be made that he ought, as a moral agent, to work out 
what must be the role (4) rather than to look at what is the role 
(3) in his society. Expectations arise in many different ways, and 
a teacher can argue that other people's possibly arbitrary expectations 
are an inadequate basis for deciding one's own responsible actions. 
All these considerations suggest that the role (4) of the teacher is 
a responsible and difficult one. 
The conclusions presented in this thesis for the teacher's role 
(4) in a school are based upon a set of assumptions about teaching, 
about what justifies schooling, and about what it is to fulfil a 
role responsibly. There is thus the implied prescription that, if 
my arguments are correct, those who share my assumptions ought to 
have this conception of the teacher's role10. The relationship 
between concepts and action is such that spelling out the role 
implied by a set of assumptions in more detail may change a person's 
view of his role and thereby may change what a teacher feels he can 
rightly do in school. Thus, as I argued in Chapter 1, one of the 
main justifications for philosophizing about the teacher's role 
lies in the prescriptive implications which it has for school practices. 
In that first chapter, I presented arguments to substantiate the 
claim that philosophical work could have direct prescriptive implications, 
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and added that the main body of the thesis represented an 
instantiation of this which was offered as additional grounds 
for accepting the claim and revising our conception of philosophy 
of education to include it. I believe that this chapter, which 
has collected together the many and wide-ranging prescriptive 
implications of this thesis itself, indicates clearly the validity 
of the original claim about the nature and value of philosophy 
of education - that its importance lies in its being not simply 
an academic discipline issuing in theoretical judgments but also 
an activity closely related to the world of action and issuing 
in practical judgments as well. 
Notes and references for section V 
1. Of course it is possible for people to hold beliefs which conflict 
with one another. Hy claim is that, on reflective consideration, 
it can be seen that, insofar as we hold consistent beliefs about 
teaching, this is how we do understand it. 
2. Downie R.S., Loudfoot E.N. 	 Telfer E., Education and Personal  
Relationships, Methuen, 1974 use this term on p. 173 to speak 
of the way in which they recommend the use of the term 'education' 
and the view of the end-state of educatedness which they employ. 
I use it here in the same sense. 
3. It must be pointed out that this kind of claim is not legislative 
about the use of language in a wider sense, for I have discussed 
in this thesis many other concepts of teaching, such as Scheffler's 
(which could become normative) and the institutionalized uses of 
the term which have developed as a result of the establishment of 
schools. There is no suggestion that these uses should be 
abandoned, nor is there any claim that new uses may or should 
not develop. I only suggest that they must all respect this 
logical relationship between a person's goals (what he wants to 
do), and the attempts he makes to do these things. That is, all 
senses are, I suggest, necessarily based on an 'outcome' sense. 
4. As suggested by Ryle (personal communication) 
5. On certain relativist positions, of course, role (4) may collapse 
into role (3). 
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6. Peters R.S., "The Justification of Education" in Peters R.S. (ed), 
The Philosophy of Education, Oxford University Press, 1973. 
Footnote p. 242. 
7. i.e. because of the conceptual relationship between 'being an 
authority' and 'knowing' on the one hand, and between 'knowing' 
and 'being infallibly right' on the other. 
8. There are certain things on which the children are necessarily 
authorities in relation to the teacher, and in a position to 
teach him and each other. In individual cases, as well, a pupil 
may be more of an authority than his teacher on something, and 
again be in a better position to teach in relation to it than his 
teacher is. Neither of these possibilities is excluded by the 
formulation and arguments of this thesis. Indeed, great care 
has been taken to ensure that this is not the case. 
9. This might suggest the possibility of making attempts to match 
teachers and pupils in some way, in order to maximize non-inert 
learning, rather than, as happens at present in most schools, 
arbitrarily assigning them to each other. The aspects of a 
subject area or problem which interest one person may be boring 
to another, who is interested in different aspects. It is 
unrealistic to expect everyone to be interested in everything. 
10. As already discussed, this does not imply that there will be no 
disagreements at more substantive levels, since there may be 
disagreement about what non-inert learning is worthwhile. It is 
worth noting that it is logically possible that the view of pupils 
may in some cases be more valid than the views of their parents 
or teachers who are not exempt from the possibility of being 
irrationally prejudiced in favour of or against particular kinds 
of learning. 
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ON THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY OF 'EDUCATION AND ITS PRACTICE IN COLLEGES  
AND DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION - OR "DOES PHILOSOPHY OF -,1;DUCATION LEAVE 
EVERYTHING AS IT IS?" 
Philosophy used to be thought of as providing a comprehensive 
understanding of the universe, and philosophers as constructing 
metaphysical and ethical systems, and thus prescribing the Good 
Life for Man. Now philosophy is more modest, and as has been 
explained to us in this very journal (Barrow 1973), it is no longer 
understood in this way. Philosophy, it is usually said, prescribes 
nothing. 
Wittgenstein (1953) said, of philosophy as he conceived of it, 
that it left everything as it was (although the changes in his own 
thinking and of people's conception of philosophy which resulted 
from his philosophizing might be adduced as evidence for rejecting 
the claim). But if what he said is true of philosophy now, and if 
philosophy of education is being properly philosophical, it, too, 
must leave everything as it is. 
Now this is not necessarily regarded as an objection to philosophy 
by those who believe it is true of philosophy as it is conceived of 
now. A.J. Ayer, when asked about this by Brian Magee in a radio 
interview (Magee 1973), said that he didn't regard it as an objection 
to philosophy, because, as he put it in his incisive way "That's 
where things are." But many would clearly regard it as an objection 
to philosophy, for this way of understanding philosophy (including 
philosophy of education) makes it essentially and necessarily 
conservative. And this is important to those who teach philosophy of 
education to intending teachers, for it may mean that such students 
are unwilling to give this activity their serious attention. To those 
who feel that philosophy - seen as Ayer put it (Magee 1973) as having 
as its point clarification, eludication and justification - is 
important, there are grounds for concern if students are unwilling to 
consider it seriously. 
But I believe that Ayer is wrong is agreeing with Wittgenstein 
that philosophy, conceived of as above, leaves everything as it is. 
I must make it clear that I do not treat this as a merely empirical 
point. Rather it is a claim to do with the nature of philosophy (and, 
a fortiori, philosophy of education). In this paper I shall loe 
concerned to deny that philosophy of education necessarily leaves 
everything as it is (and thus to claim that it is not necessarily 
conservative), to claim that much work in philosophy of education has 
prescriptive implications for practice (though not all of the same 
kind) and to claim that this, rather than constituting an objection 
to philosophy of education, is the main justification for including 
philosophizing about education and school practices as part of the 
professional training of teachers. 
The question of the relationship between philosophy of education 
and educational practice has been raised again recently by Barrow 
(1974), who suggests that philosophical work can issue directly in 
prescriptions for educational practice. My own view is that Barrow 
has only skimmed the tip of the iceberg, and that far more work in 
philosophy of education has prescriptive implications than he has 
suggested. This paper shows what some of them are. 
Conceptual analysis and its relationships with practice  
Adelstein (1971) has attacked the method of conceptual analysis 
as being necessarily conservative. He writes, "It defends only the 
status quo because it takes the status quo as its starting point." 
Though he uses Gellner's (1968) book "Words and Things" in support, 
he does not appear to know of Gellner's own (1958) speculation that 
the society of Moroccan Berbers could be undermined by subjecting one 
of its concepts, baraka, to the kind of analysis performed by Ryle 
and Austin. 
The main point I wish to make here is that if an activity were 
necessarily conservative, there is a sense in which its enquiries 
would be spurious. I am not, therefore, concerned here to discuss 
whether or not conceptual analysis could undermine our educational 
system, but only to indicate the ways in which it need not leave 
everything as it is, even though it takes the status quo as its 
starting point. 
I start off this discussion by using as an example the work of 
P.S. Wilson (1971,1974). Wilson makes it clear that what he is doing 
is conducting a serious investigation into the meanings of educational 
language. In a footnote to his paper "Interests and Educational 
Values" (1974), he explicitly disclaims any intention of engaging in 
educational evaluation, adding "let alone a proselytizing or missionary 
venture on behalf of any particular brand of educational activity." 
There is no suggestion in this paper that he, or any other writer, 
intends to prescribe for others what they should do (though of course 
some writers may, in fact, have such intentions). 
However, in my view, the reader of "Interest and Discipline in 
Education"(Wilson 1971) may be forgiven if he finishes reading it with 
the feeling that he has been given prescriptions for what is worth 
doing. What the teacher ought to do is help children learn through 
interest, for education is the development of interest and children 
ought to be educated and not merely 'schooled'. So the question I am 
pushed to ask is whether Wilson, in claiming that a child-centred view 
of what education is is justified (i.e. because of its usefulness in 
picking out a distinction with 'schooling' which is of importance), is 
implicitly prescribing what ought to be done, whether he intends this 
or not. Though there is clearly a difference between justifying and 
prescribing - one can prescribe without justifying - to justify 
something is implicitly to prescribe it, all other things being equal. 
If this is the case, then questions can be raised about the suggestion 
that philosophy leaves everything as it is, for it is accepted that 
justifying (or showing that there is no justification for) something 
is a philosophical activity. 
Now it may be true that all Wilson is saying is that if a teacher 
is not helping children to learn what they value for reasons which 
are intrinsically instrumental to their own learning goals, then it 
is not appropriate to describe him as educating them. So it might be 
suggested, I am quite mistaken to regard this as in any way a prescription, 
a claim that this is what a teacher or educator ought to do. It is 
rather that it is what he must (logically) do if he is to be educating 
in the sense in which child-centred theorists use the term. So 
(according to this argument) what is being justified is the analysis. 
If the reader himself accepts that educating in this sense is what he 
ought to do, then he is prescribing for himself. It is not Wilson who 
is being prescriptive. Orl at least, if his analysis is not reportative, 
at the most he is prescribing language use, not prescribing what ought 
to be done in school. 
But I find this a most problematic position. Here is the teacher, 
or would-be teacher, already accepting the view that educating, in 
some sense, is what he ought to be doing. So he may see the argument 
in the following way, as a sort of practical syllogism:- 
(1) I ought to educate children 
(2) This is what educating is 
Therefore (3) This is what I ought to do. 
I will return to this syllogism in a moment. The point I want 
to make here is that this kind of account picks out a central problem 
in the argument about the relationship between philosophy of education 
and educational practice, as already discussed, in different contexts, 
by Pring (1970) and Hirst (1971). They point to the relationship 
between a person's concepts and his actions. Given that a person 
accepts that e.g. he ought to be teaching, or educating, or that he 
ought not to be indoctrinating, if you convince him that this, rather 
than that, is what teaching, or educating, or indoctrinating is, then 
you may affect his practice. And since philosophers of education, 
writing for College of Education students, know that the student has 
(in many, if not most, cases) beliefs that it is educating and teaching, 
and not indoctrinating that he ought to be doing in school, then there 
is a sense in which, in that context, there are prescriptive implications 
in an analysis. For the writer knows that students who accept the 
analysis, and who believe that they ought to teach and educate, or 
ought not to indoctrinate, will argue along the syllogistic lines 
already suggested, that this is what they ought to do. 
If there are, so to speak, competing concepts of, for example, 
education, Wilson or Peters (e.g. 1966, 1970), by convincing people 
of the validity of their analysis ("this is what we really mean when 
we use the term 'education") may change a student's view of what it 
is to educate so that, as Hirst (1971) put it in relation to teaching, 
"his actions in its name" are different from what they otherwise would 
have been. It seems to me that this implies an acceptance of the 
view that the analysis of key educational terms may not leave everything 
as it is. 
It might be argued that this is some kind of sociological claim, 
and has nothing to do with the nature of philosophy. For clearly it 
it is not necessarily the case that any change in practice will take 
place as a result of conceptual analysis. For, as Hirst and Peters 
(1970) have pointed out in respect of their own analysis of education, 
it could always be argued that if this is what education is, then it 
ought not to get very high priority in schools. But my claim is that 
within the 'form of life' that is our institutionalized school (or 
'education') system, there is the assumption that education is what 
the schools are for. In this context, given the relationship between 
a person's concepts and his actions, it is the nature of conceptual 
analysis that produces the prescriptive implications. They arise 
both from the nature of analysis and the assumptions about e.g. teaching, 
educating and indoctrinating which prevail in the context within which 
the analysing is done. 
The prescriptive implications here cannot be logical implications, 
for there is nothing that follows necessarily from the analysis. That 
is why it seems appropriate here to speak of contextual implication. 
Or it could be said that the implications may follow from persuasive 
definitions in the context. A good example of this seems to be 
Scheffler's (1960) analysis of teaching. Convincing people that 
teaching involves displaying the underlying rationale of the subject 
matter might make a very great difference to what actually did go on 
in schools though Cooper (1966) has convincingly shown that the 
analysis is not descriptive. People convinced that this is what 
teaching is will argue that this is what they ought to do on the 
syllogistic lines already set out. The definition or analysis that is 
prescriptive today may be descriptive in a few years, if language usage 
changes. 
And this seems to me to pick out the dangers of conceptual analysis 
(and to talk of dangers presupposes that conceptual analysis does not 
necessarily leave everything as it is). It is not the case that we can 
show that something ought or ought not to go on in schools by means of 
conceptual analysis. A different kind of justification is required. 
Displaying the underlying rationale of something is justifiably demanded 
or not independently of whether it is called 'teaching' or anything 
else. The use of the syllogistic argument given (valid though it is as 
a form of argument) is not the way in which one should decide what one 
ought to do. Except for a person who takes an extreme position on the 
fact/value issue, on any analysis of an activity X or a social practice 
Y, it is always appropriate to ask "But ought it to be done?" and look 
at the reasons for engaging or refusing to engage in it. 
This is not, however, to suggest that conceptual analysis is 
unimportant. It is important to recognize, for example, that when 
Wilson writes of the distinction between educational and non-educational 
learning, he is not talking about the same thing as Peters when he 
uses the same terms. So a very clear understanding of the use of language 
within the context of any writer's work is important. And, of course, 
any particular analysis may be open to criticism because, for example, 
it embodies contradictions within it in respect of concepts which do not 
seem to be incoherent. Or, as Gellner (1958) pointed out, analysis may 
show that the concept embodies some inherent contradictions. What 
conceptual analysis cannot do is justify people's actions, and I suggest 
that students should be made explicitly aware of the fact that to 
analyse a concept is not to offer a justification for the social practice 
which it denotes. 
Justifying social practises 
 
I have suggested above that conceptual analysis and the justification 
of social practices are different philosophical activities. But of course 
there are relationships between them, for, on this view, the former 
delineates what it is that is being justified. Many philosophers of 
education, though not all, go on to attempt to justify the social practices 
they have delineated. Wilson (1971) and Peters (1973) offer what they 
believe to be adequate justifications for the practice of educating in 
the (different) senses they have delineated. And this is clearly very 
important, for I have already pointed to the difference between what 
people (logically) must do 22a e.g. educator, and waat they ought to 
do. To argue that certain acts or kinds of acts are what a person ought 
(morally) to do because he has -Laken a jois as a Leacher is analogous 
to arguing that causing pain to people is what a person ought (morally) 
to do because he has taken a job as a torturer. Rather we might wish 
to argue that torturer is an unjustifiable social role. Any assumption 
that we can get from analysis justifications about what a person ought 
to do trades on the presupposition that teacher/educator is a justifiable 
social role. It should be clear that I believe that a justification of 
the social role would be required, and that again would be a philosophical 
task. 
I suggest that the claim that an adequate justification has been 
offered for a social practice (clearly delineated by analysis) or a 
social role, implies the claim that, all other things being equal, these 
practices should be engaged in. For there would be a contradiction 
involved in claiming that a practice had been adequately justified as 
being worth engaging in, but that no-one ought to do it. Similarly, a 
claim that no adequate justification can be offered for a practice clearly 
seems to imply that it should not be engaged in. There would be a 
contradiction involved in claiming to have shown (as for example Dearden 
(1972) has in respect of competition in school work, and Bailey (1975) 
has in respect of compelling children to participate in competitive 
games) that the practice is unjustifiable, but that it is permissible to 
- 10 - 
continue promoting it. 
Here, however, the prescriptive implications are of a different 
logical order, or status, from the prescriptive implications of analysis 
in a context closely tied to practice. These are instances of logical  
implication. If students consider the discussions, accept the premises 
or assumptions, and accept the arguments, here, if they are rational, 
they must accept the conclusions, including the prescriptive implications. 
This argument must not be taken as suggesting that all work 
involving consideration of the justification of social practices 
necessarily has prescriptive implications, for a writer may simply lay 
out the arguments on both sides and draw no conclusions whatsoever. The 
prescriptive implications derive from the formulation of judgments and 
conclusions. As long as it is considered to be part of philosophy to 
draw conclusions of this type (and it might be argued that to fail to 
draw a conclusion at all is to fail to complete one's philosophical 
investigation) then, on my argument, such philosophical work is 
necessarily prescriptive, in a particular sense which does not imply 
that it was the intention of the philosopher to prescribe. It is not to 
suggest that the study was carried out by the philosopher concerned in 
order to tell people what they ought or ought not to do, but rather to 
say that it is part of the nature of the philosophical activity of 
investigating the justifications for social practices that it has 
prescriptive implications. It is not the case that to say of a 
philosopher that he is being prescriptive in this sense is somehow to 
have a complaint against him, as some people seem to suppose. And, of 
course,itisrot to suggest that only "professional" philosophers can or 
should do this. It is rather to claim that when a person engages in an 
attempt to justify a social practice (in general) he is engaged in a 
philosophical activity. 
At this stage it is worth making explicit the reasons why it can 
clearly be seen that philosophy is not necessarily conservative in this 
area either. For philosophical work may justify, and thus, on my 
account, implicitly prescribe, either the maintenance of the status quo, 
(by claiming that social practices which are widely engaged in are 
justifiable) or change (by claiming that social practices which are 
widely engaged in are not justifiable, or that social practices which 
are not widely engaged in are more justifiable than the practices which 
are engaged in). So philosophy of education, as philosophy, is neither 
essentially and necessarily conservative, nor essentially and necessarily 
radical, nor essentially and necessarily liberal, nor anything else. 
It is, however, neutral only in the sense that, as an activity, it has 
no bias. Any particular piece of work in philosophy which draws a 
conclusion about the justifiability of social practices is not neutral. 
Other ways in which philosophy of education implies prescriptions  
Barrow, in the article (1974) already referred to, re-interprets 
some examples earlier discussed by Thompson (1970). Thompson discusses 
the place in educational theory of showing that concept A is logically 
prior to concept B, suggesting that this is a claim which is "materially 
relevant" to educational practice. Barrow suggests that Thompson's 
example should rather be interpreted prescriptively. If one accepts the 
claim that concept A is logically prior to concept B, then, on Barrow's 
account, this implies the prescription for anyone trying to teach concept 
B: "Do not try to teach concept B without reference to concept A." I 
accept Barrow's interpretation, and call this kind of relationship 
between philosophical work and prescription conditional implication, 
since the prescriptive implication here is conditional upon an agent's 
attempting to do something. It can, I think, be contrasted usefully 
with the two previous examples of contextual implication and logical 
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implication. 
But this is not the only alternative way of interpreting 
Thompson's example. We could argue that if a person claimed to be 
trying to teach concept B but made no reference in the course of his 
activities to concept A, he could not seriously be trying to teach 
concept B. On Barrow's view the philosophical work involves us in 
offering him prescriptions for acting in certain ways, given that he 
has certain goals. On this alternative account, we make claims about 
what can be said of his doings - for example, we could ask "Can-his 
trying be evaluated as serious (given that he understands concept B)?" 
Or "Is it concept B that he is trying to teach?" 
On the first account, work which shows the relationship between 
certain concepts, or to take another of Thompson's examples, certain 
logical independencies such as those between religion and morality, 
implicitly prescribes courses of action for those concerned, ceteribus  
paribus, to do certain things (teach those concepts, or what is believed 
to be true). On the second it is merely to give criteria by which acts 
or activities may be appraised. 
These accounts seem to me to involve very different conceptions of 
the relationship of philosophy of education to educational theory and 
educational practice. Both the Thompson account and the Barrow account 
fit the view of philosophy as part of educational theory seen, as Hirst 
(1973) suggests, as a guide to educational practice. But it is the second 
account that fits the Wittgensteinian view that philosophy leaves every-
thing as it is, for it simply lays down criteria by virtue of which what 
is done can be assessed - as, for example, Peters (1966) says of his 
own analysis of education. This makes the philosopher an observer, 
sitting on the side-lines, helping us to assess e.g. what can be counted 
as "educational" theory and "educational" practice. 
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But, neglecting this latter view of philosophy and educational 
theory, there remain two different viers of the relationship of 
philosophical and empirical work in educational theory and practice. 
On Thompson's view (if I interpret him correctly) the relationship 
is always the same. Philosophical, psychological and sociological work 
are equally "materially relevant" to the drawing of educational conclusions. 
I do not wish to deny that this interpretation is appropriate in 
many cases. However, in other instances such a description seems to 
me to be positively misleading. An example suggested is of a course 
in American schools which has as its stated aims the achievement of 
such goals as "learning respect for evidence, the superiority of the 
American way of life, the making of unbiased rational judgments, the 
evils of Communism etc." Now it seems to be a pre-eminently philosophical 
enterprise to show that this collection of aims embodies some radical 
contradictions, and, on my view, this has the implication for any teacher 
who seriously wants to achieve the goals he sets himself that he ought 
to reconsider his aims. To say the philosophical conclusion is'haterially 
relevant" is to make too weak a claim for it. 
Similarly, when justifications for a social practice are being 
discussed, philosophical work comes in at the beginning, to delineate 
clearly the practice for which justifications are being considered. 
Empirical evidence is clearly often relevant (sometimes the justification 
offered stands or falls on whether the empirical claims are correct or 
not). But if the drawing of conclusions about the justifiability of 
a social practice is considered to be a philosophical activity (and it 
is usually seen as an engagement in social philosophy) then it seems to 
me that a clearer and preferable alternative is to say that here it is 
the empirical evidence that is materially relevent to the drawing of 
philosophical conclusions. In arguing that there are subtle and 
important differences in the different kinds of contributions made by 
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philosophical work in respect of practice, I suggest that philosophy 
does not always stand in the same relation to empirical work within 
educational theory. Since the relationship of philosophy of education 
to educational theory and practice is necessarily part of our conception 
of it, the difference between Thompson's view and the one outlined here 
is an important one. 
I hope to have shown that much philosophical work in relation 
to education has direct practical implication, and if this is accepted, 
it might be wondered whether this involves a shift in our conception 
of philosophy of education. For philosophy has usually been conceived 
of as seeking knowledge and understanding, and I am here suggesting 
that it issues in practical judgments, prescriptions about what to do. 
It is still a matter of controversy, after all, as to whether or not 
we can rightly speak of truth or falsity, rightness or wrongness, in 
relation to prescriptions, so this may seem, at first sight, a 
strange conception of philosophy of education. But I am not suggesting 
that philosophy of education be conceived of as a search for 
prescriptions. I still consider it most appropriately conceived of 
as a search for knowledge and understanding in relation to education. 
It can surely be pursued by those who have a serious concern for truth, 
or who are interested in philosophical problems which arise in 
relation to educational discourse, even if they are not particularly 
interested in educational practice, or by those who would not presume 
to prescribe for others. I do suggest, however, that such philosophers 
should be aware of the prescriptive implications which some of their 
work may have, particularly if they publish it in the context of 
teacher education and training (that is, as textbooks, or in educational 
journals rather than journals of pure philosophy). Philosophy of 
education is not, on this view, defined as a search for prescriptions. 
It is merely that, given the nature of the enterprise and the issues 
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with which it concerns itself, prescriptive implications are, in some 
cases, unavoidable. And my suggestion is that we should acknowledge 
this. In the world of educational institutions, philosophy of education 
is applied philosophy. 
The justification of philosophy of education in teacher education and  
training, 
A philosopher reading this paper may conceive of it so far as an 
analysis of the concept of philosophy of education, for its relationship 
with practice is surely part of our conception of it. If this is 
appropriate, then on my own account I must offer a justification for the 
social practice of philosophizing about education in Colleges and 
Departments of Education. 
The first kind of justification which can be - and has been - 
offered is that philosophizing about education (or other important 
issues) is worthwhile for its interest and/or its educational value. 
Reflective consideration - philosophy itself as a search for understanding 
- can be worth doing for its own sake. But I do not think that this 
would be adequate for suggesting that philosophy, and especially 
philosophy of education, should have any special status or even be 
a compulsory part of the curriculum in Colleges of Education. For, 
given that there may be many kinds of intellectual enquiry which 
provide interest and educational value, why should philosophy of 
education be put forward as having any special claim? Courses of 
philosophy of education, on this account, should surely be available 
as options, but no account like this can justify the inclusion of 
philosophy of education in any compulsory part of a course, such as 
a "foundation core", or anywhere else. 
The traditional answer to this might be that it is not right 
that anyone should go into the schools to work without having seriously 
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and critically reflected on the professional activities in which he 
is going to be engaged. This reflection, it is argued, is necessary 
for any teacher or intending teacher (though, of course, this is not 
to say anything about what it might be called, and I do not wish to 
be taken as saying anything at all about that). But when we ask "Why?" 
the only answer that can have any force is that it is because of its 
practical implications; for if there were no practical implications 
for what a person was going to do as a teacher in school, what would 
be the virtue of his having seriously reflected? If his reflections 
could make no difference to what he was going to do, why would the 
fact that he was going into the schools to work constitute a reason 
for doing or not doing any philosophizing? This is why any student 
who believes that philosophy must leave everything as it is can see 
no point in doing it, and why it seems to me that the prescriptive 
implications of it must be made clear. For professional training 
is essentially practical. 
So the conclusion to which I have come is that student teachers 
and teachers ought to engage in philosophizing about education because  
of its prescriptive implications for practice. Now it is to be imagined 
that it will immediately be objected "But who are these philosophers, 
that they should set themselves up as being in some special position 
to tell us what to do!" And there will be a rash of objections about 
reactionary philosophers 'imposing' reactionary views, or liberal 
philosophers 'imposing' liberal views, and perhaps even of radical 
philosophers 'imposing' radical views (though the last is perhaps not 
so likely as this role seems to have been given to the sociologists). 
But of course nothing has said about anyone 'imposing' anything. 
Philosophers looking at the kinds of questions I have discussed must put 
forward their own views and the conclusions they have come to with 
intellectual honesty, for how could we ask them to do otherwise. Students 
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must look at the arguments and judge them for themselves - that is, 
they cannot be asked, and should not be asked, to accept any prescriptions 
on authority. Indeed, given that it is possible for one writer to 
claim that social practice X is justifiable, and another that it is 
not, there is no choice but that they decide for themselves whether 
or not they think that they ought to engage in it by evaluating the 
arguments and producing their own. My point is that, in stressing the 
prescriptive implications of much philosophical work, we show students 
why it is important for them to philosophize for themselves; for it 
is only in this way that they can decide which prescriptions to accept 
and try to act on in the classroom situation. 
It may be suggested that I am flogging a dead horse here. Haven't 
philosophy lecturers always argued that students should philosophize 
for themselves? Didn't Barrow (1973) explicitly point out that 
'liberal philosophers of education' would be pleased if they found 
students disagreeing with their views (e.g. on the value of autonomy) 
as put forward in their articles and textbooks, because it would mean 
that more students were doing philosophy? But if this is to be more 
than empire building, it must be admitted that the value of philosophy 
of education as part of a professional training cannot lie in our 
future teachers becoming clearer about how key educational words are 
used, or about whether the 'liberal philosophers' who do so are right 
to value autonomy. The value must lie in its relationship with the 
students' own values and actions, in what they come to believe that it 
is justifiable for them to do as teachers. Its value lies, too, in 
the discussion of their own ideas and reflections on practice. (And, of 
course, I am not suggesting that only philosophy is relevant, for I am 
in strong agreement with Elliott and Adelman (1973) about the importance 
of teachers and pupils engaging in classroom research, and of teachers 
learning to recognize the consequences, intended and unintended, of 
their actions.) 
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I finish by returning to my original point. Many students, and, 
indeed, lecturers in other subjects, who know little about philosophy, 
think that it is merely talk about talk (and I stress the merely). So 
they reject it on this account. Others believe that if philosophy 
is neutral in the sense that it leaves everything as it is, then it is 
not neutral but conservative. So they reject it on that account. 
My own view, which I hope to have substantiated here, is that philosophy 
is not merely talk about talk, for much philosophizing has direct and 
important prescriptive implications; that it is neither necessarily 
conservative, nor necessarily radical, nor necessarily liberal, etc; 
and that, on this understanding of it, the answer to Barrow's (1974) 
question is: "There's nothing wrong with the philosophy of education." 
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